The Good, the Bad, and the Garrisoned

An examination of the daily lives of Hellenistic garrison soldiers

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Abbreviations and transliterations

I have chosen to use the abbreviations of ancient authors following the model of Simon Hornblower and Antony Spawforth (eds.) in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*. A list of relevant abbreviations appears below.

All translations are my own unless otherwise noted. In order to produce my translations, I have consulted the Loeb Classical Library series for primary texts. I have opted to use the Latinized transliteration of Greek words (e.g. Seleucid in place of Seleukid), since it seems standard convention to do so. Direct quotes from works have been adapted to reflect this preference. Technical terms, such as *koinon*, have been transliterated more exactly.

Ancient Authors

Aen. Tact.: Aineias the Tactician
Athen.: Athenaios, *The Deipnosophists*
Demosth.: Demosthenes
Diod.: Diodorus Siculus
Macc.: *Maccabees* (Old Testament)
Men.: Menander
Paus.: Pausanias
Plut.: Plutarch
Polyb.: Polybius
Xen.: Xenophon

Works of Reference[1]

BSA: *The Annual of the British School at Athens*, London 1936-
CAH: F.W. Wallbank, A.E. Astin, M.W. Frederiksen, and R.M. Ogilvie (eds.) *The Cambridge Ancient History. Volume VII. Part I. The Hellenistic World*, Cambridge 1984 (second edition).
IG: *Inscriptiones Graecae*, Berlin 1873-
OCD: S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth (eds.) *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, Oxford 2003 (revised third edition).
OGIS: W. Dittenber ger, Orientis *Graeci Inscriptiones Seleectae*, Leipzig 1903-5.
SEG: *Supplementum Eipgraphicum Graecum*, Leiden 1923-
UZG: U. Wilcken, *Ukunden der Ptolemäerzeit*. Berlin 1927-1957.

[1] Note that these texts do not appear in the bibliography.

Map of the Hellenistic World



(Courtesy of Erskine 2005, 20)

1. Introduction

Many cities during the Hellenistic period had to accommodate garrisons (*phrouroi*; the singular is *phrouros*). Garrisons were usually made up of mercenaries from a variety of regions. These men occupied barracks, in either a fortified precinct of a city or on the outskirts of town. Throughout the Hellenistic world, garrisons served to control as well as protect urban and rural communities. For a *poleis* (city-states; the singular is *polis*) defeated in war, the installment of a garrison usually sounded the end of a community's autonomy; occupation in this sense, often provoked a negative civilian response.[2] *Phrouroi* were not always forced on communities, sometimes they were established upon request or served as the foundations for newly established settlements. Nevertheless, even in cities in which there was a "protective" garrison, the presence of soldiers could be disruptive to daily life.

The presence of a garrison had direct and dramatic effect on local society and economy. For example, the occupied city or region was usually obligated to pay maintenance costs of the garrison (i.e. providing food, shelter, and pay for the mercenaries) and royal tribute. These financial burdens were perhaps complicated by the fact that garrisons provided Hellenistic monarchs with the means of extracting local wealth. Indeed, some of the more profitable urban centers of the Hellenistic world were also the sites of formidable garrisons. These economic effects were compounded by social and cultural tension that resulted from foreign military presence. Garrison troops were usually immigrants and not native to the local community.

[2] Accordingly, the removal of a foreign garrison became one of the most common occasions for the establishment of a commemorative anniversary. See for example, *SEG* XL 75.

Soldiers seem to have been impelled, both by the hostility of the native population and the unfamiliar surroundings, to embrace those familiar forms of military, cultural, and religious organization as a means of socialization. There were also other, more elementary organizations soldiers made use of in their daily routines. These different kinds of associations were formed for purposes of mutual support and socialization.[3] The communities that soldiers created were distinct and allowed them to differentiate themselves from others. In contexts that facilitated the expression and preservation of these identities, soldiers may have been deterred from assimilating into the garrisoned community. Conversely, in some of the more remote garrisoned locations, one actually detects efforts being made by soldiers to integrate rather than differentiate.

Both soldiers and citizens had ways of preserving and maintaining the boundaries that existed between one another. Citizens in some locations endeavored to keep soldiers at a distance. Furthermore, subtle forms of resistance could be used to counteract the invasiveness of occupation. While a community might not have been able to resist a garrison by force, individual citizens could mitigate the disorderly tendencies of mercenaries. Despite efforts to preserve boundaries, interaction and overlap between citizen and soldier was a fact of life in a garrisoned community.

The duties and routines of soldiers brought them into everyday contact with civilians.[4] As distasteful as occupation could be, citizens and soldiers would have developed mutual knowledge of one another. Overtime, the two groups would have grown accustomed to the other's presence. Furthermore, civilians may have even come to appreciate certain aspects of the garrison's presence. Soldiers and civilians occupied

[3] Launey (1987) 1002.
[4] Aen. Tact. 1.5.2, 26.1.1-7.

the same community, and were in many ways mutually dependent on one another. While the negative aspects of foreign occupation did influence the tone of interaction, it did not prevent positive and meaningful contact between foreign soldiers and natives.

The following is an examination of the daily lives of Hellenistic garrison soldiers. The chronology of this inquiry spans the death of Alexander the Great in 323 until the first century B.C.E. In garrison towns during this period, various forms of socialization acted to maintain boundaries between groups, but also helped to bring citizen and soldier closer together. The relationship that existed between these actors was relative and could either be antagonistic or affable, oftentimes it was blend of the two. Thus, while soldiers could be undisciplined and unruly, their must have been limits to these behaviors-- which could have negative consequences in a shared community.

1.2 Sources of Authority

Current scholarly literature on garrisons is lacking in systematic treatment of daily life. Secondary literature prefers to deal with garrisons in broad terms. Of primary interest to past researchers has been to situate garrisons and their personnel within the wider context of Hellenistic warfare. This trend comes at the expense of providing in-depth analysis of daily life.

Recently garrisons have received slightly more attention as scholars begin to focus on the social aspects of garrisoning. This approach consists of the ways in which foreign soldiers interacted with one another and the native population.[5] Discussion centers on how soldiers and citizens maintained and crossed boundaries. This

[5] Ma (2002); Chaniotis (2005) 88-93.

methodology has yet to be applied to an examination of garrisons in all of the successor kingdoms.

As relevant as this approach is for discussing social aspects, we must also consider the actual mechanics of occupation in order to better understand this topic. Therefore, we must also discuss the duties of garrison troops and the garrison's effects on local economy. These consequences of military presence help us to explain the different receptions that garrisons received throughout the Hellenistic world. In the following chapters, these topics will all be addressed using evidence from ancient texts and inscriptions.

For the most part, available sources for the Hellenistic period deal with the turbulent circumstances surrounding a garrison's establishment and its removal. References to garrisons in ancient literary texts are usually impersonal, referring to the *phrouros* as a whole and not its individual members. These same texts often pay insufficient attention to individual soldiers and their daily routine.

We can better understand the practices and activities of garrison soldiers through inscriptions recorded on stone stelae. This epigraphic material consists of honorific decrees, dedications, and charters. However, oftentimes the evidence only survives in fragments. The dedications made by the soldiers themselves represents their collective voices and are therefore, extremely relevant for this paper. It must be granted that honorary decrees are very formulaic and are oftentimes exaggerated; however, in examining these inscriptions we may better understand the activities of soldiers and popular opinion about garrisons.

Most of the epigraphical evidence dates from the middle of the third century and spans through the first century B.C.E. The distribution of this material spans Hellenistic Attica, Cyprus, Egypt and Asia Minor. Garrisons in these locations are particularly well documented and, necessarily, my inquiry will draw heavily from these locals.

In the coming chapters I will also have occasion to consult Greek and Roman authors. Unfortunately, no ancient historical narrative of the Hellenistic period survives. The fragmentary accounts we have, shift from one geographic region to another and are unclear chronologically.[6] Within these texts, the prevalence of military occupation during the Hellenistic period is evident. While ancient authors offer little on the inner workings or interactions of garrisons, some of the histories furnish valuable information regarding the more famous garrisons of the Hellenistic period.

An untapped and unlikely source of information for the daily lives of professional soldiers comes from New Comedy. The ubiquitous egocentric soldier finds his way into many of these works. Although the mercenary's portrayal by Menander and Plautus is laughable, there is a tinge of social criticism in this image. We may imagine that there are elements of truth to these descriptions and that the clichéd character is in some ways representative of factual personas.

I shall also have recourse to make use of earlier writers to illustrate certain trends and for comparative information. For these purposes, I will chiefly be relying on Xenophon and Aeneas, who both wrote in the fourth century B.C.E. The latter's treatise on siege warfare is particularly instructive for its description of wartime duties of soldiers in a city. Although Aeneas is writing in an earlier period, it seems likely that the soldierly duties he describes (e.g. patrol, sentry duty, gate keeping) would be comparable

[6] The histories of Diodorus Siculus are quite illustrative of these types of problems.

if not the same in a later periods. Aeneas' work is also important because he focuses on urban environments as well as relations between soldiery and civilians.

Another unique perspective comes from Xenophon's *Anabasis*, which comprises one of the most detailed descriptions of a Greek mercenary army on the march. The text is indispensable for its treatment of social, logistical, and economic issues that confront an army on the march and at rest. Although this source comes from an earlier period, it is a unique and faithful account of the mercenary experience in antiquity. *Anabasis* elucidates some of the tendencies of mercenaries (e.g. fighting, drinking, gambling, womanizing, and so on), which helps us understand how they may have behaved in garrisons. Furthermore, we know from later texts that these habits carried through to later periods.[7] More specifically, *Anabasis* offers glimpses into the organization of a mercenary army and the clubs and associations that were part of it. The text supplies us with a way of understanding how and why soldiers organized themselves into groups. Similar methods of organization must have been present in Hellenistic armies and may well have continued to function when pieces of the army detached for garrison duty.

2. Garrisons and the Successor Kingdoms

Alexander the Great's death in 323 B.C.E. ushered in a twenty-year period of uncertainty. During this time his generals fought amongst themselves and ultimately decided the matter of succession. By 275 B.C.E., the situation had stabilized; the Antigonids ruled in mainland Greece, the Ptolemies in Egypt, and the Seleucids, Anatolia, parts of Syria, Mesopotamia, and Persia.

[7] c.f Demosth. *Conon*.

At its height, Alexander's empire stretched from the shores of western Greece, to the lush banks of the Indus River in modern day Pakistan. This territorial expanse embraced a wealth of ethnic, linguistic, and cultural groups. Adding to the sheer diversity of the empire were scattered Greco-Macedonian settlements, established by Alexander and his successors. In addition to founding new cities, Alexander also planted many garrisons in existing settlements over the course of his campaigns.[8] Macedonian garrisons were often used in order to enforce obedience and ensure the control of a given provenance or city. Garrisons provided Hellenistic powers with a means of controlling a location, without imposing direct administrative rule by the sovereigns themselves. The purposes, which garrisons served, changed little after Alexander's death, and his successors continued this standing trend of employing permanent garrisons throughout their kingdoms.

Occupation was distasteful for many garrisoned communities. For a polity defeated in war, or a community simply unable to resist royal pressure, occupation frequently led to civilian hostility. The factors responsible for such strong feelings vis-à-vis garrisons were slightly different in the three successor kingdoms. These issues reflect the unique composition of each realm, as well as the sites of individual garrisons. Significantly, not all communities in the Hellenistic world were adverse to garrisons. For newly established cities, a garrison might even be welcomed for the security provided by professional soldiers.

[8] Arr. *Anab.* 5.8, 5.29, 6.15, 6.22, 7.21; Diod. 17.98. See also Griffith (1935) 23.

2.2 The Antigonids

Macedonian control of mainland Greece was complicated by pervasive and strong traditions of independence among the Greek *poleis*. While the Greek *poleis* were nominally city-states, they viewed their sovereignty as small nations might. *Poleis* were fiercely independent and intolerant of royal rule. Therefore, few cities bore Macedonian yolk cheerfully and rebellion was a common occurrence.

The situation confronting Macedon is perhaps best exemplified by Athens.[9] When news reached Athens of Alexander's death, anti-Macedonian sentiment, which had simmered for years, boiled over and the city promptly rebelled. In their bid for freedom, the Athenians also incited neighboring cities to join in "liberating Greece" from Macedonian hegemony.[10] During the Lamian War (June 323 – August 322 B.C.E), Euphron of Sikyon was honored by an Athenian decree specifically for fighting against the Macedonian garrison in his city:

> "During the Greek War, which the people of Athens started for the sake of the Greeks, Euphron returned from exile, expelled the garrison from the citadel … as long as the people continued the war, he participated in it and he contributed soldiers and whatever necessary in a war; when, however, Greece was befallen by misfortune, and garrisons were sent to cities which had previously expelled them, he chose to be killed by the enemies, fighting for the democracy, in order that he might not see his own country and the rest of Greece enslaved."[11]

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[9] Since this study largely deals with Athens, in the interest of brevity I have chosen to focus on the city here. It should be noted however, that Athens was by no means the only polity that threatened Macedonian control in Greece. The Aetolian and Achaean Leagues of central and southern Greece adopted expansionist, anti-Macedonian policies that brought them into direct conflict with Macedonian rule. An embryonic form of the Aetolian League was first to join the Greeks in the revolt that led to the Lamian War. In the early third century B.C.E, the Aetolian League actively recruited members in central Greece thereby achieving control over the southern egress through the strategic pass at Thermopylae. Similarly, in the Peloponnese, the Achaean league became an overt threat to Macedon. In 249 B.C.E, the league was directly responsible for capturing the Macedonian garrison at Corinth. Although these leagues did not often come to direct blows with Macedon, they were collective decision-making entities, capable of pooling military resources and therefore of becoming threats.

[10] Diod. 18.9-11.

[11] *IG* II 448, cited in Chaniotis (2002) 102.

This honorific dedication is indicative of the way in which people viewed Macedonian garrisons at the time. For Greek *poleis*, foreign occupation was not compatible with freedom. Polybius gives a similar impression: "since Chalcis, Corinth, and Demetrias were arranged under Macedon (i.e. garrisoned), the Greeks were not able to have any thoughts of freedom."[12] The slavish element in garrisoning was also reflected in the diplomatic language of the time. From 378/7 B.C.E. onward, the term *aphrouretos* ("ungarrisoned") became tantamount to autonomous.[13]

After the Lamian War, Athens was forced to accept harsh terms of surrender. Perhaps most humiliating of all, was the installment of a Macedonian garrison on the Munychia hill of the Piraeus.[14] The city's defeat also resulted in sweeping political changes. The ensuing period was essentially oligarchic in character and democratic freedoms of the city were sharply curtailed.[15] The Munychia garrison became a symbol of occupation and the changes wrought by foreign conquest. Furthermore, the presence of troops within the *polis* would have been a sobering reminder of Athenian defeat and subjugation.

