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*The Soviet Union and the Specialized
Agencies of the United Nations, 1954-1962:
Cold War Policies or Humanitarian Ideals*

INTRODUCTION

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1954-1962

Cold War Policies or Humanitarian Ideals?

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INTRODUCTION

Historically the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, much as other nations, has considered international organizations, such as the League of Nations and the United Nations, as a tool to promote its national interests. Yet the exact motivation of the Soviet government and its representatives' action in international relations have remained an issue of dispute among observing parties. In 1954, Trygve Lie wrote, "Even after seven years as Secretary-General, I cannot pretend to speak with assurance as to how the Soviet mind is made up."¹

During the negotiations on the United Nations Organization at Dumbarton Oaks in September of 1944, and at the San Francisco Conference that followed, the organizers created the specialized agencies. The role of these agencies in the world Organization was to be one of "co-ordination and co-operation, rather than one of centralization and direction."² They were designed to aid in the peace-keeping function of the Organization through social, cultural and economic assistance. The Economic and

Social Council was to be the administrative body in charge of overseeing these agencies by making agreements with them on policy, considering reports from each agency, as well as reviewing their budgets.

By focusing on the Soviet Union's participation in the United Nations specialized agencies, the question of political motives, perceived national interests and maneuvering in these agencies during the Cold War years of 1954 to 1962 can be analyzed, both from the Soviets' point of view as well as on an international level. The three agencies to be examined are the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO). These agencies are representative of the general pattern of the USSR's involvement in the United Nations during a period of international tension and conflict.

Soviet policy in the United Nations changed drastically from the time of its creation to the Cold War era. The three "non-political" agencies became, and still are today, major arenas of conflict between the East (communism) and the West (capitalism). Yet each of these specialized agencies had its own unique evolution and goals. By investigating the WHO, UNESCO and ILO, a more focused perspective on the Soviet Union's participation in the United Nations can be presented, and some conclusions on the general pattern of the USSR's foreign policy from 1954 to 1962 can be appraised.

The background of the Soviet Union's participation in international organization can be traced back not only to its development as a socialist state after the Bolshevik Revolution but also to its origins as an autocratic regime under the tsarist government. A brief overview of certain historical events must be considered in order to understand the actions and motivations of the Soviet government in its participation in international organization. The Revolution of 1917, the role of the Third International (Comintern), participation in the League of Nations, the effects of World War Two, and finally the creation of the United Nations Organization must be addressed in order to analyze the position of the Soviet government concerning the United Nations and its specialized agencies.

The outcome of the Bolshevik Revolution of November 1917 was crucial in the future policies of Soviet Russia in the area of international organization. The participation of the tsarist government in World War One is considered a major factor in the success of the revolutionary forces of March 1917. The reaction of the new Soviet government was to withdraw from established international intervention and participation, which it viewed as being a major cause of oppression and suffering in their society. "The conception of foreign policy as a special form of activity with rules and principles of its own was at the outset totally alien to Bolshevik thinking," stated noted Soviet historian E. H. Carr.³ The new government, therefore, rejected previous forms of official international relations and sought

divergent means to achieve the political outcomes it desired, that is, world revolution.

The new Soviet government did utilize international organization, but it was one of its own creation. The Communist International, or Comintern, was an international organization of communist parties whose purpose was to "foment revolution abroad."⁴ According to Carr, the strength of the Bolshevik government rested in its ability to utilize propaganda to make up for what it lacked in the ordinary realm of international maneuvering, namely military and economic power. "Soviet Russia was the first national unit to preach an international doctrine and to maintain an effective world-propaganda organization."⁵ The Comintern was a splinter of the Second International, an organization that split on the issue of nationalism during the First World War. Lenin rejected both the concepts of national defense and pacifism; he maintained that the war should be transformed into a international class war. The Comintern, through its twenty-one points for admission "required all parties to model their structure on disciplined lines in conformity with the Soviet pattern and to expel moderate socialists and pacifists."

By 1921 the Soviet government realized the need for a more pragmatic approach to gain support of the working classes outside of the Soviet model. It began to speak in terms of "United Fronts" and "transitional demands." Policies of the Comintern shifted along with Soviet internal politics. In 1923 there was a movement away from the decentralization of 1919-1923, and by 1928 Stalin had abandoned his policy of "socialism

in one country" to a familiar stand of supporting "world revolution". Yet by the seventh congress of 1935, revolutionary fervor declined in order to gain allies against Germany. The Comintern now joined in with more moderate groups in "Popular Fronts" against fascism. According to E. H. Carr, "The removal of world revolution from the centre of the stage to the wings permanently affected the status of Comintern, though the consequences of the shift were perhaps not noticed in the enthusiasm of the congress".⁶

The events leading to the creation of the League of Nations in 1919 were viewed by the Soviet Union with apprehension and distrust. It considered the League to be an anti-communist organization aimed at destroying the newly born Soviet state. As such, the League was denounced by the First Congress of Comintern. The Allied intervention in Russia in 1918-20, the Bolshevik theory of capitalism, and the assumption that socialist nations would solve international problems by their very existence were some of the motivating factors for the USSR's rejection of the League.

However, as the Soviets' views on the international climate changed in the early 1920's, the USSR realized that it might utilize the services of the League of Nations in efforts to promote communist ideology. Later it saw the League as an opportunity to organize opposition to the aggression of Nazi Germany. On September 18, 1933 the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations and became an active participant. Its participation, though, proved short lived. On December 14, 1939

the Soviet delegation was expelled for acts of aggression against Finland. While the USSR had had a taste of participation in international organization with the "imperialist West" it should not be overrated in the general context of its participation and cooperation with the capitalist powers. The threat of invasion helped motivate the Soviets to adopt a more pragmatic stand toward the League, yet when its benefits no longer outweighed the ideological sacrifices, the USSR did not regret having to leave the Organization.

Owing to its position as an Allied Power at the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union actively participated in the creation and organization of the United Nations in 1945. A sense of international cooperation, however much in the framework of the reality of give-and-take to ward off the greater evil of Nazi Germany, prevailed after World War Two. A typical Western observation of the situation was that Franklin D. Roosevelt "believed he could obtain Stalin's postwar cooperation by meeting legitimate Russian security needs, provided the Soviet Union had given up its attempts to force communism on the rest of the world."⁷ The USSR's main concern in the implementation of the international organization was to confine it strictly to security issues, namely, maintaining world peace, and prevent it from encountering problems of political ideology. At Dumbarton Oaks in September 1944, Soviet Ambassador Gromyko protested the inclusion of economic and social issues in the new world organization.⁸ The Soviet delegates recalled the failure of the League of Nations to maintain world peace, and attributed it to the fact that 77% of

the issues the League dealt with did not concern international security.⁹ Even though the USSR vehemently objected to the inclusion of social and economic agenda items, it, in the end, reached a political compromise with the United States. The USSR received separate votes for its "autonomous" republics (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic), and the US pushed through the establishment of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in the United Nations.

Although it participated briefly in economic and social organizations in the League of Nations, the Soviet Union's foremost concern was international peace and security. Both the US and the USSR agreed that social and economic conditions caused war. Nevertheless the Soviets did not feel that war could be prevented through these specialized organizations, hence they generally objected to their inclusion in the United Nations Charter.

