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We are very excited to share the Spring 2022 issue of the UCSB Undergraduate Journal of History with you. It began on campus, moved online in January, and returned to campus in February. That makes it our third pandemic-made issue. Our team of undergraduate editors welcomes new and returning readers of the Journal. We are grateful for our eight undergraduate authors and their graduate student and faculty peer-reviewers, who made it possible to publish the works included in this volume.

The Journal is produced by undergraduates and for undergraduates. It aims to provide an engaging platform for undergraduate researchers to record and create history. Though focused on history, the Journal does accept research from related academic disciplines and is interested in all facets of our collective pasts. We hope to facilitate a space for exchange and curiosity within the following pages.

This issue opens with an article by David Adams. Adams examines the impact of Maoism as an ideology and social practice on Black liberation movements in the U.S. He argues that Black liberation movements were initially drawn to Maoism because of its focus on the liberation and agency of groups oppressed by imperialism. However, with Mao Zedong’s death and the policies of Deng Xiaoping in the 70s and 80s, Maoism was eventually discarded as a mantle for the Black radical community.

In the second article published here, Erica Bade interrogates the experiences of children convicted as juvenile pickpockets as they were removed from the streets of London, ushered through the court, and transported to penal colonies in Australia. Bade reads British transportation and criminal reforms alongside the unique situations these children found themselves in between 1780 and 1860 to argue, that while policies changed, children convicts continued to find ways to exploit the conditions they found themselves in, whether as criminals or colonists, or idealized British citizens.

Charlie Borah’s study of the 1941 Jefferson movement examines efforts to build a national profile for Gilbert Gable (first mayor of Port Orford, Oregon) and Stanton Delaplane (San Francisco travel writer), both spearheaders of the movement for largely self-serving purposes. Borah argues they took advantage of the anger within this movement and were able to gain distracting attention rather than focus on the actual process to statehood.

Sage Ceja’s evaluation of the anti-drug campaigns of the 1980s marks the halfway point of this issue. Ceja argues that the advertising campaign undermined efforts to win the War on Drugs. As Ceja observes, popular culture made the War on Drugs memorable, even iconic, just not as the Reagans intended. Instead, the creation of digestible anti-drug media played a significant role in its failure.

On the table of contents, you will also find Maria Rosario Katsulos’s biographic study of the lives of two Ancient Rome women, Augustus Caesar’s daughter, Julia, and granddaughter, Julia. Katsulos argues that the life histories of both Julias - daughter and granddaughter - illuminate the critical role their exiles played in Roman politics. Katsulos argues they were pivotal to the downfall of the Roman Empire’s Julian dynasty and the failure of Augustus’s policies to continue after his reign.
The sixth article, by Iuri Macedo Piovezan, explores the relationship between Hitler, Mussolini, and Bolsonaro (the current Brazilian president) to examine history as a cycle. Piovezan argues that the history of Hitler and Mussolini’s regimes and their consequent failures prefigure the fate of Bolsonaro’s government in Brazil and his agenda.

Irene Rauch’s article examines both the process and consequences of the German reunification in the 1990s. She argues that we need to think of reunification as multifaceted, challenging, and imperfectly executed. When we do, it is possible to see, as Rauch does, how planners inadvertently left East Germans economically destabilized and socio-culturally disoriented.

Our Spring 2022 issue concludes with Santiago Rodriguez's comparative history of the Cuban and Guatemalan revolutions' policy decisions and political programs. Rodriguez argues that the Guatemalan government led by Jacobo Arbenz and the Movimiento 26 de Julio in Cuba, when considered together, reveal the opposite means of achieving social transformation: internal reformism versus radically breaking with the established order.

We would be pleased to publish one of your essays in the Journal. We accept historical research from all areas and fields. So, if you wrote a research paper at your college or university or an honors thesis, please consider submitting it for publication. You can find the word length and guidelines at the start of this issue or on our website.

Enjoy this Spring 2022 issue of the Undergraduate Journal of History, and we look forward to seeing your name on our table of contents one day!

~ The Editors
# Table of Contents

**Volume 2, Number 1**

(Spring 2022)

## Articles

*From Dr. Du Bois to Brother Baraka: Maoism and United States Black Liberation Movements*
David Adams  
1-8

*Crime and Punishment: Child Pickpockets in Nineteenth-Century Great Britain*
Erica Bade  
9-21

*The Staging of Jefferson: Gilbert Gable, Stanton Delaplane, and the 1941 Jefferson Statehood Movement*
Charlie Borah  
22-35

*Policy and Media’s Role in the Failures of The War on Drugs*
Sage Ceja  
36-48

*Meretrix Augusta: The Exiles of The Imperial Princesses as Proof of the Julian Monarchy*
Maria Rosario Katsulos  
49-58

*Bolsonaro and History: The Controlling Cycle*
Iuri Macedo Piovezan  
59-66

"Blooming Landscapes" and The Last Divide
Irene Rauch  
67-80

*Revolution in Cuba and Guatemala: What did Latin American revolutionary movements from the 1950s to the 1970s seek to achieve and how?*
Santiago Rodríguez  
81-88
“I wish to take this opportunity to express our resolute support for the American Negroes in their struggle against racial discrimination and for freedom and equal rights.” So declared the leader of the People’s Republic of China and Chairman of the Communist Party of China, Mao Zedong, on 8 August 1963, on the eve of the renowned “March on Washington.” The above statement would be reprinted in the Peking Review and Black radical newspapers like the Black Panther, worlds away. Mao, and the Maoist ideology, did not impact the Black liberation movement through rhetoric alone. Whether implicitly or explicitly, through mere influence or direct encounter, Black Power groups would adopt Maoism (or tenets thereof, with its focus on the Third World and its tempering of the Leninist vanguard party with the so-called mass line) as an imaginative weapon in their struggle for freedom in the United States. Maoism’s focus on the national liberation of oppressed groups that traditional Marxism-Leninism (with its insistence on taking directives from the USSR and the strict nature of the all-powerful vanguard party) had ignored, and a less-rigid and defined implementation allowed for a wide diversity of strategy and tactics. This presented radical groups like the Black Panther Party and the Congress of African Peoples an avenue for struggle separated from (and often opposed to) both traditional Marxist-Leninist movements such as the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) (and its non-Maoist “anti-revisionist” split-offs), the liberal strains of the Civil Rights movement within organizations like the National Organization for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). With Maoism as their ideological weapon, Black liberation groups could analyze their material situation and implement tactics without dogmatic restrictions or control by a foreign state (as the Comintern and Communist Party of the Soviet Union had done with the CPUSA), as they maintained clear ideological consistency and goals. They could find solidarity with a movement that emphasized their agency as an oppressed people; frequently, radical Black liberation organizations would interact with and find support from Mao Zedong himself.

One of the Black radical movement’s first encounters with Maoism, or at least Mao Zedong, was with the arguable father of the African-American radical movement W. E. B. Du Bois’ visits to China in 1936 and 1959. Perhaps in a parallel to the future radicals’ opposition to it, Du Bois had resigned from his position with the NAACP in 1934 in protest of the Board of Directors. They had “forbade all criticism of the officers and policies” in The Crisis, the magazine Du Bois founded and

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1 David Adams is a sophomore at Murray State University, majoring in History and minoring in East Asian Studies. He hopes to pursue an academic career in the future.
His resignation signaled his break with the traditional Civil Rights movement he had helped to form and his shift to an even more radical form of thought and activism.

Du Bois first visited China in 1936, where he spoke to the “Chinese Banker’s Club,” imploring them to use their capital and power to throw off the yoke of European imperialism. No other politics were discussed aside from “hatred of Japan for its betrayal of Asia.” In 1956, Du Bois was “officially invited” to the People’s Republic of China. He was initially denied permission to travel by the U.S. government. His visit was believed to be of ambiguous legality due to the PRC’s involvement in the ongoing Korean War. He met personally with Mao for four hours and toured several cities and landmarks in the country. Du Bois marveled at the progress made with industry and social inequality yet still acknowledged that “China is no utopia.”

It was his visit to China, among other nations of the Eastern Bloc, that Du Bois cited his application for membership in the CPUSA shortly before he left for the African nation of Ghana at the invitation of its pan-Africanist and Marxist leader, Kwame Nkrumah. In 1956, he went even further, declaring that “When at last Africa is emancipated the credit should go in no little degree to the influence of Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tse-tung on the thoughts of men.” Here Du Bois highlights the already-widening gap between traditional Marxism-Leninism and Marxism-inspired Black radicalism. It reveals that Stalin had been denounced in Khrushchev’s “Secret Speech” three years earlier. In contrast, the Sino-Soviet split and the development of Maoism as a reaction to the “revisionism” of the post-Stalin Communist Party of the Soviet Union had not yet occurred. Even before “Maoism” or “Mao Zedong Thought” was exported to the international Communist stage, Du Bois recognized Mao’s thought and influence as a qualitative leap in Marxist ideology. Unfortunately, Du Bois would not live to see the advent of Maoism as a formalized ideology in a form broken from Soviet Marxism-Leninism, nor give his insight into it. After six decades of organizing as a Black radical, yet less than three years as a member of a Communist Party, Du Bois would pass away a day before the March on Washington as a citizen and resident of Ghana.

However, before Du Bois was a member of the CPUSA, there was already a strong current of Black liberation within the party. After all, the CPUSA and the American branch of the Communist International’s International Red Aid, the International Labor Defense, took up the infamous Scottsboro Case and hired the renowned Samuel Leibowitz as their lawyer. However, perhaps the

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greatest nucleus of the Black radical movement in the CPUSA lay in Harry Haywood, a chief Marxist-Leninist theoretician within the party. He served on the Central Committee and Politburo. Haywood joined CPUSA in 1925 and traveled to the Soviet Union, and lived there as a student for four years. While there, he made contact with members of other oppressed racial groups such as Manabendra Nath Roy from British-controlled India, Tan Malaka from Dutch-controlled Indonesia, and even Ho Chi Minh from French-controlled Vietnam.\(^\text{10}\) Haywood returned to the United States in 1930. He began to agitate for a new “bourgeois revolution” for Black people in the United States, arguing that the work of the revolutionary Reconstruction post-Civil War, a “bourgeois-democratic revolution” according to Haywood’s theory, was unfinished. Hayward, using Lenin’s *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination* and Stalin’s *Marxism and the National Question*, two seminal Marxist-Leninist essays dealing with national self-determination, argued that much of the Southern United States was comprised of majority African-American areas that can be conceived of as distinct nation termed the “Black Belt Republic.” He called for autonomy and the right to self-determination and secession from the United States if the region so desired.\(^\text{11}\) Haywood’s theory was the official position of the CPUSA until 1934. At that point, critics began to doubt the “economic” origins of racial oppression, a view that Haywood vigorously debated within the party. When William Z. Foster, a former ally of Haywood’s, became Chairman of the CPUSA, Haywood found himself on the party’s left wing as Foster drove the party underground rather than face McCarthyism head-on.\(^\text{12}\)

This was likely one of the first breaks from traditional Marxism-Leninism and toward Maoism for the CPUSA’s left-wing. The “correct” action, from a Maoist perspective, would not have been to drive the party underground in a non-deadly situation of repression but to instead stir the masses in favor of traditional “bourgeois-democratic” principles against the repression. The backdrop of the Korean War could have potentially harnessed an anti-war sentiment to back this struggle. Instead, Foster closed party offices, cut contact with mass organizations, dissolved the Southern region of the party in its entirety, and permanently lost the Party thousands of members. However, Haywood could not effectively lead a left-wing, or Maoist-inspired, resistance to these erroneous policies. Rumors spread while he was in France in 1950 that he was a spy from an unspecified organization. The Communist Party of France insisted they had originated from “reliable sources” in the CPUSA.\(^\text{13}\) While these rumors were never substantiated or proven, they severely damaged Haywood’s credibility and organizational capacity, even in the international Communist scene outside of the United States. Haywood could not organize effectively against a campaign against “rightism” in the party while reformists began to fill the ranks of the national office. He was eventually expelled from the CPUSA after 36 years of membership.\(^\text{14}\)

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\(^{13}\) Haywood, *Black Bolshevik*, 579-582.

Haywood left the traditional Marxist-Leninist movement after his expulsion from the CPUSA. He was involved in the Maoist “New Communist Movement” that attempted to recreate the mass movements that the CPUSA had once held. For Haywood, Maoism represented a new era of Marxist theory and practice due to its,

emphasis on testing ideas in practice, care and flexibility in applying united front tactics, of relying upon and serving the people, realism in dealing with power relationships, respect for the integrity of national minorities and the rights of the third world nations against great nation chauvinism, the concrete analysis and application of Marxist-Leninist principles to one’s own country, and the pursuing of the two-line political struggle in the Party.\textsuperscript{15}

These aspects of Maoism, a break with dogmatism, a focus on the so-called “mass line,” and the emphasis upon the agency and independence of third world nations in resisting imperialism and neocolonialism appealed so much to the Black radical movement.

Before speaking of the Black Panthers, whose Maoist influence is well-known and documented, one must speak of Robert F. Williams. Williams joined the NAACP in 1945, after serving the U.S. Armed Forces as a Marine, and was elected President of the Union County chapter of the NAACP in Monroe, North Carolina, in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{16} There he established a branch of the National Rifle Association known as the “Black Armed Guard” and committed acts of self-defense against the local KKK that led to it being banned. He also wrote the controversial tract, \textit{Negros with Guns}, that detailed the struggles and successes of his gun-toting NAACP chapter.\textsuperscript{17} Williams’ radical attitudes led to his suspension from the NAACP and undue and distorted criticism from \textit{The New York Times} and Martin Luther King, Jr. He was falsely charged with kidnapping a white couple after shielding them from an angry crowd during the famous “Freedom Rides.”\textsuperscript{18} In 1961, the Williamses (including their two sons) fled to Cuba as political refugees for five years and then to China, where they stayed three years.\textsuperscript{19} In response to an appeal from Robert Williams to many international figures, Mao gave his “Statement Supporting the American Negroes” and organized a rally of “more than ten thousand Chinese” who supported the statement and Williams’ struggle.\textsuperscript{20} Williams was invited to participate in the PRC’s National Day festivities in 1963 and permitted to go as a representative of Cuba by Fidel Castro. A year later, he returned for the same occasion and toured the PRC, of which a documentary was created.\textsuperscript{21} After the disillusionment of race relations in Cuba and the intensification of the Sino-Soviet split that saw Cuba side with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the Williams family moved to Beijing. There Williams was described as a “foreign friend” who supported the Great

\textsuperscript{15} Haywood, \textit{Black Bolshevik}, 643.
\textsuperscript{17} Frasier, “Thunder in the East,” 932.
\textsuperscript{18} Frasier, “Thunder in the East,” 933.
\textsuperscript{19} Frasier, “Thunder in the East,” 933.
\textsuperscript{20} Frasier, “Thunder in the East,” 934.
\textsuperscript{21} Frasier, “Thunder in the East,” 935-937.

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Proletarian Cultural Revolution. He was allowed to broadcast political radio shows into Africa and was given increased state support for his publication *The Crusader*, which increased its distribution from the 15,000 copies per month they had in Havana to 40-50,000 per their “convenience.”

The growing influence of Maoism on Black liberation movements in the United States, aided by the Williamses, reportedly led one Black man on the streets of Harlem to exclaim, “Fuck it man, I’m for Mao.”

Williams supported the Cultural Revolution fervently. He saw it as a material manifestation of the mass line, a massive increase in workers’ political participation in everyday affairs, unlike anything he had ever seen in the Jim Crow South. While Williams eventually distanced himself from such a radical evaluation of the Cultural Revolution, he later acknowledged that racism was a widespread problem in China. He believed that attitudes in China were actively changing, stimulated by socialist values and the egalitarian rhetoric of Maoism. In short, he believed that the Chinese had not overcome racism, but Maoism was defeating it.

Perhaps the greatest influence of Robert F. Williams was not on the African nations that his radio shows broadcast to or through the circulation of his state-supported paper, but on a pair of young students in the Bay Area of California. There, Huey P. Newton and Bobby Seale, inspired by Williams’ *Negroes with Guns*, founded the Black Panther Party for Self Defense (BPP). Newton and Seale both attended Merritt College in Oakland, California, where they met and decided to form the party in 1966, with Newton as “defense minister” and Seale as chairman. Williams was not the only ideological influence on the BPP. The selling of copies of the *Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung* at the University of California, Berkeley had provided the BPP with the funding used to buy two shotguns. Ideologically, the BPP represented a variety of influences and ideas: traditional Marxist influences from Marx, Engels, and Lenin. The influence of Maoism in Mao himself and various Black theorists like Kwame Nkrumah and Frantz Fanon, alongside BPP members like Huey P. Newton and Fred Hampton themselves.

In his pamphlet, *On the Ideology of the Black Panther Party*, Eldridge Cleaver lays the basis of the BPP ideology: it was a variation of Marxism-Leninism adapted to the peculiar conditions of the United States, seeking to utilize the lumpenproletariat as the revolutionary class to overthrow capitalism.

While this is no tenet of Maoism, Cleaver’s willingness to apply a unique analysis of classes in the United States’ particular situation is reminiscent of Mao’s *Analysis of Classes in Chinese Society*. Huey P. Newton’s theory of “intercommunalism” is much more easily identified with Maoist ideology. Newton’s theory was formulated in opposition to traditional conceptions of proletarian

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internationalism. Newton believed that “nations” in the Marxist sense of the word did not apply to the United States. Instead, he believed that the United States was formed of “communities” dominated by the American “empire.” Thus, Newton proposed a revolutionary coalition of these communities led by respective vanguard parties. This proposal was nothing new. During the Second World War, the traditionally Marxist-Leninist Comintern led by Stalin had instituted a “United Front” policy wherein the communist parties were ordered to work with social-democratic and non-communist anti-fascist organizations. Mao extended this concept and made the United Front a vital policy of the Chinese Communist Party, allowing the participation of anti-Kuomintang “democratic parties” in the “Political Consultative Conference” and formalized the policy into the structure of the People’s Republic of China. Newton brought this policy to the United States, where it had been carried out somewhat successfully even before formalizing his theory. Fred Hampton had organized the original “Rainbow Coalition” in Chicago, made up of the Black Panthers, the Young Patriots Organization formed from white southerners, the Puerto Rican Young Lords Party, the Students for a Democratic Society, the Chicano Brown Berets, the American Indian Movement, and the Chinese-American (and Maoist) Red Guard Party. Hampton had been recruited to the Black Panther Party after working with the NAACP from the age of sixteen. After being drugged by a police informant, he was assassinated in a surprise police attack while he slept beside his wife on the morning of 4 December 1969. He was only 21 years old. While the Black Panther Party would fall to factional struggles, FBI counterintelligence persecution, and state repression, another Black organization would also adopt Maoism as the guide for the Black liberation struggle.

In the 1970s, famed Black nationalist and poet Amiri Baraka became involved with an organization known as the “Congress of African People.” This organization was founded as a Black cultural nationalist group, unsurprising considering Baraka’s promotion of the “Black Arts” movement since the mid-1960s. In 1972, the principal organizer of the National Black Political Convention in Gary, Indiana, received over 2,500 delegates from all over the United States. However, by 1975, the CAP had become an explicitly Maoist organization. The CAP differed from earlier organizations in that it explicitly adopted “Marxist-Leninist-Mao Tse-Tung Thought” when it became the “Revolutionary Communist League (Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought)” in 1974. Former

allies heavily criticized Baraka and non-Marxist Black nationalists for shifting from Black nationalist thought to Maoism. These critics argued that he had become detached from the Black way of life and was no longer “one of the people.” Baraka used traditional Marxist analysis to critique Black nationalist thought that refused to meld with Marxism, arguing that it was a middle-class movement while praising those strains that melded with Marxist thought as the “antithesis to white supremacy.” However, the CAP adopted Maoism and morphed into the Revolutionary Communist League (M-L-M) at an inopportune time. Mao’s political retreat in the mid-1970s empowered so-called “capitalist roaders” such as Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun. This was reflected in radical (or perhaps anti-radical) changes in China’s foreign policy. For example, when Nixon made his famous visit to China, the People’s Republic normalized foreign relations with Zaire’s pro-Western and capitalist-aligned dictator (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), President Mobutu Sese Seko. The Chinese government supported the pro-Western, anti-communist National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in the Angolan Civil War against the pro-Soviet People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). This pragmatic foreign policy may have strengthened ties between the United States and China. However, it wrought disastrous consequences on the credibility of China as a world leader in the eyes of Third World liberation movements and Maoist organizations, Black liberation organizations in the United States included. After Mao’s death, this course was not only strengthened but became the only course as Hua Guofeng proved a weak leader in the face of the CCP’s reformist faction and fell to Deng Xiaoping, who abandoned rhetoric around class struggle and the Three-Worlds Theory that had galvanized so many African-Americans and Black liberation movements to embrace Maoism. In the end, Baraka abandoned Maoism as a formal ideology yet continued to cite Mao “as an example for Black intellectuals and radicals,” referring them to Mao’s works on the “Yenan Forum.”

Perhaps unsurprisingly, considering the failure of Marxist thought (or any radical political ideology) to ever sustain mass political support in the United States, “Mao Zedong Thought” in the Black liberation movement never found an extensive base. W. E. B. Du Bois emigrated to Ghana just days after applying for membership in the CPUSA, fulfilling his Pan-African dream for himself but abandoning the movement in the United States. After his expulsion from the CPUSA, Harry Haywood tried to organize within the New Communist Movement and its various Maoist sects. However, it was wrought with such petty ideological disputes and organizational fragmentation that a sustained base of support was never possible. Robert F. Williams could never truly embed his Maoist ideas into any organization, returning to the United States in 1969 and living a quiet, non-radical life after the charges against him were dropped in 1975. Perhaps the Black Panther Party had the most authentic mass base of both ideological and organizational support, a vanguard party with mass organizations and programs affecting the lives of ordinary people mobilized under it. However, it too was wrought with factional struggle, police repression, and state interference; the weight of these contradictions came crashing down with the deaths of its leaders and the complete collapse of the organization by 1982.

One could argue that the Congress of African People, which became the Revolutionary Communist League, *lost* the mass appeal and credibility it had spent years building once it adopted Maoism. Black nationalists began to criticize the adoption of Maoism. They became disillusioned with the stagnation of Maoism under Hua Guofeng, the repression of the Maoist “Gang of Four,” and the complete demise of Maoist ideology in favor of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” under Deng Xiaoping.

Thus, Maoism has had a long and tumultuous history with the Black liberation movements in the United States; many African-Americans found inspiration and guidance from Mao and his thought, yet many were disappointed by the ultimate lack of progress. Starting with the famed and celebrated W. E. B. Du Bois, African-American radicals, were among the first to recognize the qualitative differences between traditional Marxism-Leninism and the embryonic “Mao Zedong Thought.” However, when Maoism was formalized, African-American radicals rushed to it as a bastion of third-world liberation and independence from the liberal Civil Rights movement and the white-dominated (and perceived anti-Black) traditional Marxism-Leninism of the CPUSA. The split between traditional Black political ideologies and Maoism often caused trouble for Maoist Black radicals. This was illustrated by Robert F. Williams’ moving from Cuba to China and was seen with Baraka in his ideological conflict with the traditional Black nationalists who had followed him since the organization’s founding in 1966. While Maoism and Black liberation movements have been on the decline since the 1970s and Deng Xiaoping's abandonment of Maoism (as well as the fall of the Eastern Bloc itself), Mao and Maoism remain inspirational in the minds of many African-American radicals. This is especially so for those influenced by the Black radicals of the New Communist Movement, the Black Panther Party, and the Congress of African People.
Crime and Punishment:
Child Pickpockets in Nineteenth-Century Great Britain

Erica Bade

Introduction
On 22 August 1833, a twelve-year-old British boy named William stole a gown from a woman named Frances. As a result, the Old Bailey court found William guilty and sentenced him to seven years of transportation. In one month, William went from being a laborer in London to facing trial at the Old Bailey. He then resided at the Newgate Prison before spending almost two years on a prison hulk. Then, William was placed on the Aurora ship and sent to the penal colony of Van Diemen’s Land for the rest of his childhood. In the 1830s, children frequently went to prison for large and small crimes. The English public took notice of the increasing number of child convicts, and transportation was the solution that Parliament and the courts offered. However, by the end of the decade, transportation became more controversial, as both British citizens and government officials questioned its effectiveness in curbing crime and punishing criminals.

In analyzing the experiences of child convicts as they moved from the streets of London to the British courts and finally on their journey of transportation to the penal colonies, there are several questions of interest. First, how can we trace the movement of a child working in London who ends up in a penal colony across the globe? Second, why did the courts employ transportation as the primary punishment for children who committed small acts of stealing in the 1830s? Finally, what made the experience of a child pickpocket so unique when compared to other groups of criminals and other acts of crime?

In previous studies of British convict transportation, historians have primarily focused on the humanitarian attention to adult convicts. In terms of child convicts, historians like Wood J. Carter claimed that the rise of crime stemmed from concerns of immoral behavior that required stricter forms of policing and punishment to preserve the morality of the British Empire. Jean Trépanier and Xavier Rousseaux found many court practices to be inefficient when dealing with juvenile offenders because they presented different circumstances than adults and thus required new policies to process children quickly through the courts to decrease their time spent in prison, where immoral behaviors would

1 Erica Bade graduated from the University of California, Santa Barbara in 2021 with a degree in History.
2 Old Bailey Proceedings Online (www.oldbaileyonline.org, version 8.0, 23 February 2021), September 1833, trial of William Johnson (t183330905-48).
further influence them. Furthermore, historians such as Heather Shore stated that transportation was used as a means of punishment due to the high number of convicts. As a result, new locations had to be created out of the need to place criminals in facilities for punishment and reform. So, as crime increased, the British created new facilities for juvenile offenders because many feared that the intersection between adults and children in prisons would further negatively impact child convicts.

This article primarily utilizes archival evidence from government documents and newspapers to analyze the experiences of juvenile convicts. I include official court documents from the Old Bailey recording the criminal proceedings of trials that young children faced, which ultimately determined their fate of transportation. As official court documents, these records can be trusted to portray Britain’s youth’s criminal trials accurately. Additionally, Parliamentary papers discuss the changes that government officials made to convicting and sentencing juvenile offenders through reports of data and interviews of British officials. These records can be somewhat biased because they solely include the government’s point of view, leaving out any say from the children. However, Parliamentary papers also have records of testimony, so the adults’ opinion is especially relevant. Lastly, newspaper articles include documented accounts of crime and incorporate insight into the general public’s views. These articles are sourced from newspapers in London and Van Diemen’s Land, using both the metropole and colonies to provide a well-rounded view of convict transportation. Overall, each of these documents serves the purpose of describing the experience of the juvenile offender from the streets of London, into the courts, and through transportation by employing official records, debates within Parliament by British officials, and the views of the general public.

