Anybody 'but not Ld. B':

A Study Of Lord William Carr Beresford's Intervention In 1820s Portugal

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How many ages hence
Shall this our lofty scene be acted o'er,
In states unborn, and accents yet unknown! (3.1.111)

—Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar*

homo homini lupus

Hanging on a wall at the National Museum of the Cabildo and May Revolution in Buenos Aires, among the other oppressively large paintings, is "*La Reconquista de Buenos Aires.*" In a bizarre mix of red and bright yellow, "*La Reconquista de Buenos Aires*" portrays the ritual surrender of the leader of the ill-starred British invasion of Buenos Aires in 1806. The oil painting is centered on the British Major General William Carr Beresford, who looking like a freshly chastised child forced to share a new toy, grudgingly extending the hilt of his sword to the erect and cavalier looking commander of the victorious Argentine forces, the French soldier of fortune Santiago de Liniers. Those who are not dead or bandaging the wounded look on with piqued interest as the very gentlemanly powdered wig wearing de Liniers gently rejects the sword of the slightly shorter Beresford. Though the painting's subject matter is at best highly exaggerated, and more than likely apocryphal, the incident indeed occurred. Lord Beresford had—without orders from London—sacked Buenos Aires on 27 June 1806.

The fact that Beresford had not been authorized to do so mattered little to His Royal Highness George III and his loyal subjects—so long as he successfully held it. Far from indifferent, Londoners celebrated Beresford's capture of Buenos Aires. London's merchants bubbled with excitement over the prospects of new markets for their wares in South America. Britain's politicians, not as giddy, but excited nonetheless, hoped that the example of a "benign" government practiced in Buenos Aires would convince other South American colonies, living under Spain's "oppressive government," to throw off their yoke and become parts of the British Empire.[1] Newspapers such as *The Times* naively speculated that once Napoleon caught word of Beresford's triumph, "Bonaparte," out of fear no doubt, would be

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[1] Bernardo P. Lozier Almazán, *Beresford William Carr: Governor of Buenos Aires, British General and Portuguese Marshal, Governor of Madeira and Senhor Supremo of Portugal: British Intentions for the Domination of South America in the XIX Century*, trans. Henry S. Forbes, and Duncan Forbes (Buenos Aires: L.O.L.A, 2008), 141. The book is available in both English and Spanish; I have used the English version.

forced into "an early peace."[2] The excitement culminated in what can only be described as Roman scenes of grandeur. On 20 September the booty Beresford had forwarded to Britain was paraded around London with the pomp and circumstance befitting a great empire. Barely audible, over a deafening adaptation of Arne's *Rule Britannia*, jubilant onlookers quickly grew hoarse as they excitedly discussed the "incalculable possibilities" for trade in recently acquired Buenos Aires. The more delusional assured others that British held "Buenos Aires. . . . shall probably become the granary of South America."[3] As the excited masses chattered away, handsome carriages carried the spoils, after having gone down Pall Mall, to the secure confines of the Bank of England—where the Argentine specie was triumphantly deposited. Later, that illustrious official, the Lord Mayor of London awarded Beresford, in absentia, a ceremonial sword. In addition to the sword, Beresford was made an honorary citizen of London—a title that any self-respecting nobleman would have despised in the not too distant past. Even the king acknowledged Beresford's victory. Fortunately there were neither menorahs involved in this parade nor an Arch of Titus to commemorate it. The jollities proved short-lived, however. Once word of Beresford's defeat made its rounds in London, the gaiety was unceremoniously extinguished, and public opinion quickly shifted. Buenos Aires went from being lauded as a wondrous place inhabited by South America's most "charming and beautiful"[4] women to a backwater inhabited by ill-bred "Spanish mulattos."[5]

Lord Beresford's reign as governor of Buenos Aires lasted a mere three weeks, he was forced to surrender in 12 August 1806. Nonetheless Beresford had managed to declare free trade, and quite unintentionally—as his later career would show— his presence there

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[2] Lozier Almazán, *Beresford William Carr: Governor of Buenos Aires*, 137.
[3] Ibid., 139.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., 188.

incited the local populace to become highly politicized. Some Argentine historians, such as Adolfo Carranza, believed the origins of Argentine nationalism lay in the confidence thus gained in overcoming Beresford and his British forces.[6] For the ragtag and somnambulistic Argentine forces, whose chief task before the invasion consisted of breaking up bar brawls, had now handily defeated the most powerful nation in the world, Britain. And, as the painting proudly recalls, in a show of old world refinement and magnanimity, a newly confident Argentina refused to subject her vanquished foe to any further humiliation by permitting him to keep his sword. What was before a provincial backwater of the crumbling Spanish empire was now a supremely self-confident and proud nation, or at least that is how some historians have presented it. But what of the man who triggered this "*La Reconquista*" sentiment so lauded as the unwitting catalyst for Argentine independence, Lord Beresford? Without explicit orders from London, he had sacked Buenos Aires, installed himself as governor, and declared free trade. What of his fate? What propelled this rash man whose dogged determination chafed a number of divisive populations to a point at which their antipathy towards him helped them to coalesce into tightly bound parties? What are the lasting legacies of Lord Beresford's career? It is the purpose of this paper to provide the reader with answers to these difficult questions, with particular emphasis on Beresford's later years in Portugal. By doing so, the author hopes to reveal the dramatic complexity as well as the comical paradoxes of Lord Beresford's era. For Beresford lived at a time when the bourgeois class and their activists demanded their pound of flesh and got it. For now let the reader take solace in the fact that Beresford evaded his Argentine captors. Breaking his parole—which he would later fervently deny—Beresford fled to England.

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[6] Adolfo Carranza letter to the National Defense Commission and Reconquest of Buenos Aires, 11/8/1899 Archive of Museo Histórico Nacional.

A description of Beresford's foray in Buenos Aires in 1806-1807 serves not only to display Beresford's character, but it also helps provide a useful map that can be used to navigate the rest of this paper. For a pattern, which would persist throughout Lord Beresford's career in Portugal, is discernible in the episode described above.

Beresford had a voracious appetite for royally dispensed privilege. He was a man who can be described as stout of build, but slender of intellect. For a minor aristocrat, such as he, the avenue to his coveted privileges, and subsequent personal glorification, was through military service. Like his friend the Duke of Wellington, Beresford came from the Protestant Anglo-Irish aristocracy. Again like Wellington, Beresford, thanks to noble birth and family ties and rash status-raising gambles, as well as meritorious service, rapidly ascended to the heights of society's hierarchy. Already in 1806, Beresford was in a position to take risks of the kind he would later repeat in Portugal a number of times; and here is where the pattern, to be repeated in Portugal, began. *Radix malorum est cupiditas*; indeed greed is the root of all evil! However in Beresford's case his brand of mischief and failure was not sufficiently damaging to warrant an exile. After the debacle in Buenos Aires, Beresford instead of licking his wounds immediately got to work and on his way home compiled an exhaustively long report on the political and social conditions in Argentina. His labors made him from the point of view of policy makers at Westminster the "man to be consulted on South-American political and military matters."[7] Thus Beresford's sojourn in Buenos Aires was not a complete failure, because he was still a useful tool for the king and his ministers. Indeed Beresford was kept in the fold and remained a candidate for 10 Downing Street's dirty work. In the coming years, luckily for Beresford, Europe would be embroiled in continental war, which would provide opportunities galore for Britain's aristocratic military

[7] Lozier Almazán, *Beresford William Carr: Governor of Buenos Aires*, 191.

elite. Like any empire faced with increasingly greedy barbarians—in this case anti-privilege liberals— Britain leaned heavily on its aristocratic military elite. Accordingly, Lord Beresford, who in peaceful times would have likely been a non-factor in politics, was showered with land grants, titles, and stipends.[8] For his part he was happy to serve any privilege dispensing government in whatever capacity—whether it was political or martial in spirit. Like Wellington, Beresford was a defender of the *ancien regime* (little wonder then that Beresford would later join Wellington's Tory government) and by defending it feverishly he was at the same time trying to acquire the privileges that his conservative political philosophy and self-interest led him to protect. Thus in Portugal during the 1820s, just as in Buenos Aires in 1806, Beresford saw an opportunity to improve his social status, took it, failed, and again rather Houdini-like managed to save face. Beresford was the typical aristocrat of his era, socially self-conscious, unfriendly to change, ambitious, and vain.

Lord Beresford would later be handsomely compensated (£ 2,000 annual stipend), entitled (1st Viscount and later Governor of Jersey, 1st Marquês of Campo Mayor, and the Marshal of Portugal), and lavishly decorated (Knight Grand Cross and Order of the Bath, to name a few) for his efforts during the Napoleonic wars. His transformation of the disorganized Portuguese army into a sound one was no small task. It was not uncommon—though somewhat patronizing—to describe the Portuguese army as the worst kind of "rabble" in the days before Beresford's reordering of it, starting in 1809. Though like any task that involved the military forces, it required money and political maneuvering and lots of both. Thanks to his title of marshal of the Portuguese army, his close relationship with the absent Portuguese King João VI[9], and his creation of a ruling apparatus—complete with

[8] Lord Beresford was notorious for his harsh treatment of his Catholic tenants.

spies— Beresford was able to pull the strings of government to a point where his power was equal to—or perhaps greater than—than that of the Regency (the government left to rule in João VI's stead). Indeed Beresford has been described as the King of Portugal by Portuguese and Englishmen alike.

King, despot, and or non-political general, it makes not much difference. The fact remains that Beresford put financial strains (army expenditures) on a country that was struggling to fill its coffers, let alone pay army salaries. The war had destroyed Portugal's agriculture and the scorched earth tactics of Napoleon and Wellington had devastated the countryside. Trade with Brazil had been reduced to an anemic trickle as a result of the movement of the Portuguese court to Rio de Janeiro and the subsequent opening of Brazil's ports to world commerce. The signing of the 1810 trade treaty with Britain further damaged Portuguese trade, and all this left little money for the repair of dams and other measures to relieve the struggling peasantry. The financial constraints of post-war Portugal weighed heavily on commoners and aristocrats alike.[10] To even the most subdued of Portuguese lotus-eaters, revolution seemed apparent.

Beresford, always well informed, was aware of the discontent and frustration in Portugal towards himself— for no country enjoys foreign occupation— as well as the general atmosphere of poverty and corruption. Thus he urgently set sail (in the year 1820) for Brazil in hopes of convincing the court in exile to return to Portugal and if they should refuse, grant him the authority and money to snuff out any dissent. But Beresford's entreaty

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[9] For simplicity's sake, João will be referred to as King João, although he was not crowned until 1816 after the death of his mother, Queen Maria "the mad" of Portugal. His title, before his death, was prince regent, but as his mother was mentally unfit to rule he was a king all but in name, and certainly had the duties of one.

[10] The 1810 trade treaty was formulated shortly after João VI's arrival in Brazil. As recompense for escorting the king and his court across the Atlantic, England was granted most favored nation status in Brazil and also enjoyed lower tariffs than Portuguese traders. Thus England's cheaper and higher quality products easily flooded the Brazilian market and forced out Portuguese traders. This caused great resentment in Portugal.

fell on deaf ears, for João VI had grown accustomed to the tropical pleasures, and perhaps even more to the safe haven that Brazil provided from war, Jacobins, liberals, [11] freemasons, and all the other bogeymen of the day. While these two men, an ocean away, calmly discussed the potential outcomes of returning to Portugal, events in that kingdom rendered their discourse moot. Revolution had broken out in Oporto in the early part of 1820 and quickly spread to Lisbon. What had started out as a revolt led by unpaid low ranking army officers had quickly morphed into a revolution whose main demands were four-fold: an end to foreign occupation; reinstituting the mercantilist system of trade with Brazil; a liberal constitution; and lastly the immediate return of the king and his court. Not surprisingly, Beresford's reception in Portugal was anything but warm. He was not allowed to disembark from his ship in the Tagus and was informed by the Provisional Junta that he and all his British officers (Beresford's power base) were to be expelled from Portugal because the men of the Junta were intent on recovering the nation's "happiness." Beresford angrily warned them that "all Europe shall know of this offence . . . especially England," and England would "demand compliance with ancient treaties." Apparently the Junta was not sufficiently spooked by talk of "ancient treaties" and promptly ordered Beresford to go back to England or else.[12] Thus, like any sensible man, he eschewed conflict and sailed on to England where he received yet another hero's welcome and enjoyed new perquisites such as an invitation to the portly Prince of Wales's morning levée. To most observers it seemed that Beresford's career in Portugal was over. He was, at age fifty three, no longer a young man on the make but an established aristocrat. But the turbulence of the era afforded him still more scope for his ambitions, and he was a remarkably persistent and meddlesome individual.

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[11] The term liberal hereafter will be used as an umbrella term, in that the author will use it to encompass any group that sought to decrease the privileges enjoyed by Europe's nobles.
[12] Lozier Almazán, *Beresford William Carr: Governor of Buenos Aires*, 230.

In 1820 liberal forces in Portugal had led—or forced depending on one's point of view—the country into a quixotic quest for the installation of a liberal constitutional government. In post-Congress of Vienna Europe, this was a bold and precarious move, for Europe's great monarchs were determined to forcibly repress any liberal movements. Ironically, in their labors to censure any liberal movements, the monarchs emboldened some liberal fence-sitters to step up their efforts to once and for all abolish the *ancien regime.* Thus the 1820s in Portugal, and in Europe as a whole, was a dramatic decade in which the characters—for characters abounded during this fascinating era— of the opposing philosophies (absolute monarchy vs. liberal government) locked horns several times. In other words, during the 1820s Portugal became Europe's arena in which the pugilists of absolute monarchy slugged it out with the zealots of liberal constitutionalism. Lord Beresford, for his part, rued the day when the very enemies (radical liberals) of Britain's great Peninsular War would dissolve the bulwark he had attempted to build against anti-monarchical activitists in Portugal. Lord Beresford did all he could to make sure that the "all the worst democrats" would not gain a foothold in Portugal—the very country that Beresford was famous for defending against subversive ideologies such as liberal constitutionalism or even worse, democracy! Beresford wanted order in Portugal no matter what the cost.

Fueled by his dual status as an illegitimate and middle child, Lord Beresford actively sought to raise his social standing by taking advantage of any opportunity that presented itself. In Portugal during the 1820s, thanks to a lack of effective central authority, fractious infighting, and foreign pressure, there was a vacuum in which Beresford could conduct his ambitious political agenda, and thereby gain the prestige he coveted. Supporting him in his endeavors were Britain's political leaders, and his powerful friend and patron the Duke of

Wellington, most of whom considered Beresford to be the authority on Portuguese happenings.[13] (Beresford's relations with Britain's government and Wellington were complex, and merit further exploration later in this paper.)

Nevertheless, Beresford had the necessary support to conduct his mischief in Portugal during the 1820s. What sort of mischief? After the Vilafrancada coup in which King João VI was reinstalled as absolute monarch (27 May 1823), Portugal was deeply divided between those (a majority of urban upper middle class) who supported some sort of liberal anti-clerical government and those (mostly peasants) who wished for a return to the days of a strong crown and church. Thus post-1823 Portugal can be described as being split between these two groups, though many splinter groups did exist among the liberals. Lord Beresford, from his haunt in Britain, must have rejoiced, for he now would be useful again and could thus raise his political standing at home.

After the death of João VI on 10 March 1826, and the resulting tussle for control over Portugal, the Infanta D. Isabel Maria found herself as acting Regent of Portugal. In this role she was expected to execute the tenets of the controversial constitution that her brother, Pedro I emperor of Brazil and rightful heir to the crown of Portugal, had written for Portugal. Threatened by her absolutist brother Dom Miguel and her conniving mother Queen Carlota Joaquina, both of whom despised all things liberal, Isabel realized her army could not withstand an invasion led by Miguel and his troops. Thus, against the wishes of her liberal supporters, she invited Lord Beresford to reorder the army. Just as in 1806, when Beresford had sacked Buenos Aires on his own accord, his grasp of Britain's foreign policy might be characterized as follows: "My government prefers a stable and friendly regime in Portugal, but cannot forcibly implant one, for our intrusion there would upset the other

[13] Indeed when Canning wrote to King George IV on Portuguese affairs, he often assured the king that Beresford had validated the news.

powers of Europe. Seeing as how I possess the necessary military contacts in Portugal to sway that military into backing Dom Miguel and his brand of absolutism, might I go down to Lisbon and see what I can do about it?" Thus sensing another opportunity to up his status in both Portugal and for the British government, which at least ostensibly espoused a policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, Beresford leapt at it.

Though Beresford was invited by the constitutional government to stabilize their army, he had other plans. Immediately upon reaching Portugal, he commenced his efforts to buttress the opposition (the absolutist party). Although he believed he was in accord with the tacit wishes of the British government, there were some in Britain—liberals and Whigs—who decried Beresford's seeming treachery. His calculations proved faulty. Furthermore, liberals there quickly checked his efforts in the war department. To be sure, his verbal and material support for the absolutist faction did indeed invigorate that party. But this riled up the liberals, thereby nullifying any rallying effects he had on the absolutists. Moreover, when Beresford tried to regain his old military post as *General Junto ao Real Pessoa*—for Beresford was well aware that the army was the key arbitrator in Portuguese politics—he was quickly frustrated by the now enlivened liberals in the war department. Beresford's efforts in Portugal backfired on him. Instead of eliminating party hostilities he increased them, and the result was the Liberal Wars (1828-1834). Instead of winning Britain a loyal ally, he further complicated matters in Portugal. This led to further annoyances for the occupants of 10 Downing Street as well as for the gentlemen in Parliament. Beresford also misjudged the temper of Britain's politics. He assumed most would favor Miguel's brand of absolutism and supposed few would support a seemingly ephemeral government run by, in his opinion, "all the worst democrats of 1820." His half-baked presumptions came back to haunt him. After his blunders in Portugal, newspapers and politicians alike preyed on him. *The Times* accused

Beresford of arbitrarily wielding "irresponsible power" which, they claimed, he had used to aid "the usurper's [Dom Miguel's] court."[14] His political cohorts did not spare Beresford either; he was mercilessly criticized by liberal politicians such as F.J. Lamb and A.G. Stapleton. Using the medium of anonymous pamphlets, the duo sought to undermine the now Prime Minister, Wellington and his crony Beresford. Primarily they focused their inquiry on Wellington's laissez-faire attitude towards Beresford's devious conduct while in Portugal. Just as the poets Wordsworth and Lord Byron had complained about the British government's refusal to support nascent liberal constitutional governments during the Convention of Cintra (1808), Lamb and Stapleton blamed Beresford and Wellington for destroying the blossom of revolution in Portugal. Ultimately, they concluded, Portugal's misfortunes and Britain's resulting embarrassment lay with Wellington's failure to check "his most subservient of creatures," Beresford.[15]

Beresford was not well liked by his contemporaries, and the few historians who have dealt with him seem to have taken the same dim view of Beresford and his legacy. It is perhaps too easy to denounce him as a dull-witted, uneducated, "low looking ruffian, with damned bad manners" who had no business in meddling in Portuguese affairs.[16] Indeed that would be a simple yet amusing task, but it would not provide an understanding of this peculiar individual and his legacy. To assess a dubious character like Beresford accurately, we must take an empathetic approach. By searching out the causes of Beresford's anxieties, we will arrive at the source of his frustrations, and thus gain a better understanding of British policy towards Portugal and Portuguese politics during the 1820s. Moreover, after we have

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[14] *The Times* Tuesday, Jan 30, 1827; pg. 2; Issue 13189; col A.
[15] Frederick James Lamb Melbourne, *Observations on the Papers Lately Submitted to Parliament upon the Subject of the Affairs of Portugal.* (London: E. Bull, 1830), 30.
[16] M. D. D. Newitt and Martin Robson, *Lord Beresford and British Intervention in Portugal, 1807-1820* (Lisboa, Portugal: Impr. de Ciências Sociais, 2004), 14.

gone down the rabbit hole of Beresford's career, we may be surprised to discover how little power Beresford actually possessed in Portugal and be faced with the more perplexing problem of the paternal nature of the relationship between Beresford and Wellington. So let us then, like good sleuthing historians, start with the beginning: Beresford's birth.