After the creation (or re-creation) of these specialized agencies, the Soviet Union began harboring grave doubts about participation. In 1945, it flatly refused to join some of the agencies, often because they were viewed as blatantly anti-Soviet. Two such agencies were the International Refugee Organization (IRO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The USSR did join other agencies at the commencement of the United Nations, yet it withdrew from them later because it considered them "useless".¹⁰ In his inquiries into Soviet motives and objectives, Alexander Dallin concluded that "by 1950-

51 it [the USSR] had clearly come to view most specialized agencies as enemy tools of the Cold War".¹¹

After the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953 the Soviet government began to reappraise the advantages of these organizations for foreign policy objectives. The year 1954 was a turning point for the USSR, and just as importantly the specialized agencies, which the Soviet Union and its bloc countries began to rejoin slowly.

The debate over the USSR's participation in the WHO, UNESCO and ILO can also be divided into three separate but equally important issues. The first problem to arise was the ideological conflict between the communist and capitalist systems and the Cold War policies of the post-World War II era. The criticism the USSR expressed regarding these agencies between 1945 and 1953 was based on a power conflict with the US. The Soviet Union saw the agencies as puppets used by the West to promote capitalist ideals. The votes in the agencies by the pro-capitalist nations greatly outnumbered those of the Soviet bloc. These economic and social agencies provided a battleground for the USSR and the US since their birth in the United Nations. It was not until 1954 that the Soviet Union stopped concentrating its energy on attacking these institutions and began using them as a tool not only to condemn the West but to promote its own international security.

The second issue to be explored is the assertion that the Soviet Union used these agencies (particularly UNESCO) after 1954, as a means of promoting world communism. With the United

Nations debate on decolonization came the opportunity to woo Third-World nations. By providing leadership in the social and economic organizations, the USSR gained support and friendly votes within the agencies and the General Assembly. In looking at the Soviet Union's participation in the WHO, UNESCO and ILO, we can see how its foreign policy goals evolved after 1954. Yet another side to this question is one of humanitarianism and the intentions of the Soviet leaders. Were they out only to acquire the Third-World vote, or did they actually want to promote education and science, end world hunger and disease, and create better conditions for workers?

Finally, the third issue to be examined is the Soviet Union's motivations in regard to its involvement in the specialized agencies and its own internal policies and problems. Was de-Stalinization a turning point or just a coincidence? Were there benefits to the USSR through the social and economic organizations? Did the USSR make gains in technology and information from the West? Did the attempt to negotiate international cooperation add legitimacy to a government that was realigning its foreign policy?

plague and yellow fever. Quarantine was the lesson to be addressed, however, and twelve nations were not enough to make any major breakthrough. After procedural troubles, the first International Sanitary Conference was declared closed in 1892.

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CHAPTER ONE

The Origins of the World Health Organization, the Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization
and the International Labour Organization

The first attempt to reach an international agreement on the issue of public health came in 1851. The first International Sanitary Conference was held in Paris and attended by Russia and eleven other European states. Each nation was represented by one diplomat and one physician. "At that time few people had any notion of what is now called public health, preventative medicine was scarcely dreamed of and the principle of the responsibility of governments for the health of their peoples would have been considered impracticable," stated Fraser Brockington on the origins of world health organizations.¹ With the improvement of international transport came growing possibilities for the transmission of such diseases as cholera, plague and yellow fever. Quarantine was the issue to be addressed, however, and twelve nations were not enough to make any major breakthrough. After procedural troubles, the first International Sanitary Conference was declared closed in 1852.²

Those who wished to promote world health were not discouraged, and eleven more international sanitary conferences were to follow between the years 1852 and 1907. At one conference, held in Rome in 1907, the first bona fide

international health organization was born.³ The International Bureau of Public Hygiene (IBPH) was established to "disseminate to Member States information of general public-health interest, and, especially, that relating to communicable diseases...and measures to combat them."⁴ The policies of the bureau often failed to achieve international health legislation; it did provide, however, an information service. The Soviet Union found this approach to international health issues acceptable to its foreign policy goals, and joined the International Bureau of Public Hygiene in 1928.

What little power the Bureau was able to exercise in the area of health legislation was defused by the creation of a new international health organization after the First World War, the Health Organization of the League of Nations (HOLN). The Soviet Union viewed the League's health organization with the same distrust it had for the League of Nations itself. According to Soviet commentators, the "Health Organization of the League of Nations incorporated in itself all the deficiencies which characterized the League of Nations as a whole."⁵ The Soviet government considered the HOLN as a political instrument of the large "imperialist powers".

During the Second World War the HOLN and its objectives were considered secondary in a time of great conflict, and the organization was allowed to deteriorate. The outcome of World War II, nevertheless, caused an even greater need for a world health agency to assist with problems of disease, malnutrition and mass evacuation and relocation of peoples.⁶ The question of

this new organization was addressed by representatives at the United Nations Conference in San Francisco in 1945.

Many experts see the United Nations World Health Organization as a continuation of the HOLN. Robert Berkov, in his 1957 book The World Health Organization: A Study in Decentralized International Administration wrote:

The regional aspects of international health work had, however, an earlier origin, as has been indicated, in the first cooperative efforts toward international acting in preventing the spread of disease from one region to another. And it was the institutionalization of these efforts which confronted the WHO, at its very beginning...with the practical necessity to make administrative arrangements for the continuation of such institutions.

The structural differences between the HOLN and the WHO, however, were great enough for the USSR to join the World Health Organization at its conception in 1946. According to one observer, "the new Organization did not inherit the traditional hatred which the Soviet Union had toward the League of Nations and toward all subsequent organizations that drew heavily upon the legacy of the League of Nations."⁸

The participation of the Soviet Union in the WHO was short-lived. In early 1949 the USSR, along with its autonomous republics, notified the Director-General of the WHO that they were dissatisfied with the work of the agency and no longer considered themselves members of the organization. There was a problem with the withdrawal petition, however, because constitutionally there were no provisions for recalling membership in the World Health Organization. "The fact that the Constitution does not permit the withdrawal from the

organization," states one report, "resulted in the accumulation of arrears of contributions which had been considered in connection with resumption of active membership."⁹

Technically, the USSR was still a member nation of the WHO from 1949 to 1957 nevertheless its complete lack of participation gave it non-member status.

Nonparticipation in the WHO programs was "justified on the grounds of international sovereignty."¹⁰ The official reasons for the Soviet Union's withdrawal from the organization were that it was too expensive and the administrative areas were too bureaucratic to accomplish any real objectives. The Soviet Union also felt that the Western powers dominated the organization and its questionnaires on public health were spying in nature.¹¹ The criticisms of the WHO were generally milder and less condemnatory than those with which the USSR barraged the other specialized agencies. The Soviet Union had stated its desire to withdraw from the WHO and chose not to participate actively from 1949 until its re-entry in 1957.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization had a much broader origin than the World Health Organization. Although the organization is considered an outgrowth of the British Conference of Allied Ministers of Education in the early 1940's, its roots can be traced back to international intellectual congresses and organizations of the late nineteenth century. These were private in nature, had little or no connections with national governments, and included the International Congress of Anthropology and Pre-

History, which first convened in 1868, the International Congress of Psychology in 1899, and the Congress of Historical Sciences in 1898.¹²

At the end of the First World War interest increased in international scholarly organizations. However, the First Assembly of the League of Nations wished to avoid the issue of an intellectual organization because it was viewed as infringing on the "freedom of thought" of sovereign nations. At the Second Assembly in 1921, the plan of the French delegate, Leon Bourgeois, was considered and approved, hence the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation was created. This body had relatively little power until 1926 when the League, under special resolution, recognized it as a technical organization as other organs within the League of Nations. Interest in, and the power of, the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation grew until its abandonment, a result of the outbreak of the Second World War.