Ultimately, I argue that child pickpockets worked within close-knit gangs of children committing illegal acts while creating a sense of community, so even the law could not scare children away from crime. Pickpocketing was the starting point for the growth of criminal networks and gangs, which became large and influential. Pickpocketing was therefore extremely visible in London, prompting the need for action within the criminal justice system. Furthermore, I argue that the courts employed transportation as the primary form of punishment to break up these criminal networks of London thieves. However, British efforts to curb juvenile crime created more crime and more negative effects on British children. Pickpockets did not fear or dread transportation, so it proved to be an ineffective form of punishment, pushing the need for judicial changes that focused on reforming children into proper British citizens rather than punishing them for a crime. As policy surrounding transportation was altered and amended, children continued to be transported and faced a unique experience as they lived in a quickly changing new environment. Ultimately, reform failed, and crime persisted throughout London and the British metropole.

The Streets of London
Crime rates in London dramatically increased during the 1830s, especially for juvenile offenders, which prompted the need for government efforts toward the cause of police and criminal reform. Following

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the end of the war with France, the British faced an economic depression from 1815 to 1822. This, coupled with the increased use of machinery resulting from the Industrial Revolution, diminished the number of available jobs and created dire conditions for the unemployed. As a result, many of London’s residents turned to alternative means to make money. For example, Patrick Colquhoun, who labored in police and criminal reform, stressed the need for a greater concern for the property and security of London’s inhabitants after estimating that 115,000 people out of London’s population of 999,000 engaged in crime and illegal activity as a means to make a living during the early 1800s. This striking statistic and the conditions of the streets of London encouraged Sir Robert Peel, the Home Secretary, to pass The Metropolitan Police Act of 1829, which introduced a centralized and unified system of police in England to establish organized procedures to protect London and curb crime in the city. Carter Wood further argued that “the decades after 1820 had a deep concern with ‘unregulated human power’ in the form of ‘passions’ and ‘savagery,’” and in response, these new police forces brought “a more active enforcement of the law, increasing its presence in daily life.” The police were not only neutral observers of society, but actively played the role of “domestic missionaries” enforcing new standards of behavior. The British government increased its police force to resolve what it saw as a moral issue. A Select Committee of Parliament reported that police must primarily patrol parks to monitor pickpockets and disorderly persons, demonstrating the desire of the state to attempt to exercise control over the increasing crime within London. Petty crimes, like pickpocketing, occurred at alarming rates and increasingly involved juvenile offenders. Children committed criminal acts alone and in large gangs. In both cases, the public took notice of the conniving children and sought out ways to punish them.

Crime continuously rose throughout the 1830s. By the end of the decade, it was found that nearly 10,000 children under the age of sixteen were sent to prison in a single year. Parliament was the first to take notice of the increasing numbers of children in prisons, and the Select Committee on Police of the Metropolis and State of Crime convened in 1834 to create a report documenting and discussing the high rate of crime. Government officials believed crime “fearfully increased in the Metropolis,” as the report stated:

the ‘Criminal Calendar exhibited an increase in the annual average of Committals of 48 per cent; and in the annual average of Convictions of 55 per cent; but as the Population Returns show an increase of 19 per cent, within the same period of time, 19 per cent of the increase of Commitments and Convictions may be accounted for by a proportionate augmentation of Population.’ There was hence an increase of 36 per cent, per annum in the Convictions to

register the progress of crime and demoralization in the Cities of London and Westminster and the County of Middlesex.\textsuperscript{16}

Even though the population grew, government statistics supported Parliament’s belief that crime was rising. The state likewise saw this change as being produced by and furthering immorality, particularly in cities.

Parliament officials used this Select Committee’s findings to speculate on the causes of crime to attack the issue at its root cause. The increase in juvenile imprisonment arose, in part, from the desire to establish new reform practices for British children.\textsuperscript{17} Heather Shore pointed out that there was a perceived symbiotic relationship between societal mores and societal behavior that influenced children to turn to crime as their environment impacted how they behaved.\textsuperscript{18} The Parliamentary committee recognized this connection between the youth and society, criticizing British policies that created a rise in crime. The report from the Select Committee on the Police of the Metropolis stated Great Britain could not rely on any system of policing to diminish crime unless the government instituted an enlightened system of prison discipline and secondary punishments while also spreading moral and religious education through the metropole.\textsuperscript{19} Even if there was a better police system, moral depravity would still wreak havoc across the country unless children received further education. Parliament believed that a better education system was the only means of permanently advancing the moral and social condition of the British people.\textsuperscript{20} Thus, Parliament connected the immorality of the youth and the rise in crime. However, while the government discussed London’s spike in criminal activity and searched for solutions like education to deter crime and craft a nation of ideal citizens, the British youth were learning how to become career criminals.

When it came to the juvenile offender, pickpocketing and larceny crimes were popular choices because of the unique criminal training offered to children in this sector. Children turned to the streets for work, money, family, and friendships. As children faced trying times at home and the availability of apprenticeships declined, the line between the working-class youth and the youth of the criminal class blurred.\textsuperscript{21} When the Select Committee of the House of Lords on Execution of Criminal Law convened and discussed juvenile offenders and transportation, Edward Rushton, Esq. shared the story of a young pickpocket who was so highly trained by his mother that he had become one of the most dexterous pickpockets alive at only ten years of age.\textsuperscript{22} For this child, pickpocketing was a family trade, where his mother, a skilled criminal, taught him how to steal from passing adults.\textsuperscript{23} By learning from his mother, this child, and others like him, quickly adopted the necessary skills to become valuable

\textsuperscript{16}Report from the Select Committee on the Police of the Metropolis, (1834): HC600-XVI.1, 5.
\textsuperscript{17}Jean Trépanier and Xavier Rousseaux, Youth and Justice in Western States, 1815-1950: From Punishment to Welfare 20.
\textsuperscript{18}Heather Shore, Artful Dodgers: Youth and Crime in Early Nineteenth-Century London 1.
\textsuperscript{19}Report from the Select Committee on the Police of the Metropolis, (1834): 22.
\textsuperscript{20}Report from the Select Committee on the Police of the Metropolis, (1834): 22.
\textsuperscript{22}Select Committee of House of Lords on Execution of Criminal Law (Juvenile Offenders and Transportation), Second Report, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, General Index, (1847): HC534-VII.5, 192.
\textsuperscript{23}Select Committee of House of Lords on Execution of Criminal Law (Juvenile Offenders and Transportation), Second Report, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, General Index, (1847): 192.
assets to assist the family enterprise. As a result, these children added to the increasing number of criminals working in the metropole. With a family invested in pickpocketing, it was difficult for a child to pursue any means other than criminal activities. Therefore, the societal behavior and morals children learned from their parents influenced their actions and, in this case, influenced a child to pursue a life filled with crime.

On the other hand, some young boys were put into formal criminal training to learn how to pickpocket. Children found very few work opportunities and sought out any means to make money. Heather Shore stated that there was a “youthful population in the Metropolis devoted to crime, trained to it from infancy, adhering to it from education and circumstances, whose connections prevent[ed] the possibility of reformation, and whom no punishment [could] deter.”

Many children spent some time at a national school or Sunday school, but these periods of schooling were often brief and punctured by truancy or employment. For many young people of the lower classes, work was difficult to find, thus pushing them to miss school to pursue crime to attain money for their livelihood. So, children found new training and so-called schooling on the street to support their criminal endeavors. As one newspaper article described, there were trainings in which a “professor” would order the “pupils” to practice taking various articles from the pocket and person of a young girl. Pupils were to repeat this skill for weeks until the professor deemed the pupil ready to go out into the streets and put their skills to use. This was explicit training run by adult criminals to train the youth in the art of pickpocketing and crime. Because pickpocketing did not require excessive physical or material resources, it was fairly easy for a child to be taught how to steal from a person passing by and turn this into a profitable career. This training contributed to the unique experience of the child pickpocket because children could now turn to crime as a career, neglecting formal education and alternative work opportunities. Pickpocketing was a lucrative means for young children to make money when they lacked formal education or job training. While officials viewed pickpocketing as an act of moral depravity, it was the primary income for many kids in London.

Child pickpockets were typically quite young, so many found working in groups could increase their chances of success. Picking pockets was associated with group theft and organized crime. While the crime itself was not too serious, the action within groups became associated with moral depravity, and each child became a malevolent influence on others around them. Thus, when children went out pickpocketing, they rarely worked single-handedly. Instead, two to four children would often work together, with the most experienced child doing the actual thieving while the others acted as a look-out or cover. Children devised strategies to maximize their potential to earn a profit and limit their chances of being caught by the police. Some of these gangs involved a much greater number of children. For instance, William Wardell and Joseph Walker were two thirteen-year-olds who participated in a juvenile gang of nearly thirty to forty children, most under the age of nine, who would

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commit robberies at mid-day. Groups of this size became increasingly visible to the public, especially as reports of juvenile gangs like this one made their way into the newspapers. A gang of this size was visible to the public and a nuisance to adults who wanted to go about their daily activities without the harassment of children attempting to steal from them. Thus, London’s desire to catch these children and punish them for their actions increased. As a result, these young criminals faced a unique experience, as the goal of society was not only to catch and punish them but also to change their behavior and mold metropolitan children into model citizens of the British Empire.

The Courts
Transportation became a tool to create model citizens. The courts consistently sentenced boys and girls to transportation, hoping this punishment would put them outside of the influence of their criminal networks and positively affect their lives. In 1718, the Transportation Act made a significant change to this system. It allowed for the direct sentence of transportation to be given, rather than classifying transportation as an agreement with the Crown to escape execution. Although transportation emerged as a staple for British criminal punishment, it was not as effective as the courts had hoped. It did not lead to an increasingly positive impact of reform, making it controversial over the course of the nineteenth century. This distressed officials who searched for a new way to punish children while simultaneously initiating reform. Therefore, the question of what to do with juvenile criminals was very much on the minds of lawmakers and reformers, which helped lead to the emergence of a juvenile justice system within England to address these challenges.

As the courts tried and convicted children for their crimes, moral concerns took precedence as lawmakers and British officials looked to create new court practices and policies tailored to juvenile offenders.

Many young pickpockets caught by the police faced trial and received sentences for transportation, with most ending up in Van Diemen’s Land. One fifteen-year-old boy, Daniel Fitzgerald, worked with an accomplice to steal handkerchiefs and was indicted for stealing in 1833 before being sentenced to transportation to Van Diemen’s Land for seven years. For stealing several handkerchiefs, Fitzgerald would now spend the rest of his childhood in prison on the other side of the globe. Another young boy, William Johnson, pleaded guilty to simple larceny after stealing a gown worth seven shillings in September of 1833 when he was only twelve years old. He, too, was sentenced to seven years of transportation to Van Diemen’s Land. Johnson would now spend all of his teenage years as a convict for stealing this gown. For both Daniel Fitzgerald and William Johnson, the court

30 “Police,” The Times, August 30, 1830, 6.
34 Old Bailey Proceedings Online (www.oldbaileyonline.org, version 8.0, 23 February 2021), September 1833, trial of William Johnson (t183330905-48).
did not justify their sentence. Instead, the court sentenced them to transportation simply because that was the typical punishment for an act of larceny in the 1830s.

Other juvenile offenders received similar sentences of seven years of transportation. Still, there is also evidence of court recorders attempting to limit their use of the extreme nature of transportation in some instances. In February of 1834, Joseph Barnes, a sixteen-year-old boy, was tried at Middlesex Sessions for picking the pocket of a woman and stealing her handkerchief. The court recorder sentenced him to transportation for seven years for this crime. However, because Barnes was an orphan, the recorder granted him some leniency and ordered him to be transported to the penitentiary to learn a trade so that by the end of his sentence, he may become a “respectable member of society.” The Middlesex Sessions Recorder realized and acknowledged that Joseph had no family to turn to for guidance, yet he still decided to send him across the world for punishment. While the court intended for Joseph to learn a trade, there was no way to guarantee he would be trained or that learning a trade would guarantee him to be a better British citizen. This decision illustrates a shift towards reformatory goals within transportation as recorders increasingly felt the need to justify their recommendations.

Another young boy named David Williams was not even twelve years old when John Tyrell, the Recorder of Tiverton, found him guilty of larceny in 1839 and recommended a sentence of seven years of transportation to the Pankhurst Prison in Van Diemen’s Land. Once again, the court recorder felt the need to justify the reasons as to why the juvenile offender would be sentenced to transportation. Tyrell stated that because he belonged to a British gang of housebreakers and pickpockets, it would serve Williams best to be sent away from the gang’s reach. In this case, transportation proved beneficial to Williams because it would remove him from the London gang. Essentially, the court decided the best course of action for this twelve-year-old would be to remove him from the people he was familiar with and ship him across the world to a new home.

As the number of children convicted of crimes and sentenced to transportation dramatically increased in the 1830s, Parliament questioned its effectiveness. It took time for the trials to be processed, and during this waiting period, children spent time with other criminals, including adults. There was an increasing concern during this brief period while impressionable juvenile offenders resided in prison with notorious adult criminals. Justices in the courts took it upon themselves to informally and then formally alter court practices in favor of these young children. The courts were unhappy with committing juveniles accused of larceny to unreformed prisons while they awaited trial, so judges increasingly resorted to summary trials for juveniles. At first, this was not a formalized practice, but in 1833 Parliament passed a bill to authorize summary conviction for juvenile offenders

36 “Letter From the Court Recorder on Joseph Barnes.”
39 Jean Trépanier and Xavier Rousseaux, Youth and Justice in Western States, 1815-1950: From Punishment to Welfare, 76.
in cases of larceny and misdemeanors and to provide places for holding these petty sessions.\footnote{“Bill to Amend Law of Larceny relating to Young Offenders, and Persons tried for Second Offence,” (1833): HC207-II.} Parliament found that early imprisonment of juvenile offenders before attending one’s trial made children less likely to respond to reform.

Moreover, the bill put into law that in any case where the offender exceeded the age of sixteen, and the justices heard the charge with sufficient evidence or a confession, they could sentence the accused to a House of Correction or penitentiary within their jurisdiction for a term of no more than six months.\footnote{“Bill to Amend Law of Larceny Relating to Young Offenders, and Persons Tried for Second Offence,”} This new system attempted to limit the amount of time children had to intermingle with adults in prisons. There was growing concern that adult criminals exerted a poor influence on the juvenile offenders and thus hampered the child’s attempts for future reform. In 1837, the bill was altered, and the amendment changed the age for summary proceedings to fifteen years old but maintained that if convicted, the offender should remain imprisoned in a House of Correction or penitentiary for no more than six months.\footnote{“Bill to Alter and Amend Law of Larceny Relating to Offenders Under Certain Age,” (1837): HC224-II.} So, while the criteria for who was considered to be a juvenile offender was not formally established, it was still necessary to restrict the interactions between adult and child convicts.

The British government’s greatest fear in the juvenile judicial process was cross-contamination between adult and child criminals, where adults would influence juvenile offenders. Parliament pursued their attempts for the separation of children and adults to ensure juvenile offenders would have the greatest chance at successful reform. So, to meet the governor’s demands that criminal boys be treated with the “double purpose of punishment and reformation,” a prison was built in London solely for child convicts, and it included an “extensive system of trade-training and education” for those sentenced to a short imprisonment or those awaiting transportation.\footnote{Sean McConville, \textit{A History of English Prison Administration} (London: Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), 205.} This prison, known as Parkhurst, was created in May 1838 in the \textit{Bill for Establishing Prison for Young Offenders}, after Parliament authorized transforming an old military hospital into a juvenile prison.\footnote{“Bill for Establishing Prison for Young Offenders,” (1837-38): HC354-V.} The prison was meant to be specific to children, where reformation practices would begin immediately. Secretaries of state could also direct the removal to Parkhurst prison of any young offender, including those sentenced to transportation, where they would remain until transported, granted liberty, or moved back to the prison from which they came.\footnote{“Bill for Establishing Prison for Young Offenders,” (1837-38).} In its efforts to start reform as soon as possible, those who did well could evade the rest of their sentence if they demonstrated significant improvements in behavior. Ultimately, most children at Parkhurst remained only until their time arrived for transportation. So, while the government attempted to inflict positive change by separating children from adults, most children still faced the fate of transportation.
The effectiveness and humaneness of transportation were highly debated during the 1830s, and the transportation of child convicts did not escape this discussion. Generally, transportation was viewed as advantageous to both society and the criminal. For the criminal, “transportation provided opportunity, difference, and removal from the buds of corruption by which he or she were tainted at home,” and “nowhere was this ideology more pervasive than in the treatment of the youngest group of convicts.”

The Select Committee of the House of Lords on Execution of Criminal Law met to discuss the ongoing punishments and sentences for crime in the metropole. On the one hand, transportation was found to be an effective punishment. For example, when Lieutenant Augustus Frederick Tract was examined, he stated he found that the “London Thief” feared transportation. Nothing was “so effectual” as the punishment of transportation for these thieves. He even went so far as to state that the transportation exerts its greatest influence on the London Thief and pickpocket. The London Thief committed small acts of larceny and pickpocketed people in the city, and so it was reasonable to assume that someone committing such a small act of crime would fear being sentenced to such a dramatic punishment. It seems plausible that criminals feared being removed from their homes and shipped across the globe because the London Thief was a criminal of the metropole. However, this was only one of the accounts in which the House of Lords examined the execution of criminal law, and others did not share this same view.

Not everyone examined by Parliament agreed with Lieutenant Taft. Several of those interviewed directly contradicted his view claiming that many criminals did not fear transportation, especially pickpockets, and so its role as an effective punishment diminished. At a meeting of the Select Committee of the House of Lords on Execution of Criminal Law, Mr. Justice Torrens stated that he did not believe pickpockets exerted any dread toward a sentence of transportation, instead of seeing it as the “consummation of their fate” and the “natural result” of the pickpocket profession. With increased crime and imprisonment in London and throughout Britain, many pickpockets did not fear being caught because they recognized it would most likely happen to them at some point. Moreover, when Mr. John Darcy was called in to be examined by Parliament, he explained that he had known a couple of instances when young pickpockets thought very light of transportation, and some even wished for it. As Mr. Darcy explained, many of the juvenile offenders were incredibly fearless of transportation, mainly because it was an opportunity to travel to a new land and look for new opportunities rather than continue a life of petty crime in London. Together, these two statements

47 Select Committee of House of Lords on Execution of Criminal Law (Juvenile Offenders and Transportation), Second Report, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, General Index, (1847): HC534-VIL.5, 192.
48 Select Committee of House of Lords on Execution of Criminal Law (Juvenile Offenders and Transportation), Second Report, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, General Index, (1847): 201-203.
49 Select Committee of House of Lords on Execution of Criminal Law (Juvenile Offenders and Transportation), Second Report, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, General Index, (1847): 201-203.
50 Select Committee of House of Lords on Execution of Criminal Law (Juvenile Offenders and Transportation), Second Report, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, General Index, (1847): HC534-VIL.5, 147.
51 Select Committee of House of Lords on Execution of Criminal Law (Juvenile Offenders and Transportation), Second Report, Minutes of Evidence, Appendix, General Index, (1847), 408.
illustrate that transportation was no longer viewed as an escape from execution as it was in the past. Some criminals did not even consider it a form of punishment but rather an opportunity to move somewhere new and start a new life. So, Parliament recognized transportation was becoming less effective and set out to find solutions to reprimand child convicts more efficiently, but regardless transportation still carried on.

The Penal Colonies

Even as British officials debated the effectiveness of transportation, the government continued to send children to Van Diemen’s Land. However, Parliament recognized the need to create new resources and specific juvenile facilities to accommodate better and serve the child convict populations away from the metropole to ensure the most beneficial results from penal punishment and reform. This led to an immediate rise in the number of convicts transported to penal colonies as British and Irish criminals were forced to take voyages to the penal colonies of New South Wales, Van Diemen’s Land, and Western Australia. The fundamental concept within penal ideology and the use of transportation was the belief that “children needed to be rescued from their communities in order to be reformed.” The point of transportation was sending children away from the criminal enterprises they were caught in, teaching them to become better citizens, and training them for the workforce. To attain this goal, policy surrounding transportation was altered and amended while children continued to be transported. So, children transported in this decade faced a unique experience as they lived in a rapidly changing environment that was new to them and British officials. Despite changes to the processes of child convict transportation, the reform failed to produce its desired effect and only left a minute positive impact on children. The government’s efforts failed to curb juvenile offenders, and crime persisted throughout London and the British metropole.

As child convicts awaited transportation, they lived on hulks; essentially a floating prison meant to hold prisoners before transportation. Juvenile offenders were crowded together in these hulks, exerting their bad behavior on one another. Due to overcrowding and deplorable conditions, the hulk system had “appalling mortality figures.” Still, their use continued even as the hulks “defeated the preventative and reformatory hopes of penal campaigners” and fostered an environment for more crime and violence. A significant issue of the appalling conditions in the hulks was violence and bullying among children. One child convict previously discussed, William Johnson, was sentenced for larceny in 1833 but waited nearly two years to be transported, living on a hulk ship in the meantime. Johnson described the abuse he received from his fellow prisoners, including persistent intimidation. His bullies even pricked his eyes with needles, sending him to the hospital and partially blinding him.

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53 Cameron Nunn, “‘Making them good and useful’: The Ideology of Juvenile Penal Reformation at Carter’s Barracks and Point Puer,” History Australia 14, no. 3 (2017): 332.
56 “Evidence of Harris in the Name of Johnson,” PRO, HO 73/16, Rough Notebook IV.
The juvenile justice system fundamentally failed Johnson. He was arrested, convicted, and sentenced to transportation to remove him from crime and violence, but instead, he faced even greater violence within the British criminal justice system. This incident highlights the failure of the British Parliament to recognize inefficiencies in their judicial system, especially for child convicts. Even though children were separated from adults, the transportation processes remained flawed in their attempts to produce reformed behavior. Instead, the quartering of children together fostered the very behavior the government aimed to prevent. Despite these circumstances, Johnson set sail for Van Diemen’s Land in 1835, where he remained until 5 September 1840, when he was granted a certificate of freedom.57

When the time arrived to be transported, children boarded convict ships to set sail across the globe to receive their punishment and face their new destiny. During the 1830s, “juveniles formed around 20% of all convicts arriving in Van Diemen’s Land.”58 Daniel Fitzgerald, one of the young boys previously mentioned who was sentenced to transportation, was one of 400 convicts transported on the Moffatt ship on 4 January 1834.59 He arrived in Van Diemen’s Land four months later, at the beginning of May.60 Meanwhile, the orphan, Joseph Barnes, arrived at Van Diemen’s Land on the William Metcalfe in September of 1834.61

As these young boys made their way to penal colonies, like Van Diemen’s Land, Parliament implemented new practices to create more effectual punishments for child convicts. Out of the 156,000 convicts transported to Australia, 25,000 were under sixteen years old, and during the 1830s, 20% of convicts arriving at Van Diemen’s Land were these children.62 Due to this heavy influx, the Point Puer facility was built in 1834 to receive these children.63 One of the primary purposes behind establishing Point Puer as a prison specific to children was the “belief that the state could transform a child from criminality to conformity through training, education, and religious indoctrination” to reform children into dutiful citizens that would “eventually assume their position within the colonial labor market.”64 At this facility, boys sawed timber, dug and weeded gardens, made shoes and clothes, built houses, and learned to perform almost every necessary trade.65 Point Puer provided child convicts with skilled training to prepare them for their future. In 1836, 200 boys resided at Point Puer, which “used formerly to be one of the most painful spectacles and their disposal one of the most difficult

59 “Convict Transport Registers.” Australian Joint Copying Project. Microfilm Roll 90, Class and Piece Number HO11/9, 266.
60 “Convict Transport Registers,” 266.
63 Cameron Nunn, 329.
64 Cameron Nunn, “‘Making them good and useful’: The Ideology of Juvenile Penal Reformation at Carter’s Barracks and Point Puer,” History Australia 14, no. 3 (2017): 329; Nunn, 339.
65 “The Courier,” The Hobart Town Courier, December 16, 1836, p. 2
problems of the political economy.” Still, this experiment proved to be “one of the most successful and gratifying to humanity of modern times” as the child convicts made great strides in advancing their education and work ethic. Point Puer effectively transformed many previous criminals into apt British citizens. Finally, a policy enacted by the British government improved an aspect of the juvenile justice system, but this success did not come without some disadvantages.

Even though Point Puer exhibited some success with its training, the drawbacks of transportation still overwhelmingly overpowered the benefits for England’s youth. Transportation did not hold the same destiny for everyone. If children exhibited good behavior while in prison awaiting transportation, they received a “ticket of leave” upon arrival. If they had poor behavior, they would be sent to Point Puer. A ticket of leave “allowed a convict to live free of compulsory labor, although still under a formal sentence of transportation.” Essentially, children were shipped to a new colony to live there freely for the duration of their sentence or sent to prisons like Point Puer to learn new skills that would help find in finding a job. When the Select Committee on Transportation met to discuss the high number of convicts arriving in the penal colonies, one of their primary concerns was that this increase was attributable to the lack of dread that transportation invoked among criminals. At Point Puer, children were trained in various trades and prepared for the workforce. So, the many juvenile offenders in London who lacked parental support and employment could view transportation as a welcoming opportunity for future success. Ultimately, the purpose behind transportation was to curb crime. Still, in the end, these shifting policies made transportation, and thus crime, appealing at some times throughout the 1830s for the new life that could be pursued in a penal colony. Most of these convicts, like Joseph Barnes, completed their sentences and received their certificates of freedom. However, these certificates are the last court records and documents associated with the juvenile pickpockets. Thus, their documented journey ends here in the penal colonies.

Conclusion

The experiences of a child pickpocket significantly varied from that of other criminals and quickly changed over the 1830s. As the juvenile pickpocket moved from the streets of London, through the courts, and to the penal colonies, British policies of reform followed them in each sector. The reform of children was an important factor for the new policy enacted by the British government, but ultimately these changes aimed at dismantling the criminal networks in London and reforming children’s behavior to deter them from crime. The courts attacked the seemingly insignificant pickpockets, convicting children and sentencing them to transportation as a means to break up the criminal networks of London Thieves. Transportation was used as the primary form of punishment,

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66 “The Dilemma, Or, Contemporary Criticism,” The Hobart Town Courier, April 15, 1836, 4.
69 Select Committee on Transportation, Report, Minutes of Evidence, Index (1837): HC518-XIV, 276.
but it did little to deter crime as child pickpockets did not fear transportation and accepted their fate, with some even welcoming it. So, children’s unique situation allowed them to persevere through these policy changes. They took advantage of the streets, the courts, and even transportation to accept their given fate, whether it be criminal, colonist, or the ideal British citizen.
The Staging of Jefferson:
Gilbert Gable, Stanton Delaplane, and the 1941 Jefferson Statehood Movement

Charlie Borah

Jefferson’s Slow Birth: 90 Years in the Making
Far from the western metropolises of Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Portland lie the rugged coastline, evergreen forests, and high deserts of southern Oregon and northern California. The region, vastly different from the urban centers, is included in the respective states due to the vast size of the West; the residents often find themselves disconnected from and forgotten by the state governments in Salem and Sacramento. In 1941, the malcontent residents of southern Oregon and northern California launched a plan to finally self-govern as they saw fit. Calling themselves Jeffersonians, the citizens launched what was, in their eyes, a patriotic rebellion against their state governments in a quest to split off and become the 49th state.