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There is only one certainty regarding William Carr Beresford's birth: the date. He was born on 2 October 1768. It can be reasonably assumed that Lord Beresford was born somewhere on the southern coast of Ireland in Waterford County. However, that assumption is based on the belief that his father was the first marquess of Waterford, George de la Poer Beresford, who was the governor of the county at the time of Beresford's birth. Even more mysterious is the identity of Lord Beresford's mother because his father was not married at the time of his birth, nor was he married nine months preceding William's birth. Thus one can safely assume that Beresford was an illegitimate son, along with his brother Admiral Sir John Poo Beresford. Unfortunately for young William, the uncertainties surrounding his birth became fodder for idle gossiping noblemen and were used as a slight by the rivals he accumulated during his long career in the military and political realms. Beresford, like most people constantly bombarded by gossip, deeply resented it. Whenever he was criticized, whether by newspapers, historians, or colleagues, he felt it absolutely necessary to defend himself and make sure that his word was last. (Beresford's voluminous refutations, written in almost unintelligible prose, were, to his later delight, published to reach a wider audience.) In defending himself, the insecure Beresford inevitably became enmeshed in gossip circles and often based his decisions on the information thus gathered from his gossiping informants. Thus laid bare to the very worst of

human nature from the beginning of his days to the end of them, Beresford developed a taste for the intrigues and pitfalls of the gossiping realm. Indeed, the stress and excitement of creating and responding to intrigue became his life-blood. It is hard to discern whether his actions caused gossip, or were reactions to it. Whatever may be the case, it is clear that Beresford actively sought out fame. In his pursuit of glory, he was bold and obstinate, though at the same time fragile and vacillating. Indeed, Beresford's pride and pomposity is on full display in the several portraits of him. In one comical portrait, Beresford is shown grinning, telescope in hand, and towering over Lisbon.[17] Being an illegitimate son at the end of the eighteenth century was embarrassing, but was not necessarily a career killer. Beresford's dubious birth caused him to be vain and insecure, but it also ignited a passion in him to succeed—in the hope that his successes would overshadow his illegitimate origins.

"England expects every man will do his duty"; this duty, of which Admiral Nelson so famously spoke, equated to serving one's country devotedly and consistently, whether abroad or domestically. Britain's imperial status afforded men such as Beresford ample opportunities to distinguish themselves. Though Britain had lost most of her colonies in the Americas in a costly war, she was still, thanks to her navy and economic strength, the most powerful nation in the world.

With tentacles reaching the world over, an empire like Britain's needed constant – and often violent – maintenance. This is why Beresford, his brothers, and countless others were groomed for military careers. Without getting a real feel for his native Ireland, Beresford was shipped off to England for an education at schools in Catterick Bridge and York. Upon the completion of his rudimentary schooling, Beresford was sent to enroll in the

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[17] My thinking on this particular portrait of Beresford was influenced by a conversation with Beresford's soon to be biographer, Dr. Malyn Newitt.

Military School at Strasbourg in eastern France. Although he did little to distinguish himself during his brief tenure, he was quickly—due in part to his noble heritage—promoted and assigned to the sixth regiment of the Foot. He earned little or no distinction in his brief tenure there, but was quickly—due in part to his noble heritage—promoted and assigned to the sixth regiment of the Foot, destined for Nova Scotia in 1786. While in Canada Beresford did as most young men did away from home; he got into mischief with his friends. While out on a leisurely hunt, a wayward discharge from his hunting rifle obliterated his left eye. The freak accident, however, did not deter him nor retard his nascent career, though it provided material for his later, rather superficial, opponents.

For a young man like Beresford perhaps even more demoralizing than the loss of his eye was the tedium and ennui of serving in post Treaties of Versailles (1783) Nova Scotia. Eastern Canada offered little scope for a young officer to distinguish himself, though deliverance would eventually come. After six years of chaperoning exiled American Tories (a portion of British loyalists resettled in Nova Scotia after the American Revolution) in frigid and windswept Nova Scotia, Beresford was promoted to captain and assigned to the 69th Foot in 1792. That same year his regiment was assigned to the British West Indies, with the task of repressing rum smuggling and suppressing a revolution like the one that had begun in Haiti in 1791. However events in Europe changed their course. Though the Haitian revolution terrified the British, with reports of roaming slave mobs beheading their white masters, the fear was mostly consigned to those with a vested interest in the colonies. Besides Europe had its own decapitations.

On an uncomfortably humid spring day (25 April 1792) in Paris, curious crowds flocked to the Place de Grève to behold the first use of a reportedly more humane execution tool than that of the old-fashioned breaking wheel, the guillotine. Its first victim was a petty

highwayman by the name of Nicolas Jacques Pelletier—an insignificant figure, but a portent nevertheless. For little less than a year later one of the designers of the blade was forced to test the caliber of his own craftsmanship firsthand; the revolutionary National Assembly of France beheaded King Louis XVI on 21 January 1793.[18] The execution of Louis XVI, unfortunately for France and later the world, was not sufficiently cathartic. Like the aftermath of most revolutions, France's bloody liberation from monarchial and ecclesiastical suzerainty was followed by a series of short, increasingly chaotic and violent, political regimes. Again like the people of many countries after a major revolution, France's populace proved especially receptive to the cant of thinly veiled tyrants with their ultimately failed endeavors to perfect humankind by means of ambitious and impossibly idealistic schemes of social and moral reform. Finally, a military coup brought the Corsican Napoleon Bonaparte to power for a ten-year reign (1804-1814), which restored domestic order while unleashing massive force against its enemies, meaning its neighbors.[19]

The protagonists of the French revolution, emboldened by the writings of some Enlightenment thinkers, frightened the "king with a large jaw," King George III of England,[20] and conservatives around Europe because they worried that French Jacobinism would stimulate rebellion in their own countries. Moreover those doctrines, which had been relatively harmless up till the American Revolution, were now the raison d'état for making war against Europe's nobility. Any talk in the factories or salons of that agitator Thomas Paine and his belief that human rights are endowed in us by nature rather than arbitrarily handed out by a monarch as privileges to a select few, was state treason (according to George III); and for Britain's monarch a traitor was anyone who did "not agree with" him.

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[18] Some have claimed that Louis XVI recommended a forty-five degree angle for the blade with a beveled edge.
[19] The United States was extremely fortunate to have a man of George Washington's virtue after their revolution, for he easily could have stayed in office as long as he pleased.
[20] Charles Dickens, *A Tale of Two Cities* (New York, NY: New American Library, 1963), 13.

And though he, George III, lacked the authority to have Paine or anybody else tried for treason his opinion is a revealing one. Falling under the sovereign's traitor category—most of Europe's monarchs had a similar criterion—were those who opposed living under hereditary Lords whose fount of power was endowed in them by the grace of God. (No wonder then that so many newly enriched non-nobles gravitated towards the doctrines promising equality and despised the seemingly antiquated doctrine of hereditary right.) His Majesty was not alone in his distrust of the revolutionaries of France. That reputable newspaper, *The Times* warned its readers that believers in the "Rights of Man" are nothing but "Cannibals" who "drink blood . . . .as the Cannibals in the wilds of America do." Worse yet they, the French Jacobins and "[Britain's] political savages" wanted to overthrow the long established social order. The headline of the same article accused the Jacobins, apparently biological warmongers as well, of a plot to spread the plague in Barcelona.[21] Who would save Britain and its citizens from these mostly self-made men, who spoke of an end to nobility and privilege, and denounced the Christian Church and its Supreme Governor King George III? It seemed frightfully obvious to most of Britain's aristocracy and a great many wealthy commoners as well that the flow of subversive ideas from France could easily make its way across the channel to Britain and infect the minds of the commoners with its traitorous dogma; therefore any importers of the fin-de-siècle articles of faith must be repressed at all costs, whether by words or violence.

Who better then to protect the *ancien regime* from the onslaught of Jacobinism and later Bonapartism than men like Lord Beresford, aristocrats who had especially good reasons to make sure that the guillotine never fell in London? For our unlikely hero was born into privilege, actively sought it, and as a soldier obeyed orders well. Most importantly he had

[21] *The Times* Friday, Sep 28, 1792; pg. 2; Issue 2424; col D.

neither taste for, nor could he grasp, the sardonic writings of Voltaire. Yet at this early stage—pre-Napoleon—there were neither dragons to slay nor a Medusa to behead. Europe's caves remained, for now, unoccupied. So let us then turn back to Beresford's adventures as an undistinguished petty officer with major aspirations.

After joining the 69th Foot, in 1792, he was sent to serve as a marine under the leadership of Admiral Samuel Hood on the 100 guns *Britannia.* This "first-rate" warship (meaning it had 100 or more guns) was one of only five such giant vessels in the Royal Navy in 1793, the year that Beresford took part in the famous Siege of Toulon.[22] The British, in support of the French royalists had stormed and held the major port at Toulon, but lost it in the same year to the Jacobins. At Toulon Beresford's side was pitted in battle against a green, yet brilliant, artillery captain, the young Napoleon Bonaparte. Though unsuccessful in holding the citadel, Beresford and his troops were able two set ablaze thirty-four ships before being forced out of the port. After Toulon, Beresford was promoted to major in recognition of his performances in Corsica and Toulon.[23] Then came a lull from the fighting in the Mediterranean. He earned leave in 1794 and returned to England.

In 1799, after being thwarted by a hurricane in his efforts to command a force in the West Indies, Beresford was sent to India to deal with the uncooperative colonials there. However, after having reached India in 1800, a frustrated Beresford learned that his friend Colonel Arthur Wellesley (later known as the Duke of Wellington) had already put down the Indian insurrectionists. Knowing that Wellesley had the necessary sway to assign him to the theatres of war where victory equaled fame, Beresford offered his services to his family

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[22] Gordon L. Teffeteller, "Beresford, William Carr, Viscount Beresford (1768–1854)," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, January 2011, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/2199 (accessed February 11, 2011).
[23] Lozier Almazán, *Beresford William Carr: Governor of Buenos Aires*, 23.

friend and fellow Anglo-Irishman. Wellesley "was pleased" by the show of allegiance.[24] Thus he was also promoted to the rank of Colonel, in part due to Wellesley's lobbying, and was added to the roster of officers to be sent to fight Napoleon in the deserts of Egypt. Although he was but was a minor player in Egypt, he benefited from the major victory. With victory came fame and for Beresford that meant advancement. He was promoted to brigadier-general in 1803.

In hopes of placating Napoleonic France in what George III called an experimental peace, Britain ceded the Cape of Good Hope to the Batavian Republic (Napoleon's Dutch puppet regime) as a part of the Treaty of Amiens (1802). However after having defeated Napoleon in Egypt, Britain felt that it could reassert its imperial dominance and reclaim its colony on the lonely, shark infested, southern tip of Africa. In January 1806, a British force that included Beresford sacked the strategically important port of Cape Town. And from there, perhaps now feeling invincible, Beresford and his commanding officer Sir Home Popham (who was under the influence of the infamous South American revolutionary, Francisco de Miranda) devised the clumsy, and rather quixotic, capture of Buenos Aires.

Although there might have been strategic and trade benefits of capturing Buenos Aires and Cape Town, their seizures were principally a show of force. England felt threatened by Napoleon and his growing empire. By tampering with the New World—with its vast resources and potential for trade from which Napoleon might be effectually cut off —Britain hoped to intimidate Napoleon. Yet Napoleon was unfazed by England's flexing of its muscles.

Instead of ordering a panicked rush to fortify the New World, Napoleon gleefully conquered Western Europe. Though much to his dismay, because his navy was in shambles

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[24] Ibid., 25.

after the Battle of Trafalgar (1805), an invasion of England proved impossible. In recognition of his weakness on the seas, Napoleon instead cleverly sought to starve Britain into submission by assaulting their economy—hence his Continental Blockade of Britain and the Berlin Decree (21 November 1806). The Berlin Decree put an embargo on all British goods; in other words, any country under Napoleon's influence could not buy British goods. The most important piece of Napoleon's Continental blockade was Portugal, a key point of departure for any European blockade.[25] Its major ports, Lisbon and Oporto, were bustling trade centers. Thus Napoleon, eschewing any manners whatsoever, ruthlessly pursued his goal and with a barrage of threats and curt ultimata harassed the timid Portuguese court at Queluz. With the help of his Spanish sycophant Godoy[26] and his brother Joseph Bonaparte[27]—Godoy as the leader of Spain followed a policy of "servile acquiescence" towards France—Napoleon threatened Portugal with invasion from Spain.[28] If invasion was the stick, Napoleon offered the Portuguese a carrot: if they arrested all Englishman in Portugal, seized their property, and blocked all British goods from coming into her ports, he would spare her destruction by his *Grande Armée.*

The potential loss of Britain's "ancient ally" to Napoleon was no light matter, and the British sought vigorously to win Portugal to their side. Britain had long enjoyed trade privileges in Portugal, and the alliance dated back at least to the marriage of the Portuguese Princess Catherine of Braganza to England's Charles II in 1662. Moreover the raw materials (timber, metals, minerals) of Portugal's colony, Brazil, were absolutely essential to the

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[25] In his exile on the utterly isolated island, St. Helena, Napoleon blamed his defeat on his failure to keep Portugal. Napoleon Bonaparte, *Memorial de Sainte-Helene*, vol. 1 (Paris: Garnier Fretes, 1961), 609.
[26] King Charles IV had handed the government over to Manuel de Godoy. Some scholars believe that Godoy had a sexual relationship with Queen Maria Louisa of Spain, and thanks to the caliber of their relationship, the adulterous queen had him appointed to the post of prime minister.
[27] After the war Joseph fled to the United States. He eventually settled in New Jersey and, thanks to the sale of plundered Spanish crown jewels, lived quite comfortably there.
[28] Marcus Cheke, *Carlota Joaquina: Queen of Portugal* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1947), 14.

stability of England's mammoth manufactured goods industry. Indeed there was a sizable community of British traders living in Portugal during this period. And quite apart from the strategic location of Portugal's ports, Englishman absolutely abhorred the thought of losing their access to "port" (Portuguese fortified wine) to the throats of Napoleon and his toadies. Therefore Britain took a proactive approach towards the situation in Portugal and thus urgently implored the Portuguese court to remove themselves to the relatively safe confines of Brazil. In that way England's real interests in Portugal would be preserved—Brazilian raw materials—and if Napoleon continued to block their goods in Europe they were quite happy to sell them across the Atlantic where Napoleon, navy-less, had no sway whatsoever.

However, before the British could count on selling their goods in Brazil's markets, they first had to be assured that the sovereign of Portugal would side with them rather than becoming a puppet of Napoleon. If King João VI were deprived of his throne (the fate many of his European counterparts had already suffered) the British faced the risk of losing a large portion of the New World market. Thus it was imperative for the British to win the popularity contest between themselves and the French.

Portugal, as she so often was in political matters, was split between two informal parties: those who wished to work with the French, by paying, in their eyes, the benevolent overlord Napoleon's demand for imperial tribute; the other party, the supporters of the connection with Britain, despised acquiescence and instead preferred resistance.[29] The royal family was also split along these lines. João VI, as his character will show, was tottering towards apathy as he wavered back and forth between the two parties. It seemed that João believed the whole matter would simply blow over, thereby enabling him to avoid alienating either party. He instead made concessions to both and stalled all the while. His wife Queen

[29] Ibid., 16.

Carlota Joaquina, who absolutely hated the British for no apparent reason at all, actively tried to avoid the shores of Brazil. She despised the thought of becoming a colonial queen, for she would be cut off from her power base in Spain—her parents were the king and queen of Spain—and thus would be severely hindered in her treasonous political ploys against her husband. Fearful of that prospect, Carlota sent a stream of letters to her parents' court in Spain. Always one for melodrama she begged her parents to save her from the "claws of the lions."[30] Nevertheless, Carlota's leverage in the situation, what little she had, was not powerful enough to negate what her shocked husband saw in the Paris *Moniteur* on the afternoon of 13 October 1807. After having read that the "House of Braganza had ceased to reign in Europe," João, who had been oscillating between both parties, immediately decided to side with the British and move his court to Brazil.[31] João's decision came not a moment too soon. France's legions, under General Junot, were already moving across the Spanish plains in a pincer motion from the north and the south and were converging on Lisbon with murderous momentum.

Meanwhile, unsure of the outcome in Portugal, Britain sent a fleet of ships to the mouth of the Tagus; the ships, weighing anchor just outside Lisbon, were ready to sack the Portuguese capitol. Once hearing the good news that João had decided to move the court to Brazil, the ships hurriedly prepared their hulls for the long journey to Portuguese America. As the sailors made their ships decent for royal occupation, Lisbon was in a frenzied state. Thousands of courtiers, and their attendants, hurriedly conveyed a dizzying mass of cargo (including religious relics, the crown jewels, the state archives, and all the luxury items befitting a monarch) and people (courtiers, ministers, and the royal family) to the awaiting ships. Indeed the decision to flee came not a moment too soon because Junot's troops

[30] Ibid., 19.
[31] Ibid., 21.

reached Lisbon just in time to see the flotilla slither its way down the River Tagus towards the Atlantic. After having watched the bizarre procession, Junot and his troops merrily proceeded to rape and pillage Lisbon.

Though João had already sided with the British, fled Portugal, and left a Regency to rule in his place, England still felt an occupation of the Portuguese wine-producing island of Madeira was necessary. The British government, aware of Beresford's administrative capabilities, appointed him to the post of governor of Madeira; now a major-general, he took up his post on Christmas 1807. As governor Beresford was cautious not to disrupt the natural economic and social patterns of the island's life. However—though he was there but a short time, three months— he made a few fascinating tweaks. And aware that Britain was engaged in a tense contest with Napoleon, Beresford assured the anxious Madeirans that their private property would be protected (in contrast to Napoleon's policy of confiscating private property and wiping away privilege) and their freedom of religion upheld.

Beresford, always looking to increase British power abroad, noted that the Portuguese troops on the island were underpaid and led by undisciplined officers. These troops would be of little use if a French army invaded the island and were therefore worse than useless as an ally. Thus Beresford sought to reform the army—a feat that he would repeat in Portugal and become famous for— by cutting down the bloated officer corps and paying the regular troops higher wages.[32] Furthermore Beresford used a command apparatus composed of British officers to run the reformed army.

As he did in Buenos Aires in the year before, Beresford eliminated the restrictive trade barriers in Madeira. By abolishing tithes, tariffs, and monopolies and opening up the ports of Madeira to British merchants, Beresford sought to "liberalise trade and the

[32] Newitt and Robson, *Lord Beresford and British Intervention in Portugal*, 59.

movement of labor" for the benefit of British commerce.[33] For before the 1810 trade treaty (agreed upon by Portugal and England), there were several restrictions placed upon trade in Portugal and its dominions. For instance bullion was banned from export, direct trade with Portuguese colonies (including Brazil) was prohibited—unless one was Portuguese— and the crown held several monopolies.[34] Beresford's economic reforms did away with these privileges, although after his departure most of the tenets of the old order were reinstated.[35]

Beresford, as he had done after having escaped from Buenos Aires, took copious notes on the social, economic, and political situation of Madeira. Furthermore during his tenure in Madeira, Beresford became acquainted with the nature of Portuguese society, gained a basic understanding of the language, and more importantly he was able to diagnose a remedy for the ill-ordered army. England especially took notice of his successes in reordering Madeira's army.