These punitive measures perhaps paved the way for subsequent Athenian rebellion. Athens frequently initiated screaming bouts of rebellion to enjoy only fleeting respites from Macedonian control. [16] Throughout the city's history, aside from sporadic periods of *stasis* and the intermittent rise of tyrannies, there was no standing tradition of

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[12] Polyb. 18.11.5.
[13] *SEG* XXXVIII 1252; *SV* 442, 489; see also Chaniotis (2002) 2.
[14] Diod. 18.18.3; see also Habicht (1997) 42.
[15] The censuring of democratic freedoms in Athens was to become a trend in the years leading up to 295 B.C.E. Such curtailments usually followed in the wake of an attempted revolt. Invariably, the reestablishment of the garrison in the Piraeus accompanied measures against the democracy. Citizens therefore, would have had good reason to associate the loss of democratic privileges with occupation and garrisons.
[16] Habicht (1997) 42.

autocratic rule in Athens. Thus, this civic history may have made it particularly difficult for the Athenians to stomach foreign rule. Furthermore, these factors may well account for the strong boundaries that existed between Athenians and foreign soldiers. These Boundaries prevented soldiers from truly integrating into the community. Elsewhere, soldiers were able to make inroads and achieve solidarity with citizens, especially in rural locations of the Near East and Egypt.

In 295 B.C.E, the harbor fortress on the Munychia became a mainstay and a symbol of Macedonian occupation for the next sixty-six years. It is difficult to qualify this period of relatively unchallenged occupation. This success could well be explained by the fact that the Antigonids left the city's government and political rights untouched.[17] One could infer from this, that a *polis* might have been more willing to cope with occupation, provided that the community was still governed by its ancestral constitution. Yet, the Athenians were resolute in keeping foreign soldiers at a distance, and perhaps only tolerated occupation because they had to.

2.3 The Ptolemies

The Ptolemies inherited an already developed system of autocratic rule. In their three hundred year ruling period, the Ptolemies enacted no sharp breaks with the ruling traditions set down by the Pharaohs and later, the Achaemenids. The Ptolemies demonstrated tolerance for native practice by allowing traditional elements of society to exist and function. However, in order to effectively administer their territories the Ptolemies required Greeks. Within Egypt, Greeks were firmly a minority, nevertheless they were considered members of the ruling class and therefore, provided. While

[17] Rostovtzeff (1940) 215.

solidarity between Egyptian and Greek was possible, marked social and cultural differences created tension.[18]

Many Greco-Macedonians responded to the beckoning of the Ptolemies and came to Egypt as mercenaries. Some were employed in Alexandria as guards, but the vast majority was sent up-country and either billeted on the local population or served as military settlers. Maintaining control over Egypt required the Ptolemies to deploy rural as well as urban garrisons in their territory, particularly in the restive regions of Upper Egypt. This system of control was burdensome on the local Egyptian population, who were sometimes forced to house soldiers and even their families. As will be discussed in greater detail below, the highly invasive practice of billing was detrimental to soldier-civilian relations.

The tension created by differences between Greco-Macedonian and Egyptian would have been particularly pronounced in the earlier periods of occupation. While pronounced hostilities were probably not a feature of everyday life, Egyptians frequently made use of passive forms of resistance-- staging strike action, intentionally not meeting quotas, and so on.[19] Regimented control of production was a feature of Ptolemaic rule.[20] At times it seems that Ptolemaic expectations failed to take into account Egyptian capabilities, which produced indignation. Several national revolts in the third century B.C.E. did occur and some evidence suggests that these insurgencies were ethnic movements for secession.[21] In sum, Ptolemaic rule in Egypt created cultural and

[18] Thompson (2001) 312.
[19] Burstein (1985) 106.33.
[20] ibid. 101.51-90.
[21] Thompson (2005) 115, 117.

economic tension. Politically autocratic rule seems to have been tolerated, although Egyptians may well have glanced askance at the legitimacy of the Ptolemaic dynasty.[22]

Despite these underlying problems, there is ample evidence to suggest that soldiers and citizens in Egypt were able to achieve a measure of solidarity. Some of the best evidence for mixed marriage and sympathetic feelings towards native belief comes from garrisons in rural Egypt. In the absence of Greek cultural forms, soldiers seem to have been willing to adapt life in the *chora* ("countryside"). Indeed, many Greco-Macedonian soldiers appear to have been absorbed into the fabric of traditional Egyptian life.[23] Similarly, citizens and soldiers on Ptolemaic Cyprus interacted in constructive and meaningful ways, forming associations and intermarrying. Ultimately, it was the willingness of individuals to embrace and accept foreign elements that contributed to harmonious relations within the garrison town.

The Ptolemies also maintained a network of overseas possessions and garrisons that furnish us with valuable information about the everyday lives of soldiers. There are substantial differences between garrisons inserted into Greek contexts and outposts in the *chora*.[24] A soldier's interaction with civilians on Greek islands, such as Cyprus and Thera, would not be overshadowed by the same degree of linguistic, cultural, and religious differences present in Egypt. Nevertheless, there is no reason to suppose that foreign military present was welcomed. Initially, the violent suppression of the Cypriot kingdoms by the successors probably resulted in a response akin to the Athenian.[25] Furthermore, garrison troops on these islands could behave in inappropriate ways about

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[22] Burstein (1985) 106.3.
[23] *CAH* 200.
[24] The same can be said for remote locations in the Seleucid kingdom.
[25] *OCD*, 420.

town, thus adding to civilian frustrations. Even so, sustained Ptolemaic presence in these locations may have in the long run, contributed to unusually cordial relations between garrisons and cities.[26]

2.4 The Seleucids

The Seleucid Empire was a multiethnic conglomerate that far exceeded both the size of Antigonid and Ptolemaic holdings. Like the Ptolemies, the Seleucids ruled as outsiders. Unlike their rivals, who ruled over mostly Egyptians, there was no one dominate ethnic group in the Seleucid domain. Within this mosaic, there may have been an initial tendency for Greco-Macedonians to stick together and to preserve boundaries between themselves and the indigenous populations.

The Seleucids held Greek ideals and customs in high esteem. Numerous inscriptions from Asia Minor demonstrate Seleucid patronage of Greek institutions and culture.[27] Promotion of Greek ideals in the Hellenized cities of Asia Minor might have created little in the way of conflict.[28] Elsewhere however, Seleucid Hellenizing engendered resistance and insurrection. Sponsorship of Greek culture often came at cost to native practices, as seems to have been the case in Jerusalem. In forcing Greek culture in Jerusalem, the Seleucids came into their most infamous conflict with a non-Greek community.[29] The establishment of a garrison in Jerusalem further intensified this conflict.

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[26] The Ptolemies inherited Cyprus as part of Alexander's legacy. They remained in control until, when in the first century B.C.E. the island began to oscillate between Roman and Ptolemaic rule. Cyprus was finally annexed by Octavian and made a minor public province of Rome's in 22 B.C.E.
[27] ibid. 222, 229, 237.
[28] For the locations of these garrisons see Polyb. 15.24, 21.41.2.
[29] Sherwin-White and Kuhrt (1993) 149-58, 171, 179, 180-3.

It is important not to view Hellenizing as any sort of Seleucid cultural mission. Rather, the diffusion of Greek culture was an indirect effect of Seleucid rule and a consequence of the dynasty's membership to the Greek world. With some exception, most notably during the reign of Antiochus IV, Seleucid rulers accepted the status quo in the existent communities. The individual Greek settlers however, sought ways to promoting their heritage in their new homes. Therefore, the inclination of individuals towards adopting and promoting Hellenistic mores seems to have been a significant factor in this cultural diffusion.

The Seleucids also endeavored to implement central rule through the establishment of cities. These settlements usually grew from humble military settlements (*katoikiai*) and were virtual islands of Greek culture.[30] For example, cities like Dura Europus, exhibit Greek city plans as well as civic buildings. The existence of nucleated settlements of Greek culture meant that immigrants were perhaps less concerned with interacting with natives. Furthermore, the mostly homogenous population of these settlements makes it reasonable to think that the potential for cultural conflict between citizen and soldier was reduced.

While Seleucid colonizers may have intended these settlements to be bastions of Hellenistic culture, the reality was quite different. Oftentimes, settlements were superimposed upon native villages. Therefore, we may expect that there were many indigenous peoples inhabiting the area before Greco-Macedonian soldiers arrived. These people, provided they were not displaced of their land, would have continued on with their lives and would have interacted with the new settlement. Additionally, many of

[30] Hadas (1959) 27.

these cities were major trading centers, seated astride caravan roads and river crossings. The filtration of peoples and commodities through these cities was an everyday occurrence and as such, the composition of these settlements would have changed regularly.

Since these cities constituted important sources of revenue and facilitated Seleucid control, garrisons were utilized to provide security. Military presence in Seleucid colonies may well have been welcomed as it would have provided security for commercial endeavors and deterred raids against settlements.[31] For garrison troops, conditions in these cities also created opportunities for interaction and mixing with the natives.[32]

2.5 Legitimating Occupation

For many cities, the installation of a foreign garrison was a hated method of control—one communities sought to avoid at all costs.[33] However, the context and circumstances surrounding a garrison's establishment is crucial for understanding how soldiers interacted with natives. One must carefully differentiate from garrisons established to protect and those established to control. At times kings were quick to justify the presence of their troops in cities. Philip V shrewdly explained the purpose of stationing troops at Lysimacheia in Thrace ca. 198 B.C.E, was to protect, rather than garrison the community.[34] Philip's statement indicates there was an implied and

[31] The other non-Greek cities that accepted Seleucid garrisons, such as Babylon, probably regarded the military presence as more of an imposition than anything else. Cf. Austin (2005) 123.
[32] *CAH*, 191.
[33] Polyb., 15.24.2.
[34] Polyb. 18.4.6.

significant difference between protecting and garrisoning a city. In making this distinction, Philip may well have been acknowledging the stigma of garrisons. Whatever the case, garrisons did serve to protect both the community as well as the interests of a monarch.[35] For example, in newly established colonies, like those in Egypt and Syria, soldiers seem to have been present for security purposes. Inversely, soldiers serving in the Munychia garrison in Athens enforced submission to foreign rule and ensured the survival of an oligarchic government.[36] In many ways, protection of a city was linked to royal interest; however, such agendas were not always advantageous to the community.

Occupation radically altered the daily lives of citizens during the Hellenistic period. Even for cities that acquiesced to foreign control, soldiers could be a daily inconvenience and significant force of disruption. Thus far, we have considered the political and social effects garrisoning could have on communities. We have seen some of the problems created by a military presence, but we have not discussed what garrison members actually did on a daily basis. This topic will now be addressed in the following chapter.

3. A Soldier's Duties

Garrison soldiers had a variety of duties that brought them into contact with civilians on a daily basis. These routine tasks included patrol, sentry duty, and gate keeping. Although civilians may well have found military presence inconvenient for

[35] *IG* II 1225, XII.3 1291: dedicatory inscriptions made on behalf of communities for Ptolemaic garrisons that protected cities from pirates. For more discussion on the way in which garrisons defended cities, see also Launey (1987) 654-5.
[36] Habicht (1997), 40-1.

their daily routines, the presence of soldiers in the streets, in public areas, and at points of entrance and exit became part of daily life. Initially, these duties probably seemed overbearing and excessive. Gradually citizens would have grown accustomed to the daily activities of soldiers. In time, civilians may have acquiesced to military presence and could have even come to appreciate certain aspects of occupation.

3.2 Reveille

A soldier's day in a garrison possibly started with some form of reveille. Soldiers on night watch at Acrocorinth were relieved by the sound of a bell, which an officer made rounds with.[37] Commanders at other sites probably had similar ways of rousing the men to muster.

Morning reveille would have provided an opportunity for company commanders or the garrison commander to address the men as well as given them assignments.[38] In large organized garrisons, like the one on the Munychia hill or the Ptolemaic garrison at Alexandria, soldiers might have gathered in front of their barracks to receive orders. If all or most of the garrison's troops assembled, the space would have to been sufficiently large. For other soldiers serving in rural garrisons, a central space in town, such as a marketplace, could provide a suitable meeting ground.

Morning reveille would have also given commanders the opportunity to inspect the troops. Such an activity would have been important in times of peace and war. In the first place, commanders could make a count of the men and determine if anyone had deserted or died during the night. It would have been important for commanders to know

[37] Plut. Arat. 7.4.
[38] Aen Tact. 13.3-4.

the relative strength of the garrison at all times, so as to make the best possible use of manpower, and to know when it was time to request reinforcements.

Civilians probably outnumbered garrisons in a community at any given time. When Demetrius Poliorketes ("the besieger of cities") captured Cyprus in 307 B.C.E, he took 16,000 mercenaries in the employ of Ptolemy I prisoner.[39] These mercenaries would have been deployed throughout garrisons in several different Cypriot cities. Cyprus is the largest Mediterranean island and at the time, consisted of several kingdoms. During the Hellenistic period, a reasonable and conservative estimate of the islands population would be about 200,000, including slaves and non-citizens. This is roughly a fourth of the islands present-day population of 800,000.[40] This means that for every one soldier, there were about thirteen civilians. Cyprus is, as has already been discussed, an exceptional example of civilian acquiescence to Ptolemaic occupation. Therefore, commanders may not have felt the need for a heavy military presence in Cypriot cities.

In a city like Athens, which demonstrated reoccurring hostility toward the Macedonian garrison, the discrepancy in the ratio of soldiers to civilians, might be far less. The example of Nicanor, buffering the Macedonian garrison in 318 B.C.E, is illustrative of this point.[41] The Athenians probably wished to maintain numerical superiority over the Macedonian soldiers, and were therefore upset by this action.[42] The presence of more troops also meant greater obligation to the *polis* as well as an added military presence in the street. After all, once the troops had been assembled and assigned posts, as much as half the garrison might be seen on duty throughout the

[39] Diod. 20.53.1.
[40] Central Intelligence Agency (n.d.).
[41] Diod. 18.64.2-6.
[42] cf. ibid. 12.4.

community.[43] After reveille, the remaining troops probably went back to their billets or barracks to get some much needed rest.[44]

3.3 Patrol

Whitehead astutely observes, "Defense of a *polis* was defense against fraud as well as force."[45] It was these threats, both overt and covert, that underpinned the duties of garrison soldiers. In order to maintain control over a city it was necessary for soldiers to maintain a state of vigilance over the community and civilians. Organizing patrols circuits was an elementary way of enforcing law and order as well as well as keeping watch over the population.