The Thursday, 27 November 1941 edition of the San Francisco Chronicle featured a headline demanding, all capitalized, that the United States “ANSWER TO JAPAN!”\(^2\) by intervening militarily against the Japanese to stop letting them wage war against whichever countries they pleased. However, in the midst of what was then the Second Sino-Japanese War and eventually became World War II, Japan was not occupying the most prominent part of the front page. The headliner article about Japan was shoved in the far-left column of the paper. The article with the most dedicated space on the busy front page was “Secession Snowball: ‘It’s No Joke -- We Need Some Good Roads!’”\(^3\) The author of this story about a stunning political development was not a seasoned reporter on the California State Assembly or other political machines in the state but was instead a fresh, thirty-four-year-old travel reporter: Stanton Delaplane. Delaplane was not reporting on the burgeoning movement as it happened, but a note entitled “The Reason for the Story” within the article explained that the 27 November article was actually “the first of a series of stories he will write on the secession counties.”\(^4\) It certainly seems curious that such an important story, about an attempted breakaway state, was reported on in a planned series instead of as it happened. That is unless the story was more staged than real.

The idea of southern Oregon and northern California declaring independence from their state governments was not new in 1941. Separatist movements had been around since California joined the Union in 1850. In 1852, an influx of gold miners to northern California created a significant center of political power outside of Sacramento that led to multiple attempts at the passage of a proposal

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splitting California into two states. That year, the creation of a northern state of Shasta was proposed and killed in the California State Assembly. In 1853 and 1854, the state legislature debated a proposal to split off the northern half of the state and turn it into the state of Klamath, which was slated to include an annexed portion of the southern part of the then-Oregon Territory. An 1854 statehood convention drew local support, but the plan was nixed by legislators elsewhere in the country. Joseph Lane, the Oregon Territory’s Congressional delegate, accused the Californians of hypocrisy and stated that they “don’t think of entertaining the idea of clipping their state” but were nevertheless willing to take part in the Oregon Territory.

It is important to note that these movements, from 1851 to 1941, marketed themselves in varying ways. Some used the term secession more liberally; others strictly stuck to calling themselves statehood movements. It led to some confusion, but there was never a serious movement in southern Oregon and northern California to create an independent country; the movements advocated just for their statehood or, less frequently, to join the other state. These movements were part of California’s formative years when the borders seemed up for debate as a young state. Later, as California’s borders were firmly established and after Oregon’s 1859 admission to the Union, the separatist movements became more attention-seeking than legitimate proposals. In 1909 and 1910, the northern California and southern Oregon independence movement reared its head once again. They renamed the proposed state Siskiyou and sought to market their proposal with the support of the Jackson County Press Association as a way to bring business to the region. This movement, despite letter-writing campaigns and general support in the media, eventually ran out of steam and was the last significant independence movement until the 1941 Jefferson movement, which two men spearheaded: Gilbert Gable, the cosmopolitan East Coast transplant and mayor of Port Orford Oregon, and Stanton Delaplane, the San Francisco travel writer credited with bringing Irish coffee to the United States. Gable and Delaplane’s involvement in the 1941 Jefferson movement was largely self-serving and used the widespread anger of citizens to benefit themselves.

Jeff Lalande, a professor at Southern Oregon University, is intimately involved with the history of Jefferson. In a 2017 article for the Oregon Historical Quarterly, entitled “The State of Jefferson: A Disaffected Region’s 160-Year Search for Identity,” Lalande details the long history of the Jeffersonian movement, and the piece was instrumental in influencing my thinking on the subject. Lalande’s article laid the groundwork for my writing and was the first to bring to my attention the possibility that the movement was not as organic as one would think. Lalande’s article broadly covers the history of Jefferson to examine the mindsets of the people in the region but does not focus closely on Gable and Delaplane. Other scholarship touches on various aspects of Jefferson. This includes its place among other breakaway state movements, reminiscences on the movement and Gable and Delaplane’s roles through the eyes of Jeffersonians alive during the events of 1941. Another examines

7 LaLande, “A Disaffected Region.”
the geographical composition of Jefferson, which is inextricably linked with the demands for a breakaway state. This piece draws upon the prior scholarship and strives to combine two central facts of the 1941 Jefferson movement: citizens of the region were unhappy with their treatment by the federal and state governments, as well as the true story of the movement, which is that Delaplane and Gable played up and embraced the movement for their purposes: increased wealth and political power for Gable, and a long-sought Pulitzer for Delaplane.

Creating Jefferson: The Men Who Made a Movement
Gilbert Gable was well-traveled before he became mayor of Port Orford. Born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in 1886, he forwent college to do publicity for Bell Telephone before heading Liberty Loan drives during World War I. Following the war, he explored the American West and uncovered dinosaur tracks and an ancient Indigenous village in Arizona before finally settling in Port Orford in 1935 with lofty goals.11

Ever the worldly man, Gable dreamed of making Port Orford the West Coast’s only deepwater port between Puget Sound and San Francisco. Gable opened a sawmill in Port Orford and developed a residential neighborhood before wowing the Orfordians by getting the town incorporated. He was rewarded for this by being elected mayor of tiny Port Orford, with a population of a mere 300 people. Gable spent liberally on the harbor upgrade, with total costs of around $750,000 (more than $14 million in 2021) for the dock, administrative building, and another lumber mill. In September 1935, Oregon’s miserly governor, Charles Martin, attended the dedication of the harbor, where Gable, in a rare moment of humility, declared, “I find myself shrinking into microscopic tininess beside the influence and the commerce we here set in motion.”12 The next day, he was granted permission by the Interstate Commerce Commission to build a ninety-mile railroad connecting Port Orford to Leland, an inland town connected to the Southern Pacific line. Gable had struck gold. He intended to use the rail line to transport timber and various precious ores that were to be extracted from the southern Oregon mountainsides.

Gable’s plans were often more show than substance, which was the case with his harbor and railroad. His harbor, shoddily built, was destroyed in a winter storm just three months after its dedication. His railroad, technically approved, was slow to begin construction, and Gable was incensed. In an appearance before the Interstate Commerce Commission, a now-defunct federal railroad regulation agency, he announced a plan to fund the railroad on his own, so long as the ICC granted him a certificate of convenience and necessity. Unable to present any proof of funding and refusing to name his backers, Gable was denied. The Oregon Railroad Commission similarly turned him down. These defeats became a sore spot for Gable and created a sense of disillusionment with the bureaucracy that governed the vast public lands in Curry County, home to Port Orford.

If Gilbert Gable was a worldly man, then Stanton Delaplane must have been universal. Delaplane was born in Chicago, Illinois, in October 1907, where he attended high school before

11 “Gable’s Gold Coast,” Time Magazine, 4 April, 1938, pp. 60.
12 “Gable’s Gold Coast,” p. 62.
moving west to California to finish his education. He began his career in journalism at twenty-six when he joined *Apérîtif Magazine*, a San Francisco arts and culture magazine, as a writer. When *Apérîtif* stopped publication in 1936, three years after he started working there, he headed over to the *San Francisco Chronicle* to serve as a reporter and travel writer, a job he held for more than fifty years until his death in 1988 at the age of eighty.

Delaplane never turned down a good adventure throughout his long career and often created adventure where there was none. In Mexico, writing for his “Postcards” travel series for the *Chronicle*, he hunted for the long-lost head of Mexican revolutionary leader Pancho Villa. In the Shannon, Ireland airport, he discovered Irish coffee, which he excitedly brought back to San Francisco and, as legend has it, sampled so many different versions at a friend’s San Francisco bar that he nearly passed out on the cable car tracks. In 1954, the American Society of Beau Brummell’s named him one of the twenty best-dressed men in the country. A surprising honor considering his color-blindness, which frequently resulted in him wearing mismatched socks. Delaplane and Gable were seemingly a match made in heaven. Amazingly, the Pulitzer Prize he won in 1942 for reporting on the state of the Jefferson movement came relatively early in his career, less than a decade after he started in journalism. Delaplane was always on the hunt for a fascinating story with eccentric characters, and in 1941, he stumbled upon one such story in his own backyard. Mayor Gable sensed the opportunity and was more than happy to play the main character. Despite Delaplane and Gable’s self-serving involvements with the movement, it was by no means inorganic, and the secessionists had a laundry list of legitimate complaints with California and Oregon.

The complaints can largely be pinned on the four governors who served before the 1941 movement: Charles Martin and Charles Sprague in Oregon and Frank Merriam and Culbert Olson in California. Governor Martin of Oregon, who had attended Gable’s harbor opening, served as governor from 1935 to 1939 with a decidedly anti-government and pro-business slant. Before becoming governor, he served in Congress. He used his position on Capitol Hill to convince President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to direct New Deal funds to Bonneville Dam and Timberline Lodge, massive projects close to the state’s northern population center Portland. In Congress, Martin was certainly sympathetic to the New Deal but never once cast a vote on New Deal legislation during the legislative marathon that was President Roosevelt’s first one hundred days. Any love he may have had for the New Deal ran out once he was elected governor. As governor, he refused to fully restore the wages of state employees, who had suffered a fifty percent pay cut during the Great Depression.

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raged about striking timber workers, accusing them of attempting to embarrass him. He railed against government relief and welfare programs as products of a nation run by “Jew Communists.” He declared that he planned to have more than ninety percent of the residents of the Fairview Home, a government-run facility for the developmentally disabled, put to death to balance the state budget. Martin was certainly not the sort of governor who would invest in developing southern Oregon. His successor, Charles Sprague, was far more willing to wield the power of the government but used his power to enact long-term, environmentally focused regulations instead of the infrastructure investments that southern Oregonians desperately wanted.

In Governor Sprague’s inaugural address to the Oregon State Legislature in January 1939, he declared, “I am convinced that the wise handling of natural forest lands calls for their consolidation under public ownership.” Sprague established conservation practices to require reforestation after timber harvesting operations, mandating that loggers leave a set number of seed trees, reseed, or replant the logged land. Sprague also established the state forest system, which set aside land for preservation and limited logging. These regulations were certainly beneficial to the long-term health of Oregon’s forests. However, they added to the general dissatisfaction of the residents of underdeveloped southern Oregon, who wanted development, such as roads, logging, and mining, and believed that such infrastructure was long overdue. The gubernatorial situation in Sacramento was equally bleak for the development-obsessed Jeffersonians.

Frank Merriam, elected governor of California in 1934, began his term facing a shrinking state budget and growing deficit. In response, Merriam, a Republican, had the state legislature enact California’s first state income tax. The new tax was not met with any substantially increased government investment in northern California, as the tax was enacted to cover Great Depression-era deficits. Merriam’s support for relatively high taxation and troubled relationships with unions did not do him any favors with California’s conservatives or liberals, respectively. In the 1938 general election, he lost by eight points to Culbert Olson, who became the first Democrat to serve as governor of California in over four decades. Olson, an ardent supporter of New Deal-style economic policies, had the potential to be northern California’s saving grace. However, he certainly did not do himself any favors with the rural northern believers when he refused to say, “so help me God,” instead of declaring, “I will affirm” while taking his oath of office. His gubernatorial agenda was chock full of government spending with the potential to rejuvenate northern California. However, conservative Democrats sliced almost $100 million off his first budget, quashing programs such as universal healthcare and a proposal to distribute public power from Shasta Dam, less than one hundred miles

from the California and Oregon border. The southern Oregonians’ and northern Californians’ gripes were legitimate, as years of neglect had fostered a disdain for their far-flung state governments.

Even today, almost eighty years after the 1941 statehood push, the flag of the State of Jefferson far outnumbers state flags in southern Oregon and northern California. The flag is green, with a circular yellow seal in the middle. Around the circle’s rim are the words, “The Great Seal of State of Jefferson,” with every letter capitalized. Inside the circle are two black, offset Xs to signify how their state governments had double-crossed the Jeffersonians. The flag likely has the most longevity of anything to come out of the shockingly short 1941 movement—it was a two-week-long movement that changed the region forever.

The Rise and Fall of Jefferson

The 28 November report on the state of Jefferson dubbed the Jefferson statehood movement: “The Yreka Rebellion.” It explained that “rough-shirted miners with pistols buckled on their belts, barricaded the main highway north and south tonight, declared ‘patriotic independence’ from California and Oregon and dared Governor Olson to collect the penny sales tax.” Drivers along the highway were stopped, issued pamphlets containing the Jeffersonians’ declaration of independence, and told to distribute them as they continued down the road. The declaration of independence read, in full:

You are now entering Jefferson, the 49th State of the Union.
Jefferson is now in a patriotic rebellion against the States of California and Oregon.
This State has seceded from California and Oregon this Thursday, 27 November, 1941.
Patriotic Jeffersonians intend to secede each Thursday until further notice.
For the next hundred miles as you drive along Highway 99, you are travelling parallel to the greatest copper belt in the Far West, 75 miles west of here.
The United States Government needs this vital mineral. But gross neglect by California and Oregon deprives us of necessary roads to bring out the copper ore.
If you don’t believe this, drive down the Klamath river highway see for yourself. Take your chains and shovel and dynamite.
Until California and Oregon build a road into the copper country, Jefferson as a defense-minded State will be forced to rebel each Thursday and act as a separate State.
(Please carry this proclamation with you and pass them out on your way.)

In one picture from the roadblock, armed Jeffersonians in cowboy hats and dirty clothes handed a copy of the declaration of independence to a supposed tourist dressed in a fur coat. However, it was not noted that the stopped woman was none other than Miriam Moore, Stanton Delaplane’s then-

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Another suspiciously timed development on 27 November was Lassen County’s pledge to join the fledgling movement. Wiring the Jefferson Citizens’ Committee, Lassen County declared, “We offer to bring in the only active volcano in the continental United States, Mount Lassen.” In their quest for statehood, Lassen’s wire brought them together with California’s Del Norte, Siskiyou, and Modoc counties and Oregon’s Curry County.

Elsewhere in the proposed Jefferson territory, a march was staged in Yreka. A Yreka newspaper instructed potential marchers to “wear Western clothes if they are available” for a chance to become one of the “two hundred people in Western costumes...selected to march past the camera for close-ups.” Film crews sensed the impending story and scrambled to send crews to Yreka. Once on-site, they directed marchers to look at maps, not look at the cameras, complained about the overabundance of children in their shots, and encouraged their subjects to look more excited about the statehood movement. To outsiders around Oregon, California, and the rest of the country, the movement looked shocking and real. This was due in no small part to Delaplane, who, despite witnessing the marchers being directed by film crews, chose not to report the occurrence.

The Jefferson statehood movement was supported by the workers of the would-be state of Jefferson, especially the copper miners who were sitting on massive deposits that could not be reached by trucks for extraction. The Klamath River Highway ran 150 miles from inland Yreka to Crescent City, just a few miles south of the Oregon border on the Pacific coast. The road was largely undeveloped and made mineral extraction nearly impossible. One truck driver who frequented the road recounted an anecdote about a fellow driver transporting a steam shovel, being forced to stop his truck and detonate some dynamite to remove part of a hill blocking his path. Miners also shared a common gripe with the Jeffersonians: They were being forgotten in favor of the state population centers. One miner declared, “If this was Los Angeles County, they’d have the roads in no time. They’ve got the votes, but we’ve got the copper.” There was quite a contrast on 27 November 1941. In one part of the proposed splinter state was a highly orchestrated declaration of independence and march designed by powerful men in the movement for publicity. Elsewhere, in the areas that the state of Jefferson promised to represent, there were miners, citizens’ committees, and truckers declaring their support for the breakaway.

In Delaplane’s third article on the state of Jefferson, on 29 November 1941, he escalated his antics once again, taking to the Klamath River Highway himself to see just how bad the roads were and, as his article title declared, getting “stuck halfway!” To drive home his point, he wrote that a

miner cheerily advised him that if he took the trip through the poorly maintained highway, “they
would probably find my bones by spring all right and give them a decent burial.” Delaplane’s
reporting had entered a new stage. Delaplane had switched from passively reporting on events secretly
staged for publicity to actively insert himself into the news story by traveling the treacherous highway.
He was finally going to put his interactions with Gilbert Gable in the written record. He noted that
his reason for traveling the dangerous, snowy highway was that he was heading to visit Mayor Gable,
“instigator of the secession movement.” Elsewhere in California, reactions to the secession
movement were varied. An editorial published in the *Santa Cruz News* humorously proposed that Santa
Cruz County, south of San Francisco, secede from California and join Portugal. Members of the
state government were less amused.

State officials at the California Department of Public Works and California Department of
Natural Resources were incensed at claims that the Jeffersonian counties did not have adequately
funded infrastructure. A state highway engineer pointed out that California had already spent hundreds
of thousands of dollars on highways in Del Norte, Siskiyou, and Modoc counties and had apportioned
another $400,000 in the 1941 through 1943 budget for highway construction. Other state highway
officials went so far as to pin blame for poor road qualities on the local officials who, they charged,
were responsible for maintenance. Charles Averill, an engineer in the mines division of the
Department of Natural Resources, accused the secession counties of exaggerating the value of their
natural resources and assigned the federal government responsibility for surveying said resources.
Another official from the Department of Natural Resources said, “just as quickly as those and other
counties show that they have something to justify development, they’ll get action from federal and
state governments.” However, the Department of Natural Resources admitted there were substantial
copper deposits that were not being extracted.

The Californian government certainly was not alone in its distaste for the secessionists. When
rumors of the statehood movement first cropped up in October 1941, the Portland-based *Oregonian*
published a derisive article sarcastically declaring that, should Curry County leave Oregon, the county
“would of course immediately acquire the glorious climate of California and become a haven for
retired mid-west farmers.” The *Oregonian*, which in 1941 still declared itself to be a Republican
newspaper, was not a fan of Gilbert Gable’s showy displays of insolence to Republican governor
Charles Sprague. Gable had sent an open letter to Governor Sprague demanding to know what “actual
mineral development’ the state ever made in Curry County, what improvements the state has made to
Port Orford harbor, and why the governor has not obtained for Curry County some of the millions
newly appropriated by congress for defense roads.” The *Oregonian* ran defense for the state
government, writing that the “state has never engaged in actual mineral development anywhere in
Oregon, or in improving harbors anywhere in Oregon, and the new defense road appropriation is

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34 “Curry, Beware!,” *The Oregonian*, 4 October, 1941, p. 6.
35 “Fun from Wonderland,” *The Oregonian*, 20 November, 1941, p. 10.

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imaginary on the mayor’s part.”

It was a brutal smackdown from a paper that had, just the paragraph before, accused Gable of “harshly and oratically” making demands of Governor Sprague. Perhaps sniffing out Gilbert Gable’s publicity stunt before it even began, the article ended by coldly stating that “the mayor has ceased to be funny.” The Oregonian article went on to poke real holes in Gable’s scheme. The duties that Gable accused the state of neglecting were not the state’s duties, at least according to The Oregonian. It was a big strike against Gable’s integrity as a leader of the movement that many of the desired infrastructure projects were either not the state’s responsibility or based on imaginary funding information in the case of the defense road. Regardless, The Oregonian article, published on 20 November, did little to slow Gable on his quest for a state of Jefferson, as the movement launched a little more than a week later.

Delaplane’s write-up of Gilbert Gable is surreal, as Delaplane repeatedly implies that Gable’s Jefferson scheme is little more than a personal ploy. To Delaplane’s readers, Gable was the “sparkplug that is setting the new world on fire.” However, to the Jeffersonians, Gable presented himself as the “hick Mayor of the Westernmost city of the United States.” Gable’s next move after the secession displays was to call a provisional state legislature to meet, composed of the citizens’ committees from the seceding counties. The mayor boasted to Delaplane about receiving almost two dozen letters and telegrams from investors intrigued by the Jeffersonians’ claims of limitless copper, chrome, and other minerals in Curry County. Delaplane nearly gave away the game in response, predicting that “a few more stories and Gable won’t need the OPM money he has demanded of Washington.” There it was summed up in one offhand remark: Delaplane and Gable were in cahoots, and the Jefferson project benefited them both. For Delaplane - “a few more” stories - was not a big ask for a man whose articles were being reproduced as wire reports in The New York Times and about which buzz of a potential Pulitzer Prize circulated. He later won this award for his reporting on the state of Jefferson. Similarly, Mayor Gable, a real estate developer and owner of a sawmill who stood to benefit handsomely from investment in Curry County, was certainly not going to decline the money of free-spending private investors who wanted to start digging.

Gable made himself the de facto chief executive of the Jefferson movement from the beginning and made a series of contradictory executive orders to local newspapers. Gable, advocating for increased funding to the region to build roads and extract minerals, informed the papers and citizens that any state of Jefferson he was governor of was not going to have a sales tax, income tax, or liquor tax. How he was going to fund roads and infrastructure was left a mystery. Gable, ever the businessman, also declared that he intended to outlaw the practice of striking within Jefferson. In an article about the Jefferson movement, Finn J.D. John noted that this was “no big surprise coming from the guy who owned almost all Curry County industry.”

36 “Fun from Wonderland,” p. 10.
37 “Fun from Wonderland,” p. 10
38 “Fun from Wonderland,” p. 10.
41 John, “Port Orford P.R. Wizard Managed Jefferson Secession Like a Movie.”
The two Xs on the proposed Jefferson state flag that signifies how California and Oregon double-crossed their rural regions could well have been four after Gable and Delaplane’s betrayals during the 1941 movement. The movement for a state composed of southern Oregon and northern California was long and storied. The people, according to Delaplane, were “serious about it. They write scorching letters on both sides of the question to their newspapers. They are mining men and lumber men, and they, and their fathers before them, were born here.”42 That was a stark contrast to the men tasked with leading and promoting the movement: a decently wealthy Philadelphian who had made Port Orford and Jefferson his pet projects and a San Francisco travel writer. On 1 December 1941, Floyd Healey, a reporter with decades of experience at the San Francisco Chronicle and Los Angeles Times, took over writing about the Jefferson statehood movement since Delaplane’s four article series had concluded with the previous day’s article about Gable. The article’s tone changed immediately, from Delaplane’s detailed descriptions and repeated insertion of himself into the story to Healey’s dry writing about minute details of the relationship between unions and the Jefferson movement. Delaplane’s vivid descriptions of the statehood movement were not that way just because he was enthusiastic about his job but because he was involved with the statehood movement’s planning and execution.

In the article above on Jefferson, Lalande provided a damning indictment of Delaplane, writing that the Chronicle reporter “actively participated in the unfolding story by suggesting, urging, and apparently choreographing”43 events like the roadblock and a torch-lit parade in Yreka. Interestingly, Lalande said that the leading energy behind the movement came from businessmen and politicians, not the citizens, whom he argued “dutifully showed up as extras.”44 Lalande seemed to be only speaking of how citizens supported the specific Gable-led movement because citizens were absolutely in support of the idea of a state of Jefferson. They repeatedly lamented to Delaplane about how mistreated they were by their state governments, how the citizens and their natural resources were forgotten and expressed envy of the coddling that big cities like Los Angeles received. By the end of November, feelings were varied about the Jefferson movement. Some viewed it entirely seriously, others viewed it as a simple publicity stunt, and to others, it was just some laughable grumblings from the perpetually displeased rural folks. Even Delaplane’s newspaper, the San Francisco Chronicle, mocked the Jefferson statehood movement. In one section of the 2 December edition, a cartoon spider named Mimi asked a cartoon mouse, “you know what happened to the last Jefferson that tried to secede,” before declaring that it was Jefferson Davis, much to her amusement.45 On the morning of 2 December, San Francisco Chronicle readers read that quip about Jefferson. By that night, Gilbert Gable, the leader of the statehood movement, was dead of a heart attack.

Gable died as he lived: on the front page of newspapers. His death was a massive blow to the Jeffersonian movement as he was a leading favorite to become the governor or a Congressman for the proposed state. On 3 December, Delaplane returned to his Jefferson reporting to eulogize the late

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mayor and the state of Jefferson. Delaplane declared that Gable was a man “whose historical importance was yet to come” and lamented that he “left a great idea unfinished.” Delaplane also continued his trend of exposing Gable’s true character. While Delaplane certainly was not writing maliciously about his good friend, Delaplane was more interested in the story than the fact that he was revealing his and Gable’s phony roles in the statehood movement. In two damning paragraphs, Delaplane wrote:

Gable was never what he claimed to be: “A hick Mayor of a Western Coast town.” He was a smooth, cosmopolitan product with clothes cut by a New York tailor and an acquaintance list built up from 11 years as a public relations man for Bell Telephone Company in Philadelphia.

For the dramatics of it, he liked to pose as just a small town Mayor. Gable probably knew that his 49th State and secession movement would never be accomplished. But he knew the weakness of State Legislatures, the pin pricks of adverse publicity, and he used them neatly.47

Just days before, Delaplane had presented Jefferson as a great populist movement, with Gable, its brave leader, guiding the citizens on their quest for statehood. Delaplane’s tone had shifted dramatically a day after Gable’s death. Gable and Delaplane spent the evening together on the night of 1 December, comparing notes and game planning how exactly to discuss the movement and the massive regional and national attention it was drawing. Delaplane expressed his hopes of winning a Pulitzer. At the same time, Gable believed the movement would get him the railroad capable of opening up southwest Oregon for development and, in turn, making him handsomely wealthy. Delaplane had planned and staged multiple events with Gable to legitimize the state of Jefferson but was trying to distance himself from that, declaring that it was never going to be accomplished. Delaplane also played it off as a political ploy to get more money from the state legislatures. While Gable was almost certainly leading the movement to get investments in Port Orford and the surrounding areas, either from the government or private investors, that was not the message he conveyed to the angry citizens of northern California and southern Oregon who desired to start their own state.

Neither Delaplane’s words nor Gable’s death dampened enthusiasm for the statehood movement. On 4 December, two days after Gable’s untimely death, the citizens of the planned state converged on Yreka, California, the proposed capital, to elect a provisional governor. The late Gable had been seen as a frontrunner in the gubernatorial race, but the citizens elected Judge John Childs as their governor in his absence. It was a celebratory day in Yreka, as the town leaned into its status as the secession capital of America. Schools let the kids out early to join in the celebrations, and the streets were decorated with bunting and state of Jefferson flags. The author of that day’s San Francisco Chronicle article about the festivities was not named. However, they struck a similar tone to Delaplane, declaring, “Whether copper is brought out of the snowy Siskiyou or not, Yreka was hitting top

48 John, “Port Orford P.R. Wizard Managed Jefferson Secession Like a Movie.”
Christmas business, with packed restaurants, stores, and hotels.\(^{49}\) The inauguration was the second occurrence of the weekly secession events that had started the week prior with the roadblock. Governor Childs gave a fiery inauguration speech, exhorting the crowd to continue supporting the statehood movement and to demand better of their governors. He invoked the Bible, quoting 1 Kings 12:16, to summarize the plight of the Jeffersonians: “So when all Israel saw that the King hearkened not unto them, the people answered the King, saying ‘What portion have we in David’… So Israel departed unto their tents.”\(^{50}\) Governor Childs implied that the Jeffersonians were the chosen people, but their state governors had still turned their backs on them, so they needed to create their own homeland. It was a dramatic and rapid shift from Gable’s freewheeling and exuberant advocacy for their own state to Childs’ emotional biblical invocation.