The government of Soviet Russia did not participate in internationally organized cultural relations until after it abandoned its commitment to world revolution. The All Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, also referred to as Voks, was created in 1925 "with propaganda for the Soviet system as its object", according to Western perception.¹³ Voks was created to exemplify Soviet culture in the world arena and its intellectuals were encouraged to promote world peace by setting a good example as distinguished Soviet citizens. The USSR was hesitant, no less than the US,

to participate in any educational and cultural organization within the League of Nations.

The actual creation of the UNESCO is attributed to a Conference of Allied Ministers (CAME) in London in 1942. At the onset, this conference was concerned with the restoration of the educational systems in the countries occupied during the war. Also interested in the issue of education were non-European countries, such as China and India, who, along with the Soviet Union, were observers at the conference. In 1943, during one stage of the conference, an observer from the USSR showed interest in participating in an international educational organization concerned with a strictly technical exchange. During the same conversation the Soviet observer made it clear that national curricula should not be a topic of agenda in any international agency.¹⁴ The Soviet Union viewed national education issues as being within the sphere of its sovereign interests, and were of no concern to non-Socialist states. This was the position that the Soviet government maintained in regard to its participation in international educational and cultural agencies until 1954.

The specialized agencies were first proposed along with the general United Nations organization at Dumbarton Oaks. It was China, with the backing of the United States and the United Kingdom, that originally proposed, at the second phase of discussions, the inclusion of a educational and cultural agency under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council. The Soviet government agreed to sponsor the Chinese proposal at the

San Francisco Conference.¹⁵ Problems arose, nevertheless, when the CAME shifted its emphasis from the immediate aims of educational reconstruction. They attempted to defer the UNESCO, by the establishment of an Emergency Rehabilitation Fund, to a more broad based concept of "intellectual and moral cooperation between nations."

The stated functions of the UNESCO were mainly administrative. It was designed to contribute to world peace by promoting international cooperation and collaboration in the fields of education, science and culture. Some of the organization's goals are to encourage free national education, eliminate illiteracy, and exchange ideas and knowledge.

The constitution of UNESCO was drafted in London in 1945 and was set into a plan of action in Paris in 1946. The Soviet government did not participate; it objected to the fact that the United Kingdom and France called the conference rather than the Economic and Social Council.¹⁶ In the Report of the United States Delegation on the First Session of General Conference of UNESCO the absence of the Soviet Union is noted, however it was pacified by the fact that the Yugoslav Delegation "gave explicit expression to the philosophic position to which the Soviet Union is committed."¹⁷ This seems to indicate that participation of the Soviet Union in the UNESCO was not of particular concern to the Western Allies or that they perceived the Soviet absence from the organization as only temporary.

With the commencement of the UNESCO the conflict of ideology immediately surfaced. The new Director-General of the UNESCO, Julian Huxley, wrote in his short book of 1948, UNESCO: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy:

In pursuing this aim [the goals of the UNESCO] we must eschew dogma - whether it be theological dogma or Marxist dogma or philosophical or any other form of dogma: East and West will not agree on a basis for the future if they merely hurl at each other the fixed ideas of the past....If we are to achieve progress, we must learn to uncrystallize our dogmas.¹⁸

This idealistic attitude on the part of the creators of the UNESCO ignored the significance of ideology and its place in the Soviet concept of participation in international relations. Without the ability to discuss and promote communist ideology, the Soviet government considered this forum of educational exchange unproductive.

Between 1948 and 1954 the Soviets did not participate in the educational and cultural agency, and often vehemently opposed its existence as hostile to their interests. During this period the dangers of ideological conflict outweighed any benefits the USSR might have received from being a part of UNESCO.

The International Labour Organization was one of the first specialized agencies established in the United Nations. It has been in existence since its inception in the League of Nations. G. A. Johnston, former Assistant Director-General and Treasurer of the ILO, traces the first idea of international labor legislation to Robert Owen, a wealthy Welsh industrialist

and utopian socialist. Owen (1771-1858) envisioned the possibility of an international agreement to regulate labor conditions.¹⁹ Many other intellectuals of the nineteenth century advocated intergovernmental action on labor conditions during the industrial revolution.

One influence in the creation of the ILO was the International Working Men's Association, which was formed in London in 1864. It was an organization attempting to exert influence in the arena of labor legislation. A split in the Association took place in 1872 and led to its downfall. The group was divided in support of two Internationals, the Second (Socialist) International, which advocated specific State-supported guidelines, and the International Federation of Trade Unions, which was more concerned with the promoting of trade union organizations.

The International Association of Labour Legislation was established in 1900 and was the first international organization that attempted to legislate labor issues. It was not successful in its attempts because it incorporated neither the governments', the workers' nor the employers' organizations.²⁰ There were also problems in the acquiring of industrial information on which to draw conclusions and make recommendations. These same issues of representation and information continued to plague the International Labour Organization after its creation and throughout its existence. There were other attempts to establish an international labor congress during the early twentieth century, such as the American Federation of Labour's world congress of 1914, the

Inter-Allied Trade Union Conference in 1916 and a conference in which workers from the Allied, Neutral and Central Powers met in Berne in 1919. ~~was dropped and the Soviets did not~~

The Peace Conference of 1919 created a Commission of International Labour Legislation which would "enquire into the conditions of employment from the international aspect....and to recommend the form of a permanent agency to continue....under the direction of the League of Nations." This agency was structured according to the Preamble of the Labour Charter to promote "social justice". Yet at the conclusion of World War One there were conflicting ideas as to what constituted "social justice" and how it was to be achieved. The Soviet Union considered the founders of the ILO to be reacting against the concept of class warfare and world revolution, and most importantly against the formation of the Third International (Comintern).²¹ Although periodically courted by the member states of the ILO, the Soviet Union remained indifferent and often hostile to the agency from 1919 to 1954.

Membership in the League of Nations constituted automatic membership in the ILO, and the USSR was briefly a member from 1935 to 1937, although it participated only on a superficial level. Soviet delegations to the agency were small compared to those of other nations. However, the main debate rested on the credentials of the representatives from the Soviet Union. Between 1936 and 1937 the Soviet delegation was attacked on the ground that the representatives of the employers were merely agents of the government and that workers' representatives were not real agents because they did not have "freedom of

association."²² The objections were passed to the Governing Body of the ILO which took no action on the matter. Even though this issue was dropped and the Soviets did not participate in the 1938 and 1939 conferences, this problem of representation was to arise again in 1954. Owing to its loss of membership in the League of Nations, the Governing Body acknowledged in February of 1940 that the USSR was no longer entitled to membership in the ILO.