It comes as no surprise that Beresford was capable of disciplining foreign armies based on British guidelines, because Beresford was of the self-seeking brood and as an ambitious soldier he understood the beneficial effects of order and structure. Thus in Portugal, Beresford, in his doggedly persistent way, managed to recapitulate the structure and discipline of the British military in which he had been achieving promotion after promotion. The British government saw Beresford as an unflinching reformer. Yet Beresford, at times, proved to be a most trying individual for his superiors in London. His constant letters asking for advice on every nicety that his ever curious and fussy mind detected must have been somewhat irking.

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[33] Ibid., 60.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid., 65.

While Beresford was conducting his surveys and subsequent reforms of Madeira, the British ambassador to Portugal, Viscount Strangford, was en route with João to Brazil. With great persistence, Strangford busied himself in the effort to reap a rich recompense for Britain's services as chaperone to the Portuguese court. His efforts proved fruitful because as soon as João touched the sun-soaked shores of Brazil, he declared free trade in Brazil. The opening of the ports resulted in a flood of higher quality and less expensive British manufactured goods. The influx of these goods led one jaded Brazilian merchant to the conclusion that "to live comfortably in Brazil it was necessary to first arrange to be born in England."[36]

The opening of the ports was a ringing success for Britain (though later it would prove disastrous for the Portuguese and tiresome for the British). Britain enjoyed all the best benefits of owning a colony (cheap raw material for its finished goods industry) without the hassle of having to police it. And for Beresford's part he was eager to ensure that a regime (the House of Braganza) friendly to British trade would continue to rule a large swath of the New World. Furthermore, when the opportunity came, he was equally keen to help the Portuguese expand their empire at the expense of the French-allied Spanish, with the knowledge that any territory thus conquered would be opened to free trade. This made him the patron saint of London's merchants.

However life was not all mangoes and rum on the other side of the Atlantic. With trade flowing away from Portugal and their king having abandoned them to their own fate, João's subjects back in Portugal increasingly grew frustrated with their situation. Their anger reached a boil in 1820, when the port town of Oporto erupted in revolt. The effects of the revolt, and the succession of revolts after it, caused some serious headaches for England's

[36] Cheke, *Carlota Joaquina: Queen of Portugal*, 32.

politicians. Worse yet, for the Portuguese, Brazil would later declare itself an independent kingdom (as a result of the condescending treatment it received from the 1820 constitutionalists).

On the war front, a comical event in Spain further propelled British momentum in their eventually victorious struggle against the Corsican Emperor. An opening for a British invasion of the strategically important Iberian Peninsula became apparent after a dispute between Carlos IV and his son Fernando VII turned ugly in March 1808. The quarrel began when Carlos IV, under pressure from several sources, abdicated in favor of his son the ill-bred Bourbon Fernando VII. To make matters worse Carlos, immediately after having stepped down, attempted to regain his throne. Napoleon rather shark-like tasted blood in the water and invited the blundering Bourbon duo to Bayonne for mediation. Not surprisingly, at the end of the mediation Carlos IV found himself throne-less. Napoleon had forced him to abdicate in favor of himself, and for good measure had Fernando VII imprisoned for six years in the magnificent villa, Château de Valençay. Napoleon then placed his brother Joseph Bonaparte, now Joseph I of Spain, on the throne of Spain. The masses of Spain, loathing further acquiescence, had had quite enough of Napoleon's shenanigans. A Junta was established in Seville; there representatives of the Cortes drew up a constitution very similar to that of America's 1776 and France's 1791 constitutions. The constitution of 1812—which the Portuguese constitutionalists of 1820 would later draw heavily upon—was of the formulaic revolutionary brood; it called for the powers of government to lie entirely with the people, gave the people rights to arbitrate succession matters, and most importantly required that no treaties henceforth could be passed without popular consent.[37] This constitution, however, would remain a dead letter as long as Spain continued to be ruled by the French

[37] Hispaniae Philos, *The Political Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy: Proclaimed in Cadiz, 19th March, 1812.* (London: J. Souter, 1813).

usurpers. In the meantime, the Asturian Junta wrote the British government (25 May 1808) and asked for urgent assistance in throwing off their French yoke.[38]

Much to Lord Beresford's dismay, the troops under Arthur Wellesley—after having learned of the Junta's entreaty—were redirected to Portugal rather than attempting to re-conquer Argentina as Beresford had hoped they would. Instead Wellesley and Beresford were destined to make names for themselves on the peninsula; they also solidified their relationship during the peninsula years. Wellesley's service in Iberia would earn him his iconic title, The Duke of Wellington. In Beresford's case, it was the beginning of a life long tempestuous bond between him and his rogue mistress, Portugal.

British troops quickly expelled the French from Portugal, resulting in the much maligned Convention of Cintra (30 August 1808). The Convention allowed the French to flee, under the protection of the British, with all their plunder from Portugal's monasteries, palaces, libraries, and museums.[39] England's intellectuals, who had a very different concept of the war than that of the government's, were disgusted by the proceedings at Cintra. Among those disheartened by the convention were England's poet laureate and a leader of the Romantic school of poetry William Wordsworth and that sardonic wit Lord Byron. As this passage will show Wordsworth, perhaps channeling that peculiar Protestant need for spontaneity and reform, was deeply distressed by England's inability to see what the Peninsular War truly was. For him the war was a moral crusade, fueled by a fragile evolution of universal reason, against Europe's oppressive and antiquated institutions, church and monarchy:

> Such issue would have been a heavy calamity at any time; but now, when we ought to have risen above ourselves, and if possible to have been foremost in the strife of honour and magnanimity; now, when a new-born power [Spain's Junta, or a

[38] Lozier Almazán, *Beresford William Carr: Governor of Buenos Aires*, 201.

[39] The booty the French took with them can still be viewed today in many of France's magnificent museums.

> revolutionary coalition between Portugal and Spain] had been arrayed against the Tyrant [Napoleon], the only one which ever offered a glimpse of the sane mind, the power of popular resistance rising out of universal reason, and from the heart of human nature,—and by a peculiar providence disembarrassed from the imbecility, the cowardice, and the intrigues of a worn-out government—that at this time we, the most favoured nation upon earth, should have acted as if it had been our aim to level to the ground by one blow this long-wished-for spirit, whose birth we had so joyfully hailed, and by which even our own glory, our safety, our existence, were to be maintained; this was verily a surpassing affliction to every man who had a feeling of life beyond his meanest concerns![40]

Lord Byron, less frustrated than Wordsworth, but upset nonetheless, was also ashamed of, what seemed England's treacherous conduct towards their blossoming allies in Iberia. In his endlessly imaginative narrative poem, *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage,* Byron took it upon himself to express the sorrow and frustration of Britain's intellectuals, lamenting in soliloquized form, "And ever since that martial synod met, Britannia sickens, Cintra! at thy name."[41] Though these two men, and countless other British artists and intellectuals, bemoaned England's reluctance to support a government based on reason, in political terms it was nonetheless an important victory for the British. After Cintra, they possessed a stable continental base upon which they could point their forces in the direction of Napoleon's capital, beyond the snow-capped Pyrenees, Paris.

The Peninsular War

In 1809 the Portuguese Regency, a body ruling in João's stead, formally requested that a British officer be assigned to the large task of reordering the Portuguese army. Since Beresford had a rudimentary grasp of Portuguese, was endorsed by Wellington, and had already shown his aptitude in dealing with Portuguese troops on Madeira, he was the natural

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[40] William Wordsworth and Albert Venn Dicey, *Tract on the Convention of Cintra (published 1809)* (London: Humphrey Milford, 1915), 51.
[41] George Gordon Byron, *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage* (Paris, 1845), 21

choice. When the summons was extended to Beresford, he eagerly accepted the commission. He was then promoted to lieutenant-general and given the handsome title, the Marshal of Portugal.

The Portuguese army was in a "most wretched state" when Beresford took command of it in 1809; he certainly faced a formidable task in transforming a long neglected army into a functional one.[42] He was not helped by the fact that he lacked wholehearted support from either the Regency (who preferred to laud native achievement and blame any failure on the British) or the British government, which was more concerned with its own army. Nevertheless Beresford painstakingly labored to instill discipline, pride, and his version of proper military decorum into the derelict army.

No detail escaped Beresford in his campaign to change the martial culture of Portugal. For example, he went so far as to flog soldiers who removed brass buttons from their uniforms to stop the practice of some soldiers who hammered their buttons down and passed them off as coins.[43] Once disciplined, Portuguese soldiers were indoctrinated with Beresford's interpretation of European politics and their place within them. This was necessary because the troops had to be cognizant of what they were going into the killing field for. To effect this undertaking, Beresford addressed his soldiers frequently via his "orders of the day."[44]

Although Beresford is famous for his tenacious and often unmannerly technique in reordering the Portuguese army, he actually delegated most of the organization and

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[42] Benjamin D'Urban and Izac Jozua Rousseau, *The Peninsular Journal of Major-general Sir Benjamin D'Urban... 1808-1817* (London, New York [: Longmans and Green 1930), 60.
[43] Gordon L. Teffeteller, "Beresford, William Carr, Viscount Beresford (1768–1854)," in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison (Oxford: OUP, 2004); online ed., ed. Lawrence Goldman, January 2011, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/2199 (accessed February 13, 2011).
[44] Newitt and Robson, *Lord Beresford and British Intervention in Portugal*, 91.

disciplinary practices to his retinue of British officers.[45] This is not to say, Beresford, was not a hands-on Marshal—he was—it is rather that politics took up most of his time. Portuguese society, after the king's departure to Brazil in 1807, was decentralized and subjected to the whims of the Regency; moreover a portion of the nobility had raised private armies. It was that sector of the nobility that Beresford had to court in order to make headway in his effort to establish a disciplined, unified and synchronized Portuguese army. Thus Beresford needed the cooperation of the quasi-warlords of Portugal and the intransigent and "imbecile" Regency.[46]

The journal of Benjamin D'Urban, Beresford's quarter-master-general, provides insights into the frustrating obstacles that that the British faced in wartime Portugal. For example, the British government, he complained, was unwilling to meet Beresford's quota for soldiers, supplies, and weapons.[47] Moreover the regents, thanks to their corruption and "imbecility," had driven Portugal to "poverty," according to D' Urban, resulting in "half-starved" troops.[48] As for the stubborn quasi-warlords, D' Urban described Beresford's close contact with them. Though D' Urban, as did Wellington, deplored the "Marshal's" cordial relations with the "perfect charlatans" of the Portuguese nobility, he deemed them a necessary evil.[49]

During the war, due to the intricacies of his assignment, Beresford was forced to work closely with the nobility of Portugal. While doing so he discovered that he could, at least to some extent, manipulate the capricious nobility for his own ends—or at least had the illusion that he had done so. The corollary was that Beresford became attracted to the notion

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[45] D'Urban and Rousseau, *The Peninsular Journal of D'Urban*, 53.
[46] Ibid., 346.
[47] Ibid., 58.
[48] Ibid., 82.
[49] Ibid., 57.

of ruling over them in some fashion, so that he could pursue whatever ends he pleased. To achieve this he would have to ingratiate himself with João VI after the war's end. If he could succeed in serving the Portuguese government, he might win acclaim in both England and Portugal and thereby satisfy his consuming lust for privilege and the power inherent in it.[50] Obviously, critics might object that Beresford was an opportunist rather than a patriot. It is hard to discern whether Beresford's actions were guided by the dual purpose of improving his station while at the same time improving Britain's as well, or that of greed unadulterated by any sort of altruism. One incident (the Infanta's offer in 1826), among others, however points to the latter. Beresford's ambition, during this episode, was such that he willingly forsook his status as an Englishman for the temptations of station, power, and privilege more easily gained in Portugal.

War's end

While Napoleon pined in exile after Waterloo, scheming no doubt for the bloody rebirth of his toppled empire, the Congress of Vienna cultivated an equally doubtful dream of imposing the old conservative sociopolitical order upon a vastly changed Europe; in general the ever growing middle class of Europe was reluctant to forego their newfound liberties in exchange for renewed second-class citizenship. Leading the charge against liberals and chairing the congress, was the Austrian Minister of State, Prince Klemens Von Metternich. Metternich and a coalition of Russia, Prussia, France, and Spain would later form the neo Holy Alliance, whose chief aim was to strike down any liberal movements in Europe and to restore the values of the *ancien régime* in Europe. As Metternich, Talleyrand, and the Duke of Wellington plotted the re-establishment of the old order and debated the

[50] From the English point of view, Beresford was stabilizing an ally and ensuring Portugal's loyalty.

allocation of territories, Beresford was in England enjoying the celebratory rituals of war's end.

Londoners celebrated their triumph over Bonaparte, who had made a mockery of hereditary rule. They, the true metropolis, had given the Emperor his deserved comeuppance and were proud of it.[51] Beresford reveled in the sunshine of victory, and the Londoners, for their part, were eager to join the celebration. Their sacrifices in the Temple of Mars were not in vain. Britain's royalty, feeling fortunate to avoid a war on their shores, showered veteran officers with privilege. Beresford was made a peer of the realm; as Baron of Dungarvan and Albuera, he and his next two successors would receive a lifetime stipend of £2000. And since he had not been in London long enough for such a ceremony since his exploits in Buenos Aires, the city's elite took the opportunity to honor their hero. Beresford was finally presented, by the Lord Mayor of London, with the ceremonial sword that he had won in 1806. At the ceremony Beresford hobnobbed with England's bluest of bloods. Among those who deigned to chat with him was the future king of England (George IV), the Prince of Wales, who personally thanked Beresford for his service. He was also offered the governorship of Gibraltar, which he rejected in favor of Portugal.[52] It would seem, now that Beresford was a part of the privileged elite, he would quit tempestuous Portugal and retire to a comfortable, yet sufficiently challenging, life as a peer. It is impossible to know why Beresford, at this point in his career, shunned a sedentary life in Britain and choose a chaotic one in Portugal. Perhaps he longed for the intrigue of Portugal, or believed his work was undone there, or maybe he simply preferred the balmy weather? However, his actions, and reactions during his tenure there seem to point to the former.

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[52] Newitt and Robson, *Lord Beresford and British Intervention in Portugal*, 145.

Part of the reason Beresford returned to Portugal is that he fully expected João to return in 1814. The British government also expected a royal return, and Beresford's brother, Admiral Sir John Poo Beresford, was sent to Rio de Janeiro to convey the court back to Lisbon. George Canning even journeyed to Lisbon to receive the returned court. Yet João preferred to rule from Brazil, and thus frustrated any attempts to entice him back to Lisbon. Beresford, more than likely upset, had after the war decided in favor of returning to Portugal in the belief that the returned court would fete him and express their gratitude monetarily. Yet Beresford, if he were discouraged, nevertheless continued to expect that the court would eventually return.

Wellington disdained the Portuguese Regency (then the ruling party in Portugal), and tried, but to no avail, to convince Beresford to stay out of Portuguese affairs and return to England. Aware that Beresford depended upon a group of British officers in Lisbon, Wellington warned Beresford that "it is impossible for the British government to maintain British officers" there indefinitely. In fact Wellington thought it nonsensical to subsidize the army of a country that had refused to "give service" on England's side of the war. He was clearly disgruntled by the Regency's refusal to fight on the British side at Waterloo in 1815. Nonetheless, Wellington sensed that Beresford would not heed his advice to "pitch them to the Devil, in the mode which will be most dignified for yourself." Assuming that Beresford would stick with a power struggle he thought he could win over the Regency, Wellington therefore reassured his friend that he would "hold a language here [in England] that will correspond with your actions in Portugal."[53] Wellington's intuition proved uncanny. Beresford stayed in England for only a few months before setting off to Lisbon.

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[53] Arthur Wellesley Wellington and John Gurwood, *The Dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, during His Various Campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, the Low Countries, and France.*, vol. 7 (London: Parker, Furnivall, and Parker, 1844), 231.

Once Beresford returned to Lisbon he set about solidifying his power there. To root out any dissent, he created an elaborate system of informers and spies.[54] Beresford was leery of the returning troops from Napoleon's defunct Portuguese force and the subversive doctrines he suspected the French had infused into them. Freemason clubs, and other secret societies, were popping up like mushrooms all over Lisbon. And perhaps even more threatening was the wavering stance of the Regency. Its members were deeply concerned about the country's dire financial straits. Portugal's economy was destroyed due to the scorched earth tactics used during the war, and to make matters worse trade had been cut down to a trickle after the 1810 trade treaty that allowed merchants to circumvent Portugal and trade directly with Brazil. Money was hard to raise, and Beresford's constant demand for higher military expenditures must have been insufferable. Unsurprisingly, both Beresford and D'Urban accused the Regency of purposefully trying to destroy the army. The Marshal, aware of the growing antipathy towards himself and the crown and all that it stood for, traveled to the tropical court of João VI in 1815. Beresford went there hoping to obtain a large sum for the payment of soldiers. He feared they would mutiny without it, and he also hoped to be handsomely rewarded for his service. The historian Almazán Lozier suggests that Beresford went to Rio de Janeiro with designs on sacking Montevideo under the auspices of the crown of Portugal and thus again causing trouble along the River Plate.[55]

Upon his arrival in Brazil, Beresford was treated with all the pomp and circumstance that the tropical capital, Rio de Janeiro, could muster. And it was Beresford's good fortune that João's mother, Queen Maria I, died on 20 March 1816 while he was in Brazil.[56] This enabled him to be among the first to swear fealty to the newly crowned king, and thus

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[54] Newitt and Robson, *Lord Beresford and British Intervention in Portugal*, 91.
[55] Lozier Almazán, *Beresford William Carr: Governor of Buenos Aires*, 225.
[56] As was stated before, João's official title was prince regent, but king all but in name, until his mother's death in 1816.

receive the benefits of such submission. In the days leading up to the coronation, Beresford led a military parade through the heart of Rio to celebrate the occasion.[57] The parade was both a show of martial grandeur and a demonstration of Beresford's handiwork. Queen Carlota Joaquina was one of many eager to employ the reformed army. Carlota and her husband had their hearts fixed—the first and last time they agreed on anything—on adding another port to their empire, and thus commissioned Beresford to sack the port of Montevideo. Beresford would have been happy to carry out this imperialist agenda, but he was stymied by orders to cease and desist from the British government. Viscount Strangford, the British ambassador to the Portuguese court, readily perceived the infinite annoyances to be incurred if Beresford, though under the orders of the king of Portugal, was allowed to capture a Spanish colony.[58] Nonetheless Beresford's mission to Brazil was a success. He returned to Lisbon with the title of *Marechal General Junto ao Real Pessoa*, a mandate to draft able-bodied men into the army, and money for the army's salaries. Though João was a somewhat benevolent king, he did not hand out privilege without an expectation of reciprocal service. The king had granted Beresford all that he wished with the tacit agreement that Beresford was to perform two duties: he was to keep order in Portugal and deflect any revolution; secondly, and most importantly, he would supply well-trained troops for the João's plans to add to his territory in South America.