The new governor’s commitment to the state of Jefferson was noted in the 6 December 1941 issue of the San Francisco Chronicle. That day the paper reported that many of the revelers from the inaugural party awoke with hangovers, but not Governor Childs. Childs was reportedly well-rested and immediately got to work on real legislative solutions. One of his first acts was to proclaim that the federal government must rectify a tax imbalance caused by the vast public lands in the planned Jefferson territory. Childs said this created an unfair tax burden on private property holders near the public lands, as the federal government was not paying tax on its land. Governor Childs also declared his intention to immediately begin negotiations with the California government on funding for roads into the state’s northern interior to extract timber and minerals.\(^{51}\) Childs was a longtime resident of northern California and was tuned in to the political workings of the state, not simply a loud-talking firebrand like Gable. Unfortunately for the supporters of Jefferson, Childs’ governorship did not last long.

The 6 December 1941 issue of the San Francisco Chronicle was the final issue of the year to mention the statehood movement as a legitimate political movement. The 7 December 1941 was, in the solemn words of President Roosevelt, a “day that will live in infamy”\(^{52}\) as the Japanese military launched a massive surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. The next day the paper made no mention of Jefferson, the rebellious countryfolk replaced by a massive, entirely capitalized headline that proclaimed: “U.S. AT WAR!”\(^{53}\) The attack’s death toll eventually was determined to be 2,403 people, but at the time of the Chronicle’s morning publication, only 350 of those deaths were known. Even with the partial count, the response was still resounding. The paper’s editorial board took out a small box on the front page to implore Americans to unite. The board wrote that “The time for debate has passed, and the time for action has come. That action must be united and unanimous. ‘Politics is


\(^{50}\) “Jefferson Inaugurates a Governor,” p. 8.

\(^{51}\) “‘Governor’ Takes Up the Tax Problem,” San Francisco Chronicle, 6 December, 1941, p. 7.

\(^{52}\) Franklin D. Roosevelt, “‘December 7, 1941– A Date Which Will Live in Infamy’– Address to the Congress Asking That a State of War Be Declared Between the United States and Japan,” (speech, Washington D.C., 8 December, 1941). https://www.loc.gov/item/afccal000483/.

\(^{53}\) “U.S. AT WAR! PARATROOPS LAND IN PHILIPPINES!” San Francisco Chronicle, 8 December, 1941, p. 1.
adjourned.” The advocates for a state of Jefferson felt similarly, immediately moving to disband the effort. Governor Childs announced that the weekly secession activities, planned every Thursday indefinitely, were to cease immediately and proclaimed, “In the view of the National emergency, the acting officers of the provisional territory of Jefferson here and now discontinue any and all activities.” The plucky Jeffersonians and previously front-page headlines were relegated to the paper’s sixteenth page. Childs, who had been firing up crowds in Yreka for independence just days before, sought to make peace with state officials and pledged support. He announced that, the State of Jefferson was originated for the sole purpose of calling the attention of the proper authorities… to the fact we have immense deposits of strategic and necessary defense materials… We have accomplished that purpose and henceforth all of our efforts will be directed toward assisting our States and Federal Governments. Childs was attempting to back down from the audacious calls for statehood as the country worked to rally for what was surely going to be a brutal war. As part of the defense funding authorized during World War II, some of the roads called for during the statehood movement were constructed. Across the region, committees once dedicated to supporting the statehood cause issued statements of loyalty and unity with their states and the United States. The story was dead.

Jefferson’s Legacy
The movement, however, was not dead. Despite Gable’s death and Delaplane’s declaration that the statehood movement was over, the same problems that caused the movement in the first place persisted and were finally being discussed in the media and statehouses. The Jeffersonians were serious about their loyalty pledges, and the movement was nearly nonexistent during World War II. Since then, it has flared on various occasions, and the twenty-first century has brought a sustained movement for statehood with it. The complaints remain similar today. The modern Jefferson movement, represented by the State of Jefferson Formation group, is primarily composed of Californians. They continue to feel that the California state government does not adequately represent the northern portion of the state. While the movement has taken a significant shift towards a libertarian ideology, they still call for full utilization of the region’s natural resources. They continue to believe that the region’s tax obligations are out of proportion with the lack of services it receives and that the region is massively underrepresented. Mark Baird, a member of the Siskiyou County Committee of the Jeffersonian statehood movement, even channeled Governor Childs’ biblical invocation in a speech explaining why the state of Jefferson was necessary. He compared the plight of the statehood activists to that of the Israelites in Biblical Egypt, held as slaves by a Pharaoh, foreign to them, who did not care for the Israelites. Said Baird, “when the Pharaoh did not let them go, they did something about it.” He encourages his audience to follow suit.

54 “America at War!” San Francisco Chronicle, 8 December, 1941, p. 1.
55 “War With Japan Stops Agitation For 49th State,” San Francisco Chronicle, 8 December, 1941, p. 16.
56 “War With Japan Stops Agitation For 49th State,” p. 16.
The modern Jefferson movement does not seem particularly interested in reckoning with Gilbert Gable and Stanton Delaplane’s legacy, even though the brief 1941 movement was when the proposed state finally got the name Jefferson, selected in a newspaper poll in honor of the third president. The State of Jefferson Formation website mentions neither the mayor nor the journalist. Gilbert Gable maintains a certain favorability in Port Orford, where the residents appreciate his successful drive to incorporate the city. However, outside the small coastal town, the men’s legacies are nonfactors in the modern movement. Perhaps it is fitting that Gable and Delaplane, who began the movement in search of worldly possessions like awards and money, have faded from the movement’s memory.

Today, anyone looking to travel from either of California’s biggest cities, San Francisco or Los Angeles, to Portland, Oregon, will find that the fastest route by car is to take Interstate 5 directly through Yreka, California. Less than ten minutes before entering Jefferson’s proposed capital, an eighty-foot-long, open-air barn sits near the side of the road. Overlaid on the barn roof is a white wrap cut out, so the corrugated steel left visible reads “State of Jefferson,” and under the roof’s cover lies a massive quantity of neatly stacked bales of hay. It is unlikely that the rural farmer who owns the building has much in common with Gilbert Gable or Stanton Delaplane other than a shared desire for a state of Jefferson and a piece of common knowledge: it is important to make hay while the sun shines.
The Role of Policy and Media in Reagan’s War on Drugs

Sage Ceja

Fifteen years into the War on Drugs, cocaine had taken a prominent victim. Two days after the 1986 National Basketball Association draft, the first-round second pick had become another person to mourn. Len Bias was an exciting player to watch, expected to be on the level of Michael Jordan and other basketball legends, but ultimately, he was more influential in the War on Drugs. The famous basketball star’s untimely death from an overdose influenced the creation and approval of new, stricter drug laws, like the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act. This act further penalized and criminalized the drug that caused Bias’ death—crack cocaine. Beyond legislation, this new world of mass media and a national popular culture also influenced the battleground for the drug war. In the 1980s, one of the weapons most used to fight narcotics was popular culture and media. Music, sports, celebrities, and advertisements became quintessential pieces of weaponry in the War on Drugs. Legislation and public policy passed, like the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, of course, remained a way to fight against substance use. The War on Drugs was fought on both the political and cultural front. Both fronts reduced the nuance and complexity of the drug issue in America. In anti-drug media, the issue of drugs was reduced to an issue of the individual, contradicting the legislation being created. The oversimplification of drug use in the media led to the War on Drugs becoming an ineffective campaign.

Popular culture could reach a broad audience, but how anti-drug activists used it undermined the effectiveness of their campaigns. Many of the campaigns were cheesy and difficult to take seriously. They also oversimplified the causes of drug use, minimized the difficulty of quitting drugs, and demonized drugs, their users, and addiction rehabilitation. While trying to make complex concepts – like drug use, addiction, and rehabilitation – digestible to a very young demographic, the anti-drug activists reduced the genuinely complex drug issue in America to a problem with a simple solution. Like the anti-alcohol pieces released during the Prohibition era, many anti-drug works perpetuated the idea that any substance use was inherently wrong and that individuals who used them would be reduced to delinquency. Beyond that, the anti-drug propaganda of the 1980s insinuates that all drug issues could be solved via the individual.

While popular culture boiled solving the drug issue in America down to personal righteousness and discipline, the policy differed. It aimed to solve the drug issue through brute force and punitive measures. Like the measures taken in the Prohibition era, the policy created in the 1980s dealt with substance issues by preventing the use and the sale of drugs with harsh repercussions. The War on Drugs had two fronts— popular culture, which displayed a softer approach to the issue, and legal measures, which showed a rigid approach to halting drug use. Both these fronts were unsuccessful in

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1 Sage Ceja is a first-generation student from Downey, CA. She turned an obsession with bad commercials into this paper.

their mission. The media and the legislation created led to the War on Drugs being deemed ineffective. Anti-drug media oversimplified the issues, causing them not to be taken seriously. The policy had no discernible effect on drug use or sales in the United States and had high social costs. The dichotomy between the media and the legislation further showed how the War on Drugs was unsuccessful.

The War on Drugs may have made media and culture a battleground, but the United States government waged it. The 1960s were undoubtedly difficult for Americans and their nation; a war raged overseas, and wide-scale civil unrest erupted over continued racial disparities. In order to combat these issues, President Lyndon B. Johnson started the War on Crime and the War on Poverty. The War on Crime expanded surveillance, patrol, and detention, and the War on Poverty created more opportunities for economically disadvantaged people through financial assistance and training opportunities.³ These programs, referred to as the Great Society policies, set a precedent for social programs to be active participants in law enforcement.⁴ For example, Great Society policies indicated that punitive measures to prevent crime must be implemented to support lower-income families, who were more likely to be people of color.⁵ Law enforcement became essential to furthering any social program or societal goal. However, while President Johnson attempted to fix many of the root causes of many issues in America—like poverty, unemployment, and housing—Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan decided to focus on the drug issue.⁶

On 18 June 1971, Richard Nixon waged war against America’s newest and most daunting foe: illicit substances. Nixon’s immediate successors would not carry on his tough on drugs approach. Both Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter would attempt a harm reduction approach, where medical and psychiatric treatment was prioritized.⁷ Nevertheless, the War on Drugs would be reignited by Ronald Reagan. The war’s peak, particularly in media and popular American culture, would come in the 1980s with President Ronald Reagan and First Lady Nancy Reagan. The two played vital roles in achieving the same goal but did so in vastly different ways.

The first couple of the United States waged this war as a united front, with each playing a specific role. Ronald Reagan fought drugs in a way that suited his position—through legislation. By capitalizing on the fear of Americans—who were witnessing an increase in crime and deaths from drug use—he garnered support for two strict anti-drug acts. The 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Act and the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act introduced some of the strictest federal laws regarding drugs and substance users in the United States and sharply increased the power of law enforcement. Both acts received overwhelming support from both the House of Representatives and Senate. These acts introduced mandatory minimum sentences for drug users, allowed police to seize private property, and

and disproportionately affected marginalized communities. However, the modern perception of the War on Drugs sees it as an expensive failure. Rates of drug use remained relatively steady, drugs remained easy to buy, and incarceration rates have only increased. The perception that the War on Drugs was a failure is much easier to attribute to Ronald Reagan and his political role, but his partner’s role in the battle is often overlooked.

Nancy Reagan may be best known as the First Lady of the United States, but her initial rise to prominence was through the media. She and her husband met as Hollywood movie stars but became significant forces in the conservative movement. While her husband helped create a more punitive drug enforcement regiment, Nancy waged her anti-drug fight through the media and popular culture. Her role and influence were understated compared to her husband’s, yet she was an important force in the War on Drugs. As argued by historian Kevin Mattson, Nancy Reagan knew about Hollywood and the culture of the 1980s to know that the way to the people’s hearts and minds was through images and sounds. Nancy Reagan attempted to tap into the spirit of millions of Americans through any medium she could. She understood how to weaponize popular American culture and media against drugs. The anti-drug media and Nancy Reagan’s influence on it may not be the most apparent reason for the shortcomings of the War on Drugs, but it shaped subsequent perceptions of it. Anti-drug media showcased American drugs and drug use in a highly simplified manner. The lack of nuance and realism of these topics indicated that Nancy Reagan and her anti-drug supporters did not fully understand the enemy they were fighting. The War on Drugs had shortcomings on the policy and media fronts where the iconic pieces of media show a reductive and straightforward solution to a complex and nuanced issue.

The War on Drugs was not the first time in American history that the media was used to push a political agenda. The ideological predecessor to the War on Drugs, the Prohibition era, saw its fair share of media being utilized to push the dry agenda. In 1899, the song “Blue Monday” depicted a resentful miner discussing how drink brought out the worst in his coworkers, causing them to be messy and water their money, so he pledged to commit himself to temperance and give his wages to his wife. The ideas regarding substance abuse during the Prohibition era are seen in the media produced during the War on Drugs. It innuendated that any amount of drinking wrecks the individual’s life. The drinker, as a person, values alcohol over his wife, implying that they were not of upstanding character. The good, reformed miner quickly stopped drinking, eliminating the idea that drinking can be addictive and difficult to shake. This song, and the Prohibition era in general, set a cultural precedent for the War on Drugs. Media and popular culture would be vital to shaping public policy, but the drug media produced in the 1980s set itself apart from its predecessors in many ways.

As mentioned earlier, War on Drugs media was the personal project of First Lady Nancy Reagan, as opposed to the anti-alcohol media, which was made by private individuals, like the author of Blue Monday or prohibitionist organizations. This sets the anti-drug media apart from its

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predecessors. This media was directly tied to the Reagan administration through the First Lady. Beyond that, due to technological advancements, the scope of the media was broader, circulating on mediums that reached vast and diverse audiences. While media has been used to push many thoughts and ideas, the anti-drug work was directly tied to the First Lady’s cause and circulated on various mediums.

By the 1980s, television was a quintessential part of American life. With millions of Americans from almost all demographics watching a select handful of broadcasting networks, it became the perfect medium to advertise concepts and ideas. The War on Drugs used television as a primary weapon. Anti-drug rhetoric was quickly and constantly put on screen. Many of the most iconic anti-drug commercials came out during this decade. Television series, particularly those aimed at a younger audience, began to have special anti-drug episodes. Because this media was created with adolescent audiences in mind, many of these works appeared less earnest to older audiences, who likely grasped the complexity of drug issues. Television scenarios used over-the-top scare tactics to influence young audiences, encouraging them to be vehemently anti-drug. Cartoon characters and inanimate beings were used to show the dangers American youth would face regarding drugs. Advertisements reached this exalted status not by being good or necessarily effective but by being ridiculous and grossly oversimplifying many of the concerns surrounding drugs. Television was easily digestible for children and young audiences, but this digestibility came at the cost of nuance and realism regarding drug use concerns.

Ranked as the eighth-best commercial of all time by Entertainment Weekly in 1997, “Fried Egg,” sponsored by The Partnership for a Drug Free America, is an infamous cultural force. The premise of the work is simple. The narrator, serious and exasperated, is holding an egg over a hot frying pan and sternly says that this egg is a brain, and the pan represents drugs. The egg is then cracked onto the pan, instantly splattering. The whites quickly set and the egg fries immediately. The narrator quickly declares that this was what a brain on drugs looked like and asks the audience, “Any questions?” Most audiences would very quickly understand the message presented by this commercial, but it vastly oversimplified and misrepresented the effects of drug use. This iconic commercial perpetuated the concept that drug use will undoubtedly ruin an individual’s life. It also insinuated that one experience with the fry pan drugs would lead to irreparable damage. The explanation for the War on Drugs lacked any room for nuance, exemplified by this commercial that implied that just as the egg cannot be unfried, those who use drugs could never be fully sober. Drug use and its effects are incredibly personal and individual, but instead of portraying it as such, the media portrayed a problematic all-or-nothing message. However, this simple commercial did not reach its iconic status due to its reception as a successful anti-drug commercial, but through its delivery and ability to be parodied.

While the commercial attempted to scare individuals into sobriety, this iconic piece was not well-received by teenagers. Students who had grown up watching this commercial—and similar media—appeared to be skeptical of the hard anti-drug ideas shown. One student, who ended up

studying at the University of California Berkeley, noted that the commercial was inaccurate and that many students on the honor roll also smoked marijuana.\footnote{Erika Alexander, “Students debate effectiveness, accuracy of well-known anti-drug commercials”, CNN Student Bureau, 2000.} The student stated that she does not “believe that scare tactics ever work in preventing kids from doing anything.”\footnote{Erika Alexander, “Students debate effectiveness, accuracy of well-known anti-drug commercials”, 2000.} This statement on scare tactics aligns with research on anti-drug PSAs done in 2013, which found that teenagers respond best to anti-drug pieces that show the negative impacts of drug use in an emotionally compelling way that is not overly aggressive.\footnote{Ian S. Ramsay, et al, “Affective and Executive Network Processing Associated with Persuasive Antidrug Messages”, \textit{Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience}, 2013.} “This is your brain on drugs” is not an emotionally compelling piece; it shows the supposed effects of drug use in a very matter-of-fact way. Beyond that, the piece feels passive-aggressive due to its closing ‘Any questions?’ line. This work used scare tactics, which may influence its inability to connect with many teens.

“This is your brain on drugs” is the best-known line from the advertisement and was quickly co-opted by other popular television programs, being used as a joke. For example, the popular 1980s and 1990s sitcom “Married... with Children” parodied the advertisement. The main character, dealing with the idea of being an unhappily married man, recreates the commercial. He loosely follows the format of the commercial. An egg representing the brain is held up and then slammed onto the floor. He then declared that is what a brain on marriage is like. He finishes by asking his female friends if they have any questions and a classic 90s laugh track ensues.\footnote{Married… With Children, Season 4, Episode 18, “What Goes Around Comes Around”, Directed by Gerry Cohen, Aired February 25, 1990, Fox.} “Fried Egg” was widely known enough to be parodied and laughed at by thousands of viewers. This sitcom is just one of many examples of how this commercial got reclaimed in popular culture. It intended to be a serious warning against drug use the world of American pop culture warped it. Yet, for all its sincerity and positive intent, the American people did not take the anti-drug commercial seriously. The commercial was ineffective as anti-drug media but was well-known enough to be a funny gag in future media. Its simplicity and attempt at being earnest played a significant role in making it such a fun work to parody.

Anti-drug PSAs continue to be parodied in popular media. In 2019, Saturday Night Life spoofed the anti-drug works in a skit simply titled, “‘80s Drug PSA”. The skit depicts three men, who are supposed to be young, being swayed away from using crack cocaine by two supposed anti-drug advocates. In the typical fashion of anti-drug media, the work ends with the iconic line, ‘just say no.’\footnote{“’80s Drug PSA”, \textit{Saturday Night Live}, 2019.} The dialogue and exchanges are awkward and almost unnatural – emulating how many of the actual PSAs are perceived. African American Vernacular English is ironically used throughout this skit, showing an awareness of the racial biases found in many anti-drug works. One of the funniest parts of this anti-drug skit is its recognition that anti-drug propaganda can be ineffective. One of the men who is supposed to be pushing for sobriety expresses interest in doing crack when he learns that it is less expensive and just as potent as cocaine. The individual who represents anti-drug propaganda does
not fully believe in anti-drug messaging. This skit shows the everlasting effect of the 1980s’ anti-drug media on popular culture and the overall ineffectiveness of War on Drugs media.

Although television shows sometimes parodied the ineffective War on Drugs media, they also supported the cause. Cartoons served an important role because much of War on Drugs media in the 1980s focused on preventing drug use in younger, elementary school-aged audiences. Animated series already had a younger fan base, and the fantasy world they lived in made television shows an ideal format for promoting anti-drug messages. The cartoons portrayed drug use—ranging from smoking marijuana to doing crack—simply and in a binary manner that was easy for children to understand. They also stripped the issues of their complexity and nuance.

On 21 April 1990, a special anti-drug regiment was released. It was financed by the Ronald McDonald Children’s Charity and was broadcasted by NBC, ABC, FOX, and CBS with the Saturday morning cartoons. It capitalized on cartoon star power. It starred Winnie the Pooh, Tigger, the Smurfs, Huey, Dewey, Louie, and many other beloved cartoon characters. “Cartoon All-Stars to the Rescues” was set up to be a highly successful advertisement with its prime showtime, star-studded cast, and wealthy financiers. Despite this, it did not depict drug use and drug users with the seriousness the subject deserved because it was marketed to children. The plot was simple and came to a clear and oversimplified conclusion because it was to the benefit of anti-drug advocates to create simple pieces with binary conclusions towards children. If the anti-drug message was internalized in adolescence, it would be more difficult to approach with nuance in adulthood. While this seems like a solid idea, the simplicity of the pieces led to them being ineffective.

*Cartoon All-Stars to the Rescue* followed two siblings; Corey, the younger sister who cannot be older than 10, and Michael, the early-teen brother who uses drugs. Michael steals money from his sister at night, and unbeknownst to him, Papa Smurf watches his crime. The star-studded cartoon lineup then begins to follow Michael with the hopes of stopping his marijuana usage. Michelangelo from *The Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles* tells Michael that the drugs are frying his brain, but he ignores him. After another attempt to change his path, Michael wakes up startled and throws his sister into a wall, almost breaking her arm. Another character shows Michael an older, decrepit version of himself. The cartoon character shows that using crack in his teenage years is what sets off a lifetime of hurt and states that the drugs are in charge, not Michael. This vision of the future is not enough to set Michael straight. Finally, Daphne Duck offers Michael his future, in which an even sicker and unsuccessful version of himself appears, finally scaring himself straight. Michael and his sister then talk to their parents about his drug abuse.

This show presented an anti-drug message but perpetuated many harmful concepts regarding drug use and users. Firstly, as many other media sources do, it indicates that any drug use is toxic and will send a person down the wrong path. Michael was a young man, but his future, seen through a crystal ball, was predicated solely on his drug use. This furthers the War on Drugs’ all-or-nothing mentality. Just as the egg was ruined by one experience with a hot pan, in the episode, it is a safe assumption that a few instances of drug use ruin Michael’s life. The TV special makes drug use unanimously bad, but it also glosses over the complexity of individual drugs. Marijuana and crack are

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both illicit substances, but they are vastly different, and this cartoon stripped the nuance and varying effects of these two substances. Michael was also portrayed as a danger to others by harming his sister, insinuating that those who use drugs harm society and those around them. The messaging was made explicitly for a young audience, but it undermined the complexity of preventing drug use.

The imaginary world of cartoons was the perfect place to spread anti-drug media, and it would have been a great place to showcase the intricacies and nuance of the issue. In this cartoon, the character Smoke, who represented marijuana and the dangers of the drug, was a flat character. His only purpose was to be malicious, and he was tossed away once Michael decided to stop using. Since marijuana is not necessarily a harmful drug with only adverse effects, smoke could have been more dynamic. He could have had a character arc or some redeeming quality but showing the nuance of the effects of drugs would not have been good enough for the conservative crusade against drugs. A complex and nuanced message would not benefit the case against drugs, so they were presented as only being malicious. This media reinforced the idea that drugs were harmful, have no use in society, and that it was up to the individual to either say no to drug use or fall victim to a substance. The issues of drugs, drug use, and drug users are much more complex than any anti-drug cartoon depicted, and that was likely done on purpose to reinforce the worldview that declared the War on Drugs.

Television in the 1980s revolutionized music’s impact on popular culture. Music had always been an effective medium to express and push political messages, but the growing popularity of the music video took music’s influence to another level. On 1 August 1981, the Music Television Channel aired and revolutionized popular media. Visual stories were now attached to famous songs, and anyone with cable access could listen to and watch the same piece. The rise in the Music Television Channel gave popular culture even more weight regarding its role in the War on Drugs.

In 1986, the War on Drugs took a different approach by releasing an anti-drug song with an accompanying music video. “Stop The Madness” united many big-time celebrities, like Whitney Houston, Arnold Schwarzenegger, and the leader of the anti-drug effort herself, First Lady Nancy Reagan. This visual aspect of this work aimed to further the concept that drugs are inherently harmful and that waging war on drugs will benefit society. The music video shows images of various substances and guns, contrasted with snippets of police units violently entering homes and handcuffing people, creating a visual link between drug use, violence, and criminality. The video then establishes two protagonists, a young, pretty white woman who looks relatively well off and a young Black man who embodies the stereotype of a low-income drug user. The two protagonists appear to be opposites in about every aspect—gender, race, and financial income—which aims to show that drug issues are pervasive and non-discriminatory. No one is safe from drugs, and a war on drugs is the only way to save society. Both individuals are scared straight, joining together at the end of the video to dispose of their drugs. The final moments of “Stop the Madness” show people from all backgrounds joyously dancing together, celebrating the new drug-free lives of the protagonists. The music video takes a clear anti-drug stance. It connects drug use with delinquency and then aims to show a positive and simply better, drug-free life. The work uses the power of many celebrities and their influence to appeal to a broader audience and attempt to popularize the war on drugs.

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20 “Stop the Madness”, Tim Reed, (January 17, 1986: NBC Friday Night Videos), Music Video.
The visual aspect of the video appears to challenge preconceptions of drug users but still succumbs to many racial stereotypes. Many works and anti-drug videos express the idea that drug users are irredeemable and unable to change, but the finale of this video denounces that idea. Both users throw their dope in a trash bin and join the crowd of happy people, symbolizing that they are sober and can rejoin society. That being stated, this piece was overly simple in its presentation of rehabilitation. Quitting drugs and fighting addiction is not as simple as discarding a stash and moving on with life. This work appears to fight a racial bias but ultimately relies on race-based stereotypes. Drug use, addiction, and incarceration are more heavily associated with African American communities, so having a Black male lead break off from this preconception shows movement away from stereotypes.21 It could have challenged more stereotypes regarding drug users of color. The music video still has a Black man living in a neighborhood that appears low-income and unsafe, dressing in a stereotypical ‘hood’ way. While not great, this work portrays the issue of drug use with more nuance and is more forgiving towards users, making it a step in a better direction.

Despite these positive aspects of the video, the lyrics can undermine them. The line, “Now you’re a prisoner in a cell crying to be free,” reinforces the concept that drug users are not in control of their own lives, but the substance they use is. While the video breaks away from the racial stereotypes of drug users, the diction used, and the celebrities chosen to sing suggest a bias. Drugs are called slavery, an allusion that is rather tone-deaf with the history of America and African Americans. Individuals who believe drugs are a victimless crime are called “fools.” This is a common piece of slang in African American Vernacular English (AAVE). A drug-using “brother,” another common term used to refer to a man in AAVE, is spoken to for his issue. Adding to the lyrics, the main singer of this work is Whitney Houston, a famous African American singer. She, a Black icon put on this track for her star power and influence, sings these lyrics directly to a Black audience. The singer and diction choice diminish the concept that “Stop the Madness” was racially progressive and could challenge stereotypes. Having a Black singer directly sing to their community, using AAVE and alluding to slavery, was perceived as performative. The creators, purposefully or not, had a Black artist preach anti-drug propaganda to their community. “Stop the Madness” made strides in portraying drugs and their users as more complex but seemed to undermine its attempt to avoid racial bias.