Health has been further defined by the organization as "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity." The WHO organizes campaigns for the eradication of disease, conducts international work in the field of quarantine and epidemiological inspection, develops standards of medicines and quality controls of pharmaceutical preparations.² The organization also sponsors technical assistance and education, in the form of research institutes and public health administration education for member states. International conferences, scientific meetings and symposia are also sponsored by the WHO.

During the years after the Second World War new threats of disease and great strides in the advancement of medical technology caused a shift in international health objectives. Before the creation of the WHO, international health legislation was primarily Eurocentric in character. Much work by the preceding health organizations had been to prevent the spread of Asian diseases to the European continent. Membership

CHAPTER TWO

Soviet Participation in the World Health Organization

The stated goal of the World Health Organization is "the attainment of all peoples of the highest possible level of health."¹ Health has been further defined by the organization as "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity." The WHO organizes campaigns for the eradication of disease, conducts international work in the field of quarantine and epidemiological inspection, develops standards of medicines and quality controls of pharmaceutical preparations.² The organization also sponsors technical assistance and education, in the form of research institutes and public health administration education for member states. International conferences, scientific meetings and symposia are also sponsored by the WHO.

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and participation in the health assemblies was based on national interests of the states themselves and had little to do with humanitarian ideals. European nations, including Russia, were concerned with protecting the health of their own, not increasing the well-being of foreign populations. A dramatic change in policies of the health legislation can be seen after World War Two. Most nations now realized that public health in all nations affected the international climate and a more humanistic approach was adopted into the WHO's policies.

The movement toward public health in the Soviet Union was well planned and very effective after the First World War. Pre-revolutionary Russia was considered backward according ^{to} Western medical practices and technology. Before 1920 the Russian health care system was run by the local government body, the Zemstvo, which was in charge of salaried physicians practicing both preventative and curative medicine.³ This form of public health care, however, was disorganized and relatively ineffective. As the program of socialist health care developed in the 1920's, polyclinics, more aptly called health centers, were instituted to promote both curative and preventative measures in specified areas. The Soviet health services, which were unique and shocking in the eyes of the European nations, can be seen as the expression of Soviet political thought.⁴ In a relatively short time the USSR transformed its national health care service from that of an under-developed nation, to one equal and in some instances superior to those in Europe.

The history of the Soviet Union's domestic health care agenda was reflected in its role in the international arena. The Soviet government attributed the improvement in its medical program and facilities to the hard work and righteousness of the socialist system. The nation had made its advancements with relatively little help from other nations. It might, therefore, be correct to assume that the USSR would not be particularly anxious to participate in an international health organization that would extend aid to foreign nations.

What inspired the Soviet government to rejoin the World Health Organization in 1957? Several issues appear to be significant motivations for the Soviet Union's reevaluation of its foreign policy in regard to both the United Nations and the specialized agencies. According to historian Alexander Dallin, "Until 1955, Moscow, along with the rest of the world, saw the Communist bloc as a permanent minority, both in the real world and in the UN."⁵ In the mid-1950's the WHO began to take a more universal approach to health issues. This allowed the member-states to participate on a more international level. Programs which were previously administered through regional centers of the WHO were now operated on a global scale, because many under-developed nations were rising in stature and many of them had similar health problems. The Soviet Union saw this trend as an opportunity to expand its presence in the international organization.

After rejoining the WHO the Soviet Union became a very active participant, unlike its behavior during its brief affiliation with the organization in the 1940's. One year after renewing its membership, the first itinerant seminar was held in the USSR on the question of public health administration (October 16-November 21, 1958).⁶ The Soviet Union played host to many more seminars in the following years. Also in 1958, the Soviet delegation sponsored a proposal to the 11th Health Assembly of the WHO calling for an international effort to completely eradicate small pox. Other issues the Soviets put forward to the Assembly were the peaceful use of atomic energy in the field of medicine and the task of the WHO in connection with the adoption of a resolution on general and complete disarmament. This role of activity in promoting health legislation was a drastic change for the Soviet government. World Health Organization.

One event that draws attention to the Soviet participation in the WHO is the 1962 report on maternal and child health in the USSR.⁷ The Soviet government set a precedent and invited a delegation from the WHO, consisting of public health specialists from 17 nations, most of which were considered to be in a state of "development".⁸ The first tour was from 1958-59 and consisted of two groups of doctors visiting various parts of the USSR to study health services. In 1960 nineteen specialists observed maternal and child care in the Russian Federal Socialist Republic, and the Soviet Socialist Republics of the Ukraine, Georgia and Uzbekistan. The conclusion of the

report of the visit, published by the WHO, commented that these health services were:

...consonant with the political and social system in the Soviet Union. The principle has been put into practice systematically for the last 40 years by training numerous medical and paramedical workers and establishing health services with the main emphasis on preventative medicine... This report has sought to remain objective and to describe rather than to praise or criticize. Everyone is entitled to his own opinion regarding the fundamental concept and organization based on it. It is certain, however, that most members of the Group, coming from countries in the course of economic development, where medicine must be essentially preventative, were greatly impressed by the concept and its methodical application.

The Soviet Union opened the doors of its health care program to observing nations, however selectively, because it saw an opportunity to promote the communist system to developing nations and to the world in general. This report legitimated the new position of the USSR as an active participant in the World Health Organization.

The emergence of developing nations had always been of great interest to the Soviet Union. Moscow had historically supported attempts by any nation to dislocate itself from the clutches of the capitalistic imperialists. However, endeavors to free these countries from their colonial oppressors often proved unsuccessful, as was the case with China in 1926-27.¹⁰ Joseph Stalin was not overtly concerned with benefits created by friendly relations with the newly independent states, and even went so far as to label leaders of Indonesia, Burma and India "lackeys of imperialism."¹¹ Nikita Khrushchev's policies toward these developing countries was quite different and in the mid-1950's a campaign was launched to extend

material and moral aid to the new nations. By the 1960's this platform was entrenched in Soviet foreign policy:

The time is past when the United Nations was the scene of strife, of "arm twisting" tactics, of dictation by a group of Western imperialist powers. The United Nations enters the New Year with its membership more than doubled, chiefly by the inclusion of young Afro-Asian states. This is something of which the world is already reaping the benefit.¹²

In a speech to the UN General Assembly on October 12, 1960, Khrushchev forcefully stated on the issue of colonial freedom, "The colonists are compelled to send reinforcements to Rhodesia. What kind of reinforcements? Grain, medicines, doctors and teachers? No, these reinforcements are troops, machine guns, shells and cartridges."¹³ The Soviet government saw the opportunity to portray itself as the paternal figure helping to liberate the developing nations and assist them in their quest to improve their national health care. The Soviet Union's participation in the WHO, from 1957 onward, is a graphic illustration of its change in international diplomatic strategy.