Patrolling provided garrisons with the means to conduct mobile surveillance. Garrison troops probably conducted circuits around the city or specific precincts.[46] This way, soldiers could monitor civilian activity. Unfortunately, we do not know exactly how patrols would have operated. However, it is possible using the evidence available to us, to envision how patrols might have been conducted and organized. In order for the patrol to thoroughly cover an assigned area, routes may have been shorter and walked several times throughout the day. The size of a patrol group was probably relative to any given route. One group, on night patrol at Acrocorinth, consisted of four soldiers.[47] Although Acrocorinth is relatively small when compared to a metropolis like Athens, the size of the patrol group might serve as a model for a wide range of garrisoned sites. Patrolling groups would have to be sufficiently large, so as to provide safety in

[43] Aen. Tact. 22.26.
[44] ibid. 10.26.
[45] Whitehead (2001) 25.
[46] Aen. Tact. 1.5, 13.3, 22.3.
[47] Plut. *Arat.* 21.2.

numbers.[48] However, officers would have to make effective use of the garrison's available manpower. Thus, commanders had to assign elements to guard duty as well as to patrol. In doing so, commanders had to make sure that soldiers were not spread too far and to thin, nor entirely concentrated in a single and vulnerable location. Aeneas suggests that at any given time, about half the number of enlisted personnel should be on guard duty or patrol.[49] Given that some garrisons probably had upwards of 3,000 soldiers, it seems reasonable to believe that several larger patrol groups would have made rounds throughout the city.[50]

Mention of military patrol may well conjure up images of soldiers kicking down doors and hassling civilians. We do not know if soldiers engaged in regular breaching activity or other assaults. Nevertheless, for soldiers serving in a hostile environment vigilance and scrutiny were essential.[51] For example, the Macedonian garrison established in Athens after the Lamian War, was probably on high alert. Accordingly, the frequency and strength of patrol groups might have been increased in anticipation of civic unrest.[52] In such an environment, soldiers might have been quick to scrutinize civilians, thus impeding daily life. Initially, soldiers might have been used to round up those identified as threats to the new pro-Macedonian government. However, the general purpose of patrolling seems to have been to observe and protect. Although, if surveillance was a patrol's primary duty, soldiers might well interrogate and scrutinize

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[48] Soldiers serving Aratus of Sicyon attacked the aforementioned patrol group. Significantly, three of the patrolling soldiers died, while the fourth fled to warn the rest of the garrison.
[49] Aen. Tact. 22.26.
[50] Polyb. 5.25.2. See also Griffith (1935) 118, 126-31.
[51] Aen. Tact. 18.25, 29.2.
[52] c.f. ibid. 22.26.

civilians whom they thought to be suspicious. Equally, soldiers on the night patrol may have been quick to challenge those they met in the dark.[53]

In addition to providing a means of mobile surveillance and peacekeeping, patrols could also be put to other uses. The successors were keen to extract wealth from their profitable territorial holdings. Within such policies, garrison soldiers could be put to good use collecting taxes, tribute and maintenance fees. However, such collection would have made troops visible targets for civilian frustration.

While a heavy military presence in the streets may have been uncomfortable for civilians, it would have provided security. Garrison troops and their commanders would have been responsible for law and order in the city or village they were stationed in. Aeneas suggests that soldiers be stationed in public areas, like the *agora*, theatre, and around civic buildings.[54] A military presence about town may well have curtailed the effects of crime. Theft in the marketplace could be deterred and passing patrols might break up brawls at taverns, unless of course, the soldiers were somehow involved in picking the fight.

Patrol groups may also have made scouting missions into the countryside around a settlement. A cavalry expeditionary force might be tasked with securing high ground, checking on suburbs, and conducting reconnaissance.[55] In the cold of winter, patrolling on horseback would allow soldiers to cover great distances in a short amount of time, so as not to get too cold.[56] These mobile units could also be invaluable in spotting approaching enemies or making note of enemy troop movements. These kinds of

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[53] ibid. 24.19, 26.1
[54] ibid. 2.1, 22.4.
[55] Aen. Tact. 15.5
[56] Ibid. 18.1, 26.4.

activities probably occupied cavalry officers such as Dryton son of Pamphilos, who served as part of a rural garrison in Egypt (ca. 152 B.C.E.).[57]

3.4 Sentry Duty, Gate keeping, and other Duties

Garrison troops were also assigned to stand guard as sentries. Like those on patrol, sentries watched for both internal and external threats to a community. As sentries and gatekeepers, soldiers also controlled points of entrance and exit to the city. For some civilians this type of control was probably difficult to tolerate, particularly for those who found themselves the targets of suspicion.

Sentries were probably posted at locations that combined visibility and fortification.[58] Therefore, we would expect to find troops along the walls and in guard towers. Groups of soldiers were assigned portions of the wall to guard, which they did by pacing back and forth.[59] Guard dogs could also assist sentinels; the keen senses of the dogs could often detect intruders before the watchmen could.[60] The posts that soldiers manned would probably have always been occupied.[61] During the nighttime, soldiers probably took short watches to ensure that the sentinels were vigilant and rested.[62] If sentries failed to spot an approaching enemy, a city could be stormed and taken by surprise.

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[57] Lewis (1986) 88-103.
[58] Aen. Tact. 22.2; Plut. *Arat.* 7.4, 21.1, 27.1.1.
[59] Aen. Tact. 3.3, 18.14.
[60] ibid. 22.20; Plutarch also mentions that each group of 400 soldiers, serving the garrison at Acrocorinth, was accompanied by 50 dogs, *Arat. 24*. Dogs might also be used while on patrol as well. According to one inscription, it fell under the responsibilities of some garrison commanders to maintain canines, Burstein (1985) 28. For more examples of how dogs were utilized in ancient warfare, see also Foster (1941).
[61] Aen. Tact. 22.8-15.
[62] Ibid. 22.5.

A trained sentinel or scout, whose eyes were honed by years of military service, could be a valuable asset to a city. First, veteran scouts, posted on ridges or hills around a city, could read enemy movements and deduce weather or not enemies would veer towards a settlement.[63] If a raid or attack seemed likely, he could send signal to friendly riders or to the city directly. These advanced warnings, would give those working outside city walls enough time to get to safety. Furthermore, if an enemy force did attempt an assault on a city, professional soldiers might have been better able to defend that community than a civilian militia.

Sentries were also placed at the city gates. Controlling exits and entrances allowed soldiers to supervise traffic, detect threats, and uncover contraband. Soldiers might have inspected a portion of incoming cargo to make sure it did not contain illicit weapons. Civilians could use arms smuggled into a city in order to make a surprise attacks on soldiers and the garrison. One can imagine however, that a soldier's rifling though cargo could have damaged or broken legitimate merchandise. Soldiers even may have "confiscated" items in the name of security.

It is not practical to assume however, that soldiers inspected every basket or interrogated every traveler. For major trading cities, like those along the caravan roads of the Seleucid kingdom, it would not be feasible for soldiers to inspect all goods entering a city. Nor would it be appropriate for soldiers to hinder commerce by barring individuals from entering or leaving the city. Hellenistic monarchs depended on the revenues their cities provided them with. So soldiers may have had orders to wave merchants through the gates with minimal questions asked.

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[63] Aen. Tact. 6.1-6.

In times of war or impending conflict, one would expect movement through the gates to be more tightly controlled. Accordingly, the number of sentries and guardsmen on duty might increase. Since gates were a particularly sensitive and vulnerable location, soldiers may have been on orders to pay close attention to traffic both coming and going. In such an event, a heavy and strict military presence at the gates may have inhibited civilians from freely leaving or entering the city.

Control over the city gates may have highlighted a community's lost freedom as a result of foreign occupation. In an occupied city, garrison officials likely held the keys to the city gates, which allowed them to exercise complete control over traffic. This must have been very unsettling to know that foreign mercenaries had the final say of who to admit or turn away from a given city. Plutarch notes that the keys to the Corinthian gates, which had been in Macedonian hands since 337 B.C.E., were finally returned to the Corinthians in 243 by Aratus of Sicyon. This action signified Corinth's independence from almost a century of foreign occupation.[64] Thus, foreign possession of gate keys was yet another reminder of lost autonomy as a result of garrisoning.

As distasteful as the aforementioned duties were, civilians would have adapted. Citizens who made their living by making frequent commercial trips into an occupied city would have had little choice. After a while, soldiers at the gates would have begun to recognize those who frequented the city. As a result, they may have been more willing to wave past a familiar face.

Aside from the duties already mentioned, there may have been other responsibilities that soldiers had. Soldiers not assigned to patrol or guard duty might be made to drill. Given the focus placed on discipline and training in Hellenistic armies, it is

[64] Plut. *Arat.* 23.1.

possible that soldiers did train while serving in garrisons. In fact, training would have been a priority for military units that would see combat, such as the Alexandrian royal guard. Sometimes, garrisons were stocked with veterans or soldiers unfit to continue to serve on campaign. It is very questionable weather or not these groups would have also been made to conduct maneuvers.

Soldiers may well have trained indirectly in gymnasia as well. Historically, the gymnasium was a place of great importance for military training in Greek antiquity.[65] However, the building was also one of the characteristic features of civic life. The importance of the gymnasium in daily life is attested by the fact that soldiers readily used their own pay to supply oil for Gymnasia.[66] While soldiers may have trained for war in a gymnasium, the building had great social importance as well. This social dynamic may well have influenced the soldier's decision to support the structure, rather than any sort of desire to hone their skills.

While the duties of soldiers could have negative impact on a citizen's daily routine, overtime they would have gotten used to the military presence. In turn, soldiers may well have relaxed their guard after serving in a community for many years without incident. The various duties that soldiers performed provided a regimented and daily way for them to interact with civilians. Friendships may even have developed between civilians and soldiers who frequently came into contact. Even though aspects of this military routine could be unpleasant, some civilians may have come to appreciate the security garrison troops brought to a community.

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[65] Chaniotis (2002) 110.
[66] Bagnall (1976) 68, 129.

The routine tasks of garrison soldiers were of low intensity, which may well account for comments on the ease of garrison service.[67] Fortuitously for the garrison trooper, there were no forced marches, no impending battles to fight (provided an enemy army was not seen on the horizon), and no foraging for scraps of food. While garrison soldiers was supposed to be attentive and vigilant, boredom and tedium are two words often mentioned in connection with garrison service.[68] The sheer monotony of daily routine might have made soldiers welcome the opportunity for rigorous drill. However, a garrison was made up of soldiers who knew each other, many had even served on campaign together. Therefore, soldiers had ample time to socialize with friends. Bouts of feasting, drinking, and singing surely would have alleviated some of the mind numbing boredom of garrison service.

4. Ties that Bind

Hellenistic garrisons were made up of an amalgam of individuals of different origins. Greeks, Cilicians, Ionians, Thracians, and Cretans all served throughout the successor kingdoms as mercenaries.[69] Even within a foreign context, however, these soldiers took comfort in the languages, faces, gods, and festivals familiar to them. These comforts reminded them of their distant homelands and helped them cope with being amidst alien surroundings. [70] Although many mercenaries had left their homeland,

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[67] Xen. *Anab.* 1.4.
[68] Buckley provides a poignant description of the British soldier's experience in the West Indies, noting that "long periods of boredom and inactivity… undoubtedly brought on fits of nostalgia and memories of former times and cherished landscapes far away" (1998) 332.
[69] Of course, this is to name but a few of the different regions mercenaries came from.
[70] Ma (2002) 121.

enticed by the prospects of riches and adventure, they abandoned neither their identity nor their cultural heritage and sought ways of reinforcing both.

There were various forms of association soldiers embraced. Clubs could be small and intimate, consisting of fellow soldiers who simply ate together. Associations could also be highly structured bodies that sought to advance the social and political interests of members. The context of a city-garrison lent itself to group stability. While informal groups like *suskeniai*, probably continued to function, it became more common for soldiers to embrace formal methods of social and religious organization.[71] It must be granted, however, that the distinction between formal and informal association is slight. Both informal groups like the *suskeniai*, or mess groups, and formal associations like the *koina* or *politeumata*, formed in response to the needs of soldiers. Membership in such groups helped soldier fulfill routine tasks as well as cultural obligations. Clubs also provided fellowship and a way of bonding over shared heritage. This chapter examines these associations—their formation, function, structure, and significance in the everyday lives of garrison soldiers.

4.2 Army Groups

A Greek army has often been likened to a town on the march, an entity consisting of combatants and noncombatants alike.[72] This community was further subdivided into many small groups, formed by individual soldiers for purposes of mutual support. While these informal groups are less visible to us, we know that they were an elementary part of

[71] For my discussion of informal army groups, I have chosen to focus on *suskeniai* partly because there is abundant evidence for their existence. Moreover, I feel that such an organization exemplifies small groups in general. *Suskeniai* encapsulated many of the logistical, social, cultural, and even religious benefits a soldier probably hoped to accrue as part of a group.
[72] *CAH* 353.

Hellenistic armies and mercenary outfits in general.[73] When military units were deployed to garrisons, it is likely that soldiers continued to use these informal groupings. During the early Hellenistic period, mass migrations of Greeks resulted in the tendency to stick together in immigrant communities. Soldiers would have embraced the forms of organization that were familiar to them—that is to say, those groups formed while on campaign. These groups had an important and positive impact in the soldier's everyday routine on the march, facilitating daily tasks like food preparation. However, the relative ease of garrison duty meant that soldiers were less reliant on these same forms of organization when not in the field. Therefore, more comprehensive and complex societies developed from the foundations laid by these early military groupings.

While on campaign, soldiers who bivouacked and ate together developed close ties. These bonds helped individual soldiers accomplish routine tasks. For example, soldiers frequently made meals in groups. *Suskeniai* shared the responsibilities of provisioning and preparation for a meal. The clearest example of this practice is provided by Sparta. Here *suskeniai* met in companies, each member contributing on a monthly basis: barley, wine, cheese, figs, and money for meats. [74] This is of course, an example of highly formalized mess, but it gives us an idea how smaller groups may have operated—around the principle of reciprocity.[75] Given the influence of Spartan organization on professional armies overseas and the fact that many Hellenistic mercenaries were of Dorian and Arcadian origins, it is probable that similar suskenic activities took place.

[73] Launey (1987) 1002; Lee (2007) 90-2, 96-7; Fall (1994) 288.
[74] Plut. *Lyc.* 12.3-6 cf. Xen. *Anab.* 4.5.
[75] Equally, institutionalized mess is what we might expect to find in some of the urban garrisons with mess halls.

Indeed, Pomeroy observes that such dining groups were in general, quite popular during the Hellenistic period.[76]

We must allow for differences when discussing the informal groups that existed in garrisons. Fundamentally, the needs and issues confronting an army on the march were different than those facing a garrison. For example, the setting of the garrison would have made the challenges of food preparation (i.e. cooking while on the march) easier. Community services such as taverns, vendors, and markets were readily available to garrison soldiers. In addition, soldiers could serve for years on end as part of the same garrison. Long terms of service would allow men to develop a familiarity with the local community and vice versa. Soldiers would therefore have had more time to modify existing forms of organization and make use of community services (scribes, sculptors, poets, and so on) to construct new and complex clubs. However, how would small group dynamics function in such a setting? Additionally, were suskenic relationships less important because of the services available in the garrisoned community?