The “Stop the Madness” music video, simply put, aged horrendously. Looking back at this video, with modern hindsight, is both an amusing and disconcerting experience. The star-studded lineup was instrumental in drawing audiences in and was a significant selling point of the piece. Still, the video highlighted many weaknesses of the Reagan Administration’s anti-drug campaign. With Nancy Reagan’s approval, the song discussed ending drug use, and the video successfully showcased that message. However, many of the prominent cultural figures in the video had used illicit drugs. Basketball superstar Kareem Abdul-Jabbar was in the video throwing a basketball at the head of the protagonist, who was just about to inhale an unspecified substance. Just three years prior to the release of this video, Abdul-Jabbar had admitted to smoking weed, using LSD, snorting cocaine, and trying heroin while in college.22 He wanted to use his life experiences to show young people to stay away

from illicit drugs. Despite this, just two decades later, in 2000, he was caught driving under the influence of marijuana, his second time coming into conflict with the law since 1988.\textsuperscript{23} Arnold Schwarzenegger not only admitted to using anabolic steroids and performance-enhancing drugs, but he also admitted that he did not regret using them.\textsuperscript{24} Whitney Houston, the music video star, publicly battled drug use and addiction throughout her career. In 2012, at the age of 48, the music icon drowned while overdosing on cocaine.\textsuperscript{25} Looking at this primary source through a modern lens is immensely ironic. Here are the top celebrities and icons of the era, preaching an anti-drug stance with Nancy Reagan while they would publicly struggle with their own substance issues for decades to come.

The popular culture and media, created in support of the War on Drugs and influenced by Nancy Reagan, reached a relatively straightforward conclusion. All drug use, regardless of the substance, was terrible. Issues stemming from drugs were color-blind and affected every group. The American drug issue could be solved through personal willpower and moral commitment. In “Fried Egg,” it was up to everyone to ensure that their brain was safe from drugs. \textit{Cartoon All-Stars to the Rescue} clarifies that Michael’s drug use is his fault and his responsibility to be sober. “Stop the Madness” shows two very different individuals who come together and consciously choose to be drug-free. Drugs became the individual’s problem, and morals and discipline would fix this seemingly simple issue, according to the media created by Nancy Reagan. The political actions of Nancy Reagan’s other half contradicted the message shared.

While Nancy Reagan placed the drug issue on the individual, according to her husband, it could only be solved through raw, punitive state power. Media created during this era insinuated that all drug use was equally bad, but the drug laws being enforced heavily penalized one drug. During the War on Drugs, Ronald Reagan’s tough-on-crime mentality contradicted his wife’s “just say no” mentality. The issue of drug use in America was not simple enough to be solved through individuals practicing moral rigidity and discipline, and Ronald Reagan understood this. His solution also lacked nuance and presented sheer state power and punitive measures. The harsh actions taken by the presidential administration to solve the drug issue contradicted the solutions the media suggested and resulted in the War on Drugs being deemed ineffective.

Unlike Nancy Reagan’s suggestion, the drug issue in America was not as simple as saying no. If solving the drug issue was as simple as turning down offers to do drugs and throwing substances in the trash, there would be little need for harsh and punitive measures. Drugs were presented as the issue of the individual in the media, but in real life, they were the issue of the tough-on-crime government. In order to meet the goals of Reagan’s War on Drugs—which included slowing the drug trade, reducing drug-related crime, and promoting sobriety in general—local law enforcement would need to become more active in the President’s mission. In 1988, under the Reagan administration, Congress introduced the Edward Byrne Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Program, which offered millions of dollars in aid to agencies that would commit to reducing drug-

\textsuperscript{23} “Kareem Abdul-Jabbar Arrested on DUI Charge”, ABC News, January 2006.
\textsuperscript{24} “Schwarzenegger Has No Regrets About Steroid Use”, ABC News, January 2006.
\textsuperscript{25} Mark Seals, “The Devils in The Diva”, \textit{Vanity Fair}, May 8, 2012.
related crime.26 Reagan’s actions regarding the police show that drug use would not be treated as an issue of the individual but as one to be handled by the government.

Along with the increase in police presence came an increase in arrests and incarcerations. These arrests and incarcerations were meant to take those committing drug crimes off the streets to create a safer society. The drastic increase in the population of incarcerated Americans indicates Ronald Reagan’s tough-on-crime approach. Drug-related offenses account for about half of the rise in the state prison population between 1985 and 2000.27 Despite most drug crimes being non-violent, those crimes have been met with harsh punishment. While there were many policy alternatives to incarcerating those who did drugs, like the harm reduction approach of Presidents Johnson and Carter, Reagan’s administration had little grace for those who used or sold drugs. The tough-on-crime approach and the anti-drug media created in the 1980s had a lasting impact beyond the reasons for their creation.

Anti-drug media in the 1980s lumped all drugs use into one category: wrong. The “Fried Egg” commercial did not mention that a specific substance fries the brain but that drugs, in general, would. Under much of the popular culture influenced by anti-drug advocates, all drugs were equally bad, but the policy created did not reflect those thoughts. In the United States legislation, one drug was strangely targeted and penalized much more than the rest—crack. Following the tragic and untimely death of rising basketball star Len Bias, who overdosed on crack cocaine, the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act was passed. The act disproportionally penalized crack with a 100:1 ratio regarding sentencing crime. An individual possessing 1 gram of crack or 100 grams of powdered cocaine would be sentenced to an equal amount.28 This policy indicated that not all drugs were equally bad; in this case, crack was one hundred times worse than cocaine. What made this policy lose credibility and become increasingly unfavorable to many Americans was the knowledge that crack was, in fact, not one hundred times worse than cocaine; they were the same substance. Crack is a less expensive derivative of cocaine, and the only significant difference between the substances are the rates of absorption.29 This law directly contradicted the message portrayed by Nancy Reagan. According to her, all drugs may be wrong, but not all drugs were equal in the eyes of the law.

The increased penalization of crack indicated that the War on Drugs may not have been color-blind. This contradicted most of the color-blind media produced by anti-drug advocates. The anti-drug media was not free from stereotypes. It was for the benefit of anti-drug advocates to have very diverse people in their works. They wanted to deter drug use in the diverse nation, so it was best to show a diverse range of people who could be users. That depiction was relatively accurate. While much of the works created did sadly follow stereotypes, they showed a diversity of individuals who were substance users. “All-Stars to the Rescue” depicted abuse in a white male teen, and “Stop the


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"Madness" shows an upper-class white woman and a lower-class white man. Drug use rates were relatively similar among all races, and the media did an excellent job of indicating that drug use could affect anyone. Despite the media depicting a color-blind War on Drugs, it contradicted much of the media put forth in practice. The War on Drugs more heavily hit specific racial communities, despite the accurate media depiction that anyone could fall victims to substance issues.

A racial bias became relatively clear when examining one specific drug, cocaine, and its derivatives. Racial groups in America tend to use drugs at relatively even rates, but the incarceration rates for drug-related crimes do not reflect that. Much of the legislation created to defeat drugs made one drug appear like much more of a threat—crack. Despite drugs with very comparable effects having relatively light punishment, like pure cocaine and Ritalin, the possession of crack was heavily penalized. The unequal punishment of drug users could be due to the connotations of the substances.

While they have drastically different social connotations, crack and cocaine are very similar substances. Cocaine was more expensive, becoming socially associated with advanced status and glamorous life. Crack, being cheaper, became associated with crime, low-income areas, and people of color. The different social reputations of two drugs that were pharmacologically almost identical influenced the difference in the penalization of their users. In combination with expanded police powers, the reputation of crack led to more individuals of color being convicted for drug-related crimes. As discussed in Michelle Alexander’s *The New Jim Crow*, the War on Drugs was a significant cause of the mass incarceration of people of color. By the mid-1980s, the number of African Americans in prison quadrupled in three years and steadily rose. A steady drug-use rate and the disproportionate incarceration of people of color led to much of the legislation being deemed ineffective.

The media showed that individuals would solve the War on Drugs. Nancy Reagan appeared to be under the belief that through discipline, moral righteousness, and just saying no, drug use would fade off. Her husband appeared to believe the opposite. His tough-on-crime approach contradicted the idea that the War on Drugs was won through the individual. Instead of focusing on the individual, law enforcement was given much more power to battle drug use. The expanded power of the police, in theory, should have reduced drug use. However, it ultimately diminished the civil liberties of individuals and significantly contributed to the mass incarceration of people of color. This exemplifies another shortcoming of the War on Drugs regarding legal measures. Drug sales and use were not reduced, but the liberties and opportunities of many Americans were.

If personal willpower and strong discipline were the only things necessary to solve America’s drug issue, the increase in the jurisdiction of law enforcement would not have been deemed needed. The War on Drugs showed the slippery slope that was expanding police powers. *Terry v. Ohio* decided

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31 “Rates of Drug Use and Sales, by Race; Rate of Drug Related Criminal Justice Measures, by Race”, *The Hamilton Project*, October 21, 2016.
that officers are entitled to search an individual and area if the individual is displaying unusual behavior and if the officer has reason to believe the person is engaged in illegal activity. This has normalized law enforcement officers’ stopping civilians without probable cause. The loosened requirement for stopping people in combination with implicit bias wreaked havoc on many communities of color. When asked to describe a drug user, 95% of respondents described a Black drug user. Those working in law enforcement were far from free of that racial bias. Because drugs were more strongly associated with Black Americans, though all evidence suggests equal use of drugs across all races, they were often targeted by police on the suspicion that they could be carrying. Once Americans of color became the primary target due to bias and could be stopped with no pretext, it was a numbers game. If enough drivers and motorists were stopped, drugs would be found, and charges could be pressed. The War on Drugs was meant to fight drugs. The sale, use, and social costs of drugs were supposed to be limited. Instead, the legal aspect of the War on Drugs diminished the rights of Americans and people of color who were unfairly targeted for drug-related crimes. This result of Reagan’s mission played a significant role in it being an ineffective undertaking.

Ronald Reagan attributed crime and poverty in the nation to drug use. He attempted to solve his nation’s issues by eliminating drugs, but President Johnson saw that the issues in America ran deeper than substances. Lyndon B. Johnson’s plan for a greater America was to attack the fundamental root issues Americans faced. He planned to attack poverty, housing crises, and racial inequality to build a greater society. Johnson understood that reducing these issues and providing greater opportunities to those in disadvantaged situations would reduce drug use and crime. With his tough-on-crime approach, Reagan attacked a secondary issue that stemmed from poverty and disadvantaged situations. The over-policing of low-income areas, mandatory minimums, and racialized drug policies further harmed the communities needing support. The goal of the War on Drugs was to create a better society, but it was fighting a side effect of the more significant societal issues that plagued the United States.

The War on Drugs failed on both fronts. First Lady Nancy Reagan fought through media and popular culture. The media she created was understood by a very broad age demographic, meaning that they were simple pieces that lacked the nuance the drug issue deserved. The bulk of the pieces played into fear-mongering stereotypes surrounding drugs, drug users, and sobriety. They were very memorable pieces for their simplicity and off-beat humor. The pieces created, particularly the commercials, are pervasive in popular culture because they are funny and over the top. Nancy Reagan’s cultural works failed to portray the drug issue in a meaningful and impactful way. The battle waged in the political and legislative world, led by Ronald Reagan, undermined many of the ideas expressed by the media and had its own adverse effects. Nancy Reagan’s media argued that the issue of drugs would be solved through personal choices, but Ronald Reagan’s choices implied that the only way to fight

drugs was through sheer state force. Drug users were heavily penalized, the jurisdiction of law enforcement was expanded, and communities of color were hit hardest by the War on Drugs. Despite this expansion of the law, drug issues in America were not diminished. Drugs are still easily accessible and used. Both Reagan’s failed on their ends of the War on Drugs. The War on Drugs undoubtedly has had a legacy on the United States. It was just not the legacy that the Reagans intended.
Although the era itself is named after the men who ruled it, the Julio-Claudian period in Roman history is marked by several powerful women who were significant players. Some of those were solely enemies, like the sexually empowered Cleopatra. Her relationships with Julius Caesar and Mark Antony turned her public image in Rome into that of an exotic temptress. Others were seen as the consummate angel, like Empress Livia, whose loyalty to her husband was reinforced by not remarrying after his death. Some women, though, transcend the barrier of good and evil, starting as one and becoming the other until finally finding their place in the more morally gray 21st century. Perfect examples of this type of character are Augustus’ daughter and granddaughter, both named Julia. As the first imperial princesses of Rome, mother, and daughter both lived the luxurious and hedonistic lives a modern viewer might associate with the Roman Empire. In their times, they were tried, condemned, and exiled for this shameful use of their independence and education. Julia the Elder was the only natural child of Augustus, and through her bloodline, emperors such as Caligula and Nero came to the throne. Had she not been a woman, as a granddaughter of Augustus and a daughter of Agrippa, the elder Julia’s namesake daughter should have had every opportunity to wield the political power of her forefathers. Even though female independence and sexuality were more heavily penalized than the same qualities found in men and incurring moral stigmatization for an adulteress, such a severe punishment as banishment was not common among women of the Julias’ time.

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1 Elaine Fantham et al., *Women in the Classical World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 292. Translated as the “imperial whore,” an example of the criticism levied at the daughter and granddaughter of Augustus.
2 Maria Rosario Katsulos is a senior President’s Scholar at Southern Methodist University in Dallas, Texas. Her undergraduate research has focused on investigating questions of gender, sexuality, and community through art, material history, and literature. After graduating with honors in History in May 2022, she will begin her History PhD at Northwestern University in Fall 2022. Special thanks to Dr. Melissa Barden Dowling, Professor Justin Germain, and TR, AK, + MK.
3 Scholars have also drawn connections between the identification of Cleopatra with Dido, the mythical queen of Carthage who “breaks her oath of celibacy…and devotes herself to Aeneas” in Virgil’s *Aeneid*. Fantham et. al, 298; see also Sarah B. Pomeroy, *Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity* (New York: Schocken Books, 1995), 189.
4 Livia is portrayed as a paragon of moral chastity in primary sources, though more recent stories like Robert Graves’ *I, Claudius* depict Augustus’s third wife as the personification of the evil stepmother trope. Sarah B. Pomeroy specifically notes the promotion of “Fides, denoting [a wife’s] faithfulness to one man” even after her husband’s death as an ideal for Roman women. Pomeroy, 184-185.
5 Pomeroy writes that “Augustus declared adultery a public offense only in women,” whereas men were accused of “criminal fornication (*strapum*),” which only applied to his potential “sexual relations with an unmarried or widowed upper-class woman, [not] relations with prostitutes” or with enslaved people. 159, 160.
discussing historical evidence for the banishment of adulteresses in the Augustan era, Amy Richlin writes that “the limited evidence suggests only that the [lex Julia] ’s application was irregular, although the possibility must be kept in mind that only irregular cases were recorded by contemporary writers.” She further notes that “most of the exiles on record are involved with offenses to the reigning dynasty.” Similarly, Suzanne Dixon argues that “the stronger sanctions like divorce and prosecutions for adultery seem to have been employed intermittently and half-heartedly,” except in the case of the imperial women. The treatment of Julia the Elder and Younger, both by Augustus himself and their contemporary critics, stems from their promise of dynastic inheritance and their key positions within imperial succession, effectively disproving Augustus’ claims that the Empire was not a monarchy. Their key roles in this imperial history mark them as valuable figures in the biographical and feminist studies of the Roman Empire, despite the invective nature of the ancient sources on their behaviors.

There are two important factors to remember when analyzing ancient sources that deal with the history of the Julias. The men who wrote about the Julias had been socialized to reject female sexuality in any form but the marriage bed (prostitutes and enslaved persons notwithstanding). Additionally, writers who were contemporaries of Augustus, such as Livy, must have felt immense pressure to vilify the women exiled by Augustus. To portray the mother or daughter with even a hint of sympathy might have triggered retribution from the emperor, especially considering how preeminent the moral reforms were in Augustus’s reign and propaganda. Thus, even later writers like Suetonius had to work within the confines of the lasting historical record: pro-Augustus, anti-Julia. Interestingly, Cassius Dio remarks that the Roman people – the poor, plebeian majority of the city – “brought such pressure” and protests against the exile of Augustus's daughter that the emperor eventually conceded by allowing Julia back onto the Italian mainland. Despite the populus’s love for

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6 Richlin also notes that “Livy shows no concern for factual cases of adultery in the extant books,” choosing instead to focus on mythological moral exempla such as the stories of Verginia and Lucretia. Amy Richlin, Arguments with Silence: Writing the History of Roman Women (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2014), 44, 43.


8 Erich S. Gruen writes that when “Rumors had circulated of a prospective blood-line dynasty,” the emperor “had been at pains to discredit [those rumors]. He could not give even the appearance of preparing such a dynasty by indirect means.” Erich S. Gruen, “Augustus and the Making of the Principate,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Augustus, ed. Karl Galinsky (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 43. Augustus’s desire to squash rumors of dynastic inheritance stemmed from wanting to avoid the deep-seated Roman hatred for kings and kingship, going back to the overthrow of the Tarquins in 509 B.C. and seen again as recently as 44 B.C., when Augustus’s own adoptive father had been assassinated partially for assuming the role of Dictator for Life. Throughout his tenure as the first emperor of Rome, Augustus was sure to never liken himself to a king; even though from his title princeps we get the word “prince,” it was translated at the time as “first among equals.”

their princess, the upper registers of Roman society continued preaching invectives against Julia to fall in line with Augustus’s propaganda. What then remains to modern scholars of the Julias is “a dreadful warning to all those fast-living women whose conduct Augustan policy aimed to transform.”\(^{10}\) Moving on from solely written work, visual evidence of either Julia (but especially the Younger) is few and far between due to Augustus’ destruction of their statuary. Although her mother’s likeness survives in coinage, both women’s busts and other statues have mostly been destroyed over the years – and much of that destruction occurred immediately following their exiles.\(^{11}\) This action served equally as a threat toward others who might displease the emperor and have their legacies quite literally shattered and helped to bolster Augustus’ image. By removing any evidence of moral or sexual failure within the Julian clan, it was easier for the emperor to separate these women from their families and continue portraying himself as a morally perfect savior of the Roman people, one who was not swayed by the favoritism or nepotism that might otherwise have stayed his hand. For far too long, the Julias have simply been cautionary tales.

With more modern analysis, however, this trend has started to change. For one, the development of gender studies has allowed a more multifaceted lens to be placed over historical women who were shunned in their own time for daring to step outside societal norms. Scholars can now more closely compare the opportunities allowed to male versus female children\(^{12}\) and can address historical misogyny like the proto-slut-shaming that existed in Ancient Rome.\(^{13}\) Another example of modern scholarship allowing for changes in the study of these ancient women is the heightened importance of social history and the study of prosopography.\(^{14}\) The removal of women from the historical canon or ignoring them in favor of deeper studies of male social circles results in an inaccurate portrayal of important figures and relationships. Especially as a quasi-monarchy developed in imperial Rome, social connections were one of the most valuable forms of currency. Scholars can piece together more information about Roman social circles and norms by elevating these women back to their historical importance pre-exile. This begins with a careful examination of the biography

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\(^{10}\) Fantham et al., *Women in the Classical World*, 315. By levying taxes on unmarried or childless women, Augustus made it financially, politically, and socially beneficial to engage in the institution of marriage and to grow the Roman population.

\(^{11}\) The survival of coinage with Julia the Elder’s likeness can be attributed to the higher difficulty in rescinding coins already in circulation in comparison to destroying larger portraits. Even though the representations of Julia on these coins were tiny, they would have been recognizable to the Roman people.

\(^{12}\) Pomeroy notes the continued references, even into the Augustan period, to “a law attributed to Romulus that required a father to raise all male children but only the first-born female.” Pomeroy further acknowledges that “while [this so-called law is] not to be accepted at face value as evidence that every father regularly raised only one daughter, it is nevertheless indicative of official policy and foreshadows later legislation favoring the rearing of boys over girls.” Pomeroy, 164.

\(^{13}\) It is still important to acknowledge, however, that the modern understanding of the term “slut-shaming” has evolved exponentially since the Roman Empire, especially due to the Christian influences developing at the time.

\(^{14}\) The study of one’s social, familial, professional, and other connections.
of Julia the Elder, through childhood and young adulthood, as these were the times when she most effectively consolidated her political and social power.

From birth, the elder Julia’s childhood would have created an ideal imperial heir: as a young woman, her betrothals, marriages, and many children showed her father’s dynastic aims to cement the Julian bloodline as imperial successors. She entered a world of discord as Augustus divorced her mother, Scribonia, immediately following Julia the Elder’s birth. At the age of two, she was already available as a political pawn, becoming betrothed to a boy eight years her senior. Suetonius claims in his Life of the Caesars that Mark Antony himself discussed Julia’s first betrothal to his namesake son, nicknamed Antyllus. However, after Antony’s defeat at Actium, Augustus had Antyllus executed, despite the betrothal to Julia. Continuing with her childhood, she was raised by her father and stepmother, Livia. Julia was educated in more feminine arts, like weaving, and enjoyed a more masculine education. According to Macrobius, Julia had “a love of literature and much learning, easily accessible in that home.” She inherited her father’s high level of intelligence and ravenous appetite for knowledge. As a young teenager, Julia the Elder became engaged again. Her first husband was her cousin, Marcellus, son of Augustus’ sister Octavia. Augustus hoped to make Marcellus his official successor; he sped the boy’s elevation through government and military ranks in preparation. However, this plan never came to fruition, as Marcellus died in 23 BCE, and there were no children from his union with the emperor’s daughter.

Julia remained unwed for two years before remarrying her father’s right-hand man Agrippa, who was over twenty years her senior but would father her sons, the eventual heirs to the imperial throne. This was not a political marriage in the sense that Agrippa was a new ally – on the contrary, he had been instrumental to Augustus’ victories at Actium and other locales. His marriage to Julia was seen as a “prestige above the ordinary” and was meant to cement his loyalty to the Julian family. Throughout their admittedly very happy and fruitful marriage, Julia frequently boasted about being sexually liberated but only having Agrippa’s children. In Saturnalia, Macrobius quoted her as saying, “I never take on a passenger unless the ship is full” – in other words, Julia would only sleep with another man if she was already pregnant with Agrippa’s child. While Julia’s method of birth control was unconventional even in her own time, it seemed to be effective enough; Agrippa fully claimed all five of Julia’s children from their marriage.

Before long, Augustus had officially adopted their eldest two sons, Gaius and Lucius, as his imperial heirs. He honored Julia with a portrait on imperial coinage to commemorate the adoption –

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Fantham et al., 291.
Fantham et al., 291. Sourced from Macrobius, Saturnalia, 2.5.2.
Gruen, 43. Gruen places Julia’s marriage to Agrippa in 21 B.C.E. According to Dio, LIII.27, Augustus was unable to attend the wedding due to illness while on campaign.
Fantham et al, 291. Sourced from Macrobius, Saturnalia, 2.5.9.
a privilege, not even his wife Livia had attained. The coinage showed Julia accompanied by her sons, boldly advertising her position as the highest-ranking mother in Rome (and continuing her opposition to Livia). The corona civica was placed above Julia, with her sons at either side; the symbol was an important “token of dynastic succession.” Although Augustus still maintained that the Empire was not a monarchy, his emphasis on the Julian imperial bloodline through Julia and her children showed the vast departure from the Roman Republic. Other Julia-centric coins of the era attributed significant symbolism; she was depicted in the guise of Diana, wearing the iconic bow of the goddess and her royal diadem. Augustus symbolizing his daughter as the virgin goddess was ironic for many reasons, not the least of which is that in Diana’s childhood, her father grants her the privilege of remaining unwed. By forcing his daughter into multiple political marriages, Augustus contradicted any

23 “Ara Pacis,” Ara Pacis Museum, Rome, Italy, photographed by the author May 23, 2019. Though there is scholarly debate over the identity of the two women featured among the imperial family (which is Julia? which is Livia?) I am inclined to agree with a majority of scholarship that argues the more significant figure, near Agrippa and a child argued to be Gaius as a young child, is Julia. The fact that she held a more significant position than her stepmother is very important, as the Ara Pacis celebrated the power, strength, and success of the Julian family. Effectively, Julia was recognized at this point of the empire (13 BCE) to be the de-facto first lady of the Empire, to use more modern terminology.
24 British Museum Collection Database, “1921,0612.1,” https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/object/C_1921-0612-1, British Museum. Online. Accessed 27 April 2020. The placement of the singular corona civica, over Julia rather than over, for instance, her elder son Gaius, signifies her leading importance in the dynastic succession. Even though the grandsons were the heirs, not the mother, Augustus acknowledged that his daughter was the real key to this lineal succession.
26 Zanker, 216. Zanker interprets the presence of Diana’s bow on the coin to imply “that the goddess herself had attended the birth of the two boys.”
27 British Museum Collection Database, “1856,0904.8,” https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/object/C_1856-0904-8, British Museum. Online. Accessed 27 April 2020. In my personal analysis of the coin, it seems that the obverse side of the coin (which depicts Augustus) shows him with the lyre of Apollo. This link between father and daughter as not only two sides of a literal coin, but also to represent the divine twins, seems significant.
28 There are other important factors to consider in the identification of Julia with Diana. For example, despite the departure from Diana by being known for her “famous fertility,” Julia’s success in raising five of her six children to adulthood conquered the high infant mortality rate of the time, identifying her with Diana’s association with children and childbirth. Another similarity between Julia and Diana came in the form of their shared “transgressive behavior[, exemplified by] the goddess’s fierce and permanent virginity, her habitat in the wilds, and her predatory behavior in the hunt,” though certainly this was a more problematic difference between the two that Augustus would not have wanted to emphasize. Eve D’Ambra, “Daughters as Diana: Mythological Models in
equivalence to Jove he may have had in this example. Even though Julia had surpassed the requirement for Roman matrons’ independence – she had two more living children than the baseline three – Augustus continued to use her for political gain. Less than a year after Agrippa’s death in March 12 BCE, 29 while Julia was still deep in mourning, her father forced her to marry her stepbrother Tiberius. This union came on the heels of Tiberius’ forced divorce from his pregnant wife Agrippina (Agrippa’s daughter from a previous marriage), with whom he was deeply and publicly in love. Despite the inauspicious start to the marriage of Julia and Tiberius, they were happy together before the couple fought “so severely that he lived apart from her thereafter.”30 They had one son together, but he died in early infancy.

Julia doubled down on her wild escapades as she entered this new marriage, which became her downfall. In 2 BCE,31 she was put on trial and officially banished, proving how seriously Augustus took his moral reforms. Julia “took part in revels and drinking parties by night in the Forum and even upon the Rostra,”32 an incredibly explicit sign of disrespect for the Roman government. Though her father had tried to ignore her antics for years, he was finally forced to treat her as a criminal. He also tried those with whom Julia had committed adultery, and nearly all the men were exiled like Julia was.33 Through the trial, there was no shortage of contemporary criticism of Julia. It became easier and easier to heave loaded terms and explicit disdain at the emperor’s daughter because, by failing her father, she had failed Rome and the very concept of what it meant to be Roman. Instead of upholding Augustus’ public tenets of chastity and frugality, Julia reveled in her own “luxury, elegance, and sexual autonomy,”34 basically spitting in the face of the new Augustan moral code as she flouted her father’s rules. Because of this, there were frequent comparisons to her father’s hated enemy Cleopatra; female sexuality was negatively exoticized, and the Egyptian queen was the closest model Roman people had.35 In the eyes of the public, the less Roman Julia became, the easier it was to vilify her.