One way the USSR promoted the issue of decolonization was through traveling seminars on health education.¹⁴ Topics discussed were malaria eradication, nutrition, maternal and child health, school and environmental health, all of which had grave impact on the developing nations. Especially important to the Soviet Union were courses taught in Moscow, in English and French, on malaria eradication techniques in the newly independent states.¹⁵ The Soviet Union also participated in research on pathological and epidemiological studies of cardiovascular disease in cooperation with Czechoslovakia and

Sweden.¹⁶ This program was later expanded internationally. In 1961 laboratories in the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and the United States collaborated in studies on the importance of animal reservoirs in viral research.¹⁷ As the international

The Soviet government was particularly successful in the area of medical education for the Third-World nations. The USSR established the Lumumba University at Moscow, which by 1962 was turning out 100 students a year.¹⁸ The emphasis of this program was placed on training African medical students who would return to their native countries to improve health conditions. The Soviet delegation to the WHO still stressed, however, the necessity to support the decolonization by sending teams of doctors to these nations whose duties included on-spot training of the native staff.

Another interesting aspect in the Soviets participation in the WHO were the "vaccine wars" between the Eastern bloc and the West. Reports coming from the World Health Organization *Chronicle* indicate the philanthropic action of the Soviet Union in donating vaccines to the developing nations.¹⁹ In one instance the USSR and the German Democratic Republic provided free polio vaccine to all the children on Mali between the ages of six months and two years. The government of the Soviet Union also donated 250 million doses of freeze-dried small pox vaccine to India. One report noted that the USSR shipped 400,000 doses of oral polio vaccine to Ceylon, while the United Kingdom donated 150,000 doses and the US only 100,000.²⁰

Through these humanitarian actions the Soviet Union was able to draw support from the Third-World nations, both in the specialized agencies, but more importantly in the General Assembly of the United Nations. As the international organization grew, so did the voting bloc in support of the USSR. With added support in the UN, the Soviet Union saw greater advantages in promoting its foreign policy goals and spreading the communist ideology through international organization. It should not be forgotten, however manipulative Soviet participation in the WHO appears, that the USSR accomplished many humanitarian health programs and saved a great many lives.

Participating in an intellectual organization on an international scale, but the goals and policies of the UNESCO itself were dramatically transformed. In the mid and late 1950's the balance of power within the UNESCO began to shift, to the dismay of the Western powers. The reason the UNESCO's policies and ideology were reconstructed was twofold, the first reason being the general growth of active foreign policy of the Soviet government during this period. The second explanation was the collapse of the colonial system and the admission of newly independent states into the specialized agency.

With the entry of the Soviet Union in the UNESCO the

CHAPTER THREE

Soviet Participation in the United Nations

Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

The entry of the Soviet Union into the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in the spring of 1954 marked a turning point within this specialized agency.

This event not only changed the USSR's perception of the usefulness of participating in an intellectual organization on an international scale, but the goals and policies of the UNESCO itself were dramatically transformed. In the mid and late 1950's the balance of power within the UNESCO began to shift, to the dismay of the Western powers. The reason the UNESCO's policies and ideology were restructured was two-fold, the first reason being the general growth of active foreign policy of the Soviet government during this period. The second explanation was the collapse of the colonial system and the admission of newly independent states into the specialized agency.

With the entry of the Soviet Union in the UNESCO the agency and set upon political questions within the agency. These questions involved disarmament, decolonization and racism, as well as peaceful coexistence of nations with differing socio-economic structures. Dealing with such specific issues was in contrast to the previously stated goal of "world scientific

organization's functions changed from being essentially apolitical in nature to being, according to the original members, very much oriented to the current international political scene. The Soviet delegates took the opportunity of participating in an organization whose constitution's preamble stated:

That a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.¹

The Soviet government also must have interpreted Article I of the organization's purposes and functions to reinforce its belief that it was "impossible to draw a line between the political and non-political questions".² The article reads:

The purpose of the Organization is to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations.³

The Soviet Union felt that since the questions to be addressed in the UNESCO were to affect the outcome of international peace, that therefore it had the right to discuss and act upon political questions within the agency. These questions involved disarmament, decolonization and racism, as well as peaceful coexistence of nations with differing socioeconomic structures. Dealing with such specific issues was in contrast to the previously stated goals of "world scientific

humanism" as put forward as the organization's philosophy by its Director-General Julian Huxley.⁴

It is interesting to trace the development of this trend of politicalizing of the UNESCO's policies by looking at the types of programs the USSR was involved in. In 1954, the first year of Soviet participation in the agency, its delegation was involved in such mundane topics and works as a symposium on wind and solar energy of the arid zone held in New Delhi (October 22-25, 1954)⁵, a study course organized by the British Broadcasting Corporation on production of educational and cultural television programs⁶, and an international publication entitled *Vacations Abroad*.⁷ However, in a more politically heated arena, in 1954 the Soviet delegation to UNESCO requested the General Conference discuss the banning of war propaganda by the western press.⁸ In an article in the *UNESCO Courier* the Soviet perspective of freedom of the press was analyzed by the Philippine delegate, who stated:

Soviet theorists considered freedom of speech and of the press to be "among the most important political freedoms." However, their approach to securing freedom of information is conditioned by the basic Marxist opposition to private ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange.

This was a rather remarkable view point to be published by an organization whose charter the USSR claimed to be "idealistic, bourgeois conceptions concerning the causes of wars" and whose founders tried to "mislead public opinion" and "conceal the imperialistic character of contemporary war."¹⁰ Yet by 1954 the Soviet government's hesitation about the agency

was outweighed by the benefit they might contrive from being an active member. This change of attitude was ascribed by some Soviet commentators to the fact that there was a "change in the international balance of forces."¹¹ The growing membership within the organization, the growing independence of nations such as India, along with the dissatisfaction of the United States with the UNESCO and other specialized agencies perhaps advanced the Soviet government's perception that the organization provided new opportunities at very little risk.

By 1956 the Soviets were calling for a condemnation of imperialist aggression, namely Great Britain, France and Israel, against Egypt in the 9th Session of the General Conference of UNESCO.¹² In the years following the Soviet delegates promoted the discussion of such issues as UNESCO participation in UN activities designed to support complete and total disarmament (1959 Executive Board, 55th Session, Resolution No. 5.2.A) and the role of UNESCO in "granting independence to colonial peoples and countries" (1960 General Conference, Resolution No. 8.2).

One other debate that the Soviet Union actively participated in was the issue concerning lack of agreement between the nations on the meaning of "peaceful cooperation" and "peaceful coexistence". The term coexistence was adamantly favored by the Soviet delegation and the other socialist states in the organization because they felt that cooperation was only possible between nations sharing the same political and economic structure.¹³ Again the USSR was attacking the theory of "one world culture" espoused at the commencement of the

UNESCO, and attempting to tailor the philosophy of the organization to their own ideology. In 1956 a resolution was presented by the Polish delegation, with the backing of the USSR, calling for all member nations to develop the idea of "peaceful coexistence".¹⁴

The theme of peaceful coexistence was one that was maintained and constantly reiterated as the new philosophy of the UNESCO body during the late 1950's and throughout the 1960's. The USSR Academy of Sciences, at the request of the UNESCO under the auspices of the International Social Science Council, published a book entitled Social Sciences in the USSR. The publication was a collection of articles designed to give a foreign reader a general understanding of the state of the social sciences in the Soviet Union since the Second World War. A member of the Russian academy writes in the introduction:

The idea of the peaceful co-existence of countries with different social system is being widely welcomed among scientific workers throughout the world, including those concerned with social sciences. In recent years contacts between social scientists in the Soviet Union and those in other countries have considerably expanded, thanks in part to that important organization for promoting cultural intercourse between peoples, Unesco.