After reaching Lisbon in September 1816, Beresford found Lisbon more mutinous than ever. The Portuguese, with the passage of each day, increasingly resented what seemed to them Beresford's imperious "reign" there. The Portuguese thought it ridiculous to pay the high salaries of British officers, who were given preferential treatment over their Portuguese counterparts. Moreover, because it increasingly seemed that their king was perfectly content

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[57] Lozier Almazán, *Beresford William Carr: Governor of Buenos Aires*, 226.
[58] Ibid., 227.

to rule from Brazil indefinitely, an intention implied in his declaration that Brazil was a kingdom on the same standing as Portugal in 1816. Portuguese of all classes began to look around for a more sympathetic sovereign who would save them from the indignity of becoming, in effect, a colony of Brazil. Making matters worse for João and Beresford, the Sebastianists[59] of Portugal had hailed Fernando VII[60] as their hero. (In all truth there were some similarities between Fernando VII and King Sebastian of Portugal, but as science had not yet devised reliable detections for inbreeding it is thus a matter of speculation and not worth discoursing on here.) The more prudent, annoyed by foreign rule, and most likely in financial straits (due to the loss of trade and devastation of war), also entertained the notion of joining the Spanish empire. After all, things could not be, for the Portuguese, any worse than they all ready were. Fernando VII did his part to heighten speculation, by at first rejecting his Portuguese niece bride, and then, quite agitated by João's repeated invasions of his colonies in South America, advancing his troops to the Portuguese frontier in 1816.[61]

Both D'Urban and Beresford, thanks to their network of informants, were aware of the machinations occurring around them. D'Urban, at once dejected and furious at the Regency's insubordination, which he long suspected, wrote in his journal in October 1816:

> As I predicted so it is;— The Regency commenced their machinations with the Marshal General's arrival,—and all is open war again.—They impede the execution of the Royal orders by every means in their Power ,—and even attempt, by every means in their power to make them unpalatable to the people, and certainly it is their fault if there has not been a rebellion. There is no doubt that the Nobility of Portugal

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[59] Sebastianism, the belief that a millenarian hero would lead Portugal to imperial greatness, is a part of the popular folklore of Portugal. The legend began when, King Sebastian of Portugal never returned from an ill-advised war in North Africa in 1578. He was almost certainly killed in battle and was never heard from again. Thus whenever times were bad in Portugal, expectations that their ill-fated king would return reasserted themselves. Further adding to Sebastianism's mystique, Nostradamus spoke of Sebastian in one of his famous prophecies.

[60] Fernando had been released from his prison in France by Napoleon in 1814. Upon being released, Fernando VII was forced to swear fealty to the revolutionary 1812 constitution, which had been created during his absence. But once in Spain, apparently unsatisfied with constitutional monarchy, he purged the constitutionalists and named himself absolute king of Spain.

> for the most part is disposed towards the House of Braganza, and— that they dislike the Reigning sovereign,—the Government [Regency] is composed of Imbeciles and dangerous Theorists. The former at once devoted to the Party of the Nobility and ruled by the latter,—and the General and Object and end of the whole to deliver Portugal into the iron yoke of Ferdinand 7th.[62]

The Regency was now being accused of sabotaging the army, so that when Fernando VII marched across the frontiers he would not meet any substantial resistance to his seizure of Portugal. It could be however that the accusations of treason were mistaken and were instead the paranoid assumptions of foreigners (Beresford and D'Urban) in a country hostile towards them. The threat of Spain was, however, very real, and with or without the Regency's connivance the army and fortifications of Portugal were vulnerable to attack.

Meanwhile Beresford acted like a man who intended to root himself deeply rooted in Portugal. First he confiscated the palatial home, Pateo da Saldanha, of the French sympathizer Conde d' Ega.[63] The property, by all accounts, was of the sprawling decadent sort. Indeed, it was the sort fit for a "well-bred Portugueze."[64] The Pateo da Saldanha, situated on one of the hills of Lisbon, had sweeping views of the Tagus and under Beresford's tutelage was furnished with a "pleasure ground" guarded by the long fragrant shadow of peach and orange trees—a veritable "city on the hill" for aspiring nobles.[65] Further adding to his pleasure, and at the same time immersing himself further into Portuguese culture, Beresford took on a mistress named Maria de la Luz Lemos.[66] His mistress however was the wife of his Portuguese military secretary, making for a bizarre arrangement in which all three lived on Beresford's property. And attesting to Beresford's ascendancy over the king, his housemates were conspicuously granted titles of nobility. The

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[62] D'Urban and Rousseau, *The Peninsular Journal of D'Urban*, 345.
[63] Newitt and Robson, *Lord Beresford and British Intervention in Portugal*, 145.
[64] Marianne Baillie, *Lisbon in the Years 1821, 1822, and 1823* (London: J. Murray, 1825), 142.
[65] Baillie, *Lisbon in the Years 1821, 1822, and 1823*, 123.
[66] She bore Beresford a son and two daughters.

king dubbed them the Visconde and Viscondessa de Juromenha. Gossips must have had a field day.[67]Aside from hearing rumors about his risqué liaisons, Beresford received word of an intrigue a bit more unsettling.

Beresford had been looking for an opportunity to showcase his powers, thereby affirming his position and silencing opponents. That chance came in the person of General Gomes Freire de Andrada. General Freire had served in Napoleon's Portuguese legion and had fought alongside Junot in the Netherlands. After the war he returned to Portugal, where he quickly became Grand Master of the Freemason chapter of Lisbon. He was just the sort of mark Beresford was looking for. Beresford, although believing Freire had little to do with any of the conspiracies to overthrow the Regency and himself, persecuted Friere on the count of high treason.[68] And although Beresford, not wanting to canonize any martyrs, had preferred to wait for an execution order from the king, the Regency hurriedly carried out the grisly spectacle on 8 October 1817. As the historian Dr. Newitt has pointed out, Beresford purposefully overstated the conspiracy to prove that he alone was the only impediment to an outbreak of "anarchy" in Portugal, thereby making him extremely valuable to both Britain and Portugal.[69] Yet neither did his unscrupulous Machiavellian tactic, nor his torrent of "orders of the day" silence the opposition's fervor; it instead increased it. Grudgingly aware of the circumstances of Portugal, amid a blistering barrage of anti-British posters, Beresford once again set off for Brazil (April 1820). But not before sending out a desperate order of the day. The order assured the troops, with tiresome platitudes, that "His Excellency [Beresford speaking in the third person]" has set forth to Brazil with the express desire of ameliorating the military's "state of pay and allowances," that were so far in arrear. The

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[67] Baillie, *Lisbon in the Years 1821, 1822, and 1823*, 123.
[68] Ibid., 99.
[69] Ibid.

order ended with a paternal reminder that "His Excellency" will not and cannot "cease to love" Portugal and its illustrious military.[70]

While Beresford, self-acclaimed champion of the soldier, traversed the high seas, the House of Bragança was divided and disordered. The capital of Rio de Janeiro was their royal war zone, and indeed each faction within the family had its own citadel. The principal reason for the family's friction, lay in the person of Queen Carlota Joaquina, sister of the King of Spain, Fernando VII. Carlota, could never quite accustom herself to the Portuguese rhythms of life at court. Instead she preferred to gallivant on horseback, full tilt, through her manicured gardens, or orchestrate an orgy, and when those activities failed to sate her, she would look longingly to the East, while picking out gipsy melodies on her Andalusian guitar.[71] But perhaps this is too romantic a picture of Carlota. She was, by all accounts, a woman hideous in manner and appearance and as a wife she constantly plotted to usurp her all too benign husband. At any rate the queen—the evil genius that she was—had, when not busy with offering herself as Queen of Spain or Empress of South America, split her family in half. She had raised her son Miguel in her image and had instilled in him a love for absolute monarchy and papal authority. These two were always at odds with the poor king, and indeed lived separately from João. Miguel, however, was not as domineering as his mother. Rather he was the puppet or proxy of the conspiring queen. Opposing these two, more ostrich-like than lion, was the helplessly indecisive king and his son Dom Pedro, as well as João's daughters.

Beresford happened unto this rather unhealthy domestic scene with news supremely disturbing to João's easily addled mind. He told of the machinations of freemasons and other

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[70] *The Times*, Monday, May 01, 1820; pg. 2; Issue 10921; col G.
[71] Cheke, *Carlota Joaquina*, 94.

dubious clubs; he told of armies unpaid, and, close to mutiny, willing to serve under the highest bidder. Would it be Fernando VII? He told of a corrupt Regency, collaborating with Spain; he told of the all the frightful talk of constitutions. Something, he warned, must be done and done fast. João, unwilling to leave his Brazilian citadel for the seemingly treacherous politics of Europe, threw all the honors and money he could muster at Beresford. And furthermore, to ensure compliance in Portugal, he sent the following decree to his, what he believed to be, still loyal subjects: "*And I command all authorities, both civil or military, and all my subjects of all classes,* as far as it lies in their power to assist the aforesaid Marshal-General."[72] Besides temporal power, Beresford had been given the more practical power to repair and construct new fortifications, build new garrisons, enact a draft, and given the authority to increase military expenditures. In essence João, like a frightened child wringing his blanket, told Beresford to make the monsters go away.

Word of Beresford's successes at the Brazilian court preceded his return. Rumors circulated that Beresford had been granted the ridiculously high, and royal sounding, title of "Duke of Portugal and the Algarves."[73] If the Portuguese could not deal with Beresford as a marshal, what were they to do now that he was borderline royal? However hatred of Beresford was not the sole cause of the coming revolution of 1820. There were several underlying causes: a poor economy that never recovered from the war; a jealously of Brazil and its booming trade; of wages in arrears for the military, and the continuing absence of their king. As one impassioned Portuguese observer put it:

> The country of the Albuquerques [Portugal] is not now a nation, nor is it even a colony, since its Prince fled to the Brazils; it is little better than the coast of Guinea! Its money and its men go to another hemisphere, and to shed the blood of its brothers, the Spaniards! In recompense for these sacrifices, what does European Portugal receive? The destruction of her industry and commerce, the domination of

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[72] *The Times* Wednesday, Nov 1, 1820; pg. 3; Issue 11078; col B.

[73] Rose Macaulay and L. C. Taylor, *They Went to Portugal Too* (Manchester: Carcanet, 1990), 212.

> Beresford, and the capture of its ships by the corsairs of Artigas in sights of the batteries of Lisbon! ! ![74]

Portugal was a powder keg and Beresford's chafing personality provided the proverbial spark. Thus when he arrived at one of Lisbon's quays, he was denied entry. Unsatisfied with the Junta's somewhat mocking excuse that they feared he would be "exposed to insult" which could lead to unwanted "complications" with Britain, Beresford assured them that he was of the masculine stock and was impervious to insult and "felt no apprehension." Moreover, he told them "that they need not fear a misunderstanding with Britain, as he would take full responsibility.[75] The Junta however was not buying whatever Beresford was selling and forwarded him an ultimatum: go home or you will be sorry. Naturally he was outraged, for he had property, children, friends, and a mistress in Portugal. Moreover, Lisbon had been his home for close to a decade when he was told to be on his way by the revolutionary Junta in April 1820. But cut off from wielding his army, he was helpless and was thus forced to leave. Defeated once more, Beresford set sail back to Britain. However, the Junta had not seen the last of the nettlesome foreigner—he would be back.

Meanwhile in Spain another revolution had broken out, leading some to the fearful conclusion that an Iberian Republic, with liberal Spain and Portugal as its revolutionary members, would be founded. Fernando VII had indeed crushed the revolutionary fever, upon his return to Spain from his French rococo prison in 1814. Yet his risky intention to reclaim the recently severed colonies (Montevideo, Bolivia, Mexico, and New Granada had seceded) gave life to new revolutionaries. A group of soldiers who considered deployment in South America a death sentence rebelled before they could be sent off. Though the

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[74] *The Times*, Saturday, Sep 16, 1820; pg. 2; Issue 11040; col G.
[75] *The Times* Wednesday, Nov 01, 1820; pg. 3; Issue 11078; col B.

revolution originated from the barracks—as so often happens—it was quickly, usurped by bourgeois intellectuals of the anti-clerical brood. Fernando VII again was taken prisoner, this time by his own people, and remained so until 1823 when the French, eager to snuff out anything that resembled their past revolution, invaded Spain and restored Fernando. Fernando later may have regretted his decision to call on the French for help, for after the French invasion he was forced to be a French puppet, once again.

1820s Portugal

The revolution that had begun in Oporto made quick work of the Regency in Lisbon. Though the coup was of the bloodless sort, a series of mass imprisonments ensued. Indeed the nobles, who were stripped of their privileges and refused to swear allegiance to the constitution, were deposited in prison and left to rot. Worse yet, for the church, the Junta (provisional constitutional body) had done away with the Inquisition and the tithe and had expropriated the church's vast property holdings. The church had been declawed. Once the more penetrating components of the *ancien regime* had been disposed of, the Junta got down to more serious business; they declared, after hours of intense discussion, that their official national colors would be baby blue and white. After having cleared that up, they immediately sent a haughty summons to King João VI in Brazil. They demanded that he and his court return to Portugal immediately, and among other things, that the mercantile system of trade be reinstalled. Brazil was to be knocked down a peg.

A curious metamorphosis in France had occurred after the war's conclusion. Once the Bourbons were restored in France, she morphed from one extreme to the other. France had gone from being a leader of the liberal vanguard to a staunch absolutism closely

associated with the Vatican.[76] Furthermore she went from accusing Britain during the war years of being a cruel proponent of absolutism, to now persecuting the British as a "nest of Jacobins."[77] Meanwhile Britain went through her own metamorphosis. Since France now was a part of the Holy Alliance (defenders of Catholic order and crushers of liberalism) she naturally had to change her wartime conservative colors. After all, had Britain not drafted Europe's first constitution? Accordingly, *The Times*, being "being the organ of the government" could not ignore the changing of the seasons and promptly shed its cocoon.[78] Apparently *The Times* was successful, but with any change a few feathers were ruffled. The complaints of the Russian princess and prominent political socialite, Lieven, were proof of such; she complained that the paper was promoting the most "mischievous doctrines."[79] Thus with the British and French exchanging camps, the British paper praised the Spanish and Portuguese revolutions for their "sound and upright spirit."[80]

For the British government, which wished to stay on good terms with any regime in Portugal, it was now of signal importance to ensure that Beresford be kept out of Portugal. For if he were allowed to return, he would either upset the government—which clearly despised the man—or that the Junta might act against him and thus place London between two hard places. In either case the good public opinion they cultivated domestically towards the liberal government in Portugal would crumble. This might allow another country, most likely France, to reap the trade benefits to be gained from a friendship with Portugal.

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[76] Although a constitution was granted by Louis XVII, French government was little different than before the revolution.

[77] "Letter from the Duke of Wellington," letter to Lord Beresford, July 30, 1823, Huntington Library, San Marino, California.

[78] Though this is Lieven's opinion her, correspondence mate, Charles Grey, 2nd Earl Grey, did not disagree with this assessment.

[79] Dorothea Lieven and Strange G. Le, *Correspondence of Princess Lieven and Earl Grey*, (London: R. Bentley, 1890), 444.

[80] *The Times*, Wednesday, Sep 13, 1820; pg. 2; Issue 11037; col D.

Apparently the popularity contest abroad between France and Britain would continue *ad infinitum*.

For those who heard of the expulsion of Beresford and his legion of British officers by order of the Junta, *The Times* did its best to assure them that the expelled bunch were treated with the upmost "respect and courtesy."[81] In France, on the other hand, the government exerted every sinew to forestall any news of Portuguese revolution. When they did finally publish news of it, they grudgingly reasoned that the revolution was of the rare legitimate sort, for Britain had made life insufferable there—revolution was necessary.

After being expelled from Portugal, Beresford made the long voyage back to his native county of Waterford in Ireland. Unfortunately for him, a Protestant aristocrat, his arrival in Ireland coincided with the declining stages of the Protestant ascendancy over Irish Catholics. Although the change had begun towards the end of the eighteenth century, it gained considerable political momentum during the 1820s. Indeed, since the hazy beginning of the industrial revolution and the steady decline of papal authority—making them seem less a menace—Catholics had steadily risen in stature in Ireland. This enabled them in myriad ways to harass the "House of Beresford."[82]

However, Beresford was not alone in his frustration because the industrial revolution and the subsequent rise of the middle class was challenging the political hegemony long held by the aristocracy. And worse yet, for Britain a Protestant empire, they thus were without the legitimizing powers of the Catholic church and its deft ability to instill in its members, as the Holy Alliance put it, a belief that "God has made" a class of people (royalty and the aristocracy) fit for rule—over others—as they were more "intelligent" and thereby "made

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[81] *The Times*, Thursday, Sep 14, 1820; pg. 2; Issue 11038; col D.
[82] *The Times*, Tuesday, Jun 27, 1826; pg. 3; Issue 13004; col E.

responsible for power."[83] Instead of Catholic legitimacy, Britain, after the Glorious Revolution, had made the ownership of "property" the major fount of legitimacy for its aristocracy.[84] Indeed, Beresford's own ancestors had been among those families, who sided with William and Mary and directly benefited from the Glorious Revolution. And as a reward for their steadfast loyalty—and as a counterbalance to Ireland's vast Catholic population—the family was given a large swath of land in Ireland and a corps of Catholic tenants to work it. However with the rise of the industrial revolution and the subsequent enrichment of self-made commoners, aristocratic families like Beresford, whose wealth had been traditionally derived from their estate, had to compete with the vibrant new class. Moreover, with the rapid urbanization of Britain, Lord Beresford would have had difficulty keeping tenants, a large source of revenue for the Beresfords. Indeed, one of Beresford's brothers fell into debt to a commoner money lender; the family was forced to sell part of their estate to commoners. With more competition financially, the Beresfords found it difficult to exert their traditional power over the Catholics. And indeed the Catholics in Waterford County had the gall to challenge—through the county elections—the "last remnant of Orange power" in Ireland, the "House of Beresford."[85] Perhaps the reason for the most improper decorum of Beresford's Catholics was the rise of education based on liberal principles (equality, human rights, and reason)—what we call in today's parlance, a "liberal education." This new education, based on liberal principles, naturally inclined a growing number to favor such novel ideas as reform of the electoral franchise and religious toleration. And thanks to the advent of mass newspaper distribution, the general public became aware of the machinations of their government. A *Times* article (printed on 27 June

[83] Frank Harrison Hill, *George Canning*, (New York: D. Appleton, 1887), 166.
[84] *The Times*, Tuesday, Jun 27, 1826; pg. 3; Issue 13004; col E.
[85] *The Times*, Tuesday, Jun 27, 1826; pg. 3; Issue 13004; col E.

1826) on anti-Protestant domination in Ireland is a good example of the political voice and pressure valve that the newspapers of this era possessed, as well as the antipathy many felt towards the House of Beresford: " 'Ascendancy' is in substance with the Catholics. A single family holds out on its fortified castle, trebly fortified by wealth, patronage, and prescription; but the Beresford family cannot stand alone; while its party are in ruins around it."[86] Thus in a era of dramatic revolutions, based on the desire for rights and an end to privilege, the British government faced pressure to appease public opinion with reforms in order to head off more radical change.

Beresford and Wellington had built their careers on defending the traditional sociopolitical order with military force. Accordingly, when they left the military realm for the political, they were principally concerned with maintaining the status quo, both abroad and domestically. For them the domestic status quo was that of the continuity of royal and aristocratic control over political decision-making. And abroad they desired to maintain the balance of power in Europe. European politics, for the duo, was a battle between the various royal families of Europe, and diplomacy that of polite conversation between members of the various aristocracies. Furthermore, both took a dim view of the professional classes (lawyers and merchants) and were leery of enriching them. After all had not the main agitators of the American Revolution been mostly lawyers and merchants? It was this sort of personal mentality that shaped Beresford's and Wellington's political policies. They would oppose those who wished to support democratic governments, and equally denounce those who wished to disturb the status quo—whatever form it might have from place to place.

While Beresford was struggling to comprehend the origins of Catholic insolence, João was faced with an equally perplexing child of the Enlightenment. The Junta demanded

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[86] *The Times*, Tuesday, Jun 27, 1826; pg. 3; Issue 13004; col E.

that he come to Lisbon and swear allegiance to their, yet to be written, constitution. But João had little idea of what to expect of this Junta, who demanded that he cease to rule as an absolute monarch and instead reign as a constitutional monarch. What did all of this mean? He was unsure. João however was a benign king who – at least in theory – always wanted to appease his subjects. Thus he reasoned that if the people wanted it, then let them eat cake; he left for Portugal in 1821.