30 Suetonius, III.7.
32 Dio, L.V.10.
33 Dio. Out of the men on trial with Julia, only Iullus Antonius was put to death. The son of Mark Antony (and younger brother of Julia’s first fiancé, Antyllus), he was tried not only for morality crimes, but also for treason. Augustus considered Iullus a conspirator, and perhaps to continue eliminating the rest of the Antonius line, had him executed. Of course, Mark Antony’s descendants would eventually become members of the imperial family, and even emperors themselves.
35 In the eyes of Augustus, and implicitly, therefore, in the rest of the Roman population, Julia became “a counterpart to the loathed Cleopatra” because of her sexual licentiousness, a trait that
Unfortunately, most surviving historical sources neglect Julia in her own words. As Richlin writes, this invective writing style against Julia and other Augustan-era women does “not tell you directly about women, but they tell you what women had to put up with.” What remains for modern scholars to study, then, amounts solely to “the scabrous jokes Romans told about her…that constructed her as the farthest pole of promiscuity,” rather than any contemporary sources representing Julia with a more understanding lens. Seneca, for example, called her “shameless beyond the indictment of shamelessness;” Suetonius wrote that both Julia and her namesake daughter “were tainted with every form of vice.” Although Augustus considered having Julia killed, he eventually decided to sentence her to a lifetime of exile on the tiny island of Pandateria. Instead of being affected by love for his daughter, Augustus had other concerns in mind. He dreaded returning to his pre-imperial habits of proscription, which had made him infamous for his cruelty before he could win over the Roman public again, and thus avoided unnecessary executions. Tiberius may also have convinced him of clemency. By this time, the divorce between Augustus’ stepson and Julia was official, but Tiberius urged the emperor to treat Julia with mercy. Thus, Augustus allowed Julia’s mother Scribonia to accompany her into exile rather than sending her to her prison alone.

Julia’s permanent and fairly severe exile proved that no one was safe from imperial wrath. Julia’s exile could have been more appropriately described as boring than torturous during her father’s lifetime. For example, among the luxuries forbidden in exile, Augustus did not even let his daughter have wine. After several years of this treatment, Augustus allowed Julia to move from the island back to the Italian mainland in 4 CE though she was still forbidden from re-entering Rome. The loosening of Julia’s metaphoric chains allowed the Roman populus to hope their beloved princess might come back to the city, though Augustus shut down those rumors in a public meeting and told his people that “fire should sooner mix with water than that she should be allowed to return.” Julia would never

was understood to go hand-in-hand with the orientalized figure of Cleopatra or, as mentioned earlier, Dido of Carthage. Fantham et al., 292. Further, Seneca calls Julia “once again a woman to be feared with an Antony” as an allusion to Cleopatra; through her analysis of this quote, Richlin “recalls the feverishness of the propaganda against Augustus’s old enemy…Cleopatra was not only foreign but also Egyptian and Eastern…and was drunken and profligate…and there were rumors that [Cleopatra] wanted to take Rome itself. …This is what Seneca is talking about.” Richlin, *Arguments with Silence*, 88.

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37 Fantham et al., 315.
38 Fantham et al.
39 Suetonius, II.65.
40 Suetonius, II.65.
41 Dio, I.V.10.
42 Suetonius, II.11.
43 Dio, I.V.10. 55.
44 Suetonius, II.101.
45 Suetonius, II.65. Cadoux and Seager, “Julia (3), daughter of Augustus, d. 14 CE.” In this article, the authors determine her new place of exile to be the colony of Rhegium. This is also in line with Dio’s assessment of the Roman populus’s clamoring for leniency for Julia. I.V.13.
46 Dio, I.V.13.
set foot in the capital again. Augustus also decreed that she was not to be buried in his mausoleum. Suetonius wrote of one specific plot to rescue Julia and her Agrippa Postumus, who had been deemed mad and banished. This plot involved an elderly forger named Audasius and a half-Parthian Roman, Epicadus, who planned to bring Julia and her son home to Rome. Augustus’ death ended any hope the Romans had for Julia’s return. Once in power, her ex-husband Tiberius contradicted all his pleas during Julia’s trial by harshening her exile. He stopped sending her a yearly allowance, refused any visitors, and supposedly even denied her food, contributing directly to her death in 14 CE, just months following her father.

Like her mother before her, Julia the Younger had a life marked by excess, flying in the face of Augustan reform in both similar and different ways from her mother. She was born in 19 BCE and married at fifteen to Lucius Aemilius Paullus. Julia was primarily raised in the household of her grandfather and step-grandmother, Livia. Aemilius Paullus had been hand-selected by the emperor to marry his granddaughter and enter the Julian family. He would eventually become a consul in 1 CE. Together, they had a daughter called Cornelia, who was betrothed to the future emperor Claudius until her parents fell out of favor with Augustus. Until then, the couple flaunted their wealth and power. Augustus found his granddaughter’s luxurious countryside villa so offensive to his austere tastes that he had it razed to the ground. This dramatic level of reaction toward Julia’s disobedience foreshadowed her downfall. Julia and her husband were to fall dramatically out of favor with her grandfather in the years between 1 and 8 CE. Toward the beginning of this time, Julia was charged

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47 Suetonius, II.65.
48 Suetonius, II.19. The racial implications of Epicadus being only half Roman, and half Rome’s greatest enemy, should not be ignored; Suetonius chose to include that detail among the rest of his imperial propaganda in order to further vilify Parthia. Of note: nothing came of this plan to rescue Julia or her son, but the fact that it made it into Lives of the Caesars suggests that it was fairly well-known in its own time.
49 Cadoux and Seager, “Iulia (3).”
51 Cadoux, Seager, and Badian, “Aemilius Paullus.”
52 Cadoux, Seager, and Badian.
53 Suetonius, II.72.
54 The sources of Tacitus and Suetonius, as well as the additional research through the Oxford Classical Dictionary, seem contradictory and unclear on specific timing, but are all in agreement that the falls of Julia and Aemilius Lepidus occurred during these years.
with adultery. Her main paramour was the senator Decimus Junius Silanus, whose punishment for his misconduct with the emperor’s granddaughter will be discussed later in this paper. Closer to 8 CE, Aemilius Paullus was found to be planning a rebellion against Augustus. Suddenly, both husband and wife were criminals in the eyes of the Empire.

A mere decade after her mother’s exile, Julia the Younger was also banished. She and her husband were tried for adultery and conspiracy, respectively. Perhaps to reinforce the severity of the punishment, or maybe for dramatic irony, Julia was exiled similarly to her mother. The grandfather of the latter had sent her to the island of Trimerus. Once on the island, Julia had a baby – the grandson who could have, in any other circumstances, answered Augustus’ quest for an heir in his bloodline. Because of her transgressions, however, Augustus ordered the child to be killed through exposure. Though the dates are unclear, Aemilius Paullus’s fate was more severe than his wife’s; he was executed sometime around 8 CE for involvement in the rebellion plot. Back in the city of Rome, as soon as Augustus had died and Tiberius had taken the imperial throne, Decimus Junius Silanus freely returned to the capital. Because his brother was a high-ranking senator, he was allowed to approach the Senate and ask the emperor to pardon his former crimes. Tiberius noted that Decimus “had been banished not by a decree of the Senate or under any law” and thus could re-enter Roman society as a normal citizen. Decimus never again, however, held political office.

On the other hand, Julia remained in exile on Trimerus until her death twenty years later. Unlike her mother, whose financial livelihood was ended by Tiberius, Julia was sent relief by her step-grandmother, Livia. Because Julia predeceased the empress by a year, she could live the rest of her life with that support. It is possible that the support Livia showed Julia contributed in a small way to the rift that grew between her and her son Tiberius, by this point, the Roman Emperor. This analysis, focusing on the sympathy and kinship between women, relates to the modern scholarship in the field of gender studies discussed earlier in this paper; perhaps Livia had regrets over her husband’s treatment of his daughter, or maybe the daughterless woman just wanted to extend a helping hand to

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56 Cadoux, Seager, and Badian, “Aemilius Paullus.”
58 Cadoux, Seager, and Badian, “Aemilius Paullus.”
59 Suetonius, II.65. Though Suetonius does not draw the connection, in my analysis I found this to be similar to the executions of the Vestal Virgins and also to the way Augustus waited for Lepidus to die of natural causes, as the *pontifex maximus* was protected from assassination. By allowing nature to take its course on his newborn great-grandson, rather than ordering his direct, active execution through a soldier’s sword, Augustus could remain untainted from both the general cultural stigma of infanticide, but more important to his propagandic presentation, he could avoid becoming like Romulus, who killed his own family member in the name of Roman strength.
60 Tacitus, III.24.
61 Tacitus, III.24.
62 Tacitus, IV.71.
the girl. If Julia the Younger’s life in exile was more bearable than her mother’s, indeed, the emperor’s mother’s generosity played a part in that. Regardless, the loss of her husband, her life in Rome, and most heinously, the murder of her infant son must have taken an indescribable toll on the granddaughter of Augustus. In ancient sources, as noted above, the vast majority of information about either Julia is written with Augustus’s propaganda in mind. Even in modern scholarship, Julia the Elder fades into a footnote; Richlin eloquently declares that modern scholars, “like their [ancient] sources…write from the end of a story that lacks [Julia’s] voice, only incidentally seeking Julia,” within her own story.  

If Augustus had hoped to strengthen the moral backbone of his imperial family and his Empire as a whole, future emperors would prove his immense failure. What he did manage to achieve was the destruction of his granddaughter’s legacy as he performed a hasty amputation of an invaluable limb of his family tree. In his daughter and granddaughter, Augustus had a unique opportunity to confirm the continuation of his bloodline. Regardless of who fathered the Julias’ children, their mothers were related to the emperor, legitimizing them as inheritors to the \textit{pater familias}’ power. Reported promiscuity on the Julias’ parts, in other words, would not have precluded their sons from Augustus’s dynastic inheritance, only that of their mothers’ husbands. However, Augustus damaged his legacy and destroyed his dynastic aspirations by exiling and killing the male heirs of his daughter and granddaughter.  

In addition to his military victories, Augustus won his Empire through propaganda, and he strengthened his hold on it in the same way. How was he meant to symbolize Roman morality and tradition when his female descendants flouted the rules at every turn? When considering the exiles in that cruelly strategic way, Augustus’ treatment of the two Julias makes strange sense. Augustus had only been able to maintain his stronghold on Rome by painting himself as the one who could return Rome to its traditional ideal, removing the moral taint of the Republic’s sins. To use an Augustan art historical reference, the moment there were cracks in Augustus’ plaster, he quickly painted over them. In these cases, the imperfections in the imperial family were his daughter and granddaughter. By erasing them, though, Augustus did not create the perfect work of art for which he hoped. Instead, he allowed his dreams of a dynastic empire to become that of the weaker emperors who would follow him.  

Perhaps if he had allowed his daughter and granddaughter to continue the Julian line, future emperors would have been able to reach the pinnacle set forth in the Augustan Age.  

\footnote{Richlin, \textit{Arguments with Silence}, 90.} 
\footnote{These included, of course, the emperors Caligula and Nero, whose own instances of sexual licentiousness were picked apart by Roman writers. Due to a lack of surviving material from the emperors’ own times, one of our best primary sources is that of Suetonius, who wrote anywhere from fifty to eighty years after the emperors’ reigns. Suetonius, IV.36, IV.52, VI.28, VI. 29.}
Bolsonaro and History: The Controlling Cycle

Iuri Macedo Piovezan

Jair Messias Bolsonaro and his far-right movement are an embarrassment to ethical Brazilians. On 28 October 2018, to the surprise of many, Bolsonaro was elected the thirty-eighth President of Brazil with over 55.13% of the votes. In the years that followed, the right wing’s influence, of which the president himself partakes, became increasingly popular. History, both as a subject and a natural phenomenon, is cyclical, and I believe that many events could have been avoided if people had taken a more careful look at the past. Due to history having such a nature, and taking into consideration other far-right movements that came before Bolsonaro – such as Adolf Hitler’s and Benito Mussolini’s – and their personalities, I believe that Bolsonaro’s fate will match his right-wing antecessors.

First, some definitions need to be made. This essay will compare these three populist leaders and conclude that Bolsonaro’s regime is doomed to fail. By failure, however, I mean that his goals in politics will not be achieved. At the end of World War II, Hitler committed suicide in a bunker, and Mussolini was assassinated. Therefore, their political scheme failed, but not in the same way that I believe Bolsonaro’s will. I am not insinuating that Bolsonaro will either kill himself or die at the hands of another, but rather due to the way he is conducting his business as a right-wing populist president, he is doomed to failure. Since history repeats itself, and he fits “in the same box” as Hitler and Mussolini, his political goals as the thirty-eighth Brazilian president are doomed to fail.

Germany was in shambles after World War I, a perfect scenario for Hitler to emerge. The Great War met its end when the Germans signed the ceasefire of November 1918, following the disastrous Spring Offense. In order to decide their fate (including other losing nations’), the Paris Peace Conference was established. According to the historians Michael D. Richards and Paul R. Waibel, the meeting resulted in – among other things – five treaties. The most well-known, however, is the Treaty of Versailles. This treaty, named after the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles where it was signed, laid out a set of punishments for the Germanic nation, such as “forcing the nation to surrender around 10 percent of its territory and all of its overseas possessions” and demilitarization. The most important, though, which caused the most revolt, was the “war guilt clause,” which demanded Germany accept full responsibility for World War I and pay an exorbitant amount in

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1 Iuri is a soon to be graduate of Temple University majoring in Global Studies and minoring in History and Spanish.
5 Richards and Weibel, Twentieth Century Europe, p. 81.
reparations. In response, Germans felt distressed and, due to its demands, hated the Treaty of Versailles. In a situation like this, where people need a savior, is where figures like Hitler appear.

![Figure 1: Hitler with Joseph Goebbels' daughter, 1932. Source: https://www.livescience.com/54441-](https://www.livescience.com/54441-)

Many characteristics made Adolf Hitler a popular figure. The first was his ability as a public speaker. Karl Schleunes, in the book *The Twisted Road to Auschwitz*, claims that the Fuhrer became known in the German Workers’ Party due to his power as a speaker. Even though defining him as “not an interesting conversationalist,” Schleunes says that Hitler “could milk an audience and shape it and get it to feel.” For instance, in a speech before the Reichstag on 30 January 1937, Hitler mentioned that it had been four years “since the beginning of the great internal revolution” that gave a “new aspect to German life.” So, he prepared a speech to summarize “all the successes that have been achieved and the progress that has been made during these four years, for the welfare of the German people.” The next was Hitler’s portrayal as an honorable, patriotic man. Historian Despina

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8Pappas, “Hitler’s Rise.”

9Adolf Hitler, “Speech before the Reichstag,” transcript of speech delivered at the Reichstag, 30 January 1937,
Stratigakos claims that one strategy that Hitler used to “rehabilitate his personal image” was to focus propaganda on his personal life. This propaganda portrayed Hitler “as a good man, a moral man.” Even though the image was fabricated, this historian concludes that it was an effective strategy.¹⁰ This photograph, taken in 1932, shows Hitler with Joseph Goebbels’ daughter, spreading the notion of him as a lover of kids (Figure 1). Hitler’s relationship with Rosa Bernile Nienau is another example. Heinrich Hoffmann, Hitler’s official photographer, made a picture book titled *Youth Around Hitler* that, as the title suggests, contained pictures of Hitler and young children. One of them, specifically, would impact the Fuhrer like no other. Due to a shared birthday, Hitler would meet and adore Rosa Nienau, a child whom — even after discovering they had Jewish roots — Hitler would continue a friendship with (Figure 2).¹¹ Lastly, Hitler used the growing tensions between Germans and Jews in his favor. The Jewish population was then his chosen scapegoat.

![Figure 2: Hitler and Rosa. Source: https://allthatsinteresting.com/hitlers-children](https://allthatsinteresting.com/hitlers-children)

Italy, too, required a hero after World War I. After the Battle of Caporetto, on 24 October 1917, the nation saw itself with a significant number of casualties. Around 700,000 people were

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¹⁰ Pappas, “Hitler’s Rise.”
impacted (40,000 killed, 280,000 captured, and 350,000 deserted). For the Italians, desertion was a serious offense, with many officers advised to shoot their men if they chose to leave the battlefield. Italy emerged victorious but deeply divided, with many men feeling that they left the war without what they were expecting out of the peace negotiations in Paris. As Richards and Weibel discuss, “the peace conference awarded Italy much less than it felt entitled to by the Treaty of London between the Triple Entente and Italy (1915).” National pride was therefore hurt. In addition, “massive national debt, rapid inflation, and increasing unemployment struck the nation,” leaving many with the sense that a Bolshevik revolution was imminent in Italy. When it comes to politics, both the Catholic and Socialist parties were deeply divided, not giving the population the certainty they needed. Benito Mussolini emerged in this confused state of animosity, “a former schoolteacher and editor of the Socialist Party newspaper, Avanti.” When Mussolini claimed that Italy should enter the war with the Allies, he was expelled from the Socialist Party in 1914.

Mussolini’s regime was rooted in nationalism as he was made Italy’s Prime Minister in 1922, with the Duce’s popularity rising each day. Fascism, as an ideology, called for action, preaching for an unequal society, divided between the strong and the weak, where the state has full autonomy. The term comes from the Roman ax Fascio, a weapon that was only possible by the union of wooden pieces (the people) with red chains (the state) and the iron ax. Like the Romans, they also revered past societies and abominated new ones. Like the Nazis, they denied the importance of knowledge and acted almost by instinct. When discussing Mussolini and his success, some of his characteristics come into play. The first was, like Hitler’s, his way with his words. In a speech in Napoli, in 1931, and 1936 in Rome, we see a man with an incredible ability to make an engaging speech. The way he forms his sentences, enunciating Italian patriotism, and his physiognomy and body language were engaging and called everyone’s attention to every word that left his mouth. In both of these videos, the Italian dictator is seen with both hands alternating between his hips and performing brute movements as he speaks. Undeniably, this stance greatly helps him assert his power over his people. The second characteristic was his image to the general population. Many believed him to be a man sent from God, a man of “divine providence.” Lastly, like Hitler, Mussolini had a scapegoat. Instead of blaming

13 Richards and Weibel, Twentieth Century Europe, p. 131.
specifically the Jewish population, Mussolini chose “socialists, trade unionists, homosexuals, and racial and religious minorities.” Therefore, like the Fuhrer, Mussolini had a favorable image to his people.

Brazil’s depression did not come through war but political exhaustion. One of the significant themes that immensely helped Bolsonaro’s election was that he was a breath of fresh air to people tired of the previous party’s dominance. According to Folha de São Paulo, a chief news source in Sao Paulo, the Partido Trabalhista (Workers’ Party) was in power from 2003 to 2016. This party, however, was rooted in corruption, with many of its members being incarcerated due to the Lava Jato operation (Operation Car Wash). So many years in power resulted in significant opposition, which made the majority of the population wish for change. Brazilian politician Nikolas Ferreira, after Bolsonaro got elected, claimed that “people were tired of the life from the Left.” With increasing tensions happening in the nation, Bolsonaro appeared to be the nation’s last hope. In 2018, I had the privilege of interviewing some people in Brazil for a project related to politics at my university. I must say that all names listed are not the real names of the subjects since all requested to remain anonymous. John, my first interviewee, claimed that he only voted for Bolsonaro because “in between voting for Bolsonaro, or PT, I’d rather vote for Bolsonaro.” Maria, a mother of two, said that “I cannot swallow the lies of PT anymore; I firmly believe that Brazil needs change, and maybe it will be with Bolsonaro.” Many Brazilians, unfortunately, had the same mentality on 28 October 2018.

Bolsonaro’s image to his people, like Mussolini’s and Hitler’s, is favorable in similar ways. Marco Rodrigo Almeida, a Folha de São Paulo journalist, reported that “Brazilians have never seen a President in such a simple surrounding.” Pictures (Figure 3) surfaced on social media, portraying Bolsonaro as a “common Brazilian, not raised in a rich environment.” Here, to the right, one can see the president wearing a soccer jersey while eating food directly from a tray. In addition, Bolsonaro is portrayed as the utmost patriotic leader Brazil has ever had. While being interviewed by JovemPan, a significant radio in Brazil, Bolsonaro claimed that his “party is Brazil,” which became one of his

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slogans. Bolsonaro also claims that only God can remove him from the president’s chair. In this vein, far-right Brazilian activists tend to bind Bolsonaro and his actions with religious figures. Bolsonaro shared a video of Steve Kunda, a Congolese pastor, who affirmed that Bolsonaro was “chosen by God” to guide the nation on his personal Facebook account. Moreover, when trying to defend the use of hydroxychloroquine to cure COVID-19, a medicine with no scientific backing, the President claimed that God was the one that provided the nation with such a remedy.

The language the President uses in his speeches is also praised by his followers. Even though he lacks an eloquent language, Bolsonaro appeals to and motivates those listening. Andre Singer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Sao Paulo, one of the most praised institutions in Latin America, claims that the President has a more “direct and popular” method of speaking when compared to his antecessors. For Singer, however, this is only a strategy to secure the 2022 elections. Reginaldo Ferreira da Silva, known as Ferrez — a Brazilian writer — claimed that “Bolsonaro speaks a language that the people understand.” Notice here that many people compliment the simplicity of Bolsonaro, which seems to be his central selling point. When it comes to his scapegoat of choice, Bolsonaro chose the Workers’ Party, a left-leaning party that had ruled Brazil for twenty-one years. Bolsonaro was seen as Brazil’s last hope among a tired population.

History is cyclical. The debate of whether history follows a cycle is not contemporary. Many scholars like Arthur Schlesinger, in *Paths to the Present*, Arthur Schlesinger Jr, in *The Cycles of American History*, and Ibn Khaldun, a fourteenth to fifteenth century Arab philosopher, discuss whether historical events are deemed to repeat themselves or if this is some sick joke of fate. I, however, accept the proposition that history is cyclical. I believe that history exists to teach us a lesson, and we, as a society, can only succeed if we learn from the mistakes of the past. If maybe Hitler had paid more attention to Napoleon, he might have succeeded in Russia. Maybe, if we had learned something from the 1918-19 Influenza pandemic, we might have had an easier time with COVID-19.

Bolsonaro shares key similarities with Hitler and Mussolini. Throughout this paper, I have written about the key elements that made each leader popular in their country, mainly focusing on their image and word choice. When it comes to their ability to discourse, all three leaders were very popular in their speeches. Hitler was said to be charismatic, Mussolini made engaging speeches, and Bolsonaro chose to appear as a simple man in his words. All of them had appeared as the ideal man in their society. Hitler was seen as a lover of kids, Mussolini as a religious figure, and Bolsonaro as the leader God chose. Moreover, all of them were incredibly patriotic. I must say that this goes not to claim that Bolsonaro is capable of the atrocities that Hitler and Mussolini committed but to show the similarities in how these right-wing populist leaders engage with their population and the propaganda they use, which, as seen, idealizes their images. I must acknowledge that Hitler and Mussolini's situations differed from Bolsonaro’s. First, Brazil is not in a major war at the risk of being invaded by a neighboring nation. Second, Bolsonaro — even though being from the far-right — is not a dictator and therefore cannot remain in power indefinitely. However, the point of this essay is to portray the similarities between these three right-wing populist leaders and illustrate that accepting the claim that history is cyclical, Bolsonaro’s regime is due to fail.

Considering the cyclicality of history, Bolsonaro’s regime is doomed to fail. Both Hitler and Mussolini’s governments met their end at the closing of World War II. This was factual proof of the

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failure of Nazism and Fascism and, for me, of any extreme right-wing movement. Bolsonaro, being a representative of such a group, is even accused of having Nazi or Fascist tendencies. Historian Federico Finchelstein, an authority in studying fascism, claims in *A Brief History of Fascist Lies* that “there is no doubt that Bolsonaro acts as a fascist.” Moreover, according to Finchelstein, there are four elements that populism abandons from fascism, but the most important — and the one that Bolsonaro relies on the most — is the “lying” aspect. According to Finchelstein, this element is the most important since, even though every politician lies, fascist ones do it in a greater quantity. The scholar then concludes that Bolsonaro is a fascist “wannabe,” one that definitely lies like a fascist. In addition, 234 Brazilian Jewish intellectuals published a letter claiming that Bolsonaro’s regime had fascist, anti-democratic, and Nazi tendencies. This letter, in a free translation, says

> It is necessary to call things by their name. It is time for us, intellectuals, freethinkers, Jews, and progressive Jews, descendants of the greatest victims of the Nazi regime, to position ourselves as social actors in the public debate about the current national moment. It is noticeable that the government headed by Jair Bolsonaro has strong Nazi and fascist leanings. It is necessary to call things by their name. Conspiratorial and anti-democratic perspectives produce, just like fascism and Nazism, imaginary enemies and allies. If not Jewish, as the case may be of the Third Reich, leftists; if not gypsies, scientists; if not communists, as in Fascist Italy, feminists. The idea of a constant struggle against ghostly threats continues. But there is more. The repeated racist and Nazi reports of the Bolsonaro government, the use of fascist symbols, and reference to the extreme right cannot leave any doubts. The project of power advances. Genocide, destruction of the democratic structures of the eugenic state, and practices are wide open. It is up to us Brazilians and Brazilians to prevent us from reaching a greater tragedy. Removing Bolsonaro must be the so-called unison of the hour. It is the call against genocide.

Therefore, I firmly believe that, when taking such similarities and putting them into perspective, Bolsonaro’s far-right regime simply cannot be successful. Hitler, even though he was a popular leader, is seen by most as an example of a failed man. Even though he had a strong persona and was seen as honorable, Mussolini failed. Bolsonaro, as history repeats itself, is destined to do the same.

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30 Pinheiro-Machado, “Bolsonaro.”


On 1 July 1990, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl delivered a televised address to the nation. A year earlier, he had been Chancellor of West Germany. Now, he presided over a newly unified nation and faced the immense challenge of integrating East Germany, which until then had been ruled by a socialist regime, into the capitalist Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). In his speech, an attempt to inspire enthusiasm and collaboration between East and West Germans during his campaign for federal reelection, Kohl promised redemption and revival for the East. He assured his audience that “through a joint effort, we will soon be able to transform Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Saxony-Anhalt, Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia into blooming landscapes once again, where it is worthwhile to live and work.”

Not only does this statement connote condescension—perhaps unintended but nevertheless palpable—towards the Eastern states, implying that life was not worth living there, but this speech, particularly the phrase “blooming landscapes,” would eventually come to haunt Kohl and becoming a standard by which the successes and failures of reunification are measured to this day.

At the time of reunification, the Eastern landscapes he described were far from blooming. In an economy where manufacturing and industry played a significant role, other aspects, like health and the environment, were largely overlooked. East Germany, or the German Democratic Republic (GDR), was a leading industrial technology supplier to several Soviet states in its heyday. As a result, industrial land was ravaged by pollution. For decades, “acid rain, corrosive soot and chemical toxins had been fouling its air,” posing an invisible threat to workers’ health.