This contrasts greatly to the rhetoric put forward in a 1954 article in the *New Times* which claimed that "rulers of several capitalist countries persist in the cold-war policy and try to disrupt every attempt to promote international cultural exchange."¹⁶

In analyzing the Soviet decision to join the UNESCO events occurring within the USSR itself must also be taken into consideration. While entry into the agency cannot be directly attributed as an outcome of the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953 and the ensuing de-Stalinization, the intellectual movement within Soviet society appears to relate to its decision to participate in an international intellectual organization. A "cultural revival" within the arts took place after Stalin's death as the party authorities were attempting to wipe away all of the most damaging policies of the deceased leader.¹⁷

The "thaw" of Nikita Khrushchev's rule, while fluctuation between periods of repression and relaxation, did create a revived interest in literature and the arts in the Soviet Union. From 1954 to 1956 there was a more open discussion of Soviet culture and its role in society, both domestically and in the international sphere. The stagnant framework of the Socialist Realist movement, in which art and culture existed solely for promotion of the state, was criticized by leading intellectuals, such as Soviet journal editor Alexander Tvardovski and author Ilia Ehrenburg.¹⁸ This period of enthusiasm and intellectual discourse was short lived however, and restrictions were again enforced after the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956. One can hardly look at the revival in intellectual and cultural interest in the Soviet Union, no matter how short lived, and not consider this as having some influence in its entry into UNESCO.

The Soviet Union obviously felt it had more to gain in joining the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in 1954 than it had to remain outside. Not only were the delegates able to promote Soviet political ideals on an international scale, but they were able to advance their ideology as well. They did this by transforming the UNESCO into an agency able to work for and not against their stated policies. One modern Soviet definition claims that UNESCO:

In the 1960's and early 1970's, on the initiative of the USSR, other socialist countries, and the developing countries, UNESCO adopted several resolutions aimed at increasing its role in the struggle for peace and in the fight against racism and colonialism despite the resistance of the forces opposing detente.

well as the protection of children, women and elderly persons against exploitation, peace and harmony in the world will be preserved. The organization's preamble also claims that "the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labor is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve conditions in their own countries". Many of these same precepts are also stated in the Constitution of the USSR and the Labour Code of the Russian Federation. Therefore, it was not so much these ideals and objectives that the Soviet government opposed to its dealings with the UN, as it was the role of the membership and operations of the agency.

While there appears to be an official answer as to why the Soviet Union rejoined the UN in May of 1954, it can be argued that it certainly was not because the organization had changed its objectives or its nature. Soviet sources give reasons for

CHAPTER FOUR

Participation in the International Labour Organization

The International Labour Organization was constructed to establish "universal and lasting peace" based upon "social justice". Its constitution states that by improving working conditions through the regulation of working hours and the labor supply, the prevention of unemployment, the protection of workers against illness and injury caused by employment, as well as the protection of children, women and elderly persons against exploitation, peace and harmony in the world will be preserved.¹ The organization's preamble also claims that "the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labor is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire to improve conditions in their own countries". Many of these same concepts are also stated in the Constitution of the USSR and the Labour Code of the Russian Federation. Therefore, it was not so much these ideals and objectives that the Soviet government opposed to in its dealings with the ILO, as it was the make up of the membership and operations of the agency itself.

While there appears to be no official answer as to why the Soviet Union rejoined the ILO in May of 1954, it can be argued that it certainly was not because the organization had changed its objectives or structures.² Soviet sources give reasons for

reentry as being the desire of the USSR to breathe new life into an agency overruled by the monopoly of the capitalist powers, along with the reaffirming of ideological goals for the workers of the world and defending workers' rights. One such claim was espoused by V. Berezhov in a June 1954 issue of *New Times*, in which he stated that the reentry of the Soviet Union and the Byelorussian and Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republics to the organization lent a "more representative character to the ILO" and its "anything but democratic constitution".³ The Soviet government saw the organization as being intentionally hostile to their interests with procedures that "enable the capitalist governments to keep genuine representatives of labor out of the ILO conferences and governing bodies" and the result being "to give the ruling classes of the capitalist countries virtual control of the ILO."⁴

The main issue of conflict before the Soviet Union rejoined the ILO continued to plague it in its first stages of participation in the mid-1950's. The reason for this debate was the tripartism of the organization's representatives. The first paragraph of Article 3 of the ILO Constitution states that the General Conference "shall be composed of four representatives of each of the Members, of whom two shall be Government delegates and the two others shall be delegates representing respectively the employers and the workpeople of each of the Members."⁵ Paragraph five states that Members are "to nominate non-Government delegates and advisers chosen in agreement with the industrial organizations, if such organizations exist, which are most representative of employers

and the work people, as the case may be, in their respective countries." This form of representation was carried over from the General Conference to the Governing Body, Regional Conferences and the Industrial Committees of the International Labour Organization. According to this system there were three distinctive interests to be represented in the agency, namely the public interest of the government, and the interests of both the employees and the employers, which were independent from those of the government.

When the Soviet Union reentered the organization in 1954 and attempted to consolidate the communist nations into a voting bloc, a vigorous campaign was begun by the Western powers to unseat the functional delegates. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions entered objections against the credentials of both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union.⁶ A 1954 report of the Credentials Committee claimed that, "freedom of association does not exist in the USSR or in Czechoslovakia and that the trade union organizations are subservient to the State" and the governments of both nations "were not in a position to nominate Workers' delegates...in the spirit of the tripartite structure of the International Labour Organization."⁷ This report stressed the importance of maintaining absolute independence between the three elements of the body of the organization. From this debate grew another question in regard to "freedom of association".

The question of freedom of association has consistently had the tendency to propaganda overtones.⁸ It has been used by both the Eastern and Western blocs to cause public embarrassment. On the Soviet side, the World Federation of Trade Unions was continually submitting allegations that the West was infringing on trade union rights. Two separate resolutions were submitted by the Soviet delegation, one in 1955, the second in 1957, which criticized widespread violations of trade union rights and claimed that the ILO's work in this area was unsatisfactory.⁹ Both of these resolutions were greatly amended, the first so much so that the Soviet Union ended up abstaining on the issue. However, the resolution of 1957 was not modified as dramatically and the Soviet bloc voted in favor, while the West was against the resolution, and considered a victory from the Soviet viewpoint.

In a more defensive role, the Soviet government had to battle the West on the issue of freedom of association of its own trade unions. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), as far back as 1950, had made continual allegations that centered around the fact that the Soviet government and the Communist Party had unbending control over the trade unions in that country. The Economic and Social Council requested that the Soviets submit to a fact-finding commission to investigate these allegations, to which they resoundingly refused. Referring the issue to the Governing Body of the ILO, a special Committee on Freedom of Association was set up to investigate. In 1956 a report was filed, with a

follow up report a year later, both of which were published by the ILO in 1959 under the title *Trade Union Rights in the USSR*.