The urban location of some garrisons may well have resulted in institutionalized mess groups in barracks or dining halls. Excavation of the fort at Elutherai (fourth century B.C.E) has revealed a dining hall, with offset doors to accommodate couches. However, the size of the room could not have allowed the full detachment at the fort to eat together.[77] Perhaps the dining hall was intended for officers. Officers and the common soldier likely had different forms of sociability and solidarity. For instance, captains and officers might have kept houses in the city, in which they could entertain guests over a meal. An officer living in a house, and not in barracks, might also have slaves and could

[76] Pomeroy (1997) 65.
[77] Ober (1985) 162; Coulton (1996) 160-63.

therefore, have his meals prepared for him. Officers, because they were paid more, may then have been less reliant on their fellow soldier for support and therefore, more able to interact with members outside of the garrison community. If this is accurate, then the rank-and-file may well have formed mess groups like the ones they had on campaign.[78]

Although Elutherai is a rural site, it tells us a great deal about the possible organization of other barracks. We can conjecture that similar mess halls were constructed at the more well-established and organized garrisons in larger cities, like Alexandria or Athens. The existence of organized chow lines however, does not mean that the mess hall could physically accommodate the whole garrison. Therefore, even in urban garrisons the messmate system was probably important, and soldiers likely still made use of *suskeniai*.[79]

The way in which mercenaries were paid during the Hellenistic period suggests that individual mess groups might have been quite common. Mercenaries were paid in two categories: wages and ration-allowances, normally called *siteresion*.[80] That soldiers serving as part of a garrison continued to receive *siteresion*, suggests that provisioning was left to the soldier. Rations were generally bought in the towns or villages which soldiers were stationed in. In some extraordinary examples, rations were paid in kind.[81] Usually the army was ensured that a supply of grain was available for purchase. In Attic garrisons, throughout the third century at least, generals purchased grain and then sold it to individual soldiers.[82]

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[78] Ma (2002) 120.
[79] Launey (1987) 1001-36; Chaniotis (2005) 94-5.
[80] Griffith (1936) 278; Daly (2001) 373; *OGIS* I, 229: an inscription from Palaimagnesia attests to the fact that some garrison soldiers received both wages and rations in kind.
[81] *GSAW* I 36, 40.
[82] Daly (2001) 375.

Soldiers living in the same barracks may well have formed mess groups with those they lived with.[83] Communal living was a feature of army life, both on and off the march, one that facilitated the formation of small task-cohesive groups.[84] Men of the same unit marched together, fought together, and lived together. Archaeological clearing of the Phylla barracks suggest that soldiers lived in a variety of small rooms, built to no particular specifications or standards. This manner of construction suggests "the work of more than one gang of inexperienced builders," possibly the very soldiers who lived there.[85] While the construction of the rooms at Phylla is unique, the overall layout of the barracks is similar to those at a range of sites. In general, barracks consisted of a long building of uniform rooms. The construction of said rooms was neither systematic nor standardized. The sizes of the buildings vary, as does the sizes of the individual rooms. Some are large enough to accommodate about 10 to 14 soldiers (a good size for a campaign mess group); others seem to be suits built for an officer or two.[86]

The urban setting of a garrison likely changed the dynamics of mess groups. Convenient access to urban markets would lessen the hassle of foraging and provisioning.[87] On campaign, if a foraging party was unable to find food men went hungry. The effects of hunger could have dire consequences on a long, hot day of forced marching. Furthermore, when an army bivouacked for the night, each *suskenia* had to look after animals and gear, in addition to foraging and cooking. Fortunately for the garrison soldier, he escaped the rigors of campaign. The amenities provided by the

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[83] Launey (1987) 1003.
[84] Lee (2007) 104.
[85] Vanderpool (1962) 44.
[86] Coulton (1996) 161-4.
[87] We may imagine, however, that these challenges were replaced by the irritation of bartering with local merchants. A charter of shopkeepers from Samos (ca. 245 B.C.E) lists soldiers as repeated violators of order in the marketplace. The charter almost certainly refers to soldiers of the Ptolemaic garrison. See *IG* XII 6.1, 169 cited in Chaniotis (2002) 104.

community meant that a soldier was less concerned with daily survival and perhaps more interested in alleviating boredom with the camaraderie of his fellows.

It was still beneficial for soldiers to cook in groups, even though their survival may not have depended on it. *Suskeniai* could combine their ration-allowances, which perhaps allowed them to purchase better foods. Soldiers living in a barracks outside of town would also have to have the provisions transported. Granted, a barracks might have some storage facilities, lessening the need to make daily trips to the market. Preparing a meal in antiquity required a considerable amount of work, animals had to be butchered, skinned and then cleaned, wood would need to be gathered and fires prepared. Food preparation could be expedited if several soldiers worked together and divided the labor. Division of labor also had the added benefit of giving the soldiers more time to relax and socialize after the meal was done.

As long as we are considering the local community's ability to provide commodities to the garrison, we might also consider the services that could also be offered. For example, cooks might have been hired by soldiers to prepare their meals. Although it is speculative weather or not ordinary soldiers would have had the money to hire such help. Nevertheless, it is possible that the mess groups came to include slaves, concubines, even wives and children.

There were also social benefits of eating in a group. Eating with the same messmates provided the soldiers with the opportunity to interact with fellow soldiers and countrymen. We also hear of *suskeniai* making religious dedications, which indicates that mess groups might have worshiped together. If the activities of food preparation and communal eating reinforced links between equals, acts of piety solidified the group's

sense of corps.[88] The soldiers who engaged in these activities, particularly in food preparation, would likely have been of similar rank and perhaps even members of the same guard detachment.[89] It is even possible that *suskeniai* were made up of soldiers who shared the same ethnicity and/or fighting unit.

This social aspect of *suskeniai* may well have been more desirable to the garrison soldier than the logistical and practical aspects of food preparation. Garrison soldiers who lived, ate, and drank together would have developed close ties. In addition to mess groups, there must have been a multitude of other small organizations, clubs, and gatherings that garrison soldiers used, or that simply formed on a given occasion. Furthermore, we can imagine that there were familiar haunts (a district, shop, tavern, even a water well) that soldiers of a garrison—Ionians, Cretans, Thracians, Athenians, and so on, were known to frequent. There, soldiers might meet to gossip, drink, and await news from their homelands.[90]

Being stationed amidst foreign surroundings must have taken its toll on soldiers, who longed for familiar landscapes, foods, festivals, and gods. The informal groupings already discussed, may have formed the cornerstones of larger more complicated clubs. As a corollary to this, informal task-oriented groups may not have met all of a soldier's needs. That soldiers constructed formal ethnic and religious associations suggest that there was an impetus towards sharing and advancing common interests. Equally, the

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[88] Dalby (1992) 30.
[89] Diodorus provides a rather extraordinary example of a general feasting his men en masse. Peucestas, an elite bodyguard of Alexander the Great, upon leading his army into Persepoils, performed sacrifice in honor of Alexander; immediately following this, he feasted his entire army. He arranged the dining group in several circles, one within the other. Each circuit composed a dining group: the outermost ring was filled with mercenaries, the innermost with the generals themselves and cavalry officers, 19.22.1-23.
[90] Lewis (1995) 436-7.

context of the garrison imparted stability, which could have led the formation of formal associations.

By the third century B.C.E it was becoming increasingly common for soldiers to organize themselves into formal clubs. Greco-Macedonian migrations, by this time, had slowed and immigrant communities solidified. City-garrisons were, for the most part, well established and soldiers embraced distinct forms of association. By examining the circumstances surrounding the formation of these clubs and the activities in which the groups were involved, we can understand how and why soldiers constructed formal associations.

4.3 Constructing a Formal Association: Formation and Function

One of the most common forms of organization garrison soldiers embraced was the so-called *koinon* ("shared thing," the plural is *koina*).[91] The Cypriot *koina* known to us are all distinguished by ethnic names. For instance a "*koinon* of Cilicians," is recorded as having made an honorific dedication to Theodosius the son of Seleucus.[92] Launey observes that wherever there was an especially large quota of soldiers of the same origin, ethnic associations abounded.[93] Groups of Cretans, Thracians, Ionians, Lycians, Greeks, and others also utilized *koina* structure and made similar dedications.[94] These ethnic designations may imply that promotion of the group's racial identity was a matter of great importance. Likewise, since such ethnic categories were also applied to army units, the group consciousness might have been influenced by shared occupation. Amidst a mosaic

[91] Indeed, there seems to have been a particularly strong tendency among Ptolemaic soldiers to organize themselves into associations.
[92] *OGIS* 157.
[93] Launey (1987) 1031.
[94] *OGIS*, Cretans: 153, Thracians: 143, Ionians: 145, Thracians: 146, 147, 162, Greeks: 151.

of immigrants and in foreign surroundings, the formation of social clubs provided ways of celebrating shared culture and promoted individuality. These activities were central to the maintenance of ethnic identity.[95]

Ethnic identity in the Hellenistic world is a convoluted topic. Macedonians and Greeks monopolized the ruling positions in the kingdoms. In Greek cities like Athens, there was no incentive in disguising one's identity. There was however, significance in proclaiming individual identity in the face of a foreign threat, like the Macedonian occupation of Athens. Elsewhere, Egyptians, Syrians, Arabians, and countless other ethnic groups lived under colonial rule. These "others" could achieve entry into the ruling group through various channels, most of which entailed adopting Greek ways; non-Greeks could also achieve status by serving in the military. Thus, depending on the context, ethnicity could be invoked to erect boundaries, and constructed to cross them.

Within Hellenistic armies, troops were often equipped and trained according to ethnic categories. For instance, in Polybius' account of the battle of Raphia in 217 B.C.E., he makes note of troops, assembled from every region of Egypt, armed in Macedonian fashion (τους εἰς τὸν Μακεδονικὸν τρόπον καθωπλισμένοθς).[96] Presumably, this fighting unit was composed of native Egyptians. Shared combat experience would have cemented the bonds existing between men of the same army units and fostered a sense of occupational identity. This enhanced sense of identity would still be present among garrison soldiers because they had been equipped and trained together. Membership in the same fighting units leads to strong sense of corporation in members. In consequence,

[95] Ma (2005) 186-91.
[96] Polyb. 5.79.4

soldiers often align their own interests with those of the group.[97] Thus, troops serving in Macedonian styled army units, regardless of their actual ethnicity, may well have constructed a new identity around this fighting style. Additionally, men might have chosen to form associations, perhaps even the *koina*, to promote this new source of identity. Therefore, the background from which these ethnic associations emerge, lead some scholars to doubt the applicability of these titles for actual club composition.[98]

Evidence for the Cypriot *koina* comes at a time in which Egyptians were being widely recruited into the Ptolemaic army. With this influx of native elements into the military, the correlation between a given ethnicity and fighting style became blurred. It is therefore problematic to reconstruct the actual ethnic composition of Hellenistic armies as well as military associations. While the actual ethnic makeup of the Cypriot *koina* is dubious, examining the circumstances in which they formed may also help us understand club composition. Additionally, there is reason to suppose that the makeup *koina* were true to the ethnic designations used.

In the *koina*, both military and ethnic commonality would have contributed to cohesion as well as a heightened sense of identity. This sense of unity may have resulted in substantial ingroup bias and strong feelings towards outsiders.[99] With the increasing amount of Egyptians in the king's forces, Greek soldiers may have felt that their place in the military was jeopardized. These professional soldiers probably still felt that they occupied a special position in the kingdom. Theirs was a proud legacy, for the formation of the very kingdoms in which they served was their accomplishment. By the time the

[97] MacCoun (1993) 299-300; Lee (2007) 91. Indeed, in antiquity the mercenaries' experience seems to have brought fellow soldiers of fortune together, as Plutarch's *Life of Timoleon* demonstrates, 20.2-3.
[98] Griffith (1935) 134.
[99] Lee (2007) 92.

Cypriot *koina* become visible, all who could boast of such an achievement were surely dead. However, soldiers (perhaps even some of the decedents of those before) could at least lay claim to defending the realm.[100]

The formation of *koina* could have been in part, a response to the fear of being replaced and losing this status. Constructing such a formal association allowed soldiers to broadcast their solidarity as well as pride in their respective national heritage to their superiors. These associations had the added benefit of allowing members to reinforce and promote their respective heritage, thereby demonstrating group resolve and solidifying ethnic identity in a foreign context.[101] Sociologists note that small groups, when facing displacement by a larger entity, attempt to demonstrate their viability by emphasizing those aspects that make them distinct.[102] In the case of the *koina*, these aspects stemmed from the common heritage that members shared.

Similarly, in Attica the threat of Macedonian occupation seems to have impelled military personnel "to emphasize their ethnicity," thereby forming the first known Attic *koinon* of 235/4 B.C.E.[103] In the inscriptions dealing with Attic garrison *koina*, all of the soldiers associated with the clubs are Athenians. There seems to have been, in Daly's words "no overlap of domestic and non-domestic forces."[104] This is to say that soldiers constituted distinct communities based on their various origins. Prior to 229 B.C.E and the liberation of Athens from Macedonian control, Athenian citizen-soldiers might have felt hesitant to associate with those they viewed as occupiers. Here we can see boundary

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[100] Additionally, the evidence for Cypriot *koina* parallels the island becoming the base for the Ptolemaic royal fleet and therefore even more of a crucial possession in the eastern Aegean. Garrison soldiers would have been cognizant of the strategic importance of the island and the importance of their role in holding the territory. This awareness may have led them to form these organizations. See Mitford (1953) 147-8.
[101] Ma (2005) 187.
[102] See Brewer (1979); Tajfel (1982).
[103] Daly (2002) 345.
[104] ibid. 345.

maintenance in effect, as the *koinon* organization separates Athenians from outsiders. Presumably the others, including Macedonians, had their own chosen methods of association.

External pressures in both Attica and Egypt may have yielded similar internal responses within military communities. The formation of distinct groups that stressed ethnic solidarity could be a reaction to such angst. Ethnicity, Hall purports, assumes a "greater importance at times when the integrity of the ethnic group is threatened."[105] The formation of an official organization acted to preserve boundaries between members and non-members. By maintaining selective criteria for admissions (e.g. ethnic background or membership in a certain fighting unit), clubs could claim authenticity and present themselves as communities of interest. Members of city-garrisons could also use associations for political purposes.

The army, despite being an important part of all of the successor kingdoms, did not play a constitutional role.[106] The absence of this role was somewhat compensated for by the personal relationships that existed between individual soldiers and the higher chain of command. The cultivation of good relations with superiors would have been a fundamental concern of any corporate military body. As already mentioned, honorific decrees issued by Hellenistic garrison soldiers abound. The dedications made by these associations are all very similar, and were usually voted to members of the royal household or to a general.[107]

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[105] Hall (2001) 9.
[106] Chaniotis (2005) 64.
[107] Examples from Attica, Cyprus, and Asian Minor have already been used in connection with other points above.