In 1990, secret environmental records that the GDR had kept under wraps about the state-owned manufacturing companies came to light. It was agreed upon that unequivocal “ecological disasters” had been inflicted on the East by the East. Inspired by the release of this information, Der Spiegel magazine published an article on the city of Bitterfeld in Saxony-Anhalt, which was particularly afflicted by decades-long extreme pollution. An unknown “toxic cocktail” had been brewing in its groundwater, with immeasurable hazardous waste remaining from the past hundred years. To blame were unregulated open-cast lignite (brown coal) mining, film and paint factories, pesticide plants, and a six-kilometer-long open pit mine. At the time, Bitterfeld District Council Chairman August Pietsch saw the situation for how urgent it was:

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1 Irene Rauch graduated from the University of California, Santa Barbara in June 2021 with a double major in History and German. She has gone on to work in the German Bundestag as a recipient of the International Parliamentary Fellowship, and will attend law school beginning in August 2022.
“We are sitting on a time bomb,” he said. If Bitterfeld did not receive help soon, there would be disastrous effects on the population’s health.

Before it began to be cleaned up post-reunification, Bitterfeld was widely considered the dirtiest city in Europe. In 1990, it was calculated that the city’s smokestacks emitted three times more dust and sulfur dioxide than the entire West German state of Hesse, which is forty-six times larger. Particles in the air were known to cause skeletal deformities. Gardens produced inedible fruit. Glass in church windows had to be replaced abnormally quickly because it disintegrated in the corrosive air. Factories built during the Third Reich were repurposed after the war—and insufficiently modernized, if at all—and were still in use in 1990. In some places, Bitterfeld positively stank. Toxins in wastewater threatened to poison people’s kidneys and livers. At a meeting of the Bitterfeld Chemical Combine, chemist Günter Krieg pleaded, “We only have one life, we still want to have some of it.” His worry about a shortened life was no exaggeration; people died of cancer at unusually high rates in Bitterfeld. The Deputy Production Director at the Bitterfeld Electrochemical Combine had a more specific request: “We urgently need Western help.” The dire ecological circumstances were a danger for East Germans. However, the polluted state of these lands was worrisome to the FRG leadership because it did not bode well for future Western investments in Eastern industries. After all, a prospective Western family would be unlikely to be enticed to move east by murky rivers, smoggy skies, and the “sorry state” of Eastern infrastructure.

Enter: Kohl’s promise of blooming landscapes. His vision for reunification was most successfully realized in terms of ecological rehabilitation in the East. In July 2014, German weekly news magazine *Stern* published a photo series in which locations throughout the East were pictured before reunification, side by side with photos from 2014. It is incredible how drastically the landscape had changed in less than thirty years. In the Saxony-Anhalt town of Leuna, a once-polluted street with a tram rattling through it is now neatly lined with trees. In Bitterfeld, the abhorrently polluted focus case of the 1990 *Spiegel* exposé, thick, impenetrable-seeming smog, has been replaced by blue skies. South of Bitterfeld, near a town called Wolfen, toxic industrial runoff once poisoned a marsh, ironically named the Silver Sea. Today, an idyllic pond populated by water plants has taken its place. While the pond is still closed to the public for its toxicity level, this is a marked improvement from the past. The area now shows signs of hope and life that were nowhere to be found before reunification. These places, plagued by the consequences of an unbridled, industrial-command economy, are not yet blooming landscapes, yet they finally show potential for revitalization.

**Tensions and Contention: Early Challenges in Reunification**

Unfortunately, the environmental progress made in the East is just about where the unequivocally positive results of reunification end. Everything else is a matter of opinion and debate and differs based on whether you ask a *Wessi* or an *Ossi*—a Westerner or an Easterner. Although it was regarded

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as a victory at the time, much of the reunification project played out in a way that left East Germans feeling disoriented, underappreciated, and ostracized by their new countrymen.

The federal government was determined to assimilate the East to its own economic and social standards and essentially scrap the East German system. Initially, spirits were high, and optimism radiated on both sides. However, this mood soon faltered for multiple reasons as logistical difficulties became apparent. In March of 1990, the federal government unveiled a plan for converting East German currency—the Ostmark—to West German currency—the Deutschmark. As explained by historian Pekka Kalevi Häälääinen, the plan “allowed the East Germans to convert up to 2,000 Ostmarks at a one-for-one rate for the far more valuable Western currency.” However, the rest of their money could only be exchanged at a two-for-one rate; this included pensions and wages. Predictably, East Germans were outraged, calling the plan a “swindle” and taking to the streets to protest against it. Neither exchange rate boded well for the East. Both the one-for-one and two-for-one left Easterners with significantly lower wages than the West: one-third and one-sixth, respectively. The government struggled to reach a compromise between the demands of the federal bank, the Bundesbank, and the demands of irate East Germans. After all, a generous exchange rate would mean depreciation of the Deutschmark and West German stock markets. Eventually, the one-to-one rate the Bundesbank had feared was announced.

While ordinary East Germans had cause to celebrate, economists already foresaw the issues this exchange rate could cause in terms of market competitiveness for the East and adaptation to a market economy system that Eastern workers had never experienced. This prediction would later be confirmed. However, the West had given at that moment, and the East had received. This showed Chancellor Kohl’s determination to make his vision of blooming landscapes a reality and a streak of political bravery for promoting an exchange rate that was viewed skeptically by his supporters in the name of reunification. In any case, this debate made very clear the notion that the East was of lower financial value than the West.

Westeners benefited from the high value of Deutschmark in comparison to Ostmark. Friedrich*, sixty, grew up in West Germany and recalls visiting East Berlin when the Berlin Wall still divided East and West. “Women with strollers and little babies would corner you to exchange money on the black market,” he remembers with a laugh. “There was an exchange rate of one to one ultimately, but in Berlin, for a while there was an exchange rate of one to twenty. So, you could go for a great meal anywhere in a restaurant for one [Deutschmark].” Evidently, both West and East agreed that Western money was far more valuable and powerful. The currency debate further entrenched the popular notion that the East was hopelessly behind the West and created a Western savior complex of sorts.

Along with the tensions created by this debate, there was a fundamental difference in how the East and West handled and perceived money. Easterners had to adjust to the idea of privately owned significant wealth that existed in the West. “There was no private ownership in the GDR,” remembers

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7 Häälääinen, *Uniting Germany*, p. 170.
8 Friedrich (pseudonym), interviewed by Irene Rauch, 12 February 2021, over Zoom Video Communications, in Isla Vista, California.
Susanne*, “so parents in East Germany didn’t really have inheritances to pass down to their children.”\(^9\) This difference in systems and relationship to money already put East Germans at a financial disadvantage compared to their new Western compatriots. It was perhaps the first clue that actual reunification and integration of the East into the FRG was a much more significant challenge than simply adjusting currency and redrawing borders. Due to the extremely different nature of competitive capitalism and collectivist socialism, lifestyles and attitude differences were much more elusive, albeit all-pervasive, hurdles to overcome.

Initially, Kohl and his party enjoyed popularity among the newly incorporated Easterners. As the realizer of reunification, he won the first free election that East Germans had participated in since 1933.\(^10\) Alongside him, Lothar de Maziere briefly became the GDR’s prime minister, effectively its last leader. De Maziere had a record of protecting dissidents and conscientious objectors, which aligned with the East’s proud revolutionary spirit following the fall of the Wall. However, not long after, accusations surfaced about the new members of what was essentially East Germany’s last government having connections to the Stasi. This was a shock; the Stasi had been the East German secret police system and the government’s most oppressive and feared institution. Maziere was included in the accusations, as were many lesser politicians.\(^11\) East Germans had been left with considerable scars and a lingering distrust of their government after enduring a dictatorship, particularly the Stasi’s surveillance methods that left people suspicious of their leaders, neighbors, friends, and even family members. Today, right-wing parties and groups can capitalize on this lingering nervousness and skepticism to gain supporters and paint the governing establishment in a scheming light.

Another point of contention between East and West, which today leads people to question the success of reunification, is the general state of the economy. Immediately following reunification, Germany dealt with its most significant recession since World War II.\(^12\) Although this took its toll on both former parts, East Germany was hit especially hard, as it was already in such an intense period of total economic readjustment. Even ten years after reunification, the unemployment rate was still twice as high for citizens of former East Germany as it was for those who had lived in the FRG all along. By 2018, the gap had shrunk significantly; former East Germany had 7.6 percent unemployment, and the rest of the FRG had 5.3 percent.\(^13\) While this is an improvement worth recognizing, it seems that by 2020, the economy in the East has stagnated again. The Eastern economy seems to no longer be actively growing. As a result, it may seem to some East Germans that reunification was a source of profit for West Germany and a disaster for them. Of course, this ignores the fact that all Germans have been paying taxes to support the integration of the East for decades.

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\(^9\) Susanne (pseudonym), interviewed by Irene Rauch, 1 March 2021, over Zoom Video Communications, in Isla Vista, California.
\(^10\) Hämäläinen, *Uniting Germany*, p. 144.
\(^11\) Hämäläinen, *Uniting Germany*, pp. 146 - 47.
The East indisputably faced great financial struggles due to the economic adjustments of reunification. Political analyst Constanze Stelzenmüller cites the reunification-era job turnover as a significant reason for Eastern disorientation and frustration, even thirty years later. With the “communist caretaker state” gone, East Germans experienced competition in a new and daunting way. Stelzenmüller describes observing the Treuhandanstalt, or Trust Agency, a government agency established in 1990 to oversee the privatization of East German corporations. She recalls “despondent foremen” working in factories in Berlin that “looked like locations for movies set in the 1950s, or the 1850s.”

The East had a lot of technological catching up to do, but rather than being given a chance to attempt it themselves, the FRG’s federal government took over, altering and dismantling the Eastern economy as it saw fit. Thus, Easterners’ anger and resentment can be understood as a “displacement emotion” for “those who feel unheard, culturally marginalized, disrespected.” Rather than trying to meet their new compatriots halfway, West Germans gave them an “egalitarian promise” —read: “you’ll become just like us”— and expected assimilation without complaint. It is hardly surprising that fifty-eight percent of the people polled in the former Eastern states responded that they do not feel more protected from “arbitrary government” than before 1989.

Looking at the Treuhandanstalt, or Treuhand, it becomes clear that while the West could afford to move on from reunification, the wounds are still fresh for the East. A 2020 documentary by German broadcasting channel ZDF focuses on the Treuhand and why many East Germans still blame it for their grievances today, despite its dissolution in 1994. The documentary features clips in which newly incorporated FRG citizens react in horror to the Treuhand closing Eastern factories and taking over corporations. “It feels like there is an occupying power here,” one man said. “They’re destroying all businesses.” One woman goes so far as to say, “They’re going to destroy us all. The whole GDR. Former GDR.” Another calls the activities of the Treuhand the “greatest annihilation of productive assets in peacetime.” The documentary supports this, citing the GDR as the tenth-strongest industrial nation in the world before its collapse. Indeed, after the Treuhand had finished its work, eighty percent of the production assets went to Western Germany, fourteen percent went to foreign investors, and only six percent remained with Eastern Germany. Today, this remains an extremely sore spot for many Easterners, who view the Treuhand situation as bad practice in integrating the East. For example, Saxon Interior Minister Petra Köpping demands that Angela Merkel’s immigrant-friendly government “integrate us first!” instead of focusing on the needs of refugees.

The GDR economy also laid the foundation of Eastern social lives and lifestyles. Often, whole families would work for the same manufacturer or company. “It was actually nice,” Marita Heissig remembers. She and her entire family worked at Automobilwerk Eisenach (AwE) in Thuringia. They

17 Decker, “Petra Köpping.”
felt at home with their colleagues and the childcare that AwE provided for its workers. After 1990, Easterners were overwhelmed by consumer options and began to choose used BMWs manufactured in the West over new Wartburgs manufactured at AwE. Wartburg cars had been considered a luxury item in the GDR. They were obsolete within a year of reunification, and the company was shut down. Marita Heissig’s husband was one of the first to be let go, followed by 4,500 others from one day to the next. The family still feels the heartbreak of that day. Her relative Jens Heissig explains, “In the GDR it was seen to that you could always work. This concept of unemployment was heretofore unknown to these families.”18 The Treuhand took away jobs that many felt were insufficiently replaced. Instead, it enforced the West’s competitive capitalist system on the GDR, forcing workers to retrain for jobs they were often not suited for. While today the federal government praises itself for having objectively raised the average standard of living for Eastern Germans, introducing modern technology and systems, those affected by the collapse of the GDR do not feel that this has made up for the loss of their former lives and identities.19

At times, East Germans struggled to keep up with the pace and standards of a market economy. Hämäläinen best sums up the labor circumstances under the GDR:

Having grown up with a controlled system of guaranteed markets and prices, the East German managers’ main worry had simply been to meet the quantitative quotas assigned to them; quality mattered less. Now they had to face the new and unfamiliar challenge of trying to sell their products in a new highly competitive market which put a premium on quality.20

In other words, not only were East German manufacturers now competing against the often technologically superior products of the West, but they had to unlearn the working mindset of the GDR. The latter ideology had essentially taught them that if only one brand of coffee was sold, it did not matter how good the coffee was; it was the only option so people would buy it regardless of quality. As Hämäläinen states, the GDR discouraged economic competition through taxes and propaganda. This explains the case of the Trabant, the Eastern car brand that today is more or less an endearing yet pitiful symbol of the GDR and the often-shoddy quality of products manufactured in a system with little to no market competition. The Trabant, or Trabi as it is commonly and affectionately known, was a compact, cheaply made car, which was more or less unchanged in design from its creation in 1957 until the Wall fell in 1989. In 1990, it received a new engine type from Western automobile giant Volkswagen, but the Trabant was discontinued two years later.21 It simply could not survive in the new, merged Germany, where top-of-the-line Western automobile designs were constantly chosen over the Trabi that was often likened to plastic or cardboard. Incidentally,

18 ZDF, “Das Erbe der Treuhand.”
20 Hämäläinen, Uniting Germany, pp. 168-70.
21 Deutsche Welle, “The Trabant, the Iconic East German Car, Turns 60” Lifestyle, 7 November 2017.
thousands of Trabis can still be seen around Germany. However, they are a collector’s item of sorts and are regarded with the same comical intrigue as one observes a rare bird with strange plumage. The economic issues East Germans experienced stemmed from the system of the GDR itself, not only from reunification. However, blaming the West and reunification might be easier than accepting how ill-prepared East Germans were to handle the pressures and pacing of a capitalist system.

**After the “Woodstock Feeling”: Lasting East-West Divides**

In a nationwide poll conducted in January 2019, twenty-nine percent of West Germans and fifty-two percent of East Germans responded that they thought regional divisions still set Germans apart. The fact that Westerners are less aware of or bothered by such divisions is telling. Although Western Germans did carry a financial burden to reunify Germany, Easterners feel the unintended consequences of reunification more strongly. Nonetheless, these divisions are legitimate and perhaps most evident in the stereotypes that West and East perpetuate about each other. The East knows the West as the Besser-Wessis—a spin on the German word Besserwisser, meaning “know-it-all.” To the East, the West is a condescending wealthy cousin, perhaps even with imperialist tendencies. Some Easterners feel that the way West Germany scrapped the structure and ideals of the GDR and imposed its system on the Ossis was dismissive and overly critical of their way of life. Meanwhile, the West knows the East as the Jammer-Ossis, or “whiny Easterners.” In other words: the stubborn, less competent—yet never satisfied—junior sibling. Neither Wessis nor Ossis feels adequately appreciated by the other.

We have already delved into some of the reasons for Eastern frustrations and resentment. However, the West had gripes of its own. Many Westerners are resentful of how much money continues to be pumped into former East Germany, which estimates show to be an equivalent of two trillion dollars total from 1990 to 2019.22 Regardless of Eastern or Western origin or location, all Germans pay the Solidaritätszuschlag, or solidarity surcharge, a monthly tax anywhere from one to two thousand euros depending on financial status. The Solidaritätszuschlag was levied to close the gap between East and West: pensions, unemployment, welfare, infrastructural modernization, and much more. Incidentally, the tax is meant to be abolished in 2021 for ninety percent of Germans—it will continue to be paid at a reduced rate by 6.5 percent of Germans and in full by the wealthiest 3.5 percent.23 A poll in May 1990 revealed that eighty percent of West Germans felt that they financially suffered from reunification. The West German government in Bonn had assembled an enormous Unity Fund aid package to incorporate East Germany into the FRG and arranged for infrastructural and industrial experts to help East Germany modernize and transition into a capitalist society. West Germany was entering the 1990s weary and resentful with such costs on its shoulders.

Despite the uncertainties, reunification was initially a joyous event. The Wall came down, Germany was one again, and a peaceful revolution had taken place. Elsa*, who has lived in the Western half of Germany all her life, living through both a divided Germany and the Third Reich, still

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remembers how emotional reunification was for both Easterners and Westerners. “You can’t imagine how we cried and celebrated,” she says. She insists that the words “Ossi” and “Wessi” never entered her vocabulary and that she was overjoyed to see Germany reunified. However, it is important to note that Elsa witnessed Germany before it was ever divided. That reunification likely carried a connotation of revived pan-Germanity for her, especially since she grew up imbued with Nazi propaganda about German supremacy and a Manifest Destiny-style doctrine.

Other Westerners spoke of the East a bit more cynically. “Growing up (in the FRG), we made fun of them,” remembers Victoria*, fifty-four. “In general, the perception was that they were controlled. We thought that they were stupid because it was Communism and we always thought, that’s not the right system… It was always, ‘what can we send them? What can we help them with?’ Because they were obviously lacking things.” Today, Victoria acknowledges that she was imbued with a different sort of propaganda under the Western capitalist system and that there were some aspects of the GDR, such as childcare and gender equality, which were superior to their Western equivalents. However, the way she looked down upon the East in the past represents how Westerners generally felt about Easterners.

Even younger people who never witnessed a divided Germany express prejudice or stereotypes about Easterners. Julia*, who is twenty and lives in southwest Germany, says, “We think they’re a bit more right-wing in the East. We don’t really like the way they talk.” She laughs and continues, “Some might say you can even tell from the way a person dresses whether they are from the East.” She speaks light-heartedly but adds, “The young people have changed my view a little bit because they’re like me, but the older generation… I think lots of people have left the East and so the people remaining in the East are unhappy with the situation, so they’re voting for whoever appeals to them. They’ll vote for anything but what we have right now.” While Julia feels detached from the reunification era and the East, she says that her father cries every year on 9 November, when the Berlin Wall fell, and that his license plate is custom made to bear the year of reunification. Clearly, those who witnessed reunification, even from the West, were at least initially very emotionally invested in it.

Friedrich*, who had visited Berlin while the 1990 currency debate was ongoing, recalls a feeling of wonder and excitement when the country was reunified because a significant part of Germany’s shared heritage had been “lost” when the country was split. From Johann Sebastian Bach’s musical compositions to Berlin’s renowned natural history museum to some of Germany’s best universities, such as Leipzig and Humboldt, many pillars of German culture had all been cut off from West Germany. They had seemed to vanish in the closed-off East. Thus, at least in the early 1990s, people

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24 Elsa (pseudonym). interviewed by Irene Rauch, February 18, 2021, over Zoom Video Communications, in Isla Vista, California.
25 Victoria (pseudonym). interviewed by Irene Rauch, 3 March 2021, over Zoom Video Communications, in Isla Vista, California.
26 Julia (pseudonym), interviewed by Irene Rauch, 9 February 2021, over Zoom Video Communications, Isla Vista, California.
27 Friedrich (pseudonym), interviewed by Irene Rauch, 12 February 2021, over Zoom Video Communications, in Isla Vista, California.
on both sides were excited about the changes that were happening—Westerners were relieved to have regained their lost other half, and Easterners were throwing off the yoke of a socialist dictatorship.

Thomas Brussig, an Eastern writer who criticized the GDR through his satirical works, describes the initial joys of reunification as a “Woodstock feeling.”28 He explains that reunification and the fall of the Wall, collectively known as die Wende—the turning point—was initially an almost “romantic event,” but that ultimately, the East paid a hefty price it had not anticipated. At its core, reunification became “a practice in coldness and devaluation” for Easterners as everything they knew was deemed insufficient and needed replacement. It is safe to say that most, if not all, Easterners were affected in some way. Countless academics, engineers, and other skilled workers lost their jobs and struggled to find new ones in the reunified nation.29 As mentioned, regions were deindustrialized, thus affecting laborers as well. People’s living situations seemed unstable as properties were suddenly posed with the threat of gentrification. This concern, incidentally, continues to echo through many Eastern cities, perhaps most strongly in Berlin, where young international entrepreneurs flock to find their own corner in the increasingly cosmopolitan city. Berlin sees frequent protests about rising housing prices, and people who are born and raised there are understandably shaken by how quickly the city seemed to change in appearance and demographics.30

Not only did Easterners watch their institutions be dismantled and their economies deindustrialized, but they were also expected to adjust seamlessly to Western bureaucracy. Brussig explains that, being a populace with firsthand experience of dictatorship and freshly released from an authoritarian regime, Easterners “are more sensitive to what they see as overreach by German politicians.” It is not only the nostalgic Easterners who were happy under the GDR who resent Angela Merkel’s immigrant-friendly politics. Even some of those who rallied for the GDR’s collapse feel repressed and cheated by the current system; many see themselves as veterans who survived oppression together and tend to bond with each other over this shared experience. As a result, they may feel more closely aligned with fellow Easterners than with Westerners and the FRG despite reunification.

In an instance of razor-sharp commentary, Brussig describes the Western affinity for capitalism as no better an indoctrination than the East’s familiarity with authoritarian socialism. He posits that “Westerners, to whom free and social market economy, parliamentarianism and federalism were administered through their mothers’ breast milk,” could not possibly understand the complex feelings that Easterners had towards their former government. Indeed, expecting some degree of assimilation is no tall order. However, it seemed to many Easterners that they were being given one option—adapt or die, essentially—and that if they complained or demanded adjustments, they ran the risk of being dismissed as Jammer-Ossis. These factors combined to make Easterners feel like strangers in their own land. As explained by Brussig, who was raised in East Berlin, “we had to fight to be recognized in this country, we have all that in our past, and it wasn’t pretty.”

30 Elizabeth Schumacher, “Thousands Rally in Berlin over World-Record Property Prices” Deutsche Welle, 14 April 14 2018.
The difficulty Easterners had in adapting to the market economy’s labor standards led many Westerners to write them off as lazy, inefficient, and lacking in stereotypically German attributes like punctuality, reliability, and diligence. In reality, it took significant mental retraining to refocus one’s attention to quality rather than quantity, to competition and an ever-changing market rather than collaboration, comradeship, and stability. Easterners were chastised for the methods and traits that they had been praised for under the slower-paced, uniform labor style of the GDR.\textsuperscript{31} The impatient attitude of the West did nothing to encourage Eastern integration, either. With these factors at play, it turned out that the largest challenge in rebuilding the Eastern economy was not money but the mindset change required of Easterners to perform in the Western economic system.

\textbf{An imperfect union: evaluating reunification}

While Kohl spoke as if the ideal of the blooming landscapes would be within reach in the next few years, economic journalist Christoph Keese predicted in 2010 that it would only take shape fifty years after reunification, if then. He recalls how disheartening this realization was. “Most people, myself included, really thought there was magic at work and that this could succeed within five years. However, after two years, it was clear this could not work in five years. And that’s when a strong disillusionment set in. And frustration. And a belief that it would never work.”\textsuperscript{32} This disenchantment with Kohl’s sweeping promise became abundantly clear even sooner than the initial imagined five-year deadline. When Kohl visited the Saxony-Anhalt town of Halle in 1991, he was pelted with eggs and heckled by attendees. The facade of the seamlessly unified nation was slipping from the start, and, as humiliating as the Halle visit may have been for Kohl, ordinary East Germans suffered the consequences of reunification daily.

As if to add insult to injury, Kohl admitted after leaving office in 1998 that he had not only glossed over the condition of the East with his “blooming landscapes” rhetoric but that he now considered his optimistic statement to be a “mistake.” Later on, he admitted that it was not a mistake but a lie. According to transcripts of a conversation between Kohl and a confidant, at the time, he had not wanted to call out the ailing Eastern economy for what it was. In a later memoir, he again addressed his ambitious campaign promise. He confessed that he had been misled by GDR propaganda about the true economic strength of the socialist East before reunification. He had failed to see the cracks in the Eastern system and had thus insufficiently prepared West Germany to take on an unexpectedly large burden. Though Kohl comfortably won the federal election that year, and the CDU—today Merkel’s party—continued to dominate reunification politics, the promise of blooming landscapes was quickly shattered.

It is hardly surprising that national-socialist clubs called \textit{Kameradschaften} formed in the former East after reunification, particularly around the turn of the millennium. Lutz Kronenberger founded a notable one in Gorbitz, a bleak, socialist high-rise studded district southwest of Dresden. Groups like Kronenberger’s united around common frustrations like unemployment and impoverishment in the East, which fostered “a dangerous mix of emotional socialism and boy scout romanticism.”\textsuperscript{33} At

\textsuperscript{31} Hämäläinen, \textit{Uniting Germany}, p. 168.
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Spiegel}, “Die schlagen schneller zu.”
that point, right-wing extremism was driven by a longing for the communist order that had crumbled and the struggles Easterners faced as a result. The strong nostalgic element of the *Kameradschaften*, combined with such fresh wounds—indeed, reunification left tangible wounds on many East Germans—characterized them as a part of a distinctly Eastern right-wing movement. Indeed, it is misleading to imply that violence is endemic to a particular region. However, reunification conditions and its lasting impact have bred a unique right-wing movement in the East that differs from past incarnations of extremism in the West. The at-times drastic measures taken in the East to express or remedy their grievances—such as marching in the streets with Islamophobic signs or voting for parties espousing Hitler-reminiscent rhetoric—are an Eastern phenomenon precisely because of the difficulties the East faced. The East experienced reunification to a more substantial and often more negative degree than the West, so it stands to reason that Eastern right-wing activity would take on different and/or stronger forms than in the West.

As detailed in Hämäläinen’s study of the flawed process of reunification, the core problem was West Germany’s general misunderstanding and “lack of foresight” regarding the Eastern condition. Some West German intellectuals viewed the GDR as a “successful socialist experiment,” a notion which seemed to be supported by the fact that it was considered the most successful economy of the Soviet bloc. However, the GDR’s relative economic strength did not reflect East Germans’ attitudes towards their government. As Hämäläinen explains, “to them it was no consolation that they were better off than the poverty-stricken Poles or the Soviets—they were comparing their lot with their fellow Germans in the [FRG].” The Western intellectual perception of the East was out of touch with Eastern concerns and aspirations. Coupled with the indescribable pollution taking place, which was only revealed after reunification, it is clear that the West’s understanding of the East was lacking in depth. With these Western misconceptions in mind, it stands to reason that the FRG thought economic modernization was the key to reunification. However, the false conviction that East Germans wanted the material plenitude of the Western capitalist system above all led to the West overlooking the Eastern desire for a feeling of identity and self-determination.