The Soviet government cooperated with the investigation by providing some information and replying to questions.¹⁰ The outcome of the inquest was a request put forth to the USSR that it give its consent to the findings of the committee, and after Soviet refusal, the 23rd Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association was approved by the Governing Body by a vote of 37 to 2, with one abstention. The Soviet reply to the second of these reports (27th Report of the Committee of Freedom of Association) was written by A. Arutiunian, the USSR employers' representative of the ILO Governing Body. In it he officially stated:

...The Committee has displayed its lack of objectivity and reaffirmed its categorical refusal to take account of the true facts of the existing situation in the Soviet Union. So much worse for the Committee. Such an attitude on its part cannot justify any additional re-examination whatsoever of this question, there remaining no argument in favour of such a step. I take the liberty of expressing doubt as to the usefulness of any further action in this matter by either of us. Nothing other than the dropping of this question entirely will meet the interests of the International Labour Organization and of practical collaboration on labour problems within the framework of the I. L. O.¹¹

The Soviet response to these allegations was an affirmation that the trade union organizations in the USSR were completely independent of the communist party and the State, were the true representatives of the workers and were free and democratic organizations. In answer to the issue of freedom of association, the Soviet delegate argued that it was not

relevant since the precise language of Article 3 does not specify that freedom of association of Workers' delegates is a prerequisite to ILO membership or participation.¹² Both objections lost by a small margin of the vote and which can possibly be attributed to the desire of many of the delegates for the organization to encompass a universality in its membership. This could be enforced through a broad interpretation of the ILO Constitution.

The battle of representation continued up until 1958 when the Soviet delegation fought what it considered to be discriminatory treatment in its membership in the Employers' Group, which up to this time, while allowing seats on the committee, had denied the right of the USSR to vote. The Governing Body set up a committee to investigate these charges and work toward a equitable method for sitting communist delegates on the ILO committees. The decision of this investigation, under the directorship of Professor Ago of the Italian delegation, which gave the Soviets both the right to have seats on the Committee and the right to vote, was considered a major victory for the USSR.¹³

With its reentry into the International Labour Organization the Soviet criticism of the agency began to become more moderate and specific in nature. According to one Western observer the Soviet press "turned from attacking [the] ILO to reporting its activities, though in a slanted fashion."¹⁴ In one New Times news item reporting on the 1958 visit of Director-General David A. Morse, the importance of Soviet participation in ILO activities was noted. Reporters "pointed out that the

two social systems were not equally represented in some ILO bodies and that the Soviet Union believed that joint participation of countries with different social systems was useful.¹⁵ It was also noted that "representatives of Soviet economic organizations and of economic organizations in the People's Democracies have no vote in ILO committees" and that this was not considered "normal." The news report went on to state that Mr. Morse replied that the matter would be reconsidered by the ILO in November and that a ILO Branch Office was to be established in Moscow.¹⁶

It is also important to consider the obligations of ILO member-states in regards to conventions and recommendations and how the Soviet Union responded to the work of the organization. In examining the Constitution of the ILO it can be noted that there is no legal obligation for any member of the agency to ratify any conventions adopted by the General Conference even if the nation's delegate has voted for the convention in its adoption stage. This means that even if a government's delegation votes for a convention or a recommendation, on issues within the organization's general competence such as unemployment, minimum age of employment, hours of work etc., it is not legally bound to abide by the decision.¹⁷

There were, however, objections to the means by which the Soviet Union ratified both conventions and recommendations. The purpose of ratification, as stated in Article 19 of the Constitution, is to bring the conventions and recommendations to "the authority or authorities within whose competence the

matter lies, for the enactment of legislation or other action".¹⁸ Objections were voiced on this issue because the Soviet Union had submitted conventions to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and recommendations only to the Council of Ministers. Some members felt that both conventions and recommendations should be submitted to the Supreme Soviet for ratification. In 1958 the Governing Body issued a Memorandum concerning the Obligation to Submit Conventions and Recommendations to the Competent Authorities which called the Soviet's actions into question.¹⁹ The USSR, maintaining a loose interpretation of Article 19, ignored the memorandum and continued its ratification practices.

One area in which the Soviet government was able to utilize the ILO in its attack on the West, more specifically the United States, was discrimination. In 1955 the USSR's delegates attempted to propose a resolution that noted discriminatory employment practices had increased in the world and called for the addition of this topic in the 1957 agenda. This proposal was voted down because the Governing Body already had the discrimination issue on the 1956 agenda, however, the Soviets ensured that the topic be dealt with and attempted to make conventions as broad as possible.²⁰ This again can be viewed as a propaganda ploy on the part of the Soviet delegation, because discrimination could be used as a forum for pointing out racial segregation policies of the United States.

of these resolutions included such topics as the halt of testing nuclear weapons, the reduction of military budgets, and

Another issue that the Soviets dealt with was that of forced labor. By 1956, the USSR's delegation was involved in drafting the ILO' Convention on Forced Labour and successfully attempted to make it as broad as possible to draw away attention from earlier criticisms of Soviet policy.²¹ By espousing a policy that forced labor should be abolished in "all forms", they were able to put forward a more progressive and humanitarian policy than that^{of} their American counterparts, who refused to vote on the issue without the addition of amendments made by the United States delegation. The US government was also criticized for not responding to a forced labor questionnaire distributed by the ILO Office, a complaint usually reserved for the Soviet delegation.

According to one observer in 1960, the Soviet's reentry into the International Labour Organization, as compared to the previous decade, was "stimulating".²² It can be observed, however, that the most significant outcome was the change within the organization itself, rather than its effect on international labor policy. The ILO began to change its traditional approaches, based on the British model of trade union rights, and incorporate a more geographically diverse sphere.²³ Concurrently, the ILO became a much more "political" organization with the Soviet participation. The Soviet delegations began introducing political agenda items, which at first were considered out of place by the Western bloc. Some of these resolutions included such topics as the halt of testing nuclear weapons, the reduction of military budgets, and

improvement of world living conditions. The Soviet Union knew that these ideas would need to be addressed if they expected to have support from the developing nations, which were rapidly joining the organization in the early 1960's.

One Soviet observer saw the ILO as having "acquired a more universal character" with the USSR's participation.²⁴ He goes on to quote the Soviet delegate, N. Rogovsky, as stating that "despite the different political systems of the ILO member countries, there was no reason why they should not be able to cooperate with one another on the basis of mutual understanding" and that the Soviet peoples' desire to work to "promote a steady and continuous improvement of material and cultural standards."

in the Soviet government's position in regard to international organization was dramatic, but also pragmatic. The climate went from one of extreme distrust and condemnation, during the Stalin era, to one of rational calculations and calculating opportunities. Early in the 1950s, the USSR began a program of international "public relations", particularly in regard to the new developing countries that were joining the United Nations. Moreover, it seemed to follow that the more pragmatic policies of the Soviet Union reflected rising times of national strength and vigor, not the result of any great change in political ideology.