Honorific decrees allowed groups of soldiers to establish a dialogue with their superiors, communicating their expectations or expressing their thanks for services rendered. These channels of communication provided means for advancing the interest of group memebers. With respect to officers, it appears they paid close attention to their soldier's achievements, as well as their expectations and requests. Eumenes I, for example, was forced into negotiations with his mercenaries after they mutinied (ca. 263-241). The subsequent agreement reached, among other things, allotted extra rations of grain for veterans as well as numerous other benefits.[108]

The relationship between soldiers and superiors was rooted in this notion of reciprocity. In return for their service, soldiers expected recognition and reward—on which their loyalty was contingent.[109] This was perhaps especially the case with mercenaries serving in garrisons. On Cyprus, garrisons were an integral part of the royal administration-- which hinged on the control of cities.[110] The same can be said of territories in Greece and the Seleucid kingdom. Maintaining garrisons was important to Hellenistic monarchs for retaining and consolidating territory; these facts would not be lost on the occupying forces.

The presence of a garrison imposed economic control over cities, which granted a sovereign (or the employer of the garrison troops) control of trade revenues. Garrison personnel serving in strategically valuable sites, would likely have been aware of their importance. Overtime, they may even have come to view their duties as a unique and precious accomplishment. Their employers as well, would have been cognizant of the

[108] Bagnall and Derow (2004) 23. The agreement was inscribed on a stone stele and found at Pergamon.
[109] Krasilnikoff (1992) 34; Ducrey notes that mercenaries were "sensitive to legal and fiscal advantages," (1986) 132.
[110] Bagnall (1976) 79.

importance in retaining their loyalty. The allegiance of a garrison was then of crucial importance and something to be cultivated and encouraged. One way a sovereign could ensure this was to cater to the military.

The honorific decrees issued by Cypriot *koina* may well have been produced to thank the monarch for his generosity. The frequency of such initiatives increased over time and reached a peak in the reign of Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II (ca. 182-116). This closely coincides with the islands becoming a very important military base for the fleet.[111] The royal administration may well have been keen to cement its control of Cyprus; something they could do by appeasing members of the garrison. In order to do this, the sovereign may have distributed extra rations or pay to garrison troops. Such a policy of appeasement may in part explain this rise in the number of honorific decrees voted by associations, which thank commanders, governors, and others for their good works. In Ptolemaic Egypt, there is no evidence to indicate a revolt caused by Greco-Macedonian elements of the military, which seems to indicate that the administration did its best to placate the former.[112] Perhaps this is why Theocritus advises, "If you really wish to be a soldier, Ptolemy is the best paymaster of free men."[113]

There were also more elementary motivations, which encouraged soldiers to form groups. Many soldiers worshiped their native gods as part of large groups of other garrison personnel. Indeed, it appears that garrison associations offered soldiers with an organized way to revere select gods. This was the case with one of the Egyptian

[111] Mitford (1953) 147-8.
[112] Griffith (1936) 281.
[113] Theoc. 14.52.

politeumata (the singular is *politeuma*), which appear to have been similar to the *koina* organizations of Cyprus.[114]

The publicized activities of the *politeumata* were much the same as those of the *koina*: voting dedications, divine and worldly.[115] The relevant inscription records a dedication made on behalf of Ptolemy Philometor by a group of Boeotian soldiers to Zeus Basileus and "to other fatherland gods."[116] The Boeotian Confederacy is known to have worshiped Zeus Basileus in central Greece.[117] Similarly, a group of artillerists from Cyprus inscribed a dedication in favor of a Lycian officer; according to the dedication junior members of the corps were to sacrifice to Leto. It has been posited that the cult of Leto was imported to Cyprus by Lycians and based on this the artillerists have tentatively been identified as a group of Lycians.[118] This example also demonstrates the extent to which military units reflected the heritage of their members and the way in which such values were promulgated.

Another example of soldiers worshiping in groups comes from the island of Failaka (during the Hellenistic period known as Ikarus) in the Persian Gulf, off the coast of modern-day Kuwait.[119] Failaka, although small, was a strategically important Seleucid possession.[120] The garrison on the island made the following dedication on local sandstone in the late fourth or early third century B.C.E:

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[114] While nominally the *politeuma* make use of ethnic designations, which refer to Boeotians, Cretans, and Cilicians, two of the known Egyptian *politeumata* are without national designations.
[115] Cohen notes, "the similarities in fact are so strong that it is difficult to specify what, if any, differences there were." (1978) 75 no. 13
[116] *SEG* II 871
[117] Cohen (1978) 75.
[118] *BSA* LVI 4; Buckler (1935) 75-8.
[119] There are also examples of similar groups from Ptolomaic Thera: *SEG* VIII 714. See also Chaniotis (2002) 109.
[120] Chaniotis (2005) 149.

"Sotel[es] the Athenian and the sol[diers] to Zeus the Savior, Poseidon, Artemis the Savior."[121]

Soteles was probably the officer in command of the soldiers mentioned in the inscription. The divinities mentioned in this dedication were often thanked by soldiers and regarded as their patrons and protectors. In fact, a sanctuary of Artemis Soteira (the Savior) appears around the time that the garrison was established. Although modest in scale, the temple was built to Greek standards.[122] It is not clear if Greeks themselves constructed the temple, or if it is the handiwork of imported workers laboring under a Greek-trained architect.

The presence of this temple, would have given soldiers the ability to worship familiar gods far from their homeland.[123] The act of sacrifice and the communal meal that followed, suggests some form of community was at work.[124] This and the fact that the Failaka group made itself conspicuous by setting in stone its activities, makes it reasonable to think that this group was formally organized. If this is indeed a military unit, we can see military hierarchy acting in nonmilitary contexts. Soteles, an Athenian mercenary officer, is cast in this decree as a leader in a religious activity. Furthermore, Soteles fellow soldiers are presumed to be non-Greeks.[125] Interestingly then, Soteles was able to organize an ethnically mixed group to sacrifice to Greek gods. This measure was probably accomplished by virtue of Soteles' status as an officer. It seems that military organization was pervasive in these associations and contributed to the overall structure of garrison clubs. Military organization evolved overtime to suit the needs of a club.

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[121] *SEG* 1477; Roueché and Sherwin-White (1985) 4-10; Naveh (1995) 4.
[122] Rice (1994) 126.
[123] Chaniotis (2005) 149.
[124] Burket (1985) 55-9; Lee (2007) 227.
[125] Naveh (1995) 4.

Significantly, this military aspect also contributed to group identity and initiative. However, how were these associations structured in order to actualize group projects?

4.4 Club Structure

If the impetus to organize was felt by a group, there were still other obstacles that had to be overcome. In order to make dedications, organize events, and pursue agendas, clubs had to have some semblance of structure. The previous section sought show the importance military organization played in club construction and group identity. However, how would club meetings have actually worked? Maddeningly, the answer to this question cannot be known given the lack of evidence. We can however, speak abstractly regarding the formal structure of garrison associations. The organization of later associations and Hellenistic club activities furnish us with valuable information, which allows us to better understand the inner-workings of these clubs.

The Athenian Iobacchic society from the first century A.D provides an exceptionally well-documented example of club structure. A text dated shortly before A.D 178 provides an extract from the minutes of a meeting held by the Athenian Iobacchic society. From this document we know that the society was composed of members, who were presided over by various officers: a president, vice-president, and a priest. Each member was obliged to pay an entrance fee and regular dues to the club's treasury. New memberships as well as initiatives (e.g. dedications) were decided by a group vote. There were also mechanisms in place to discipline unruly members. Those with outstanding fines or with a history of disorderly conduct were barred from attending club functions. The organization of the club seems to have been designed to ensure

access to financial resources, streamline proceedings, put on events, and encourage corporate action.

It is highly speculative to conclude that association patterns almost four hundred years earlier would be an exact copy of the Iobacchi. It seems reasonable to conjecture however, that the habits and customs of earlier Greek clubs would have carried through and manifested themselves in slightly different ways.[126] The Iobacchic society is an example of a highly structured fraternal society. The reasons for which ancient Greek societies were established were very similar. Namely, clubs afforded members opportunities of common worship and fellowship. [127] Therefore, the institutions in these clubs would tend to interact in similar ways. Likewise, the mechanisms that facilitated club interests would be comparable. We may imagine that Hellenistic garrison clubs had a similar way of inducting new members, a system of officers, a way of voting on initiatives, collecting dues, and so on.

The activities engaged in by garrison associations offer glimpses into club structure. As the following inscription from Pathos demonstrates, the initiatives undertaken presuppose an intense amount of collaboration between soldiers and are illustrative of the group's underlying structure:

> "Resolved by the *boule* (council) and by the people to praise (the name does not survive).... Citizen of Patara of the first friends, first and chief engineer of the island on the city and overseer of artillery, he is to be crowned with a golden wreath and a painted likeness set in the sacred area of Paphian Aphrodite and in his honor, those holding senior status at large in the corps shall observe a day of sacrifice in the old city to Aphrodite and the junior members shall hold sacrifices to Leto. This decree is to be

[126] It should be noted that the model provided by the Iobacchic society perhaps has the most bearing on Athenian associations or clubs in which many members were Athenian. On a slightly different note, the Iobacchi were likely influenced by the traditions and trends set by its predecessors, some of which may have been Hellenistic clubs.
[127] Tod (1932) 92.

> inscribed into a slab of limestone and set up in a visible location of the sacred precinct."[128]

We may imagine that a considerable amount of deliberation and effort went into establishing this decree. Presumably, the corps would have had the necessary appendages in place to ensure that all this was accomplished. If we think back to the Iobacchi, such mechanisms would include a means of deliberation and officers to collect money. Furthermore, the production of the inscription itself must have been a significant undertaking. Firstly, the group would have to determine the type of dedication and then discuss wording or which formulae to use. Next members might hire a poet to compose the honorary epigram. Members would have to collect money to defray the cost of constructing both the painted likeness and the stele upon which the inscription was found. There was also the additional cost of the sacrificial animal.[129] Once a decision was reached, soldiers could easily procure the necessary items in Pathos itself. In effect, the community had the ability to sustain group activities—large and small.

It is also possible that military organization provided formal structure. The army company was a ready-made association, one that was already highly regimented. In the first place, it provided hierarchical organization. A system of officers was already existed and discipline could be enforced via military regulations.[130] Military arrangement is very similar to the Iobacchic club structure already described. Although not an exact comparison, the example of the Iobacchi provides us with a way of conceptualizing club structure.

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[128] *BSA* LVI 4.
[129] Chaniotis (2005) 94.
[130] Macedonian military regulations: Burnstein (1985) 66.

We may also speculate on the durability of these groups. As was already mentioned, the context of a garrison led to the formation of stable and lasting formal associations. Furthermore, we may even conjecture that any group that makes itself visible in the epigraphic record is communicating its stability. The very act of inscription suggests a certain permanence, which reflects on the group that has chosen to make the dedication.

4.5 Soldiers and Societies

The particulars of formal associations varied. For instance, the terms used by the groups to refer to themselves were unique. However, even the designations are similar as they define a corporate group, stationed at a given location. The actions taken by these groups were also very similar to one another. The initiatives represented the club's attempt to define itself as a distinct community while advancing member interest. In this way, formal garrison associations acted to maintain boundaries and individual identity.

Garrison associations, writes Marcel Launey, "assure à ses membres les formes d'une vie politique et nationale."[131] This statement seems accurate for clubs and associations provided the means for constructing identity, celebrating heritage, and a way of achieving mutual goals. The formation of distinct communities seems to have been very important to soldiers. In general, evidence from garrisons illustrates a picture of garrison sociability, where soldiers made a virtue of necessity and capitalized on shared characteristics.

There were more elementary benefits to being part of a group as well. These clubs were social networks. For the mercenary serving outside of the Greek world and

[131] Launey (1987) 1080.

inside the realm of *barbaroi*, garrison duty might have seemed like a punishment or exile. Soldiers sought networks with those who shared their beliefs, military unit, rank, and ethnic background. To this list we might also add that just the experience of serving as part of a garrison in a foreign, alien location, encouraged soldiers to band together.[132] These collectives facilitated social intercourse between individuals and fostered a sense of community and group identity. Far from the customary entertainments and pleasures of their homelands, soldiers probably welcomed the opportunity to swap stories, sing familiar songs, and eat meals with friends.

5. The Good, the Bad, and the Garrisoned

Garrison troops and citizens seem to have had a fragile relationship. The rapport between citizen and soldier was relative and could be influenced by multiple dynamics. In order to understand how soldiers and civilians interacted it is necessary to examine the way in which occupation affected the community as well as the individual home. Furthermore, we need to understand the potential forms of resistance that could have deterred soldiers from behaving inappropriately toward citizens.

5.2 The Economics of Occupation

Economically, the presence of a garrison involved considerable obligations for the citizens. Cities that had surrendered or that were annexed were forced to pay tribute as well as the maintenance costs of the garrison.[133] Garrison personnel and royal appointees

[132] Griffith (1935) 134.
[133] Plut. *Ar*at. 45.1-4.

could also take control of cities' major sources of revenue. As we have already seen, garrison troops could be put to good use extracting wealth from the population. While it is difficult to speak of any real economic policy embraced by Hellenistic monarchs, it seems that the successors were keen to maximize their revenues. Such a rigid level of economic control is characteristic of the experience of Greek cities under Ptolemaic control; similarly, garrisons in Asia Minor also imposed a heavy financial burden.[134]

Maintaining a garrison required that the community supply food and fodder for military personnel.[135] In order to provide these provisions, a market would be provided to allow soldiers to purchase their daily rations.[136] We have already discussed the bipartite division of pay into wages and food stipends, which allowed soldiers to make these purchases. In some exceptional cases, rations were provided to the soldier in kind (as opposed to *siteresion*), and there is evidence of granaries being specifically built to feed members of garrisons.[137] However, it was probably more common for soldiers to purchase grain and provisions from local vendors and markets.

That soldiers were also consumers may well have led to a mutual dependency between garrisons and the merchants of a community. The establishment of a garrison would have led to an increased demand for food items.[138] Businesses would have opened to cater to the garrison, for it is reasonable to think that there were some enterprising citizens willing to capitalize on the military presence.[139] These merchants would have depended on garrison personnel to make their livelihood. Likewise, *suskeniai* would

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[134] Rostovtzeff (1940) 140, 334.
[135] ibid. 334.
[136] Xen. *Anab.* 2.4-5; Krasilnikoff (1992) 24
[137] *IG* ii 128. This inscription records that granaries were built for the garrison at Sunion (Attica) and that soldiers were issued coupons in order to pay for grain. See also Griffith (1935) 290.
[138] Brothels may have seen an increase in the number of patrons as well.
[139] In similar fashion, markets catered to Greek armies on the markets. See Xen. *Anab.* 1.4.19, 1.5.6, 1.5.10.

have relied on food vendors to eat. Even if the garrison troops had their food procured and prepared for them in mess halls, representatives of the garrison would have to negotiate with produce vendors, butchers, and wine merchants in order to feed the men.