The Holy Alliance took a dim view of both the Spanish and Portuguese revolutions. Instead of opening up a dialogue with the Juntas, they recalled their ministers; instead of embracing the revolutions as reflections of the manifest determination of the peoples of Spain and Portugal, they sought to crush them before their subversive theories achieved wide dissemination. Thus recalling the extinct power of the Holy Roman Empire, they sought to dismantle, through whatever means, the liberal movements there. But in 1821 they were still unsure of what to make of Portugal. Would João not make quick work of the liberals, as Fernando VII had done in Spain? For now they were content to take the course French had done and blame the revolution on British tyranny in Portugal in the person of Beresford.[87]

Those Portuguese who had hoped for a moderate constitutional monarchy at the first outbreak of the revolution in 1820 realized very quickly that the body in power would be neither moderate nor practical. The Junta had spawned in the noblest of sentiments, but in their haste and in their zeal, the constitution they drafted was mired in abstruse "theoretical maxims." Article 362 of the "civil code," for example, stated that henceforth "man's thoughts are free"—a beautiful thought, but also ambiguous and hard to enforce. Moreover the construction of the government, in their haste to shield their power from

[87] *The Times*, Monday, Sep 18, 1820; pg. 2; Issue 11040; col B.

monarchs, was no better than mob rule and was deficient in checks and balances. The government was composed of a "single chamber, based on popular origin." The chamber (composed mostly of aristocrats) would then vote thirteen members into a ruling body, "the State Council."[88] The council had full control over legislation and could not be dissolved under any circumstances. The king was quite powerless in this arrangement, and if things went awry he had no means of redress. Also it seemed that many of the regents had simply morphed into constitutionalists; as one moderate liberal complained: "For the most part, those who occupied the highest situations of the [constitutional government's] magistracy and of the finance department were the same as those who had so much contributed to the regency."[89] Nevertheless, the Junta was in charge and they were eager to show it; Queen Carlota Joaquina, among many others, was exiled to the interior for not having sworn the oath to the constitution.

While João was being humiliated by the Portuguese Junta, Fernando VII, King of Spain, was ensnared in yet another liberal-led coup. Fernando, after having been released by Napoleon in early 1814, had repressed the liberal Juntas that had risen up to rid Spain of French occupation. The Juntas also, anti-clerical in nature, had proclaimed that upon Fernando VII's return from imprisonment he must swear, before re-entering Spain, to their newly drafted constitution and henceforth rule Spain as an constitutional monarch. Accordingly he swore to it while en route from his French prison. But as soon as he crossed the snow-capped Pyrenees, he rejected his title of constitutional king and instead pronounced himself the "Absolute King of Spain." This produced hearty applause from the Holy Alliance. In an effort to avoid any confusion over his title, he made the point clear by

[88] John Smith Athelstane Carnota, *Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Duke de Saldanha, with Selections from His Correspondence* (London: J. Murray, 1880), 49.
[89] Ibid.

proceeding to arrest, persecute and execute liberals, by way of the freshly restored Inquisition. Liberals and freemasons were fringe groups and could expect little sympathy from the people. Indeed, most were happy to find the Jesuits back in charge and grateful to have a Bourbon, once again, king upon the throne of Spain. It seemed Fernando would not have any great difficulty in retaining the throne, for his supporters were legion amongst the devout Catholics who were "the most serious opponent to Liberalism" and among many commoners who were "yet steeped in ignorance and weighed down by traditional influences."[90] However due to the "rancorous, cruel, disloyal, ungrateful, and unscrupulous" nature of his rule, as well as his highly unpopular attempts to send thousands of Spaniards to fight in provincial repression wars, Fernando quickly fostered popular discontent among the middle classes and freemason military elite.[91] Finally in 1820, six years after Fernando's return, a freemason and military man, Colonel Rafael del Riego, overthrew the despotic monarch and reinstituted the constitution of 1812. The band of mutinous troops surrounded Fernando's palace, and with the threat of violence, demanded that he adhere to the constitution of 1812. Fernando, in an effort to buy time, promised to uphold the constitution. But once the troops left he immediately began to court, with the promise of future ennoblements, some of the able-bodied subjects still loyal to him. And—setting a precedent for Libya's current despot, Muammar al-Gaddafi—once mustered proceeded to arm them with the intent of setting them loose on Madrid. What ensued was anarchy, a three-year warlord era. Priests, nobles, and even commoners assembled militias; the fighting became so frenzied that initial intentions became hazy in the minds of the belligerents, and many knew not whom they were fighting or what they were fighting for. In this utter confusion Fernando VII wrote to his Bourbon kin in France, King Louis XVIII, for help.

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[90] Charles Edward Chapman and Rafael Altamira, *A History of Spain* (New York: Free Press, 1935), 497.
[91] Ibid., 495.

His letter however was superfluous, for France, and all of Europe for that matter, had already decided what course to take.

The Holy Alliance, fearful of any liberal revolution, wished to crush the latest squirming serpents from the hydra. And indeed Fernando had egged them on by reminding the Alliance that his style of government, if duly restored, would be "eminently suitable to the feelings of the Holy Alliance."[92] Britain was weary of intervention and did not wish to see any country or any faction enrich itself at the expense of another, unless Britain scooped up the booty. A meeting of the powers of Europe was inevitable. The quintuple alliance—in reality Britain and the Holy Alliance—decided that it would be prudent to discuss the subject of Spain and the revolution in Naples. All parties met, excluding Spain, at the Congress of Verona in 1822 to discuss these matters. The Duke of Wellington was Britain's last moment replacement for the foreign minister, Lord Robert Castlereagh. The intrigues and frustrations of what appeared to be a whirling cycle of oppression, revolution, and then renewed oppression had eaten away at the often morose Castlereagh's weary mind. Just before he was to leave for Verona, he took his pen knife to his throat and succeeded in committing suicide. His dramatic death presaged the wide scale bloodshed yet to come.

George Canning, who had been instrumental in convincing the Portuguese court to leave for Brazil in 1807, was selected to replace Castlereagh as Britain's foreign minister. Canning, a graduate of Eton, was a liberal in taste and in conviction, and like Wellington was in favor of upholding Castelreagh's policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. Thus Wellington attended the congress with Castelreagh's original instruction to dissuade any of the powers there from intervening in Spain.

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[92] Michael J. Quin, *Memoirs of Ferdinand VII, King of the Spains* (London: Hurst and Robinson, 1824), 137.

Wellington submitted Britain's position at the congress and not surprisingly, as Canning had predicted, the policy of non-intervention merely "mingled with air."[93] The Alliance was decided; Fernando must be restored, though once Russia offered to march their troops across France to snuff out the revolt their solidarity faltered. France was distrustful of Russia's intention, for France did not fully trust their populace or army. Would the Russians use the pretense of destroying revolutions to lay siege to France, perhaps? Certainly, the French were not eager to test such a theory, and Metternich was equally distrustful of Russian intentions. The members of the Alliance decided to approach the matter on an individual basis.

France being the closest neighbor to Spain, eager to refurbish its tarnished "glory," and anxious to busy its restless army, was most desirous of entering Spain on the side of the deposed king.[94] Leading the charge for action in Spain was France's Minister of Foreign Affairs, François-René Chateaubriand. Chateaubriand, the founder of the French school of Romantic literature, was originally sympathetic towards the cause of the French Revolution, but the horrific violence generated during the upheaval was too much for the young thinker. Eager to escape the wanton bloodshed, he fled to America in 1791. The idyllic scenes of the Antebellum South suited and inspired the young intellectual to write his famous novella, *René*, which so impacted the imaginations of French writers. After a time in what for him was the soothing South he journeyed to Britain. Though Britain was not a part of Continental Europe, it still had its fair share of social travails. While in Britain Chateaubriand took note and was appalled by the amount of leeway that violently minded "Radicals"

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[93] Cheke, *Carlota Joaquina*, 106.
[94] François-René Chateaubriand, *The Congress of Verona: Comprising a Portion of Memoirs of His Own Times* (London: R. Bentley, 1838), 484.

seemed to enjoy there.[95] Thus after war's end, with the Bourbons restored he was eager to eradicate the violence fomenting Jacobins. It seemed that his exile had firmed in him the most unfortunate conclusion that violence must be met by violence in order to bring about the lasting "safety of Europe."[96] It was also clear that Chateaubriand's seemingly moderate intention of "amending the Spanish constitution"[97] was but a thinly veiled euphemism for his true intention of wiping out the Spanish and Portuguese liberals and "attaching the Peninsula to France."[98]

There arose two different schools in response to the intrigues in Europe: one liberal and ambitious and led by Canning, and the other, more conservative one, led by the Duke of Wellington. Canning and Wellington had two very different ideas on what it meant to serve Britain. Canning saw it as his duty to further enrich the empire, while Wellington—all too aware of the horrors of war—detested the intrigues and rumors of diplomacy, and saw it as his duty to steer Britain out of any unnecessary confrontations while maintaining the status quo both domestically and abroad. On the subject of Spain, both felt that Britain should stay out of the matter, for if Britain acted in concert with either it side it would give sanction for other powers to join the menagerie. However, Canning's sympathies ultimately lay with the "with the people struggling for their national existence."[99] And after all, Canning pointed out during a rare candid moment, "What should we [Britain] have thought of interference from foreign Europe when King John granted Magna Charta, or an interposition in the quarrel between Charles I, and his Parliament?"[100] However his definition of "interference" was one

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[95] Chateaubriand, *Memoirs of His Own Times*, 481.
[96] Ibid., 484.
[97] Ibid., 463.
[98] Ibid., 440.
[99] Ibid., 471
[100] Hill, *George Canning*, 172.

sided and would later see fit to aid liberal movements, much to the rancor of the conservative Tories and their champion Wellington.

Wellington, before leaving the Congress of Verona under protest, alerted the powers there that Britain—following Canning's line—planned to recognize Spain's colonies in the Americas as independent nations. The Continental states denounced the policy, but could do little to stop Britain's negotiations with the struggling republics in the Americas. One reason, and the main reason, for recognizing countries such as Bolivia was the trade benefits to be accrued from such recognition. Moreover the outbreak of anarchy in Spain had allowed feigning privateers to fly the Spanish flag while seizing British ships and any of the nascent republics' ships; the republics had yet to been recognized by Spain, thus the pirates could put on the pretense of acting in Spanish interests during their rapacious sport. These activities, the Prime Minister, the Earl of Liverpool observed "were in the highest degree mischievous to our commerce."[101] The matter of Spain, for Britain, was but of little import, compared to the bustling trade to be had with the former colonies. And in the end, Canning attempted to convince the French minister that," in good truth, the Spaniards have not much to give, be they ever so willing."[102] However, if a power such as France, were to annex Spain would she not annex Spanish colonies? The specter of being cut off from a lucrative trade in the New World forced Britain to take notice of the proceedings there.

Canning entered into a vigorous correspondence on the subject of Spain with his counterpart in France, Chateaubriand. Canning, an unabashed admirer of French literature, drew upon all his erudition to dissuade Chateaubriand from seizing Spain. He argued that Spain was worth little, thus France had nothing to gain. Would she not be better served to

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[101] Charles Duke Yonge, *The Life and Administration of Robert Banks, Second Earl of Liverpool, Late First Lord of the Treasury, Comp. from Original Documents.* (London: Macmillans, 1868), 228.
[102] Chateaubriand, *Memoirs of His Own Times*, 475.

"leave the Spanish revolution to burn itself out within its own crater?"[103] Moreover, Canning reasonably warned, "You have nothing to apprehend from the eruption, if you do not open up a channel for the lava through the Pyrenees."[104] Chateaubriand, annoyed by the "good little Englishman's"[105] lack of foresight, retorted with a piece of rhetorical brilliance that both revealed his paranoia and his crusade against liberals:

> We wish for peace: we invoke it with our most fervent prayers, but we will not have it by revolution. We will not daily see our soldiers corrupted, and our people inflamed. And do you think that England is less menaced than France by the clubs of Madrid? Have you not your Radicals, as we have our Jacobins? Is your powerful aristocracy less an object of hatred to modern levellers than the high royal prerogative of our Monarchy? We have here a common enemy.[106]

Chateaubriand had misjudged Canning's definition of his duty, for Canning had been born a commoner and would later die a commoner. His idea of serving the realm was enriching all classes not solely defending it against "levellers." As the correspondence progressed, Canning began to sense Chateaubriand's intransigence, and thus shifted his tone to a more hostile one. His letters ceased to be peppered with recondite Latin and French phrases, and instead took on a more straightforward business-like air. He warned France and Chateaubriand that Britain could and would not take kindly to the French occupation of Spain, for they had just rid the peninsula of her presence and could not see it renewed there. To which Chateaubriand, unmoved, sarcastically responded:

> Continue, my honourable friend, in your benevolent principles; I shall suspect that the mob will not break your windows for my sending you an ambassador. When the Radicals have done with the Duke of San Lorenzo [French ambassador], and he shall be forgotten, we may perhaps hope for some favor.[107]

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[103] Ibid., 476.
[104] Ibid.
[105] Ibid., 439.
[106] Ibid., 470.
[107] Ibid., 481.

It was clear to Canning that there was no swaying France, but how to check her without going to war? Canning's premonition came to fruition after the French army, over 100,000 strong, huddled before the Pyrenees, threw off their pretense of being an army of mere observation and invaded Spain in early April 1823. It seemed that Chateaubriand, who once denounced Napoleon as the modern day Nero, had taken up the mantle of the deposed emperor, except this time French soldiers were going into the slaughtering field for the cause of protecting the Spanish descendant of Henri IV, rather than deposing him.

Although Canning had preached a policy of non-intervention, he was peeved by the arrogance of the French minister and bemoaned the sight of a national movement for self-determination being crushed by a rival. He began to court his main conservative rival, the Duke of Wellington. This was to prove difficult, however, for Wellington was not eager to see Britain in another war and had little sympathy for the liberals and their infernal revolutions. Indeed, the French counted him an ally, for Wellington, according to Chateaubriand, did "not like leveling principles."[108] But Wellington did, however, care for the honor of Britain, and thus was not in favor of any country enriching itself to the point of empire, like Napoleon had attempted. Canning knew this and thus rhetorically questioned whether or not he could sit back in neutrality and "suffer" the French, if they were to seize the whole Peninsula, and annex Spain's colonies of "Cuba. . . . Canaries—or Ceuta—or Minorca?"[109] Wellington, not one for intrigues, reminded Canning that these were mere rumors and meant nothing until "we have some ground to stand upon."[110] Wellington was convinced that the other powers in Europe, out of jealousy would check French ambition, thereby allowing Britain to keep her neutrality and stay out of a costly war; others were not

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[108] Ibid., 403.
[109] Arthur Wellesley Of. Wellington, *Despatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington, K.G.*, vol. 2 (Millwood, NY: Kraus Reprint, 1973), 154.
[110] Ibid., 155.

so optimistic. Lord Liverpool, like Canning, saw imminent dangers in French aggression on the peninsula, especially in the case of Portugal. Arguing that the chief goal of the French was to "convert the Spanish war into an English war."[111] Liverpool assumptions were not unfounded. The Russians, eager to meddle in Western Europe, had already offered their services to the French in the event that "England should declare war against France to prevent his Most Christian Majesty from rendering the most essential services to Spain."[112]

Portugal was the keystone to any war between France and Britain. Liverpool, foreseeing war, alerted the British government that French "success in Spain" would inevitably lead to an invasion of "Portugal." In that case, in order no less to protect British trade interests with that kingdom, we are "bound by honour, if not in good faith, to protect Portugal."[113] However whether they were to be the protectors or the invaders in Portugal, was contingent upon—just as in 1807—whether or not the Portuguese "are desirous of defending themselves" from French invasion.[114] In other words, would the Portuguese side with the French or the British. If the latter, then British aid would be seen as help, and if the former than the British would be considered to be invaders. Chateaubriand, also foreseeing war with Britain, recognized the importance of Portugal. Since their armies were now in Spain, Portugal became their flank and the experiences of the Peninsular War had shown the tactical importance of Portugal. He was, not wanting to inflame the British more than need be, content for now "to keep a watchful eye on Portugal, whose movements are so dangerous."[115] It was hard for both Britain and France to know which side Portugal would

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[111] Yonge, *The Life of Liverpool*, 232.
[112] Chateaubriand, *Memoirs of His Own Times*, 478.
[113] Yonge, *The Life of Liverpool*, 233.
[114] Ibid.
[115] Chateaubriand, *Memoirs of His Own Times*, 426.

choose, for she had undergone yet another revolution on 27 May 1823. Accordingly, France and Britain scrambled to present themselves as worthy allies, all over again.

Word of possible aid for her brother Fernando VII had found its way to the ear of Queen Carlota Joaquina. She had been exiled in 1821 by the constitutional government then in power for not having sworn to the constitution. Accordingly she despised the liberals who had been such a thorn in the side of her family in Spain, and for herself in Portugal. Thus when she heard word that her brother was "about to be rescued by the Knight-errant of France" would not "the Knight-errant's eyes turn to Portugal also?"[116] Emboldened by her calculations, she began to scheme with her loyal son, Dom Miguel. The people of Portugal would not be hard to win over, for the constitutional government had done little to ease the economic straits left over from the Peninsular War. Indeed in February 1823, Count Amarante, who was in charge of the garrison in Vila Real, had staged a coup d'état and published a list of grievances against the constitutional government: "our august sovereign a captive . . . the Queen banished . . . our Holy Religion attacked . . . free masonry rampant . . . politicians despoiling the people . . . Brazil lost!"[117]

The above grievances were felt by commoners and aristocrats alike. Especially odious was the ill treatment the government had afforded Brazil; Brazil severed its tie with Portugal when Dom Pedro, son of João, named himself Emperor of Brazil in 1822. Carlota saw this Amarante-led coup (in danger of petering out) as her chance to rid Portugal of the liberals and if possible send her husband back to Brazil, while she remained in absolute power in Portugal.[118] She thus seized the opportunity afforded by the aging count and sent Miguel and a band of troops loyal to him to Vila Franca in order to carry out the coup to its

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[116] Cheke, *Carlota Joaquina: Queen of Portugal*, 107.
[117] Ibid., 111.
[118] Ibid., 112.

successful conclusion. Miguel and Amarante made quick work of any soldiers loyal to the constitutional government—a rare breed, indeed—that they encountered in their mission to "deliver the country from the yoke of the Cortes, and the Revolutionary pest, and to give the king his liberty."[119] The king had originally denounced Amarante's actions, but after Miguel journeyed to Villa Franca (27 May 1823) and after the 18th infantry regiment yelled out, just outside his palace window, "Viva el Rei absoluto! Morra a Constituição!" he quickly changed his mind.[120] The king, always eager to please, greeted the soldiers from a palace window and on a whim declared "Since you wish it, the country desires it, Viva el Rei absoluto!"[121] He then, on 1 June, proceeded to reject the constitution of 1822, and named Miguel the commander-in-chief of the army. After the proclamations he journeyed to the edge of Lisbon so that he and Miguel could proceed into Lisbon together as conquerors. Although it now seemed with the dissolution of the constitutional government he would favor instead of an absolute monarchy, he bent just as easily the other way and would soon agree to grant a constitution, much to the displeasure of his fiery wife.

Once the gaieties were over and a new color scheme (crimson and purple) adopted to rid the country of the dreaded baby blue and white of the preceding government, the true power struggles began. The king had decided, after the urgings of Pedro de Sousa Holstein (later the Duke of Palmela) and the Duke de Saldanha, to grant a constitution based on the model drawn up at the Congress of Verona. (The constitution, the moderate sort, would create a government with two chambers and full veto powers for the king.) The king then named the extremely skillful and quick-witted Pamela to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, while at the same time appointing the notoriously unpopular Marquis de

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[119] Carnota, *Memoirs of Duke de Saldanha*, 66.
[120] Ibid.
[121] Ibid.

Pamplona[122] (later Count Subserra) to the "head of the government."[123] Some exploration of Subserra's career is necessary here, for he played an important role in an extremely perplexing and little understood period in Portuguese history.