When examining the Soviet Union's participation in various such agencies as the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the International Labour Organization the evolution of its foreign policy became apparent. The USSR

CONCLUSION

The Soviet Union in the Specialized Agencies:

Cold-War Maneuvering or Humanitarian Ideals?

Soviet attitudes toward the United Nations' specialized agencies fluctuated greatly from the time of the organization's creation to the height of the Cold War in the 1950's. In order to achieve material and political gains the USSR altered its policy of denunciation to one that capitalized on the agencies' efforts. The change in the Soviet government's position in regard to international organization was dramatic, but also pragmatic. The climate went from one of extreme distrust and condemnation, during the Stalin era, to one of moderate, cautious and calculating opposition. During 1954, the USSR began a program of international "public relations", particularly in regard to the new, developing countries that were joining the United Nations.¹ However, it should be noted that the more pragmatic policies of the Soviet Union occurred during times of national strength and vigor, and were not the result of any great change in political ideology.

When examining the Soviet Union's participation and role within such agencies as the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the International Labour Organization the modification of its foreign policy becomes apparent. The USSR

was selective in its decision to join certain of the specialized agencies while avoiding others. There was a definite pattern in the Soviet government's choice of the humanitarian and technical organizations over those with more political and economic influence, which were known as the Briton-Woods Group. These agencies included the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation, International Monetary Fund, the Food and Agricultural Organization and the International Development Association. These agencies continued to be viewed by the Soviet Union as the financial weapon of the imperialist West, over which it would be able to wield little control.

One further observation is that within the so-called "humanitarian" organizations in which the USSR did choose to participate, it attempted to sway the agenda to a more "political" sphere. By calling on the WHO, UNESCO and ILO to include such topics as disarmament and the testing of nuclear weapons, the Soviet delegations were able to incorporate a international political agenda in these organizations. This not only enabled the Soviet Union to address issues of vital interest to the Third-World nations, and hence gain their support throughout the United Nations organization, but it was able to draw attention away from more specific issues that would attract direct criticism of Soviet internal and foreign policy.

It is noted that the Soviet Union would have joined organizations such as the WHO, UNESCO or ILO. According to the policies put forward by Joseph Stalin, the United Nations served purely as an international security function, and its

As long as the Soviet government could ensure that its own sovereignty and that of other, namely developing nations, was protected, it began to acknowledge that certain positive outcomes could be gained from participation in the specialized agencies. According to some observers the Soviet's actions were a "result of a direct and practical application of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence the great goal of which is the imposition, sooner or later, of 'Pax Sovietica' on the whole world."² However, it is important to look at the Soviet Union's participation in the WHO, UNESCO and ILO beyond the scope of its desire to foment world revolution and to assure the defeat of the capitalist powers.

The stress of peaceful coexistence with the West was begun after the death of Joseph Stalin on May 4, 1953. A more flexible approach to foreign policy was first adopted by Soviet Premier George Malenkov (1953-1955) and was continued by Nikita Khrushchev, from February 1956. The general "two-camp" thesis of socialism versus capitalism was transformed into a more pliant "three-camp" concept which allowed for an expanding Soviet foreign aid program to such neutrals as India.³ De-Stalinization in the cultural sphere of Soviet society can also be construed as allowing for more desire to participate in international agencies involved in intellectual, technological and cultural exchange. Had Stalin lived on through the 1950's it is doubtful that the Soviet Union would have joined organizations such as the WHO, UNESCO or ILO. According to the policies put forward by Joseph Stalin, the United Nations served purely as an international security function, and its

social and economic functions were virtually ignored by the leader.⁴

The courting of the Third-World also became a major foreign policy goal for the USSR after the death of Stalin. No longer were the neutral and developing nations considered to be favorable to the imperialist West. Rather, they were viewed as open to influence by the socialist states, whose job it was to provide assistance and examples of a fruitful life. One Soviet journalist stated:

Economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and other countries is steadily developing, offering proof positive that promotion of economic intercourse between all countries is an objective necessity, compelling enough to defeat all the intrigues of the enemies of peaceful co-existence of the two systems.⁵

The Soviet government stated that it was its duty to rescue the developing countries from the grasp of the imperialist nations of the West. It claimed that the administration of Western aid to the Third-World nations merely maintained a state of colonialism by discouraging industrialization and forcing these countries to function only as suppliers of raw materials to the capitalist powers. One Soviet report in 1954 claimed that the "economies of the underdeveloped countries are all stamped with the impress of prolonged subjection to foreign monopoly rule, of which they are far from having rid themselves even today."⁶

"Improvements" in Third-World nations, claimed by the United States, were denied by the Soviet Union, Soviet spokesmen argued that "since the time the underdeveloped

countries began receiving American aid their economic position has gone from bad to worse... American aid does not ease, but intensifies the colonial exploitation of underdeveloped countries." ⁷ The social and economic specialized agencies of the United Nations presented the forum for the Soviets to express this opinion, and this was the kind of rhetoric that the developing nations wanted to hear.

It is difficult to ascertain the humanitarian goals of the Soviet Union's participation in the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the International Labour Organization. It is similarly difficult to point to the exact intentions of the United States in these agencies. Especially with a government as elusive as that of the Soviet Union in stating its foreign policy objective, it is virtually impossible to analyze how much of its work in these social and economic organizations was based on humanitarian ideals. The one observation that can be made, however, is that many important accomplishments were made within these agencies, due to Soviet innovation and implementation of policies. Much good work was accomplished with Soviet aid in the World Health Organization to end disease and hunger. Its participation in the UNESCO and its publications educated many people on the Soviet way of life and values. Through its work and conflict within the International Labour Organization the Soviet Union helped to make it into a more universally acceptable body.

Finally, it is apparent that the Soviet Union was very much motivated by self-interest to join in the operations of the specialized agencies. Participation in the WHO, UNESCO and ILO all afforded the USSR with a platform to promote communist ideology, particularly to developing countries. The Soviet delegations, by promoting the interests of the Third-World nations, were aided in all agencies and the General Assembly with votes of the neutral nations. After the mid -1950's the Soviet bloc was no longer continually outvoted by the Western powers and was able to pass more resolutions and amendments than it had previously. Soviet participation in the specialized agencies was important in promoting the realigned Soviet foreign policy put forward after the death of Stalin by Khrushchev. The agencies also enabled the Soviet Union to begin taking a greater administrative role within the United Nations.

The Soviet Union can be criticized for its manipulation of social and humanitarian organizations for their political platform. However, it must be recognized that the United States and every other member nation utilizes these agencies to their own advantage. In terms of fulfilling the goals of the creators of the United Nations, which was the maintenance of peace and international cooperation, the Soviet Union has been successful in its participation in the specialized agencies. Khrushchev himself wrote on the issue of peaceful coexistence:

One must not only know how to read, but must also understand correctly what one reads, and know how to apply it to the concrete situations of our time, to take account of the existing situation, of the actual balance of forces."⁸

The Soviet Union's entry into and participation in the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the International Labour Organization proves that it was acting in accordance with a platform of action in regard to peaceful coexistence with the West, rather than the espousal of political dogma. 3. (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1944), 3.

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convention must still occasionally be reported on by a member state. Recommendations are likewise submitted for ratification and reports, however they are not binding.

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