It seems reasonable to believe that some sort of arrangement would have existed between the town and garrison to facilitate commercial transactions. To put it another way, prices in the market had to have been fair. Gouging would have contributed to an "unstable situation in which the army at a certain point would use force to gain necessary provisions."[140] From this, we might ask if the soldier often used violence or the threat of, to get what he wanted? The charter of shopkeepers of Samos, in the late third century B.C.E, lists soldiers (in this case Ptolemaic garrison troops) and unemployed mercenaries as frequent and potential violators of order.[141] It is possible that troops on Samos were in the habit of stealing from merchants and causing disturbances in taverns. Unfortunately, we do not know weather or not such behavior was an everyday occurrence. New recruits, like those Nicanor brought into the Munychia garrison in 318 B.C.E., might have been more likely to cause problems in the community.[142] We have already seen how being amidst foreign surroundings caused soldiers to form tight knit groups with one another. These groups had strong senses of identity and may have viewed civilians as outsiders, who were somehow inferior by virtue of occupation. Once these men became accustomed to garrison life and had developed relationships with civilians and a dependency on community services, the business of everyday existence may well have merited more conciliatory behavior.

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[140] Krasilnikoff (1992) 24.
[141] *IG* XII 6.1.
[142] Diod. 18.64.2-6.

The establishment of a garrison within a community could have negative as well as positive implications for a city's economy. On the one hand, the cost of maintaining the garrison as well as revenues lost to taxation would have been met with grumblings. On the other, the presence of a garrison might stimulate commerce by providing more customers. This commercial relationship offered something to both soldiers and civilians and perhaps made garrisoned life more tolerable to the community.

5.3 Billeting

Maintaining a garrison also meant that some communities had to provide lodging for garrison troops. Within such close proximity cultural and linguistic differences must have been compounded. Quartering of troops in individual homes is known to have been particularly common in Upper Egypt; however, such a practice is documented elsewhere as well.[143] Ideally, billeting of troops was utilized as a short-term solution until barracks could be constructed. However, if a community also shouldered the cost of constructing such accommodation, and it is reasonable to believe that it did, a long period of time could elapse before the necessary funds were collected. In the meantime, billeting was seen as a highly invasive form of occupation by homeowners, one that forced soldiers and civilians into close contact. Understanding billeting helps us understand why some communities showed marked hostility toward soldiers and occupation.

Billeting must have had dramatic effects on the delicate spatial economy of an ancient household. Edicts from Egypt order soldiers to occupy no more than half of a

[143] There is also evidence of billeting from Calynda in Caria and from Seleucid Sardis and Apollonia. Aineias even advises that mercenaries hired to defend a *polis* be quartered in the houses of individual citizens. However, his suggestion is tailored for a community seeking to protect itself and not one subject to a foreign garrison, 13.2-3.

given home.[144] However, for the homeowner, this occupation meant a substantial cut in potential domestic production. For instance, a wife may not have been able to weave as much if soldiers had occupied loom space. Furthermore, billeted households probably sacrificed multiple rooms in order to accommodate armed guests.[145] Therefore, the presence of soldiers within the *oikos* ("house;" the plural is *oikoi*) would have fundamentally altered the way in which household space was used and likely, lead to an overall contraction of domestic productivity.

We can also speculate on the added threat and occurrence of depredation by soldiers. Soldiers may have helped themselves to household stores of food and alcohol, placing further strain on the household's economy.[146] A night spent drinking, might also lead to the destruction of property by soldiers. For example, we could well imagine the loom mentioned above, being broken down for kindling on a cold winter's night.

The division of the ancient Greek household would also have been changed in accepting male soldiers. Ancient Greek *oikoi* were divided into gendered spaces. The presence of soldiers would have impeded this division, possibly even destroying it. There must have been times in which residents worried that their armed guests would force themselves upon daughters and wives. Frustratingly, evidence for gender-based organization of Egyptian and Persian homes is less clear to us. Nevertheless, we may imagine that billeting would have had similar effects.

In Egypt as well as other non-Greek speaking locals, there was an added problem of communication. Some Egyptians knew how to speak Greek; however, Greek

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[144] Lewis (1986) 22.
[145] Fiedler demonstrates the different function different rooms could serve, (2005) 106-13.
[146] On their retreat to the Black Sea, the Cyreans helped themselves to stockpiles of wine and beer: Xen. *Anab.* 3.4.31, 4.2.22, 4.4.9, 4.5.26-9.

mercenaries who had newly arrived in Egypt would probably not speak the native language. Over time, soldiers would have developed a familiarity with the language and even fluency. However, initially if soldiers and citizens were unable to talk to one another, living conditions would have been exponentially complicated. In the event of such communication barrier, cohabitants would not be able to talk about their expectations, frustrations, and explain cultural differences. To be sure, a measure of pantomiming and gesturing occurred that made basic interaction possible.

When talking about billeting, there is also the question of ownership to consider. Requisitioned billets inverted the sense of ownership that was attached to a home. As mentioned above, the proprietor was forced to accommodate armed guests. Some of these soldiers had a tendency of behaving in a self-indulgent and overly entitled way. Soldiers also quarreled over billets they found to be more desirable:

> "To King Ptolemy Greeting from Areus… I am wronged by Kephalon. After I was assigned lodgings… Kephalon—although there was no quarrel between him and me—forced his way into my billet, threw my furnishings out into the street, and beat me in an attempt to force me out too."[147]

From Areus' request we may gather that he felt entitled to the billet he had been assigned. In this letter, Kephalon seems to be attempting to take Areus' lodging for himself. Note that nowhere in this document are the proprietors of the house mentioned. Their absence in Areus' complaint might suggest that brawls and quarrels over billets eclipsed the feelings of residents. The house was seen as being at the disposal of royal interests—which superseded private concerns for property and possession.

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[147] *UPZ* 151 cited in Lewis (1986) 22.

Officers and sovereigns were aware of these problems and the destruction caused by their troops.[148] A royal edict from the second century B.C.E, found on the Acropoils at Telmessus in Lycia, demonstrates a monarch's acknowledgement of the burden posed by quartered troops. The decree comes from either Antiochus III or Eumenes II and grants a reprieve from billeting for ten years; furthermore, it imposes a forceful penalty (τάς ἀναγχαίας χπείας) for those in violation.[149] From this, we may gather that soldiers might requisition billets for themselves if the accommodation they were provided was not satisfactory. Therefore, we might ask what real control, if any, did the sovereign have over his troops when it came to billeting? As we have already seen in Areus' letter, soldiers in Egypt might beseech the monarch to redress issues regarding billets.[150] Unfortunately, we do not know if King Ptolemy ever responded to Areus' complaint. It seems safest to conclude, that monarchs were cognizant of the downsides of billeting. However in some cases they may well have had little or no other options to house troops.

5.4 Resistance

It is perhaps true that the average citizen could do little against armed soldiers. However, the citizen could make use of one subterfuge after another to make daily life for a garrison soldier more difficult. The threat of a riotous civilian response could well have acted to keep soldiers from alienating members of the community.

Perhaps the biggest threat to an occupying force was the potential for widespread civil unrest. An organized and well armed force of civilians might have easily undermine

[148] Chaniotis (2005) 124.
[149] *SEG* XXIX 1516.
[150] Lewis (1986) 22-3.

dor overthrown a garrison. A treaty between Teos and Kybissos demonstrates well this fear of rebellion:

> "The [citizens] in the city shall swear [not] to destroy Cyrbissus nor to allow another so [far] as they are able... and the inhabitants of Cyrbissus shall swear [not to abandon] the garrison commander sent by the People [and to preserve the fortress for the city."[151]

The treaty mandates citizens to swear a loyalty oath to the garrison and remain faithful to the garrison commander. This union was inscribed upon a marble stele and placed in a prominent location of the city, as was common practice for decrees. This ensured that citizens would have knowledge of the decree. The fear of rebellion must have been an acute concern for garrison commanders and soldiers. It was this fear that impelled Nicanor to increase the number of troops under his command; an increased presence that incurred the strong disapproval of Athenian citizens.[152]

As far as billeting is concerned, the civilian was again, able to offer little in the way of direct resistance.[153] For a citizen, offering any sort of confrontation was perhaps to incur strong rebuke or bodily harm. Furthermore, we hear of soldiers ejecting tenants from their houses and occupying dwellings by force.[154] Nevertheless, there were many subtle ways civilians could counteract billeting and preserve boundaries between themselves and soldiers. For example, owners of houses intentionally inflicted damage to their homes in order to make them undesirable billeting locations. Doors were blocked and altars placed in front, thus giving a residential property the appearance of a sanctuary

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[151] Burstein (1985) 28. Cf. Plut. *Arat.* 17.2: Aratus of Sicyon promised Erginus sixty talents for information about key weaknesses of Macedonian garrison of Acrocorinth.
[152] Diod. 18.64.2-6. Cf. Aen. Tact. 12.4.
[153] If however, a soldier committed a crime against the household, say the rape of a family member, direct resistance in the form of vendetta could be a result. In the event of such an extreme circumstance a soldier might have been forced to sleep with one eye open, or quickly move to another billet.
[154] Lewis (1986) 22-3.

and hence, off-limits as a billet.[155] Within a billeted home, lodgers even constructed dividing walls through the *oikos*. These measures ensured that contact with soldiers would be limited and restricted the latter's access to the household. Furthermore, such restrictions were probably empowering to the homeowner, who could control where soldiers lived.

Civilians could also exclude garrison troops from religious sanctuaries and civic buildings. As per a sacred law from Xanthus, men bearing arms (i.e. Seleucid soldiers) were barred from entering the Letoon.[156] Armed soldiers entering and exiting a temple would have been perceived as disrespectful to the goddess and disruptive to worshipers. This law allowed the Xanthians to regulate how soldiers conducted themselves while in the shrine. Furthermore, it allowed Xanthian religious life in the Letoon to continue, without interference from impertinent foreign soldiers. Breaking said law might inspire divine retribution, so if a soldier chose to enter the temple, he probably checked his weapons at the door.

There are also other examples of tactics civilians could use to complicate everyday life for garrison troops. Some of these strategies, such as price gouging, have already been mentioned in connection with previous sections. Civilians might also stonewall their occupiers, giving them misinformation or avoiding conversation entirely. Threatening contamination of food and water might also have occurred. Significantly, these concerns would have influenced the ways in which soldiers interacted with civilians.

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[155] *P. Ent.* 11 cited in Lewis (1986) 23.
[156] Ma (2002) 120.

There must have been some sort of balance in garrison towns. Soldiers were known to behave in inappropriate ways in the community. However, too much unruly behavior by soldiers could be met by a riotous civilian response. This response however, did not always come in the form of open rebellion. Citizens could make use of one subterfuge after another to make daily life for a garrison soldier less pleasant. As a community, many soldiers and citizens would have been mutually dependent on one another. Additionally, interaction between the two groups would have been a daily occurrence. Therefore, there must have been some limits to the disorderly tendencies of soldiers. Similarly, citizens had to accommodate certain parts of occupation. If there was sustained hostility in the streets, garrison troops and commanders may well have felt the need to enforce stringent levels of control. It was perhaps in the best interest of both citizen and soldier to be generally accommodating to one another and not to upset the tenuous balance that existed between them. However, the stigma associated with garrisons meant that the onus of achieving genuine acceptance in a community firmly rested with the soldiers.

6. Without Complaint: Good Behavior and Garrison Soldiers

Thus far, this paper has discussed ways in which soldiers constituted distinct and separate groups within a community. There have been many examples cited about the bad behavior of garrison soldiers. It should be noted however, that our sources make no mention of "bad" garrisons. While it is true that the practice of garrisoning is universally condemned by Hellenistic and later sources, the available texts and inscriptions do not

qualify this loathing. Rather, seemingly innocuous remarks or terms, for example *anenkletos*, "without complaint," remind us of the possibility of complaints.

We have already explored many of the ways garrison troops could be a nuisance, however soldiers did exemplify good behavior within the community. In fact, garrison commanders, or *phrourarchoi*, often behaved in such a way that provoked favorable response from the community in which they served. The example set by military commanders may well have encouraged their soldiers to interact in constructive ways with the garrisoned community. Another in which soldiers could achieve solidarity with natives was through religious activity. However, in some locations soldiers seem to have preferred familiar forms of worship and social organization; forcibly inserting these preferences into a community however, could lead to insurrection.

6.2 Phrourarchoi

The *phrourarchos* occupied a unique position within the garrison. The prominence of this position was in the first place linked to rank. *Phrourarchoi* commanded the garrison troops. The commandant was probably responsible for delegating routine tasks such as patrol, sentry duty, gate keeping, strengthening fortifications, and so on. These responsibilities were crucial to the security of a garrison and therefore the *phrourarchos* was probably the recipient of more pay than the rank and file. This advantage perhaps gave him dispensable income, with which he could benefit the community. An example of such service comes from an honorific decree from Xanthus in Lycia, for Pandarus, a Ptolemaic garrison commander sent by Ptolemy II (r. 281 – 246 B.C.E):

> "Pandarus, son of Nikias of Herakleia, sent by king Ptolemy as commander of the garrison at Xanthus; he has shown good and meritorious behavior, worthy of the king, providing no reasons for complaint to the *polis* of Xanthians and doing many and great services both to the whole community and to each person."[157]

We may note the similarities between the above decree, and the following for a commander whose name does not survive. The inscription comes from Philai (ca. 115 B.C.E), a sacred island of Isis on the Nile:

> "[---]aius, son of Ammonius, of the 'followers' (διαδόχων), commanding this place for thirty-two years providing no reasons for complaint to those living in this place nor to foreign visitors…"[158]

The precise phrasing of these decrees needs to be examined. Noting that a garrison commander gave no reason for complaint is formulaic and attested in many such inscriptions. Unfortunately, we cannot know the circumstances under which such decrees were produced or if any prompting went into their production. However, these decrees offer tempting insight into the interaction between the native population and military personnel of a garrison. That such a decree was even made, suggests a level of constructive involvement on the part of the *phrourarchos* in the community.