Subserra had sided with the French during the Peninsular War and was therefore much resented by Englishmen and Portuguese alike. Mrs. Baille, an inquisitive British tourist with high connections, claimed that he was so disliked by the Portuguese that he was burned in effigy in one of Lisbon's main squares.[124] He was not well liked by a majority of Britain's ministers. Canning despised the quisling and reminded the British government—oddly some of his wretched "Ultra colleagues" were providing him with "*moral* support,"—that "it is not to be forgotten that Subserra let Massenna's [French commander] army into Portugal."[125] However, Canning would later change his tune once he learned that Subserra could be swayed to the British side. Although he was also despised in Portugal, he was able to not only serve as the minister of war under the constitutional government but was able to retain that post, in some capacity, after 1823 and quickly became one of the favorites of the king.

It is safe to assume that Subserra was not well liked by some Britons in Portugal either. Mrs. Baille, fed up with Portuguese caprice complained that the king "still continues to heap favours upon Pampelona [Subserra], and never acts but by his advice."[126] It was well known to all, including Baille, that Subserra represented the French party in Lisbon and was in cahoots with the indefatigable and mischievous French ambassador, Baron Hyde de Neuville. Mrs. Baille complained that under his auspices, Lisbon had turned into a

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[122] In Smith's book, *Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Duke de Saldanha,* he claims that Palmela was the head of the government and Subssera made the minister of war. This very well could be. However, Subserra's influence was of such high degree over the king he might as well been the head of the government.
[123] Augustus Granville Stapleton, *The Political Life of the Right Honourable George Canning,* vol. 2 (London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown and Green, 1831), 203.
[124] Baillie, *Lisbon in the Years 1821, 1822, and 1823*, 172.
[125] Augustus Granville Stapleton, *George Canning and His Times.* (London: J.W. Parker and Son, 1859), 513.
[126] Baillie, *Lisbon in the Years 1821, 1822, and 1823*, 185.

playground for "base fidalgos, who fought against their country under Junôt" but "now they are pardoned" and are allowed to "creep, and flatter, and hang about" the palace.[127] Naturally Queen Carlota and Dom Miguel resented Subserra's power and were further at odds with the king's ostensible agreement to adopt a constitution and his pardoning of liberals. For Beresford's part, Subserra was a constant thorn in his side and accordingly despised the man. He thought him a charlatan and traitor. With so many enemies, Subserra's dominion over the king was not sustainable.

Palmela suffered Subserra's presence in the government for one chief reason: he had strong ties to a government, France, which could possibly provide a guarantee against a rebellion instigated by Miguel and his mother. They hated Subserra's and Palmela's influence with the king and detested Palmela's plans for a constitution. Since the Portuguese military men adored Miguel and he headed the army, the danger was both real and imminent Palmela did his best to secure a British guarantee, but his request fell on deaf ears. The British government did not want to entangle itself in another mess on the Peninsula, and the Duke of Wellington was especially hostile to Palmela's entreaty. Palmela was undeterred, however, by Britain's coldness. He was well aware, because the British could not allow the French to gain prominence in Portugal, that a British escape from peninsular entanglement was not likely. As Canning's biographer put it, "Portugal was too old, and too valued a connection to be lightly abandoned."[128] Both Britain and France —though unwilling to make a full commitment—did their best to curry favor with the Portuguese. Knowing this, Palmela, in his effort to ameliorate Portugal's woes played the two countries off of each other.

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[127] Ibid., 173.
[128] Stapleton, *The Political Life of George Canning*, vol. 2, 205.

Beresford still had many ties in Portugal and was in constant contact with his informants there. He was well aware of Miguel's machinations, and once they proved successful he leapt at the chance to return to Portugal. Indeed, Beresford thought that Miguel's triumphs were a major step towards the success of his vendetta against "all the worst democrats of 1820" who had treated him and his family so poorly.[129] His family showed their gratitude by having their two daughters present Miguel with a crown of roses.[130] And, as if that was not a sufficient show of his approbation, his Lisbon home was illuminated and was the scene of a raucous celebratory party.[131] Yet Beresford knew that the king, unwilling to alienate any party, was liable to pardon traitors and people dangerous to his plan to create a powerful army that would in turn stabilize a thoroughly un-democratic Portugal firmly aligned with Britain. And knowing the army to be the key arbiter in Portugal in all matters political, Beresford endeavored to return to his old post as head of the army to ensure its rejuvenation. Furthermore, his property in Lisbon had come under legal dispute, and the original owners, and other pretenders, were actively trying to seize it from him. Finally, Beresford had also been trying for some years to recover some outstanding debts owed to him and his British officers. It seemed like the perfect time, for Beresford, to reestablish himself in Portugal.

Palmela, a friend of Beresford's for some years, knew Beresford was susceptible to gossip. Eager to push Britain towards an internal guarantee, Palmela filled his letters to with—in Wellington's phrase—"a register of miserable intrigues."[132] Beresford, after having been fed propaganda by Palmela, was worried that if the British did not quickly ensure a guarantee against domestic subversion, the French would. Time was precious. If the British

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[129] Wellington, *Despatches of Wellington*, 439.
[130] Baillie, *Lisbon in the Years 1821, 1822, and 1823*, 182.
[131] Ibid., 185.
[132] Wellington, *Despatches of Wellington*, 177.

lost the race to the French, Britain would lose an ancient ally. The loss of Portugal in some ways would reflect poorly on Beresford's reputation and career. Wellington however—tired of peninsular antics and seeing little gain in meddling in Portugal—wrote to Beresford on 30 July 1823 (before Beresford left for Lisbon) urging him to stay put in Britain. In an effort to convince Beresford he doused any hopes of British intervention by stating that "Palmela ought to know, and I believe does know better . . . that we neither can nor will move a finger to sustain an Ally even if deprived of his throne by an internal movement."[133] And then, in a doubtful attempt to wipe his hands clean of the nettlesome country, he assured Beresford that "Portugal will very soon discover of what stuff the French are made; and that their object and measures are not very compatible with the existence of independence of any power which connects itself with them and particularly which puts itself under their protection."[134] Moreover, job prospects for Beresford, Wellington reasoned, would not be poor until "this discovery is made." He would be best served to delay his visit. Canning also believed that Beresford's venturing to Lisbon so soon (less than a month) after the coup "would do more mischief than good." If the enmity many felt toward him led to his murder or imprisonment, how could the British government take vengeance without upsetting one or more of the parties involved? Beresford, however, ignored Wellington's counsel and was in Lisbon no later than 20 October 1823.[135]

Meanwhile, after the Te Deum was finished and the adrenaline began to subside in the veins of old Queen Carlota, she found that her object (complete absolutism) had not been fully reached. Much to her dismay a constitution was in the works, liberals were left unpunished, and her husband was still shielded by constitutionalists. The French

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[133] Letter from Wellington to Beresford, July 30, 1823, Huntington Library, San Marino, California.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Ibid.

ambassador, Hyde de Neuville, seemed a natural ally, for his self-proclaimed cause was to "extend [French absolutist protection] to the banks of the Tagus."[136] Yet once the queen approached Neuville on the subject the ambassador haughtily, and probably fictitiously, reminded her "that an ambassador is not sent by his Court to inflame passions and second intrigues."[137] That is unless the intrigue was profitable for his "Court."

Neuville, a meddler to the highest degree, was overplaying his hand with promises of support for the French faction in Lisbon. The French, aware of the weakness of their own situation with their army in Spain and the debt they had amassed in the process, were not eager to upset Britain's neutrality by wresting away Portugal. And moreover, for Paris, since Spain had already been occupied, seizing Portugal would do more mischief than good. Palmela after several interviews and further probing was aware of this and began to cool his relationship with Neuville. Subserra, on the other hand, was slower to realize the hollowness of Neuville's words and continued to be the Frenchman's puppet.

In Beresford's haste to re-establish himself in Portugal and demonstrate his close relationship with the British regime, he had asked for the authority to bestow the Order of the Garter upon João. After the Vilafrancada both Britain and France scrambled to decorate the king. And Neuville had already bestowed on him, with much éclat, the Order of the Holy Ghost. Beresford knew that the British had to one up the French display, and thus was desirous of presenting it fully clad in Portuguese regalia. Yet because Beresford's unpopularity in Lisbon was well known in London, his ambitious request was vetoed in order to avoid upsetting the factions in Lisbon. Frustrated in this aspect of his plan, Beresford nevertheless moved to recover his old position as head of the army. He quickly

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[136] Hyde de Neuville, *Memoirs of Baron Hyde De Neuville: Outlaw, Exile, Ambassador*, vol. 2 (London: Sands &, 1913), 141.
[137] Ibid., 142.

found, however, that Palmela's threat of French support was not unfounded, making his maneuvers even more difficult. Subserra and his faction hovered closely around the king and had a firm grip over the army's bureaucracy. Since Subserra was Neuville's pawn and Palmela was anxious to avoid burning any bridges, the French ascendancy in Lisbon was at its zenith. Palmella, however, continued to use Beresford as a lobbyist with London. Beresford's letters to Wellington were stuffed with gossip of the trifling sort ("Your friend Sampayo . . . has been foolish enough to take himself a wife; a young; and not bad-looking girl"), but he also kept harping on the French threat. However, the will of the Iron Duke again proved unbendable. Wellington responded to Beresford's rumors, by telling him that Palmela would do well "not to come to us with such a proposition," as it is "a novelty in politics" and beneath "a high-minded nation [Britain]." If Palmela wants "an army upon which he can rely," Wellington proposed, then "you ought to take command."[138] French boasts were nugatory, because Neuville would "never put" his boasts and threats "in writing." Therefore they are of little concern "to this government."[139] It seemed Wellington did not share Beresford's taste for gossip. And for Palmela's part, he could not—though he desired to—force his government to give a high position to Beresford, for Beresford was highly unpopular with the French faction. Palmela was not willing to gamble on Beresford, since he "had no great confidence in his Lordship's political bias."[140] Nonetheless, Beresford continued to try to unseat his hated rival, Subserra. At the same time, Neuville continued to direct the king's favorites, Subserra and his quisling crony, the Marquis de Loulé.

Wellington was eager for Lord Beresford to settle his matters in an "accelerated" fashion in Portugal. The British Parliament opened on 3 February, and if Beresford did not

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[138] Wellington, *Despatches of Wellington*, 166.
[139] Ibid., 183.
[140] Stapleton, *The Political Life of George Canning*, vol. 2, 211.

get back before then it would be difficult and "awkward" to secure his seat.[141] Wellington needed and wanted Beresford's support in Parliament, and thus wanted him back as soon as possible. However, if Beresford got the position he wanted, he would stay in Portugal indefinitely. Wellington, thinking it doubtful that Beresford would achieve his objective in Portugal, was thus merely asking Beresford to hurry up and make up his mind between Portugal and Britain. And if the choice was Britain, he wanted Beresford to hurry back. Beresford did not underestimate the difficulties that awaited him in Portugal. He also knew it would be hard to out maneuver the entrenched Subserra, who had "complete ascendancy over the King."[142] Thus to speed up the process he issued the irresolute king a sort of ultimatum: Subserra or me, if Subserra then I will leave. However the king remained indecisive and continued to stall his decision.

Meanwhile Miguel and his mother were left seething after Neuville's curt refusal. Finding that they could not depend on the French for material support, they began to hatch a scheme to rid Portugal of the French and their lackeys. The first victim of their plot was the king's supper mate, the Marquis de Loulé. He was found dead in the old part of the Salvaterra palace on the morning of 4 March 1824; Loulé's murderer was more than likely the Marquis of Abrantes, a close friend of Miguel's. Loulé had been a boon companion of Subserra; it did not take a fortuneteller to see that Subserra could expect to meet a similar fate. And to make their antipathy clear towards Subserra the conspirators posted placards "saying the traitor Loulé is dead . . . and Pamplona [Subserra] will be so in eight days."[143] Thus Subserra, unwilling to fulfill their macabre prophecy, sped up the investigation process and discovered the identity of the conspirators. He then put pressure on the old king to

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[141] Wellington, *Despatches of Wellington*, 182.
[142] Ibid., 219.
[143] Ibid., 227.

punish them. Yet the king was unwilling to round up an indiscriminate number of his subjects for the benefit of one man and his faction. The conspirators not yet arrested thus accelerated their plans for fear of being arrested. On the night of 29 April, after a dinner party, Subserra was chased through the streets of Lisbon by his would-be captors. Subserra slithered away, however and found refuge with the French ambassador, who was eager to shelter "so precious a life."[144]

The next day proved to be more frightful than the night before. At four in the morning on 30 April 1824, soldiers from the Lisbon garrison surrounded Bemposta palace. Miguel and his mother the queen had created and spread the rumor of a freemason plot to kill the royal family. Under this pretense Miguel went down to the Lisbon garrison, where he was loved for his hyper-masculinity, and riled the soldiers to a fever pitch. The soldiers then, with shouts of "Death to the Freemasons," began to unleash a reign of terror on Lisbon. With Carlota orchestrating at Bemposta—she had journeyed there so as to avoid guilt and to gleefully watch the proceedings—and Miguel in the field, soldiers rounded up hundreds of liberal nobleman and threw them into prison. Highest on their list was the hated Subserra, but he was in hiding. They were, however, able to arrest Palmela. The king meanwhile was a prisoner in his own palace. Lord Beresford, always with his ear to the street, hurried to the palace to see what he could do. British sources claim he had "difficulties" in getting through the blockade of soldiers around the palace.[145] French sources, the polar opposite of the British source, claimed Beresford had "permission" to enter the palace. Was he in league with Miguel?[146] The arrest of Palmela makes Neuville's conspiracy problematic. Palmela was

[144] Neuville, *Memoirs of Neuville*, 171.
[145] Stapleton, *The Political Life of George Canning*, vol. 2, 215.
[146] Neuville, *Memoirs of Neuville*, 162.

Beresford's friend; moreover, Palmela was well known and liked in Britain. If Beresford had a role, he more than likely would not have condoned such an arrest.

While Beresford was tending to the king, all of Europe's ambassadors descended upon the palace. They were able to force their way through the lead guard with the "Arab type of countenance" and make their way to the king's apartments. However, much to the chagrin of Neuville, Beresford was already there with him. The ambassadors inquired about the king's status. Beresford and the king informed them that the João was a prisoner in his own palace. Miguel eventually showed up. Looking ashamed and dejected, he apologized to every one in the room. Neuville took the opportunity to scold Miguel. But Beresford rebuffed him and "defended the conduct of the Prince."[147] Neuville's account is not to be trusted however. The bias in it has rendered it in many respects completely inaccurate and largely anecdotal. From Beresford's point of view, Miguel was a young man who—just twenty-one at the time—had allowed himself to come under devious counsel, his mother. He was wet clay. It behooved Beresford to support Miguel, for Miguel had done him a beneficial service in imprisoning some of his more hated rivals and was hot on the trail of Subserra. Moreover, Miguel's passions for absolute monarchy and an end to liberalism in Portugal were in line with his. The only impediment to their alliance was his mother, Queen Carlota. If she could be circumvented, then he had only to mold the young man—no small task—and instill in him some patience and restraint. After all, Miguel's father had not long to go. His brother, the rightful heir to the throne of Portugal, seemed content to renounce the Portuguese throne in favor of Brazil. Why not let things take their natural course? It is quite likely that Beresford was thinking along these lines when he considered an alliance with Miguel.

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[147] Ibid., 168.

No scheme of Beresford or Neuville's could be accomplished however if the queen's plot to rule Portugal prevailed. She was equally unfriendly to both the British and the French. Her rule would certainly spell doom for any alliance. And although the palace coup had failed—Miguel lacked the heart to fulfill its sinister ends—the mother and son continued to espouse the rumor of a freemason plot to kill the royal family. In the king's presence Miguel showed "perfect submission," but once out of it and into his mother's orbit he resumed his mischief.[148] The arrests continued at such a pace that the king was fearful that he would be next. The British ambassador, Sir Edward Thornton, suggested that the king should come aboard the British vessel, the *Windsor Castle*. However, Beresford and Palmela—who had just been released—were worried that if the king secreted himself on the *Windsor Castle* "it might be construed into a proof of his abdication of the Crown, by the Queen."[149] Beresford, however, had another reason for keeping the king on dry land. Miguel was still very much after Subserra. If left unchecked, Miguel would eliminate his rival for him. If the king went on to the ship, he would then henceforth condemn Miguel's actions and thereby leave no chance for the reconciliation Beresford hoped for. The king's denunciation of Miguel would put an end to the hunt for Subserra. This would have permitted Subserra to come out of hiding, thereby frustrating Beresford's plan to tutor Miguel and take up a high position in the army.

Subserra had originally taken refuge in the French embassy, but after the offer of Thornton—who would later lose his job because of it—he took refuge on a British frigate, the *Lively*. The fact that Neuville thought it best for him to seek safety on a British ship diminished Subserra's confidence in the French. He realized that the French were not as powerful as he thought, for the French minister had thought it wise to come under British

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[148] Stapleton, *The Political Life of George Canning*, vol. 2, 219.
[149] Ibid., 220.

protection. Demoralized, he sought British patronage instead. He sent a letter to Canning, while still on the Tagus, inquiring if the British "would receive him as an Ambassador." Canning replied, "notwithstanding his known enmity to England and devotion to France," yes.[150] Thornton, knowing this, thought that Neuville would now be out of the equation and thus Miguel's hunt for Subserra would no longer be necessary. Without his puppet, Neuville would lose his ascendancy over the king. Since, in this arrangement, both would be powerless, Thornton reckoned that Miguel's impunity was no longer necessary for British interests. Thus he urged the king to go aboard the *Windsor Castle* in the belief that from the ship the king could safely vilify Miguel. This, he believed, would return Portugal to an orderly state. Beresford disagreed because he could not bring himself to trust Subserra and was still worried that the queen would usurp the throne if João went aboard. However the king, in fear of losing his crown if not his life, worked out a secret deal with Thornton. Beresford, upon hearing of it, was "decidedly opposed to it," and because his advice was ignored in favor of Thornton's he "took offence." [151] Nevertheless the king, under much secrecy, made it safely to the deck of the *Windsor Castle* on 9 May 1824, where Palmela was waiting for him with freshly drafted proclamations denouncing Miguel's actions.

Miguel had been on the Tagus, searching for Subserra, when he saw his father and his escort heading towards the *Windsor Castle*. His foray was over. Had he listened to Beresford's advice during their private meeting (on 6 May Beresford had advised him to slow down the rate of arrests and relinquish his command over the army) he might very well have escaped the fate awaiting him on the deck of the *Windsor Castle*. Once the king knew he was safe, he immediately summoned Miguel. Fortunately, Miguel obeyed the summons, for had

[150] Stapleton, *George Canning and His Times*, 513.
[151] Stapleton, *The Political Life of George Canning*, vol. 2, 229.

he not and instead fled to his mother's side a civil war might have ensued.[152] Indeed in the years to come, the queen looked back ruefully and bitterly told her chambermaids that if Miguel had fled to her instead that together they would have made "the streets of Lisbon . . . run with blood."[153] But Miguel had not sought his mother out; instead he went directly to the king and begged for forgiveness. The king, obliging parent that he was, spared him execution and instead stripped him of his command of the army. Miguel was then coerced into exile. He left as soon as favorable winds prevailed; he ended up in the lion's den, the hub of the Holy Alliance, Metternich's Austria.

The king's public line towards Miguel had gone from one of praise and "royal sanction" for the Abrilada (the April revolution, hence the title the Abrilada, in which the constitutional government was overthrown in 1823) to the other extreme of denouncing the prince.[154] The public was now made to believe, according to royal decree, that Miguel was "traitorous" and "sinister."[155] Everything seemed to be in good order now. The king was safe and Palmela was free. It appeared to be a British victory over the French; a British ship had saved João once again. British counsel seemed to have saved the day. Yet both Canning and Beresford were livid with the end result.