The FRG leadership also overestimated—or, in their defense, perhaps they had no way of predicting—the degree of Eastern enthusiasm about the West. While many Easterners looked forward to economic aid and know-how from the West, they were also wary of property seizure or economic destabilization; as it turns out, their fears about both were justified. East Germans remembered the property confiscations after World War II, specifically the Communist expropriation of some properties belonging to people now living in the West, and were insistent that “new injustices should not replace old ones.” Furthermore, going back to the idea of lost identity and lack of common ground, it is important to remember that part of the motivation to unite Germany was to disentangle both East and West from any potential Cold War conflicts. A reunified Germany meant that East Germany would no longer be dragged into Soviet affairs, especially as the Soviet Union teetered on collapse. Once the Soviets and Communism were out of the picture, people found internal divisions

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34 Hämäläinen, *Uniting Germany*, p. 58.
36 Hämäläinen, *Uniting Germany*, p. 130.
37 Hämäläinen, *Uniting Germany*, p. 229.
and inequalities to be agitated by. The German government became the new enemy for some, especially as Easterners saw issues like the exchange rate debate play out. The same is true today; since Germany is in peacetime, there is neither a common enemy to unite against nor a single unifying force to rally around. Thus, internal affairs have become a source of ire for Easterners who feel their circumstances are still not ideal thirty years after joining the FRG.

Reunification was certainly successful to the extent that it accomplished the mammoth task of, at least on paper, rejoining East and West Germany. However, the degree to which this incorporation happened—contingent on whether we mean economic, political, and cultural integration or simply reconfigured borders—was ultimately less than expected. Indeed, we can acknowledge the obvious triumphs of reunification. The collapse of a repressive, unsustainable, and dysfunctional regime meant that East Germans could suddenly enjoy greater freedom of speech, expanded consumer options, and a gateway to a more culturally pluralistic and cosmopolitan world. Their purchasing power was increased, having received “real money,” as some called it. Of course, these are all deemed successes by Western standards; they were unwanted and significant changes to some Easterners.

At the end of the day, though, Easterners were able to start enjoying the benefits of a welfare state. Hämaläinen puts it best, pointing out that “the very same things that attracted masses of refugees to Germany also ensured that the unemployed East German multitudes did not live in dire destitution.” In fact, it is the same thing that continues to draw refugees to Germany today, and of which, Germans are becoming increasingly protective. Having discussed the logistical issues behind reunification, it is crucial that we now examine arguably the most significant barrier to complete reunification: the inability of East and West to see each other as a united, single people.

**Misunderstandings and Nostalgia**

Reunification involved successes, broken promises, uncertainties and ultimately bred resentment on both sides. The process and its after-effects created cultural divides that left a disoriented and undervalued populace seeking vindication.

East Germany joined the FRG with doubts and uncertainties. Coupled with Helmut Kohl’s government’s misunderstandings of what the East wanted, this set up the country for decades of resentment and made it near impossible for East and West to become one attitudinally. Although the initial mood after the collapse of the Berlin Wall was celebratory, “the party could not last forever.” According to political scientist and East German specialist Klaus Schröder, some even question whether the actual cost of reunification is known or whether the government is hiding the actual figures. Schröder primarily speaks about the financial aspect of reunification but emphasizes that money “was only half the story. We should have also paid attention to the fact that this reunited nation would need to start sharing common values. Everybody thought that these problems would go away if you threw money at them back then. That’s proved not to be true.” This has led many Easterners to believe they would be better off if the GDR had never collapsed, a phenomenon commonly known as **Ostalgie** (nostalgia, but for the East—the Ost).

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Lutz R., who lives in Berlin and experienced reunification in his early thirties, is a textbook example of an Easterner with Ostalgie. He claims that he felt a greater sense of freedom under the GDR than under Merkel’s democratic government. He goes so far as to say that he felt reassured by the existence of the Berlin Wall, echoing the propagandistic name the GDR coined for it: the “anti-fascist protection rampart.” Even thirty years after the Wall’s collapse, Lutz yearns for the East’s former border and claims that it was not there to trap East Germans but “to protect us from the West.”

Lutz’s attitude seems ludicrous to Westerners who never experienced the difficult transition from GDR to FRG; indeed, the East Germans who fled the GDR would agree with the West. However, a 2009 survey revealed that nearly half of those polled would agree with Lutz; while sixty percent said that the GDR was an Unrechtsstaat, or unjust state. The remaining forty percent said it was not. To them, the fall of the Berlin Wall signified the end of a life of peace and order, not the beginning of freedom.

What about the freedom to dissent and disapprove? The abundance of goods and choices in a capitalist society? “Freedom is relative,” Lutz argues. He claims that in East Germany, he was able to complain to his boss without fear of being fired and that in unified Germany, this freedom to express one’s thoughts does not exist. “In East Germany, I could say what I thought. Not about the government, of course, but then I didn’t have anything against the government.” One could respond that perhaps Lutz had it easy, that he did not have neighbors spying on him and did not have to spend a stint in the Hohenschönhausen prison as countless East Germans did. Alternatively, perhaps he was so indoctrinated with the GDR’s fervent anti-West propaganda that, thirty years later, he is unable to appreciate the freedom of the FRG. However, could it not simply be that some people feel satisfied with the familiar and jarred by what is new and different?

Historian Hope Harrison points out that even those who marched in the streets and protested to urge reform in the GDR were not necessarily advocating reunification. It is important to remember that “not all of the East Germans calling for change wanted a Western-style system of democracy and capitalism.” Some simply wanted an improved socialist system; these people would have felt robbed by the collapse of the Wall and the reunification that turned their lives upside down in many ways. That Lutz’s nostalgia for the pre-reunification era is so strong and that he is not alone in these sentiments further underscores the point that Easterners still do not feel quite at home in the FRG.

Harrison goes so far as to say that Easterners feel as though they have been colonized by the West and by capitalism. This is a bold statement, considering the celebratory mood that characterized reunification in its early days. However, it is true that not all East Germans were thrilled to be incorporated into a system that was economically, politically, and culturally alien to them. To those who wanted a regime change, in the sense that they wanted the Stasi to be abolished and the GDR to become less authoritarian, for instance, but still wanted to keep their familiar socialist system, this unexpectedly drastic upheaval of the lives they knew was unwelcome. At that point, “the improved

40 Stelzenmüller, “German Lessons.”
42 Harrison, After the Berlin Wall, p. 314.
43 Harrison, After the Berlin Wall, p. 323.
44 Harrison, After the Berlin Wall, p. 136.
infrastructure and air quality in the East did not always compensate for these sentiments.” Harrison’s analysis mirrors Schröder’s in that both scholars identify the government underestimating East Germans’ bond to the GDR. In the narrative of capitalism triumphing over socialism, of free speech and revolution winning out over oppression, it was easy to forget that many, if not most, East Germans had never known a life outside the GDR and that its collapse was traumatic to a certain degree. Many were unhappy to have their entire way of life devalued and deemed outmoded.

As Harrison explains, even calling the GDR an *Unrechtsstaat*, or “state without the rule of law”—as the dominant discourse since reunification tends to do—is still perceived as an insult by East Germans. Many feel that this narrative condemns and invalidates the lives they lived, which in turn alienates them and breeds further *Ostalgie*. Indeed, while Westerners speak of the *Unrechtsstaat*, many Easterners fondly look back on living “a life of good within the bad state,” with the Wall as “a backdrop to their everyday lives.”\(^{45}\) In oral histories, subjects reminisced on happy childhoods in the Young Pioneers socialist group; penpalships with Soviet children; feeling fortunate to live in an anti-fascist state, away from the exploitative, crime-ridden West. Perceptions and experiences manufactured by the GDR span a broad spectrum and continue to shape East-West relations and tensions today.

Where does this leave us? As it turns out, the East, which underwent severe restructuring and political disorientation, experienced economic destabilization, and became emblematic of a lasting cultural divide between East and West, is home to fervent xenophobia and a disturbing right-wing scene today. Once the Wall came down and after the Eastern socialist regime collapsed, East Germans were initially welcomed with open arms in the West. However, the pressures and difficulties of reunification that we have discussed—unemployment in the East, rising taxes for the West, cultural differences, and great misunderstandings—collectively “brought to a halt tendencies towards post-nationalism attitudes and more cultural pluralism.”\(^{46}\) It was as if each German was in a survival mode of sorts. As a result, working to patch up East-West misunderstandings and embracing other changes like multiculturalism and globalism slid down Germans’ list of priorities.

We live in a period of historic significance in its own right. Many nations seem to be slipping politically to the right and into situations of increased intolerance and heightened tensions. It behooves us to remember the roots of such alarming trends to take steps toward addressing them in the present. In Germany, the former Eastern states now show a much higher tendency toward right-wing extremism than the West, a symptom of the lasting divide between East and West. Understanding the prevailing Eastern self-perception as neglected and undervalued people helps us make sense of this divide. It also helps explain why some Easterners may be more likely to resent immigrants and express their long-brewing frustrations with the government through right-wing votership and even violence.

\(^{45}\) Harrison, *After the Berlin Wall*, p. 15, p. 325, p. 347.

\(^{46}\) Kurthen et al., *Antisemitism and Xenophobia*, p. 261.
Revolution in Cuba and Guatemala: What did the Latin American Revolutionary Movements from the 1950s to the 1970s seek to Achieve, and How?

Santiago Rodríguez

Introduction
Revolutionary movements were a distinctive feature of twentieth-century Latin America, which surged as anti-dictatorial, nationalistic, and popular initiatives that took shape under the broader geopolitical context of the Cold War. Between the 50s and 70s, these movements appeared in response to complex sociopolitical conditions characterized by state repression, economic and social hardship, corruption, and foreign meddling in internal affairs. Through different means and varying degrees of success, revolutionary movements in Latin America sought to challenge the established order and offer a popular alternative to their respective nations' social, political, and economic reality. Despite having significant differences, most revolutionary movements shared the common desire to solve or address the many grievances felt by the popular masses and marginalized groups. In doing so, they put themselves in direct opposition to existing power structures. Such were the cases of Cuba and Guatemala, two revolutionary initiatives with similar demands (in their early stages) but dramatically different outcomes. Both the Cuban and Guatemalan revolutions surged as counter-establishment movements responding to periods of dictatorship and, in their early stages, pushed for relatively moderate claims related to social justice and welfare. The revolutionaries of Cuba and Guatemala sought to offer an alternative nation project which challenged the one carried out by the domestic ruling class and the foreign interests directly intertwined with it.

It is important to highlight that the Cuban and Guatemalan experiences are a suitable comparison, given both countries’ shared history of dictatorial rule and relatively similar material conditions in the pre- and post-dictatorial stages (i.e., type of economic activity, relationship to U.S. regional interests, etc.). Moreover, both historical examples are worthy of comparison because of the divergent trajectories each revolutionary experiment achieved, despite their similar origins. After the end of Jorge Ubico’s rule, Guatemala experienced a series of democratically-elected governments, culminating with the election of Jacobo Arbenz, who attempted to build peace between radical and moderate political elements within the institutional frameworks that existed during the dictatorship era. On the other hand, after successfully ousting Batista, the revolutionary government in Cuba quickly transitioned beyond a reformist approach, putting forth an alternative nation project outside the country’s existing institutional and political framework. In Cuba, the collaboration between radical and moderate elements in the post-dictatorship period was short-lived. Revolutionary leadership quickly decided to prioritize the delivery of radical promises above the appeasement of moderate political sectors.

Whereas the Cuban revolution succeeded in breaking with the former establishment and moving towards a genuinely radical and transformative agenda, the Guatemalan experiment was stopped dead in its tracks via a U.S.-sponsored coup. In this sense, Cuba and Guatemala present two
alternatives to achieve structural change; one would be internal reformism, as was the case of Guatemala, and the other would be a radical break with the established order, as was the case of Cuba. Whereas the Arbenz government attempted to channel revolutionary and popular demands through existing power structures and institutions, the Cuban revolutionaries implemented a popular government utterly distinct from the former establishment. Said difference would prove key to each revolution’s capacity to deliver on its promises of social change.

A common history
Both Cuba and Guatemala have a shared history of repressive dictatorial rule that inspired their revolutionary periods. Corruption, continual policing, and brutal repression of political dissent were the daily order under Ubico’s Guatemala. To secure his thirteen-year rule, Ubico relied on “a far-flung network of spies, regular use of torture, arbitrary imprisonment, and public executions,” which normalized violence in the country. Furthermore, the government used the legislative system to enforce laws “designed to secure cheap, often unpaid labor for plantation and public works,” demonstrating how Ubico’s regime institutionalized exploitative labor conditions, directly benefiting the domestic economic elite. Fulgencio Batista’s Cuba was no different in this regard. After the 1952 coup where Carlos Prio Socarrás was deposed, Batista, who had already served as president between 1940 and 1944, returned to power undemocratically. Batista silenced political parties, such as the Partido Socialista Popular, which was banned and targeted by state forces after 1953. He also co-opted labor organizations, particularly the Central de Trabajadores de Cuba, neutralizing the labor movement’s role as a potential critic of the regime. Multiple massacres took place under Batista’s rule, and it is estimated that around 20,000 people were murdered in the years leading up to his overthrow.

Cuba and Guatemala also shared plenty in terms of their economic activity, which was primarily defined by the export of commodities such as sugar, bananas, and coffee. The nature and implications of these production models created wealthy and influential actors who would profoundly influence both nations' political and social reality while simultaneously accentuating social unrest and discontent against the system in the cities and countryside. The use and ownership of land would be a decisive issue for both revolutionary movements. It was, in fact, the core element of Arbenz’s decree 900 and a vital part of the so-called ‘revolutionary laws’ embraced by Cuban revolutionaries. The plantation-based economic model was vital in the theater of revolution. Inside the haciendas and plantations, most of the rural discontent with the established order was brewing.

Additionally, foreign interests, namely those of the U.S., are another common point between both countries. The backing of dictatorial figures, the protection of property and economic activity linked to the U.S., and the active response against the perceived threat of communism characterized Washington D.C.’s stance on Cuba and Guatemala. U.S. businesses, most notably the United Fruit

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347 Roberts, Permanent Revolution, p.40.
Company (UFCO), were an integral part of both countries’ existing economic and political establishment, with over 75,000 people being “indirectly dependent on the company's activities”¹³⁴ in Guatemala alone. In this sense, with their reasonably moderate demands, the revolutionary movements were putting themselves in direct opposition to the local ruling class and, by virtue of the presence of U.S. business, in opposition to U.S. regional interests.

**Characterizing the revolutions’ aims**

Who were these revolutionaries, and what were their aims? In Cuba, institutional opposition to Batista grew as the regime attempted to secure its hold on power. A young Fidel Castro, member and candidate for Congress of the Orthodox party, saw his electoral aspirations thwarted as Batista’s coup canceled the June elections. Like Castro, many middle and upper-class intellectuals increasingly saw armed struggle as the only viable alternative against Batista. Said bourgeois intellectuals would become the leaders of the Movimiento 26 de Julio, hereafter referred to as M26-J. The movement was established after a group of insurgents led by Castro carried out the unsuccessful attack on the Moncada army barracks. Captured and on trial, Castro delivered his renowned speech *History Will Absolve Me*, a powerful text that embodies the M26-J vision for the future of Cuba through the proclamation of five Revolutionary Laws, summarized as follows:³⁴⁹

1. Reinstate the 1940 Constitution, with the revolutionary movement heading the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, deriving its legitimacy from popular support.
2. Implement agrarian reform. Granting land ownership to those working parcels of less than 170 acres, compensating owners with the equivalent of 10 years of rent.
3. Industrial workers receiving 30% of company profits.
4. Sugar plantation workers receive 55% of sugar production profits.
5. Confiscation of capital, property, and any gains obtained through fraud during previous administrations to be used to fund social programs.

At this stage, the M26-J lacked mass popular support and had few links among peasants or workers. However, the attack on the barracks and Castro’s subsequent court defense made him and the M26-J movement famous throughout Cuba. The five revolutionary laws were by no means a socialist program. Still, they did outline a clear divide between the illegitimate institutions and authority of the Batista regime and the coming revolutionary power which drew its legitimacy from the Cuban masses. This being said, the popular demands made by the M26-J did not call for a structural transformation of Cuba’s economic system; at this stage, the movement sought to redistribute the massive wealth and power held by the domestic elites rather than openly calling for the abolishment of Cuban capitalism as a whole. In this sense, the M26-J denounced Batista and its political establishment. Still, it fell short of seriously questioning the broader economic and productive institutions that perpetuated exploitation and inequality in Cuba, at least in its early stages.

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Guatemala fell along similar lines. Dissent and resistance against Ubico’s systematic repression progressively grew throughout the country. Student activism was central to the urban struggle; from the explicit rejection of government appointees in university faculties to the organization of general strikes, Ubico found that students, and the Guatemalan people in general, were increasingly opposed to the regime’s repression. Facing growing pressures from the student and labor movement, the dictator suspended the constitution in 1944, eventually resigning, but only after appointing a military junta (understood as the government of a state by high-ranking military officers) that continued his repressive policies. Amidst sustained protests and strikes calling for the end of the junta, a coup organized by opposition groups, political leaders, and members of the armed forces, including would-be president Jacobo Arbenz, toppled the government in what is now remembered as the October revolution. Elections were held, and Juan José Arevalo was elected president, carrying out a moderate program of social reforms. More radical aspirations came with Arbenz’s presidency, elected in 1950. Arbenz had broad backing, from the moderate Partido de Integridad Nacional to the leftist Revolutionary Action Party and the support of the trade unions. Arbenz’s ‘radical’ character can be partially attributed to his inclusion of notorious Guatemalan communists into the government, such as José Manuel Fortuny, Victor Manuel Gutierrez, and Silva Jonam, who acted as advisors during his presidential rule. But more relevant was Arbenz’s proposed agrarian reform, Decree 900, which called for a significant transformation of the Guatemalan countryside. The aims of the decree are best summed up in its first two articles, as follows:

Article 1°— The Agrarian Reform of the October Revolution intends to eliminate the feudal property structure in the countryside and the relations of production that originate it in order to develop the means of exploitation and capitalist modes of production in agriculture, preparing the path for Guatemala’s industrialization.

Article 2°— All forms of servitude and slavery are abolished, and hereby any form of labor as payment for rent, and ‘free’ personal benefits for laborers, are now prohibited…

The objective of the law cannot be any less radical; Decree 900 was a mechanism to develop Guatemalan capitalism, not the path to a socialist state. Overall, Arbenz’s land reform sought to “Develop the peasant capitalist economy […] Distribute land to landless peasants […] facilitate new capital investment through the rent of nationalized lands [and] increase agricultural credit for peasants in general.” That being said, the mechanisms through which said objectives would be attained (i.e., nationalizations and expropriations) were a direct challenge to the powerful and wealthy landowners of the country, including the UFCO. The rationale behind land reform was also a vindication for rural

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workers and the native population of Guatemala, who had suffered under ‘feudal’ exploitation and whose wellbeing would be achieved, as per Arbenz, through a modern, capitalist Guatemala.

Arbenz’s popular initiative was conceptualized and carried out through the same power structures that served previous governments. In this sense, the means through which Arbenz’s program would be carried out put the government at odds with the local elite and, increasingly, at odds with the United States. However, the proposed agrarian reform law rooted its legitimacy within the existing Guatemalan constitution and institutional framework. Arbenz’s reform took place within existing institutions and power structures means that the popular mass movement represented by the government remained constrained by the boundaries of the Guatemalan state apparatus, meaning that there was no break between the political force representing the masses and the existing Guatemalan establishment. This was not the case in Cuba. The M26-J operated outside the scope of the so-called illegitimate Cuban state and, once in power, created novel institutions outside the scope of the former political system.

Mass support for the revolutionary programs
Because of its popular appeal and emphasis on labor rights, it is understandable that the program outlined by the M26-J and the Arbenz government resonated among the rural and urban working class. The haciendas and plantations acted as a melting pot for labor organization and resistance to the established order, proving key for both revolutions. Sugar cane plantations in Cuba, many of which were U.S.-owned, witnessed mass strikes before the general uprising against Batista. Between 1995 and 1995, “most of Cuba’s 500,000 sugar workers were on strike”,354 showing that the growing anti-Batista sentiment was tied to labor conditions and that the feeling of unrest and dissatisfaction in the countryside was generalized, which would prove vital for the success of the coming guerrilla tactics employed by the M26-J. By 1956, the movement had “successfully established a network of (urban) worker’s cells in areas ranging from banking to railways,”355 which enabled the realization of coordinated actions against the Batista regime in preparation for the arrival of The Granma. This vessel would transport Fidel’s group of guerrilla fighters returning from Mexico.

In Guatemala, labor support was equally fundamental, although its role was different, as the country was not undergoing an all-out rebellion against the government. UFCO unions attempted to strengthen their bargaining positions by collaborating and, in doing so, became relevant supporters of the Arevalo and Arbenz governments. In 1951, the Comité Coordinadora de la Acción de los Trabajadores Bananeros y Portuarios was formed after the three main bananero unions decided to merge, seeking to “coordinate and lead the fight against UFCO in a stronger manner by uniting … denouncing UFCO and the tactics it used to weaken the worker movement”.356 The 1946 strikes, supported by UFCO unions, were vital in the push for creating a new labor code, their relevance growing to the point that both Arevalo and Arbenz attempted to secure their support by directly involving themselves in the settlement of labor disputes.357 In this sense, rural and urban worker support for the M26-J and the

354 Roberts, Permanent Revolution, p.46.
355 Roberts, Permanent Revolution, pg. 49.
356 Batres, “The Experience.”
357 Batres, “The Experience.”
Arbenz government proved fundamental as each revolution attempted to secure power and implement their respective reforms.

**Delivering the promises of the revolution**

However, the degree of effectiveness when delivering on their revolutionary promises did vary greatly. Despite being openly pro-workers, the Guatemalan government still had to abide by constitutional and political restraints, failing to fully deliver the assistance and protection it promised to the Guatemalan masses. Under Arevalo, strikes were even outlawed until a new labor code was negotiated. When said document came into force, it proved to limit the worker’s ability to organize, with the U.S. government conceding that “this code was really no more liberal than the U.S. code, and that in some ways it even limited workers in their ability to strike.”

Under Arbenz, the government was pressured to deliver on its land reform. In their struggle to accelerate the land distribution process, the Arbenz government offered “considerable amounts of unregulated power to local agrarian activists [who] drew on their authority as community leaders, politicians or patriarchs,” and in doing so, many took personal advantage of the reform process. Such is the case of ‘Pancho’ Curley, a descendant of an Irish migrant family who became infamous in the region of Alta Verapaz, given his repeated charges of fraud, patronage, and coercion. Figures like Curley demonstrate how the Arbenz government inadvertently undermined the implementation of its policies in its desperate need for results. Simultaneously, the Guatemalan establishment, embodied by opposition parties and the landed elite, opposed any serious reform, fearing that a radical transformation of the countryside “might trigger economic chaos [and] The awakening of the rural masses - largely Indians - [which] alarmed administration politicians content with the rewards of political life.” Overall, the Arbenz government struggled with policy implementation, openly challenging the domestic elite and attempting to avoid a total break with the U.S. while being constrained by legal and constitutional boundaries. Under such pressures, the future of the Guatemalan revolution was uncertain.

Cuba deviates from Guatemala because the aspirations of the M26-J became increasingly radical throughout the struggle against the Batista regime. Those who came to power after capturing Havana were not the same (neither ideologically nor politically) as those who stood by the five revolutionary laws declared by Castro in his trial. Initially led by middle-class intellectuals, the struggle to overthrow the regime grew into a popular movement that unequivocally sided with the popular masses. The M26-J further distanced itself from moderate actors, with the definitive break under the newly established revolutionary government. The new agrarian reform law declared in 1959 sought to “eradicate landed estates and foreign ownership of rustic property; eliminated all forms of non-proprietary ownership; and gave ownership of the land to those who worked it,” and it effectively

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358 Batres, “The Experience.”
pitted the new government and its mass base against the domestic economic elites, including cattle ranchers, plantation owners, and even moderate politicians within the government. The divide was so significant that four cabinet members, including the Minister of Agriculture, resigned and fled to the U.S. after the law was declared. In this sense, the post-revolutionary government in Cuba made a fundamentally different decision than the Arbenz government made in Guatemala. The initial government coalition, presided by Dr. Manuel Urrutia, included moderates, conservatives, and even anti-communists. The prime minister at the time, José Miró Cardona, resigned as the contradictions between the revolutionaries and moderates rose, which allowed Fidel Castro to step in. The coalition progressively broke down as more radical policies were implemented, such as the 1959 Agrarian Reform Law.

By deciding not to appease the moderate political sectors, and implementing increasingly radical policies aimed at delivering on the promises made during the fight against Batista, the revolutionary government in Cuba eliminated dissenting voices and consolidated its power. Radical reforms were perceived as the only way to deliver on the promises of the revolution. This rationale antagonized moderate voices while galvanizing mass support for the former guerrilla fighters. Rather than appointing moderate voices in power positions to appease other political sectors, the revolutionary government in Cuba doubled down in its consolidation of power, selecting figures that aligned with the revolutionary rhetoric embraced by the Cuban masses. The situation in Guatemala took shape in the opposite manner. When struggling to deliver on the revolutionary promises, the Arbenz government delegated power to questionable individuals residing in the countryside and chose to appease the moderate elements that actively blocked radical legislation, which greatly limited the extent to which the government could deliver on its transformative policies.

Conclusion
The Cuban and Guatemalan revolutions emerged from a deeply felt desire for social transformation. The overthrow of dictatorial power was an immediate concern that enabled a diverse set of political actors to cooperate towards a common goal. However, as the anti-dictatorial struggle developed, calls for the transformation of social, political, and economic power structures became the fundamental promises of the more radical sectors, a promise built over the collective grievances of the Cuban and Guatemalan masses. These anti-dictatorial initiatives were reasonably moderate in their early stages, but they still embodied a direct challenge to their respective domestic elites, specifically by targeting the issue of land. In this sense, the Arbenz government struggled to deliver on its revolutionary promises. The structures it attempted to work through were not supportive of the profound transformations needed to achieve structural change in the country. Without putting forth a radical program, Arbenz was framed as a Communist, and his government was terminated via a U.S.-sponsored coup, leading to years of conflict and instability in Guatemala.

In Cuba, the M26-J attempted to put forth their progressive demands but rejected the existing power structures and institutions deemed illegitimate by the M26-J movement. By declaring

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themselves in opposition to the whole of Cuba’s political and economic establishments, the movement only needed to make concessions to its base members, which allowed the revolutionary government, once in power, to push its reforms without worrying about forming a consensus with moderates and the domestic elites. It is important to highlight that the Cuban revolution was not limited to guerrilla warfare, and this was not the sole component that led to its success. Instead, it was the combination of subversive action paired with solid mass support both in the countryside and the cities which created a situation of dual power, where the revolutionaries became the legitimate power on the island. Guatemala never experienced this double power situation. It could not deliver on the monumental (and some would argue, impossible) revolutionary promises without breaking with domestic elites and foreign interests.