Undertaking measures to honor a garrison commander implies willingness on the part of a community. One factor that may have contributed to this willingness was the behavior and discipline of the troops serving under the *phrourarchos*. The community would have recognized that the troops were the commander's responsibility and it is counterintuitive to suppose that a city would praise a *phrourarchos* if his men had a habit of running amuck. In fact, a

[157] *SEG* XXXV 1183 cited in Chaniotis (2002) 102.
[158] *SEG* XXVIII 1479.

community might even send requests asking that a new garrison commander be instated if the old commandant failed to control the troops.[159]

The inscription from Philai may well support the interpretation that a *phrourarchos* was supposed to control his men. At Philai, the temple complex on the island was regarded as one of the holiest sites for worshipers of Isis. It would have been important to ensure that soldiers did not profane this site. Soldiers were known to degrade holy sites by living in them, entering temples while armed, or stealing from local shrines. [160] Specifically noting that the *phrourarchos* did not provoke complaint from natives nor foreign visitors (perhaps those making pilgrimages), suggests that he endeavored to appease the community possibly by making sure his men accorded the site a proper amount of respect.[161] If this was the case, then the stock phrase, "providing no reasons for complaint," may well have been a reflection of the commander's ability to discipline his men. Disobedient soldiers could be jailed, discharged, or forced to stand guard during the late hours of the night, or accomplish any number of unpleasant tasks.[162] Surviving Macedonian army regulations also stipulate that breaches of discipline were to result in fines. Furthermore, reward was offered for soldiers who provided information regarding disorderly acts committed by their comrades.[163]

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[159] Cf. *OGIS* 329.
[160] Living in sacred areas: Ma (2000) 304-5, no. 15; entering temple carrying arms: Ma (2002) 120. It is possible that many of these offenses were simply committed out of ignorance. Soldiers new to a garrison in a foreign land would be unfamiliar with native customs and religious practices.
[161] Later on we hear of a garrison commander making a dedication to Isis at Philai: *SEG* XXXI 1521.
[162] On jailing and discharge: *SEG* XXXVI 1306. Late watches: cf. Aen. Tact. who suggests that watch commanders auction off watches; this implies that there were better times to stand guard than others. 22.29. Conversely, this preoccupation with *eutaxia*, may well have produced a reaction among garrison troops. Soldiers might regard with indignation a commander that was strict and heavy-handed. Efforts to enforce discipline by such a commander could very well lead to depredation and disorder.
[163] Burstein (1985) 66. The disorderly acts cited in the inscription involved the destruction of crops.

Eutaxia ("discipline") is after all, often praised in sources as being one of the cardinal virtues of Hellenistic armies. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to believe that enforcing such standards would have been a concern of *phrouarchoi*. In enforcing discipline, garrison commanders expected the soldiers to be obedient to superiors, but also to show a certain level of deference toward civilians.[164]

In addition to maintaining control over the troops, garrison commanders performed benefaction and euergetism in the community. From the Southern Aegean island of Ceos we find a narrative detailing the intervention of a Ptolemaic *phrourarchos*, Heiron of Syracuse, to save threatened property within an individual's home.[165] It is not exactly clear what constituted this threat, possibly royal taxation. The inscription notes that Heiron undertook these measures for the purpose of ingratiating himself to the community, and for this he was awarded the rights of citizenship. This incident demonstrates the *phrourarchos'* genuine concern for the well being of the individual citizen and a desire to be thought of positively by the community. In a similar dedication, a cavalry commander stationed in Apollonia is commended for repeatedly making intercessions on behalf of the Apollonians to the Seleucid administration in Sardis.[166] The commander's advocacy again reveals a certain level of commitment to the community. Furthermore, on both occasions we see garrison commanders behaving more like civil servants then military officers. These

[164] Chaniotis (2005) 94. The discipline of soldiers is perhaps one way of explaining why the Aeginetans repeatedly requested that the commander of their island be kept at his post. These requests came during the mid-second century B.C.E, and they indicate that Cleon of Pergamom was well liked within the community. However, Cleon's example might lead us to suppose that some commanders were considered to be better than others and made concerted efforts to appease and benefit the community. See *OGIS* 329.
[165] *IG* XII 5 1061.
[166] Ma (2002) 120.

examples show how garrison commanders could act as intermediaries between the community, garrison, and royal administration.

Although it is highly speculative to say that euergetism on the part of the garrison's commanders would have reflected positively on the whole institution, we cannot rule out the possibility. While an officer's benefaction was perhaps designed to place him on a higher plane in the community, there is no reason to suppose that the perception of the rank and file suffered because of it. The example set by the garrison commander may have encouraged soldiers to emulate his benefaction. As was already mentioned, commanders and officers had the means to better cast themselves, as benefactors in the community. The average soldier, who was paid less, would have had fewer of these opportunities. However, this did not preclude the latter from making use of different forms of cordiality toward the community.

6.3 Koina and the Community

The *koina* organizations, which have already been discussed, also facilitated social intercourse between common soldiers and civilians. Another inscription from Cyprus, dating from the second century, revels that *koinon* values had appeal to citizens of Cypriot cities:

> "The *koinon* of Thracians, serving on Cyprus, and the *sympoliteumenos*, to Ptolemaius, son of the king, the general, and commander of the fleet, and the high priest."[167]

[167] *OGIS* I 157.

The term *sympoliteumenos* (the plural is *sympoliteumenoi*) has a range of meaning and is vague in the context of this inscription. Perhaps the best translation is simply, "sympathizers." It has been suggested that that the *sympoliteumenoi* in this case, were in all probability, not soldiers.[168] The ethnic identity of the group of sympathizers is also very dubious.[169] Indeed, Tod believes that the nature of clubs during the Hellenistic period, promoted intercourse between citizens, soldiers, and foreigners.[170] We may expect the *sympoliteumenoi* were chosen for membership in the *koinon* because they shared the organization's cultural and religious values. Since *koinon* structure reflected the ethnic makeup of members, in this case Thracians, sympathizers would have been exposed to Thracian religious and cultural practice.

The *koina* associations seem to have encouraged and cultivated a sense of commonality between civilian and soldier. It is reasonable to conjecture, that since the *koina* organization sought, in part, to promote and organize leisure time activities (e.g. worship and festivals), that the interactions between members would be cordial and meaningful. If *koina* included civilians, it is possible that soldiers and citizens could have developed close ties as a result of this association.

6.4 Religion

Serving as part of a garrison in a foreign land also brought soldiers into contact with native religious practices. Soldiers are known to have occasionally made

[168] Cohen notes the Egyptian *politeumata* also admitted *sympoliteumenoi* (1978) 74.
[169] ibid. 74.
[170] Tod (1932) 83, 85.

dedications to prominent sanctuaries near their garrison.[171] We even hear of Cretans, ostensibly soldiers, making pilgrimages to Egyptian sanctuaries.[172] Reverence for local beliefs certainly would have acted to bring together foreign soldier and civilian.[173] Worshiping and making dedications at local sanctuaries would have aligned garrison soldiers with the religious convictions of the natives.

Significantly, mercenaries became important agents in the diffusion of Egyptian cults abroad. This transference suggests that some soldiers held in high regard native Egyptian beliefs. At Thera, an island in the South Aegean and site of a Ptolemaic garrison, cults of Egyptian deities are mentioned in numerous dedications from the third century B.C.E onward. The deities worshiped at Thera were particularly associated with the Ptolemaic dynasty. However, this does not mean that some sort of royal policy affected the cult's spread. Rather, we know that deep religious convictions often were a decisive factor in cult transfer.[174] This fact presupposes that the individual believer cared enough about a foreign religion to carry it abroad.

Despite the fact that soldiers worshiped at native sanctuaries, by and large they appear to have preferred the gods of their homeland. Garrison soldiers in the Aegean islands and Greece for example, worshiped their own gods, those associated with the kingdom that had recruited them, and/or deities popular among military personnel.[175] The Attalid garrisons on Aegina and in Panion Thrace worshiped Zeus Soter and Athena

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[171] *IG* IV 769, 852, 1352. 769 and 1352 are dedications in which the individuals have chosen to identify themselves as members of garrisons. 769 was dedicated by the garrison commander and the soldiers.
[172] Chaniotis notes the graffiti scratched into the walls of prominent temples demonstrates that the pilgrims were clearly impressed by the experiences they had while visiting these religious sites (2005) 151.
[173] Much the same as worshiping in groups brought soldiers together. See above.
[174] Chaniotis (2005) 149-54.
[175] Launey (1987) 890.

Nikephoros, deities associated with Pergamon (their employer).[176] However, the evidence for such a preference comes from contexts where there were Greek religious structures.

In the absence of a Greek religious forum, individual soldiers were willing to venerate foreign deities. For soldiers serving in rural garrisons, say in Upper Egypt, foreign gods were an acceptable alternative. Overtime, native superstitions would have crept into the daily lives of garrison soldiers. Soldiers would have heard of the powers of native gods and oracles, which may have encouraged them to seek blessings.

While some soldiers adapted to the lack of Greek cultural forms, other times this want led to the insertion of Greek civilization into a settlement. This could lead to religious and cultural conflict; the most notorious example of this involved the Seleucids and the Jews of Jerusalem. We must approach the conflict caused by Hellenization in Jerusalem carefully. The chronology and causes that led to the outbreak of hostilities are rather unclear and our sources show significant bias.

Prior to the reign of Antiochus IV, the Seleucids had enjoyed a relatively good relationship with the Jews of their kingdom. Jewish soldiers were known for their ability as mercenaries and the Seleucids capitalized on this skill, using many Jews in garrisons and as military settlers. The central conflict in Jerusalem stemmed from the appointment of a group of individuals, under the auspices of Jason, who sought to promote Greek culture and ways of life.[177] In the late 170s B.C.E. the impulse toward Hellenization was given royal approval, and a gymnasium was constructed.[178] Under Jason's successor Menelaus, internal opposition and civil war began. In response to this threat against royal

[176] *OGIS* 301; Chaniotis (2005) 153.
[177] II Macc. 4.7-14.
[178] I Macc. 1.10-14.

control, Antiochus garrisoned the town. During their occupation the soldiers unwisely plundered and robbed the Jewish temple, which provoked further hostilities.

The establishment of the Seleucid garrison in Jerusalem was followed by a proclamation banning Jewish religious and social practices.[179] Greek polytheism was substituted for the worship of the Jewish god. This suppression of Jewish culture led to the outbreak of armed resistance under a traditionalist group, led by Mattathias and his son Judas Maccabaeus, which wrested Jerusalem from Seleucid control.[180] While the Seleucid suppression of Jewish culture and law was short-lived, the consequences were far-reaching.

Religion could bring soldiers and civilians together, or drive a wedge further between. The sacred law from Xanthus as well as the events in Jerusalem shows that mercenaries and their commanders could have disregard for native belief. Evidence of this sort of conflict largely comes from urban areas. This is significant because large cities could furnish soldiers with what they wanted or required. Buildings might be commandeered for religious or social purposes, which in turn led to controversy and conflict. Within rural contexts, soldiers were more or less at the whim of their surroundings. While some may have constructed altars and temples to Greek gods, others simply may have adapted and turned to new gods, hoping that they would bring blessings to their lives while abroad.[181]

[179] I Macc. 1.44-50; Shipley (2003) 309.
[180] An interesting comparison to make with the Seleucid religious suppression in Jerusalem is the democratic suppression of the Athenians by the Macedonians.
[181] The military group in Failaka for example, may well have constructed the Greek temple on the island.

7. "Frattin"

The sexual conduct of modern garrison soldiers has been frequently portrayed in musicals, movies, and comedy. More recently, the sexual misconduct of United States Marines serving in Okinawa has received the attention of the national news.[182] While discussion of foreign soldiers and native women might conjure up clichéd and stereotypical images, it is nevertheless an important dynamic in the study of garrisons. Given that there is a particularly rich and unique base of evidence for such an inquiry, this topic deserves special attention. In marrying into a native family, a soldier could form lasting ties to the garrisoned town. Conversely, a soldier's misconduct vis-à-vis women could produce indignation and outrage in that same local.

7.2 Mixed and Endogamous Marriages

Recently, scholars have placed undue emphasis on citizenship as a determining factor in soldier-civilian relations. Legal consideration for producing legitimate heirs (i.e. offspring produced by two parents with citizenship) is seen as a preventative for starting a family by way of mixed marriage. [183] One cannot rule out the possibility that such concerns were a factor when considering a marriage. However, any preference for Greek women seems to have been due to sheer convenience and not ideological consideration.

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[182] On February 15, 2008, four United States Marines were charged with the rape of a Japanese girl. The soldiers were serving on the southern island of Okinawa. The incident has triggered memories of rapes committed by U.S. service personnel in 1995 and 2002. These have sparked wide spread protest and catalyzed criticism of the United State's Military's presence in Japan and has led to acute concerns regarding the damage such actions have done to the broader security relationship.

[183] Chaniotis (2002) 108-10.

For mercenaries serving in the backwaters of Egypt or Syria, the choice to marry a Greek simply did not exist. Indeed, there were also benefits to marrying into native families.

The issue of citizenship during the Hellenistic period is complex and seems relative to any given *poleis*. On the one hand, certain *poleis* could be relatively accommodating to foreigners, granting or selling the right of citizenship. On the other, certain other cities outside of Greece began to rigidly control such a privilege. For example, the Greek cities of Egypt, namely Alexandria, Philadelphia and Ptolemais made citizenship exclusive.[184] For a marriage to be considered legitimate in these locations, both bride and groom had to be citizens. These laws, that encouraged the maintenance of an ethnically unmixed Greek population, probably stemmed from a desire to uphold the pedigrees of a select number of elite families.[185] Therefore, only the upper echelons of society would have felt the full effects of these regulations.

Marked legal considerations may well have been features of the early Hellenistic period, likewise the exclusive character of citizenship. Increasingly, we find that non-citizens were accommodated into *poleis*, via the sale of citizenship. This is concomitant with an increase in the number of mercenaries that cities hired and that served in garrisons.[186] These trends indicate that the importance placed on traditional city-state citizenship was in fact declining in certain circles.[187] Certainly those who hoped one day to return to their native cities would have held concerns for legal status and a legitimate

[184] Rowlandson remarks that the Ptolemies conferred citizenship upon select individuals in return for services, favors, and so on. Therefore, only a privileged group would have had these rights. Therefore legal restrictions concerning citizens and non-citizens would have had little effect on Egypt as a whole as well as those Greeks who were not citizens of Greek cities in Egypt, (2005) 253.
[185] Pomeroy (1984) 46; Davis also draws attention to a a charter in the city of Naucratis prohibiting the marriage of Greek citizens and natives (1952) 54.
[186] Ogden (1996) 289.
[187] Ibid. 317.

marriage. However, mixed marriages seem to have been relatively common and to a certain extent, unavoidable.

Maintaining such rigid boundaries between Greeks and others was simply not practical in the *chora*. Isolated from Hellenic culture and contacts, Greeks steadily conformed to their surroundings. We have already seen how soldiers serving in rural areas of Egypt acquainted themselves with the Egyptian religious practices and language. Another way in which soldiers integrated themselves into the rhythm of daily life was through marriage. Evidence from Ptolemaic Egypt indicates that mixed marriages involving Greek soldiers and Egyptian women were relatively common.[188] Similar evidence comes from the Seleucid settlement of Dura Europus in Asia, where Greeks married Syrians and other native women.[189] In the *chora*, Greek bridal prospects would have been relatively limited.[190] If a soldier had thoughts of marital life, marrying into a native family could well have been his only option.

The prospect of marrying a native may well have been made attractive to many soldiers. While serving abroad, many men could have been enticed by the dowries of native girls. For Egyptians, marrying a Greek or adopting Hellenistic culture could be a way of achieving social advancement. Being Greek meant being part of the ruling class and Hellenized Egyptians may well have appeared attractive candidates for low-level administrative positions.[191] Along these lines, if an Egyptian woman married a Greek, this meant that children would occupy privileged positions by virtue of their patrilineage.