Neuville, vulture-like, had swept down and carried Subserra "from the cabin of the *Windsor Castle* back to his [Neuville's] office in triumph."[156] The French had "reaped the fruits of the victory."[157] With Subserra back under Neuville's spell, he had gone from contemplating retirement to grasping for power again and continuing to carry out a policy favorable to the French. And although the king offered Beresford the position he coveted,

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[152] Ibid., 224.
[153] Ibid.
[154] Carnota, *Memoirs of Duke de Saldanha*, 75.
[155] Ibid., 77.
[156] Wellington, *Despatches of Wellington*, 324.
[157] Stapleton, *The Political Life of George Canning*, vol. 2, 229.

head of the army, he did not dare take it. He knew if he took the position he, with Subserra still around, would be frustrated in everything he did. Furthermore, Beresford was well aware of Miguel's popularity with the army. For him to step in Miguel's place right away would have been suicidal for the hated foreigner. Thornton's plan of having the king come aboard and acknowledge Miguel's actions as traitorous was a failure in the long term. His plan allowed for Subserra's resurrection, which meant a prolonged struggle for Beresford and the British government.

It did not take long, after his return to power, for Subserra to commence his reprisals, after his nemesis was forced into exile. With his liberty restored, he needed only to consolidate his power and to do so at the expense of Palmela and Beresford. Palmela's extraordinary intelligence and connections made him a formidable impediment for any aspiring despot.[158] However, although he was an apt thinker, Palmela backed down from the one time general's verbal assaults which, Beresford complained, "prevented him from taking the manly part he ought, and which I am sure he desired."[159] After having forced Palmela's submission, through personal intimidation, Subserra strengthened his grip over the king by claiming that he was the only one who could check the queen's mischief. He was now even more powerful than he was before the Abrilada. And since Beresford was still in town and a potential threat, he directed his rejuvenated powers squarely upon him. He tried to libel Beresford and since this rivalry was the total-war sort, his attack spread to Beresford's mistress, Viscondessa de Juromenha. Subserra accused her of having "a clandestine correspondence with the Queen," and thus tried to "banish her" from Portugal.[160]

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[158] The Duke of Wellington, after some years of reflection, looked back fondly on Palmela's acumen. To account for Palmela's prowess he came to the conclusion that "a Portuguese Jew lawyer" must have tutored him.

[159] Wellington, *Despatches of Wellington*, 219.

[160] *The Times*, Tuesday, Jul 13, 1824; pg. 2; Issue 12389; col C.

Beresford's popularity—what little he enjoyed—fell precipitously with Miguel and the queen, and Subserra's persistence only accelerated his decline. His reputation had become tainted with the fall of Miguel, and just as it seemed impossible for Miguel to ever reign in Portugal so did it seem doubtful that Beresford would ever regain the power he once enjoyed there. Beresford's patience and foresight had failed him. If the old marshal had only followed Wellington's advice and delayed his visit, then he would surely have avoided becoming "involved in personal bickerings, and the subject of party intrigues."[161] If he had waited instead of coming "uninvited," then he more than likely would have been summoned by the king "with the consent and approbation of all parties."[162] But as things were, there was little reason for Beresford to stay in Portugal and suffer the constant ridicule aimed at him. Besides, Neuville and Subserra, when words and actions were measured, proved to be worse than useless; they would be dealt with eventually. He need not lance that boil himself.

The French government, under pressure from Canning and the new British ambassador Sir William à Court, had Neuville recalled to Paris; he left Lisbon on 5 January 1824. William à Court was a brilliant negotiator and was at the height of his powers in Portugal. He then gave the king an ultimatum regarding Subserra: simply put, Britain or Subserra. The king chose the British and dismissed Subserra.

Once back in England Beresford continued to grapple with the Catholics. Indeed, the times had since changed "when 40 years ago a Protestant shoe-black would have grinned with contempt at the tilted head of the most ancient Catholic family, the tables are nearly turned."[163] Quite apart from the Catholics, Beresford was also at odds with *The Times*. He

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[161] Stapleton, *The Political Life of George Canning*, vol. 2, 228.
[162] Ibid.
[163] *The Times*, Tuesday, Jun 27, 1826; pg. 3; Issue 13004; col E.

seriously considered suing the editor, for what he thought to be "libel."[164] Beresford was upset that the newspaper represented him as an "abettor" of the usurper Miguel and his wicked mother, the queen. Wellington, however, discouraged legal action, for it was a "fair matter of inference," on the editor's part, "from facts, some of which are true, and others partially so."[165] The aftereffects of Thornton's failure continued to haunt Beresford. Little wonder then that Beresford was so eager to rehabilitate Miguel's image, for as Miguel's reputation went so did his.

[164] Wellington, *Despatches of Wellington*, 298.
[165] Ibid.

The Duke of Wellington, painted in 1814, several months before the Battle of Waterloo, by Sir Thomas Lawrence. Apsley House, London.

Napoleon I on his Imperial Throne, by Jean Auguste Dominique Ingres, 1806
Musée de l'Armée, Paris

D. João VI

Fernando VII by Francisco de Goya
The Prado Museum, Madrid

George as Prince Regent, in the robes of the Order of the Garter. Painting by Sir Thomas Lawrence (1816).

Canning by Richard Evans, *circa* 1825
National Portrait Gallery, London

François-René de Chateaubriand by Anne-Louis Girodet de Roussy-Trioson.

Miguel during the Vilafrancada, 1823.

An opportunity finally came after the death of João VI on 10 March 1826. According to recent scholarship, João VI's death was probably a result of his "gluttonous, melancholic and sedentary" lifestyle. Indeed, his demise did not come as a shock to those in the know.[166] Nevertheless, the queen— indefatigable plotter that she was—immediately spread rumors of regicide. There was no shortage of probable culprits because the bitter politics of Portugal during this period provided partisans with an ample roster of suspects. João was well aware of his country's self-inflicted partitioning and bitter divisions. He was unsure of his rightful heir's (Dom Pedro) status in Brazil and deeply worried about his cantankerous wife and his ambitious son in exile. For these reasons, he struggled to establish some sort of stabilizing regime that could persist after his death. During his last days, he created a temporary Regency and made his trustworthy daughter, the Infanta D. Isabel Maria, an acting regent on a board of six other regents. The Regency was designed to exist until Pedro I Emperor of Brazil, his son and rightful heir to the crown, should decide otherwise—a doubtful move to try and stabilize a fractious country.

The Infanta was not chosen for any extraordinary skill. Rather, she was tapped because she was João's oldest child in Lisbon; both Miguel and Pedro were absent when their father died. As we know Miguel was in exile in Vienna under the care of the meddlesome Prince Metternich and the world's last Holy Roman Emperor, Francis II. [167] It was probably for the better that his two sons were not there at the time of João's death, for they had been most unfilial. Pedro was often curt with his father, and at times completely disregarded him. In João's effort to reconcile the dialogue between Brazil and Portugal—the schism had been produced by the rude diplomacy of the constitutional government of

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[166] Marleide da Mota Gomes; Rubens Reimão; Péricles Maranhão-Filho, "Dom João VI's Death: Convulsions and Coma," Arquivos De Neuro-Psiquiatria, June 5, 2007, DOM JOÃO VI AND THE COURT PHYSICIANS, accessed November 26, 2010, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18345442.
[167] Carnota, *Memoirs of Duke de Saldanha*, 86.

1820—he had sent his son hand-written letters. Yet these letters were returned " without having been opened."[168] Palmela, in the process of trying to ameliorate Portugal's economic woes, was frustrated by the lack of respect the sons had for their father: "His [João's] two sons, in fact, have contributed to shorten the days of his life; and the terror of the possibility of the Infante's [Miguel] return is what most afflicts him."[169] If Palmela thought João's death would end the bickering in Portugal and allow him to carry on his work, he was sorely mistaken. Instead it triggered a battle royal in Portugal, which would not peter out until the end of the Liberal Wars in 1834 a decade later. Europe was soon to be divided about whether the crown of Portugal belonged to Pedro's daughter Maria (constitutional monarchy) or to Miguel (absolute monarchy)? Legitimacy mattered little in this tussle. In Portugal, the first to secure a monopoly over the means of violence (army, militias, alliances with other nations) would be the victor.

At the time of João's death, Portugal had endured six years of constant revolution and counter-revolution, from the time of the 1820 constitutionalists onwards. The people of Portugal, always on the brink of civil war, generally devoted themselves to one of three parties: the first party, the Absolutists, were headed by the queen and Miguel and were backed by the "higher clergy" and "most of the nobility";[170] the second party, the Ultra-Liberals of 1820 (the Freemasons' party of choice), was ineffective during its period of rule (1820-1823), and most people were disenchanted with them. As one jaded liberal exclaimed: "Great and immediate advantages had been promised" yet at "the end of the three years (1820-1823) not one had been obtained!"[171] There was also the moderate party, of which Palmela was the ostensible head. Most moderates were in favor of constitutional monarchy

[168] Ibid., 73.
[169] Ibid., 87.
[170] Ibid., 65.
[171] Ibid., 50.

with strong executive power. Portuguese people, in 1826, could attach themselves to one of the three aforementioned parties. But few did for fear of partisan reprisals, such as occurred in the case of Duke de Saldanha, who went from being a prisoner of the 1820 constitutionalists to head of the army under a different set of constitutionalists (the regime after the Vilafrancada).

The Infanta's Regency

The Infanta's circumstances were precarious, to say the least. The queen and Miguel had hung like specters over her. The army had shown their affection for Miguel during the Abrilada. What should she do if attacked by Miguel? All the while she awaited Pedro's orders.

Meanwhile Europe's ministers anxiously awaited the news from Brazil. After receiving word of the king's death from their "political circles," newspapers such as *The Times* were less concerned with eulogizing the late king than with succession matters. *The Times* concluded that João's death would generate "very interesting arrangements relative to the Portuguese succession"—a conservative conjecture.[172] Canning, for his part, was flustered upon hearing of Portugal's latest mess. He wrote to Wellington that the death of the king created a "new crisis" in "Portuguese and Brazilian affairs" and would again cause "great anxiety."[173] Canning's pessimistic prediction proved correct.

When word reached Pedro's court in Rio de Janeiro, Pedro—the rightful heir to Portugal (stipulated by the Carta Patente of 13 May 1825)— decided to grant Portugal a constitution similar to Brazil's. Although Pedro had left Portugal when he was nine years old and had not returned since, he felt himself sufficiently versed in Portuguese affairs to deliver a viable constitution. Thus, after having read a book by Benjamin Constant, Pedro sat down to a Brazilian brunch and wrote Portugal's constitution (Carta Regia 29 April 1826).[174] In that way he could stay in Brazil by abdicating the Portuguese throne in favor of his seven-year-old daughter Maria da Glória. The constitution would serve as policing measure, for he

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[172] *The Times* Tuesday, Mar 28, 1826; pg. 2; Issue 12926; col B.
[173] Wellington, *Despatches*, vol. 3, 214.
[174] Harold [William Vazeille] Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning: 1822-1827: England, the Neo-Holy Alliance and the New World* (London: Cass, 1966), 366.

planned to have Maria marry Miguel when she reached the age of nine (Pope Leo XII granted a special dispensation for their incestuous marriage). Miguel, and his absolutist ambitions, thus would be checked by Pedro's liberal constitution. Until then, Isabel her aunt and Pedro's sister, was to remain a part of the Regency.

A British diplomat, Sir Charles Stuart, conveyed Pedro's freshly inked constitution to Portugal. Nobody in Lisbon knew what to expect from Pedro. Were they to become a Brazilian? However, after the constitution arrived, liberals rejoiced. The Duke de Saldanha could barely contain his excitement: the "legitimate sovereign" has "given us a "Constitution!" and for the fickle he offered, "Our noble ally, Great Britain, approves it." Unsure of this last statement, the duke reassured himself that "(else Sir Charles Stuart would not be its bearer)."[175] Canning, unwilling to inflame the remnant of the Holy Alliance, was peeved by Stuart's intervention. He was deeply "embarrassed" by Stuart's mischief, for it made him look hypocritical in the face of his policy of non-intervention, and worried over the rumors and implications coming from abroad. Canning, however, held his composure and explained to other European powers that Stuart "had no authority to act in this manner," had not taken part in the drafting (this is still a matter of debate), and would immediately recall Stuart back to London to avoid any further misunderstandings.[176] Prince Metternich, Canning's nemesis, leader of the Holy Alliance, and keeper of Miguel, abhorred Pedro's actions. He could be heard, in some palace, muttering to himself: Pedro, "a Prince who abdicates and destroys the state at the same time."[177] Once the dejection eased, Metternich got to work in drafting a European circular from which London was omitted. Pedro had "sanctioned" a "revolution," Metternich said, that would bring "violent change"

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[175] Carnota, *Memoirs of Duke de Saldanha*, 98.
[176] Stapleton, *Some Official Correspondence of George Canning*, vol. 2, 118.
[177] Temperley, *Policy of Canning: 1822-1827*, 367.

and "threatens" us "with death and destruction of the social order."[178] The "revolution," he claimed, would cause a "reaction" in Spain" and the influence of that reaction would be felt on France, Italy and all of Europe."[179] Stirring the pot further he called for action and offered to "support" any "step" that Spain might take against her neighbor Portugal. Metternich was apparently willing to go one step further than France was willing to in the months after the Vilafrancada, when France threatened invasion.

Portugal now became an arena—somewhere Hyde de Neuville was smiling—in which the Holy Alliance and Britain's pro-constitutionalists could actively support their preferred regime and vent their frustrations through warfare. Metternich had perhaps exaggerated Portugal's potential for spreading constitutionalism. Nevertheless, a country's stance on Portuguese politics now became the cornerstone of a country's foreign policy.

The threat of a Spanish or Austrian invasion of Portugal, forced Britain once again to enter the fray. Canning's promise to protect Britain's ancient ally would be tested. War seemed plausible to even the least assuming minds. Canning, again seeing a chance to knock a repressive monarchy down a peg, did his best to entice the Prime Minister Lord Liverpool: "God forbid war; but if Spain will have it, ought not we to think of the Havannah."[180] Wellington, however, now firmly against Canning's policies, did his best to undermine Canning's maneuverings for war. He saw no profit in war and—with blatant criticism of Canning—pleaded with Lord Liverpool to "save us" from a "war with Spain," for if such a war occurred "France and the United States" would prey on Britain when she is "heartily tired." [181] Wellington's plea, however, was merely theater produced for an older man (Lord Liverpool died in 1828), who Wellington often wondered whether he was "sufficiently alive"

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[178] Ibid., 367.
[179] Ibid.
[180] Stapleton, *Some Official Correspondence of George Canning*, vol. 2, 144.
[181] Wellington, *Despatches of Wellington*, 419.

to Anglo-Luso affairs.[182] More precisely, Wellington doubted that Portugal's "undisciplined and corrupt rabble" would be able to lend any assistance and was, therefore, not worth the trouble.[183]

Canning and company, including Metternich and his, assumed the constitution would be adopted in Portugal and indeed acted as if it were a foregone conclusion. They failed to recognize that violence and the threat of it were the surest means of dictating the outcome. Indeed, if it were not for the Duke de Saldanha's ultimatum, the constitution's acceptance would have been doubtful. The duke, with that nifty threat of violence, proclaimed: "if the oaths [to the constitution] were not taken by the 31st of July [1826]" I, Duke de Saldanha, will order a squadron "to march on Lisbon" and "compel them to be taken."[184] Saldanha's threat proved fruitful and sufficiently frightening, and the oaths were taken by the "grandees of the kingdom, the judges, the army, the clergy, and the people."[185] Although the constitution was installed, the most crucial inductee, Miguel, had not taken his yet and thereby prolonged the life of his faction.[186]

Liberals celebrated anyway with fetes and Te Deums. The next day, however, Saldanha sent a sober cautionary letter to Pedro. He warned Pedro that without his threat against the metropolis, the "constitutional Charter would have become a *dead letter*" and Miguel and his mother would have "quickly seized the scepter."[187] Canning's hasty recall of Sir Charles Stuart further tempered Portuguese enthusiasm. Some Portuguese thought that, perhaps Britain knew not what she was doing. Thus, Francis Sodré, a moderate constitutional monarchist and Portuguese dignitary, felt it necessary to enlighten the "not so

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[182] Ibid., 581.

[183] Ibid., 442.
[184] Carnota, *Memoirs of Duke de Saldanha*, 99.
[185] Ibid.
[186] Ibid., 101.
[187] Ibid., 99.

well informed" Wellington. Sodré informed him that Stuart could have "suggested the adequate measures to conciliate and tranquilise the most influential and directing classes of this nation [Portugal]" which "none but him could then recommend"— because Stuart's presence implied, to the nervous Portuguese, tacit British support.[188] The effect of his recall had shaken Portuguese confidence—that is—at least among the "acute observers."[189] Sodré, intent on enlisting Wellington's assistance, was horrified by the results of the first election for representatives; he warned Wellington that the elected representatives are of the "late [1820] liberal party" who had "left amongst" them "pernicious and destructive examples."[190] Worse yet, the army, he said, an "acting political body" had made use of the anti-liberal propaganda and were succored by foreign nations, and with aid from a "certain foreign influence," the army aimed " to complete its well-known object." [191] Apparently Sodré thought that even the poorly informed Wellington was sure to know what the army's object was. The question was not whether Wellington was aware that the army was attempting to bring Miguel in. It was rather did he care?

As party tensions grew the Portuguese waited anxiously for word from Vienna. Had Miguel taken the oath? Would he take it before the first meeting of the new government? In the meantime soldiers from the unruly province of Trás-os-Montes—apparently unwilling to wait for Miguel to make up his mind— deserted to Spain. The Spanish government received the deserters, and despite Canning's protestations and a binding treaty, succored them. Miguel now had an army.

Given the unsatisfactory condition of the Infanta's army, the defections added salt to her open wound. Her army was "almost extinct" and "the number of officers excessive;

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[188] Wellington, *Despatches of Wellington*, 451.
[189] Ibid., 452.
[190] Ibid.
[191] Ibid., 453.

while the soldiers are few—there are barely enough for the Garrisons."[192] The threat from Miguel meant that the army had to be revamped quickly. Besides Miguel, the Regency had to be cautious of its neighbors. Spain, in an effort to homogenize Europe, was determined to extinguish any liberal thought. Metternich and Miguel menaced from Vienna, and Carlota ten miles from Lisbon was a flagrant magnet for Absolutists. In this panic, Isabel was desperate and as Beresford had already accomplished the feat once could he not do it again? It was an obvious choice. Lord Beresford had already once before straightened out the army and was well acquainted with Portuguese politics. Isabel, however, had not sought the counsel of the liberals, whom she knew would have tried to frustrate her attempt, before sending an invitation to Beresford. For the Ultra-liberals Beresford still smacked of the Abrilada, and they worried that he would aid the queen and Miguel. In other words, they supposed Beresford's presence in Portugal would diminish their grip over the government. One Portuguese minister took it upon himself to protest the issue with Canning. He acknowledged the expediency of once again having a British marshal, but pleaded: send anybody, "but not Ld. B."[193]

Isabel sent the proposal to Beresford on 27 September 1826, via Ambassador à Court who then—decided on his own accord—to circumvent Beresford and sent it directly to Canning's Parisian hotel room. Thus began the dizzying October correspondence between the triumvirate of Lord Liverpool, the Duke of Wellington, and the Foreign Secretary George Canning. If Beresford took on the Infanta's task, the implications went well beyond simply sending a marshal to drill the troops. If the trio allowed Beresford to go it would surely invite all of Europe to step up their interventions in Portugal, accordingly increasing the likelihood of war. Indeed, to unleash Beresford meant to commit to a war

[192] Carnota, *Memoirs of Duke de Saldanha*, 108.
[193] Stapleton, *Some Official Correspondence of George Canning*, vol. 2, 147.

that seemed imminent. Thus the three carefully debated the potential benefits and negatives to be incurred if Beresford was *allowed* to accept the invitation, or rather summons, for he had already been receiving a Portuguese crown stipend.