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[188] Launey (1987) 714; Fraser (1972) 71.
[189] Cohen (1978) 34.
[190] Interestingly enough, the earliest dated papyrus in Greek concerns a marriage contract between two Greeks, Heracleides of Temnus and Demetria of Ceos, comes from such a rural area. The relevant document comes from Elephantine, a strategically important island in the Nile River and site of a garrison.Given the location, as a Greek, Demetria may well have been a highly desirable bride. See Bagnall and Derow (2004) 145.
[191] Shipley (2003) 222.

Therefore, Egyptian families may have actively sought to marry their daughters to Greeks. Prospective grooms might be enticed by promise of ostentatious wedding gifts, land, and lavish dowries. Marriage to a native woman around 152 B.C.E., for example, brought increased wealth to Dryton of son of Pamphilos, a cavalry officer serving in Pathyris in rural Egypt.[192]

There were also less tangible benefits for soldiers in marrying native girls. Marriage formed alliances between families and signified entrance into a community. According to Justin, Alexander the Great encouraged his soldiers to marry Asian women as a way of keeping soldiers at camp.[193] From a military perspective, a married garrison solder would have added incentive to defend the community if his family lived in it. Additionally, Ptolemy I supported his mercenaries settling with their families in Egypt; and even made sure measures were taken to ensure their wellbeing.[194] Encouraging and supporting marriages was for the sovereign, a way to cultivate the loyalty of the troops as well as integrate them into the community. At Susa in 324 B.C.E, Alexander wed over eighty companions to Persian women who were part of local aristocratic families. These unions legitimated the grooms and integrated them into local traditions of rule in the satrapies.[195]

Mixed marriages may have been tolerated where lack of Greek women made them inevitable or for political purposes. However, Greeks did marry women of their

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[192] Lewis (1986) 94.
[193] Justin 12.4.
[194] Pomeroy (1984) 100-3.
[195] Plut. *Alex.* 47. Athenaeus provides a very colorful description of the events int eh wake of the nuptials which leads one to conclude that Alexander intended the most intemate synthesis between Macedonian and Persian, 538b. It is worth noting, however, that of Alexander's immediate entourage, who were betrothed in 324 B.C.E., only Seleucus actually stayed married to his Persian wife.

own ethnicity, probably because it was convenient to do so.[196] Endogamous marriages between Greeks would have been expedient for a number of reasons, aside from the issues of citizenship. In the first place, there were no linguistic barriers to overcome. Second, differences of culture would not have been as severe. As a corollary to this, the conception of gender roles would have been comparable.[197] Third, in Asia and Egypt, Greeks constituted the ruling class; therefore, endogamous marriages might be preferable to marrying into a native family-- viewed as below a garrison soldier's or officer's relative status. Simply put, Greek soldiers sometimes found it more practical to marry other Greek transplants.

Soldiers sometimes traveled abroad to serve in garrisons accompanied by their families. In the third century B.C.E. for example, a group of Cretan mercenaries was recruited by Miletus. The group was to be settled in the newly annexed territory of Hybandis. When these soldiers migrated to Miletos they came with their families and were enfranchised together.[198]

It seems highly speculative to conclude that the aforementioned group of Cretan mercenaries traveled with their families because of some aversion to mixed marriages.[199] Rather, it seems more probable that these women and children followed their husbands and fathers because of already existent familial bonds. Indeed, there were many Cretan

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[196] Bagnall and Derow (2004) 145.
[197] C.f Herodotus 2.41. While clearly, Herodotus exaggerates in this passage, it indicates that Greeks may well have viewed Egyptian gender roles as being antithetical to Greek cultural practices.
[198] Chaniotis (2005) 105.
[199] Camp followings, *aposkeue*, of this kind were common. We know that many soldiers had lovers and wives that followed them on campaign. This assortment of non-combatants welled army numbers greatly. Not all companions that followed an army however, were Greek women. The vast majority, were probably non-Greeks picked up along the march. From Arrian we learn that over ten thousand Greeks had married native women from Asia. Although we ought to regard Arrian's numbers with suspicion, he is likely providing an arbitrarily large number to reflect the fact that many of Alexander's soldiers had taken wives on the course of campaign, *Anab.* 7.4.8, 7.10.3. Furthermore these women were considered lawful wives and not concubines, some had even borne children. See also Pomeroy (1997) 202; *CAH* 353.

women in the Antigonid garrisons of Attica, Euboia, and Thessaly. These women too were probably family members of mercenaries. In the garrisoned cities of Ptolemaic Cyprus, we also find women from areas that commonly supplied mercenaries to Hellenistic armies. Bagnall provides a list of these women, which shows women from Aspendus, Euboia, Byzantium, Crete, and even Arabia.[200] In such an environment, consisting of an amalgam of Greek immigrants, a soldier might well have the occasion to marry another from his homeland. Therefore, soldiers likely chose to marry the daughters of other garrison troops.

Living in the same space would have led to the development of personal relationships between Greek mercenaries and women. The barriers that existed between two Greeks would not have been as pronounced as those separating, for example, a Greek and a Syrian. It was these personal ties of shared culture and language that led to marriages, rather than ideological considerations. Lest, we form too idealistic a view of these marriages however, there were also numerous economic factors that led to marriage. A garrison officer, living in a villa, might seek a wife to manage the domicile and provide heirs to work the land. The choice to marry another Greek, as opposed to a native, would then have been preferable because it was convenient socially and culturally.

7.3 The Mercenaries of New Comedy

Examining the caricatures of soldiers and their relationships in the works of Menander and Plautus is another way of understanding relationships of military men and civilian women. Indeed these plays constitute a particularly rich and interesting source of

[200] Bagnall (1976) 264-6.

evidence for some of the themes already discussed. However, New Comedy deserves separate treatment because it is narrowly focused on Athens.

The plays of Menander and Plautus feature prominently within their plots relationships between soldiers, prostitutes, and beautiful women. Scholars have often used these works to indicate some of the general values and concerns held by a Hellenistic audience. Given this, we might expect that reality inspired some of the personalities we find on stage. However, it is easy to overstate the importance and influence of the themes within New Comedy. Menander's works for example demonstrate that citizenship played an important part in sanctioning relationships between citizens and soldiers. These concerns however, cannot be mapped onto the rest of the Hellenistic world, as we have already seen. Nor does all of the evidence, used to indicate concerns for citizenship, clearly demonstrate such a preoccupation.

Ostensibly, concern for legal status makes an appearance in Plautus' *Miles Gloriosus*, when the egocentric soldier Pyrgopolynices probes Palestrio about the position of a local woman: "is she free born or a freed woman, made free from a slave… is she wife, or is she widow?"[201] Such a slew of questions are designed to be amusing and funny to the audience. After all, the *gloriosus* of Plautus was supposed to be a laughingstock. Pyrogopolynices' questions might equally be interpreted as being nosy and stupid. Chaniotis uses this example to indicate that the legal status of woman was "a matter of great importance."[202] However, Pyrgopolynices' questions skirt the issue of citizenship altogether and focus on questions of ownership and availability. These are questions of legal status, though not specifically of residency. If a pretty girl caught the

[201] Plaut. *Mil.* 961-964.
[202] Chaniotis (2005) 106.

eye of a soldier, we might imagine that such questions were common and extremely relevant.

Quite illustrative of legal concerns for citizenship is the fact that in three of Menander's plays (*Sikyonios*, *Perikeiromene*, and *Misoumenos*), soldiers are allowed to marry their beloveds only after the issue of citizenship is resolved.[203] In one instance Stratophanes, a soldier, tries to establish his citizenship as an Athenian, in order to marry a freeborn native girl. However, we must take into account the geographical setting of these plays. Almost all of Menander's plays are set in contemporary Greece, mainly in Athens or Attica.[204] Therefore, the concerns expressed within them may well reflect those of an Athenian audience.

Menander's works were written and performed during a time when Athens was fighting for democratic culture. Citizen marriage and reproductive capacity were central to Athenian democratic identity. Thus there is significant utility in sanctioning marriages between citizens in New Comedy. In doing this, Menander is invoking and renewing democratic ideology and culture by establishing the legitimacy of a marriage.[205] Menander may well be making a statement that Athenian women are for Athenian citizens and soldiers; Macedonians, Cretans, and others, need not bother. This possessiveness appears in writings about modern garrisons as well. Civilians in occupied Germany showed hostility toward American G.I.s, who fraternized with "their" women.[206] Menander's focus on citizenship might indicate that a similar form of sexual tension existed for the ancients as well.

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[203] C.f. MacCary (1972) 287.
[204] Hunter (2005) 482; *OCD*, 956.
[205] Lape (2004) 9-12.
[206] Willoughby (1998).

7.4 Outrage Against Women

Thus far, this chapter has discussed mostly the marital practices of garrison soldiers. In addition to thoughts of marital life however, soldiers also had sexual desires. Some probably satisfied these urges by trips to the local brothel, still others perhaps forced themselves on native women.

Scholars have noted that rape was a ubiquitous threat in wartime and functioned to "produce and maintain dominance."[207] Since some garrisons were seen to enforce obedience and subjugation, one might wonder if rape frequently occurred, and if officers sanctioned it. In the first place, the extent to which garrison soldiers victimized women is indeterminable. Second, there is no evidence to suggest any active policy such as *ius primae noctis* was ever utilized.

There is good reason to suppose that soldiers would have chosen safer alternatives to fulfill their urges, even if those options came at a cost. The rape of a native woman by a soldier would have incurred strong disapproval and outcry by the inhabitants of the community.[208] Within a traditional society, the consequence of such a forced encounter could be vendetta. Even if there was formal punishment for soldiers who committed rape, it is probable that family members would have caught up to an offender in a dark ally, before judicial action could be taken. Frequent rapes by garrison troops might also act to undermine a garrison's position. We have already seen the ways in which the

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[207] Card (1996) 7. Isocrates also offers a poignant description of the anarchic conditions that existed in mainland Greece, shortly before Philip of Macedon's day. This description includes "outrage to women and children," we may well apply this description, *mutatis mutandis*, to certain phases of the Hellenistic period as well, *Panath.* 258.

[208] Men. *Dyskolos*, 289-93. In these lines, Gorgias draws a distinction between rape and seduction and appears to regard the latter as the more serious-- warranting death many times over.

native population could constitute a threat to soldiers. The rape of a female citizen by a foreign mercenary might have incited upheaval as well.

Admittedly, the relationships between foreign soldiers and native women have been largely unexplored by scholars of the Hellenistic period. This insufficient attention is due in part to the hazy quality of evidence and/or lack thereof. A soldier's relationship with a native women fits well into the dichotomy of experience within a garrisoned site. Marriage between foreigner and native could bring the two closer together. In inverse fashion however, an illicit encounter could be a source of friction in the community. Here just as elsewhere in previous chapters, we might say that for their own safety, soldiers attempted to behave in a way that provoked minimal civilian aggression. Some garrison troops, went beyond this minimalist approach however, and actually achieved entrée into the community. Such entrance occurred not in the divisive role of a soldier, but as a husband, father, and even friend.

8. Conclusions

The presence of foreign soldiers in the community mosaic created a unique set of problems. During the Hellenistic period, cities defeated in war were normally garrisoned. The presence of a foreign garrison may well have forced civilians to relive this defeat on a daily basis. Therefore, it is not surprising that some cities sought to avoid garrisoning at all costs.[209] For the *poleis* of mainland Greece, occupation produced strong feelings in citizens. *Poleis* were accustomed to their sovereignty, and an army of occupation was not compatible with autonomy. This is of course to say nothing of the considerable financial

[209] Polyb., 15.24.2

obligations and potential for cultural conflict the presence of a garrison entailed. These feelings of discontent might have been directed at the agents of occupation: the garrison soldiers.

Initially, the city's hostility towards the garrison may well have driven soldiers to look inward for social interaction. In many garrisoned locations, soldiers lived as an ethnic and cultural minority far from home and in unfamiliar locations. In this context, it is difficult not to feel sympathy for these men. Serving in a foreign land impelled soldiers to find ways of expressing familiar customs and rituals. These activities were a meaningful part of a soldier's daily life and cemented the bonds that existed between men. The organizations that soldiers formed constituted communities of interest. These clubs attracted non-military personnel and provided a way for collectively advancing the interests of members. As an added benefit, social clubs also gave troops something to do during down time, thus providing a temporary relief from boredom.

Other *poleis* seem to have grudgingly acquiesced to garrisons. By and large, these cities were newly founded Greek settlements, like Alexandria, Antioch, and Dura Europas. In these cities, troops served not to control, but to protect. Although soldiers may well have caused the same problems they did elsewhere, these communities were not strictly occupied. When occupation served to enforce dominance and subordination it fomented social unrest. Similarly, when aspects of occupation, like forced political or cultural change, clashed with well-established tradition, the effects could be damaging to civilian-soldier relations.

However, time proved to be a consummate healer when it came to the rift created by occupation. The duties garrison soldiers were involved in provided a structured way

of interacting with civilians. Off duty, excursions to local businesses cast soldiers as consumers and patrons. Civilians would have slowly grown accustomed to seeing soldiers and even come to rely on their business. Some may even have appreciated the security that a military presence could provide.

Soldiers serving in garrisons in the Near East and regions of Egypt had slightly different experiences. Living outside Greek contexts left soldiers to search for viable alternatives. Overtime, some soldiers steadily embraced their surroundings, making benefactions to the community, dedications to local deities, learning the local language, and taking wives. These measures helped a soldier blend into his surroundings. As members of a community, garrison troops may well have inclined towards good behavior. Although Greco-Macedonian soldiers may well have preferred their native gods, language, and women, in a rural garrison they were forced to make due. Therefore, a blend of necessity and pragmatism, in rural garrisons, served to encourage mixing and even a degree of fusion between soldier and civilian.

Like any community, the garrison town had problems of disorder, theft, dispute, and so on. The experience of a garrisoned community was neither wholly positive nor negative, as this inquiry has shown. Ultimately, it seems that the positive and negative aspects of a garrison coincided and interacted on a daily level. However, our conclusions at this stage can only be tentative. The relative paucity of evidence regarding garrisons makes it difficult to offer generalizations. Furthermore, we must take into account the regional variety of sites surveyed. While the duties and tendencies of soldiers seem to have remained relatively constant throughout the Hellenistic world, a local community's reception of military occupation changed with context. One can conjecture that overtime

the presence of soldiers was tolerated because it had to be. Soldiers themselves made the best out of tedious garrison duty, interacting with the community and sometimes, becoming part of it.

Glossary of Key Greek Terms

Chora: countryside or rural location

Eutaxia: well-ordered, good discipline

Katoikiai: military settlements

Koinon/Koina (pl.): club or federation

Oikos/Oikoi: a house

Phrouros/Phrouroi; a garrison

Phrourarchos/phrouarchoi: a garrison commander

Politeuma/Politeumata: an Egyptian colonial organization

Siteresion: funds for the supply of grain

Sympoliteumenos/sympoliteumenoi: sympathizers

Syskenia/syskeniai: mess group

Syssitia/syssitiai: common meal

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