Although Canning had written poetry for an anti-Jacobin newspaper, he had considerable sympathy with the liberal cause in Portugal. He was however leery of a repeat of the Sir Charles Stuart incident and was further at odds with Beresford's political leanings. Thus Canning, in an effort to curb Beresford's political power, proposed two conditions for Beresford to obey: first that Beresford, if he should decide to accept, would not be allowed to hold or have "permission to accept a seat in the Cabinet or Council of State, or House of Peers, or any political situation or employment whatever." Furthermore the British Ambassador (William á Court) was to treat Beresford as a British subject and thus would and could not "interfere in any questions between the Portuguese government and Lord Beresford."[194] Lord Liverpool, after having read Canning's letter, forwarded it to Wellington. Liverpool, in his preface, took care to remind Wellington that he had "always has been in favor" of Lord Beresford's command of the army, for it would check "the insane proceedings of the Spanish government."[195] Wellington—who as we know detested Portuguese intrigues and was in favor of ignoring them—feigned ignorance of Portuguese affairs, "excepting what I see in the newspapers" (which he equally despised). He thus could not be expected to discourse on Portugal. But if he had to offer advice, it would be of sending Beresford to Portugal so he could stabilize the country so thoroughly that Wellington would never have to bother with Lisbon again.[196] He did have one caveat: Wellington did not share Canning's desire to limit Beresford's political powers, and thus

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[194] Wellington, *Despatches of Wellington*, 409.
[195] Ibid.
[196] Ibid., 410.

informed Canning: "if it is thought important that Beresford" should go "it had better be omitted."[197] King George IV agreed with Wellington and wrote from the Royal Lodge that Canning's desire to block Beresford's entrance into the Portuguese peerage "could not be flattering to the feelings of Lord Beresford," nor "in a political view" would it be "a dignified measure for *us* to take."[198] Although Wellington sympathized with Beresford's want of privilege for strategic purposes, his patience was exhausted by Beresford's hyperactive social ambition. He snorted, perhaps in an effort to assuage his own insecurities about fame that "if I were Lord Beresford, I would not care one pin about the matter."[199]

After haggling over suitable provisions, the triumvirate saw fit to inform Beresford of his *summons*. Wellington thus sent a highly formal letter to Beresford, no doubt in an effort to flatter his friend's ego. He was ensured that his "name" and his "character carry great weight" and when he succeeded in "bringing, order, regularity, and discipline, to this mass [Portugal] of confusion and mutiny," he wold "have rendered" the "greatest service" for "this country" and for "Europe." Being the friend that he was, he assured Beresford that if he should fail there is "candour enough in the world" to understand that you faced "insurmountable" odds, and after all "the times are altered."[200]

Beresford, always eager to satisfy his pal Wellington, decided not to write back and went directly to Wellington's hideout in Apethorpe (Wellington had been repeatedly harassed by overzealous news writers). There they discussed the provisions and the niceties of the appointment, though Beresford (often himself confused) confused Wellington to a degree where Wellington admitted we have had "two or three conversations about the provisions"

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[197] Ibid.
[198] Ibid., 412.
[199] Ibid., 464.
[200] Ibid., 413.

but "have not" been able "to come to a result which he and I clearly understand."[201] The duo also discoursed on Portugal's politics and how they might affect Beresford's position. Beresford believed, that in order "to render sufficient service" three events had to occur in Portugal: Miguel must take the oath; become the Regent on his twenty-fifth birthday, and then finally not be obstructed from "exercising the powers of the Regency given to him by the constitution." Beresford did not approve of Miguel and his absolutism; it was rather a matter of pragmatism. To be successful, Beresford said, he required order and balance in Portugal (to establish a respectable army), and a legitimate popular monarch to attach his soldiers' loyalty to. It seemed that Beresford had not given up hope on Miguel becoming a legitimate monarch.[202]

Beresford, well versed in the constitution, not surprisingly saw flaws in it. The Regency was doing more harm than good, he said, for it "has no symptoms of permanency." Miguel would be named "governor" at twenty-five (if he took the oaths), but his mother the "Queen Dowager" would continue in her efforts of "keeping alive and spurring on" the absolutists.[203] Beresford realized that absolutism was now untenable in Portugal, and thus he acquiesced. He was above all in favor of a legitimate monarch running a legitimate government, whether a moderate constitutional one that supported aristocratic privilege or an absolute one. It did not seem to matter anymore. Thus he approached Portuguese politics, this time, with a more pragmatic approach.

In order to bring order to Portugal the parties there had to disintegrate. Whether that meant reconciliation (and possibly violence) or concessions was up for partisan leaders to decide. But in the present circumstances, Beresford knew it would be impossible to form any

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[201] Ibid., 421.
[202] Ibid., 426.
[203] Ibid., 479.

kind of military cohesion with soldiers "speculating" on "every change of government" in search of "personal advantages." He believed that soldiers would not be willing to "attach" themselves to a government as "ephemeral" as the "present one."[204] The queen dowager, he said, "must be" removed entirely "out of the kingdom." If this were effected, he was "pretty sure" he "could bring back order and tranquility to that Kingdom."[205] In short, Beresford desired a government that had signs of permanency and would not take the command if that were doubtful. However he was still perfectly willing to go to Lisbon and see for himself. Beresford did not limit his reading of the constitution to politics only; he combed it for any privileges he might gain from serving under it. He had his own notion of what the "proper rewards" for his "services" ought to be.[206]

Of Canning's original provisions, namely no politics, no peerage, and renunciation of British citizenship, Beresford—with Wellington's help—had managed to eliminate all but one of them. As Wellington, exhausted with the matter, succinctly put the compromise they had laboriously concocted: "Beresford is a naturalized subject in Portugal" who "without any connection or communication with his Majesty's government" should be able "to enjoy an honour which the laws and constitution" enable him to enjoy. Finally, "he wishes to be a peer" and the "constitution allows him to be a peer." Canning was fearful of the damage Beresford might do in Portugal, but he was also fearful about how his political and military appointment would be viewed in Europe. Wellington, always eager to quarrel with Canning, lectured him on Beresford's behalf that it is "quite inconsistent" to "tell him" he "shall not be one [a peer of the Portuguese realm] only because foreign Powers may be jealous." Foreign powers would "of course be jealous of the whole arrangement," but "I shall be indifferent"

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[204] Ibid.
[205] Ibid.
[206] Ibid., 423.

toward "their feelings" if Beresford could get that army in order and turn "that country [Portugal] into an efficient ally" instead of being a "burthen" on Britain.[207]

Beresford's lobbying for privilege may seem excessive to many—and indeed it was. However he had a more practical reason for being a Portuguese peer. Beresford fully believed that when Miguel came into power that Portuguese aristocrats would enjoy a rejuvenation, because Miguel would restore the old order. Furthermore he knew his being a peer would make his "situation" more "respectable."[208] It would also enable him to continue to guide political developments from his seat in the upper house of the Portuguese legislature. Canning, thinking Beresford's seat in the Chamber was doubtful, as after all he was a "foreigner" and worse yet a "heretic" from the viewpoint of the Catholic Portuguese, acquiesced.[209]Although Canning still had "very great doubts" about Beresford being able to handle an "anomalous situation," he gave Beresford his blessing to head to Lisbon.[210] Beresford before his departure to Lisbon recited—for his handlers' pleasure—the provisions that he could not whittle away: he was to have no contact with the British government and he was to be considered a Portuguese subject.

While the triumvirate had been haggling, the Portuguese were still waiting for word of Miguel's oath. Tensions abroad escalated, as Vienna, France, and Spain speculated on Miguel's right to forego the provisional stage (Maria's maturation) and take immediate control of the Regency after having taken the oath. The new government to say the least was pressured. Desertions to Spain had not decreased and Beresford's invitation was not popular among those who knew (the current *Marechal General Junto ao Real Pessoa*, and Beresford's

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[207] Ibid.
[208] Ibid., 425.
[209] Stapleton, *Some Official Correspondence of George Canning*, vol. 2, 145.
[210] Ibid., 155.

good friend, the "Ultra-liberal," Duke de Saldanha was not notified) of it.[211] The British Ambassador to Portugal, Sir William à Court, thought that the liberals would be angered by Beresford's appointment because of the "notion" that all of Beresford's friends were "decidedly hostile to anything in the shape of a constitutional form of Government." Thus the reader may assume that the liberals were not aware of Beresford's "personally attached" friend, the "Ultra-liberal" Duke de Saldanha.[212] Political labels, during this period, were arbitrary and frequently contradictory.

Word of Miguel's oath taking reached Beresford while he was still in London; he was waiting for permission to sail to Lisbon on 22 October 1826. Miguel had taken the oath eight days before the first meeting of the new government, despite Metternich's mischief. This was a significant victory for the young government, because it gave the first meeting more of an air of legitimacy—that is if the news of Miguel's fealty reached Portugal in time for the first meeting—for Metternich had suppressed the news. However, Metternich's aim to foment anarchy in Portugal was stifled by Canning's trusted messenger, who raced across the Pyrenees to reach Lisbon just before the first meeting of government (30 October 1826).

Before Beresford left he continued to try to garner support for Miguel. He arbitrarily interpreted Canning's letters, in the hope that in the confusion they would swing to Miguel's side. He complained, at least ostensibly, that Canning had previously supported "Isabel" but now it seemed he was "certainly in favor of Don Miguel." This "line of conduct" would only encourage "partisans of Don Miguel" and thereby keep Portugal in her "unquiet and agitated state."[213] Moreover, he was annoyed by his government's lack of "fixed character" and exhorted them "to bring their minds to a decision," for the sooner they did, the sooner

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[211] Ibid., 146.
[212] Ibid., 147.
[213] Wellington, *Despatches of Wellington*, 438.

Portugal would stabilize. Beresford believed the indecision would diminish confidence in the Regency and would cause a "civil war" should the Infanta take any "strong measure" to support her wavering "authority."[214] Beresford however was "far from impugning" Canning's change of heart in supporting Miguel. In this effort to rouse support for Miguel in his own government, he reasoned that it would "be in favor of Portugal" to crown Miguel immediately, for Austria was supporting him and Spain surely favored Miguel's "becoming Regent." Beresford wanted Miguel to be crowned immediately (instead of wanting until his niece was of the proper age to marry), for the sooner Miguel was crowned the sooner that the liberal-led provisional Regency would be swept away. Thus he assured the British government that crowning Miguel immediately would be the "best arrangement" for the "tranquility of Portugal" and for the "general interests of Europe."[215] Beresford thought ill of the stipulation that Miguel should have to wait until his twenty-fifth birthday to take over the Regency from his sister. He preferred Miguel because, as the circumstances were with the army heavily in favor of Miguel, he knew that any other arrangement would be problematic. Canning immediately denounced Beresford's accusations and could not "imagine from what letter or despatch" that Beresford could have "inferred" that he had switched positions. He reminded him that it was "fully explained" in his dispatch that "the Infant has *no right* to take the Regency out of his sister's hands."[216] Canning would not be won over as easily as Beresford thought.

Beresford, however, kept up his complaint. He was upset with the government's lack of a firm policy towards Portugal. Their "middle course" would disintegrate "what little

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[214] Ibid., 438.
[215] Ibid., 438.
[216] Ibid., 443.

ground" he had to "stand upon."[217] Beresford was eager to avoid another episode like that of the *Windosr Castle* incident, in which it was obvious to the public that there was a schism between him and Thornton; Thornton's plan was supported by the British government, thus showing the Portuguese that Beresford did not have the full confidence of his own government. Appearances were everything. Thus Beresford was adamant that his government make a firm decision on Portugal and stick to it. In that way he could act accordingly and avoid being left to flap in the wind again, like he did when the king went aboard the *Windsor Castle*. Beresford and Wellington preferred that Miguel rule absolutely in Portugal because only then could Portugal finally enjoy some continuity. However that was not the principal concern of Wellington. All he truly wanted was to ensure that Portugal would cease to be a burdensome ally. With a constant threat of invasion from Spain or France, or both, Portugal's inability, due to its weak army, to defend itself was bothersome to both Wellington and Beresford. Thus Beresford left for Lisbon willing in some ways to make concessions to the liberals—that is until Miguel returned—as long as he was left to fix the army. However, Beresford's pragmatism only went so far.

Meanwhile the Marquis of Chaves (formerly Count Amarante who with Miguel were the key players in the Vilafrancada) was again in the far northwest corner of Portugal stirring up trouble against another constitutional government. And because the queen dowager was still alive, the absolutist faction was as well. Soldiers who preferred absolute rule by Miguel continued to defect to Spain, where the queen's obliging brother, Fernando VII, provided them with arms and room and board. Canning was furious. Thus tensions were high when Beresford entered Portugal in late 1826.

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[217] Ibid.,441.

Beresford was not well liked by the liberals. For them, he represented Miguel and absolutism. His reputation as a partisan of Miguel had become irrevocably solidified after the Abrilada. Liberals remembered the arrests and the terror Miguel unleashed on Lisbon on 30 April 1826, and thus were not willing to abet a man whom they believed applauded Miguel's actions. They were not, however, aware of or receptive to Beresford's recently adopted pragmatism; they were too busy with survival. Thus it is hardly surprising that cold shoulders and hollow words greeted Beresford's arrival in Lisbon.

When Beresford first arrived in Lisbon he was appalled by the seemingly free rein the liberals enjoyed. His pragmatic approach was put on hold. Liberals were everywhere, he complained. And he was distraught to see that his employer, the Infanta, had been "calling to her assistance all the worst democrats of 1820."[218] Lisbon was on the brink of "anarchy"[219] because the Infanta had no authority over the autonomous liberals making "a jest" of law and order. Liberals were persecuting people on a whim, and with "no police" and "no ministry" the Infanta had "no authority" over them. Once his shock subsided, Beresford empathized with the Infanta and tried to "comfort her" by promising to stay "by her side" in the quite possible event that the queen attacked her.[220] (Beresford was always entranced by royalty and never missed an opportunity to be in its presence.) Although Beresford was out of sympathy for her liberal government, he much preferred her to anything the xenophobic queen had to offer. In order to ensure that the queen or any other power did not topple the Infanta's interim government, he sought to make the army sound enough to repel and or intimidate any foe.

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[218] Ibid., 439.
[219] British Library Additional MSS, Peel Papers, Vol Ccx, fol. 261, Sir John Poo Beresford to William Carr Beresford, December 26, 1826, Hereafter cited as Peel Papers.
[220] Wellington, *Despatches of Wellington*, 479.

Out of his empathy for the Infanta, he donned once again his shawl of pragmatism. He was quite aware of the "enmity" many people felt towards him, and thus he took "the command unconditionally." Beresford hoped that this would permit him—working under the Minister of War—"and not meddling with them" that he would be free "to do" his "job."[221] If allowed to do his job, then the Infanta would be protected and in Beresford's mind if royalty was protected then the country was protected. But the liberals quickly exhausted his patience. The mutual hatred was too imbedded in their psyches. One can understand why liberals were leery of Beresford. His presence suggested possible British support for their repression—a scary prospect. And Beresford was certainly not an easy individual to deal with; he was confrontational and was frequently described by his contemporaries as coarse and highly emotional. Moreover, Beresford was at odds with the liberal-run War Office's policies and was not shy about making his disappointment known. He condemned their policy of dismissing Miguel supporters, for the dismissed added to the Portuguese and Spanish troops who were hostile to the Infanta, just across the border in Spain. Furthermore, his gossip circles told him that, the Minister of War, Saldanha was telling people in private conversation, that "he knew nothing of him [Beresford] as Marshal" and "certainly would not comply with his requisitions."[222] He became convinced that the liberals, "the most unprincipled people in the country,"[223] had "decided to wage war against" him "by every means."[224] He quickly came to the conclusion "that that any dependence on a Minister of War, must render the services of any Foreigner nugatory."[225]

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[221] Beresford to Sir William à Court, Peel Papers, [Fol. 122-123] January 9, 1827.
[222] Ibid.
[223] Ibid.
[224] Ibid.
[225] Ibid.

At first Beresford believed the liberals in their maltreatment of him were acting on their own accord, as there was "no communication of any nature whatever from the War Office or any other office of this Government."[226] But as the "public insult" grew worse, he became convinced that it must have been sanctioned and "encouraged in higher quarters."[227] And he eventually confirmed—if gossip is valid—that the "Infanta Regent has had to play a part."[228] It could be that after having witnessed the disorder and corruption under the constitutional government, he was eager to see Miguel come in and be crowned "the legitimate King."[229] As he argued earlier, Miguel's ascension would appease the European powers. And he was confident that he could exert his influence over Miguel, making and keeping Portugal and Miguel a British ally. Moreover, Miguel was popular with the army, and thus the longer he was kept from the throne the longer the factionalism and disorder would persist. He realized that this process would probably occur naturally and therefore his presence in Portugal was no longer truly needed.

The gossip and "the intrigue, the intrigue everywhere" finally began to take a toll on Beresford's fragile psyche. He became disenchanted with Portugal and its bitter partisan politics and was eager to leave the nest of liberals. He thus began scheming to find a way to defend his all important honor. Quitting Portugal, or being made to leave was a profound demarcation for this peer. When he explained his departure in 1827, he claimed that because the Portuguese could defend themselves from any "Spanish force," his presence was no longer "any matter of necessity."[230] Apparently the reason why the Infanta had originally hired him had escaped his memory. Beresford left Portugal angered by his treatment there.

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[226] Ibid.
[227] Ibid.
[228] Beresford to Sir William à Court, Peel Papers, [Fol. 122-123] January 14, 1827.
[229] Wellington, *Despatches of Wellington*, 479.
[230] Beresford to Lord Liverpool, [Liverpool Papers, Fol. 114] December 30, 1826.

But he however could enjoy a private chuckle when he thought about what the future—Miguel and his rampaging army—portended for the liberals of Portugal.

Relief from partisan politics—if he thought that could be achieved—was not to be found in Britain. The Tories and Whigs were in perpetual strife, and Beresford's conservative actions and vigorous use of power gave the ready Whigs prime ammunition. *The Times*, the principal "organ of the government," was now fully opposed to Beresford's sympathy for Miguel and the Portuguese absolutists. A blistering article which was filled with derogatory epithets on 30 January 1827 so thoroughly denounced Beresford that he felt compelled to write a letter to the editor defending himself. The article, in favor of the liberals, tried to humiliate Beresford, by first condemning Beresford's "illicit connexion with a Portuguese lady" and then later claiming that his mistress had left him for the liberal cause. Beresford was vilified and called an "*empenha*" (a derogatory Portuguese term for someone who is the tool of others). The article added that a Portuguese "monk" had poisoned the Minister of War, Saldanha. Although a link between the rogue monk and Beresford was not confirmed.[231] The House of Commons was equally hostile to Beresford's foray in Portugal. Whigs there attacked Wellington and Beresford. And although Wellington backed Beresford in private circles, he had grown angry over Beresford's constant stream of letters filled with Portuguese rumors. Nevertheless, when Wellington was asked to form a government in 1828 he chose Beresford as his Master-General of the Ordinance. Though his duties were now primarily domestic, he still kept an ear out for Portuguese gossip and kept up his correspondence with various individuals there. His correspondence with Portugal, however, did not prevent him from corresponding with his first cousin, and later wife, the wealthy widow Louisa Hope. The two married in 1832. In his later years he still continued to profess

[231] *The Times*, Tuesday, Jan 30, 1827; pg. 2; Issue 13189; col D.

Miguel's innocence after Miguel usurped the throne in 1828. He maintained that Miguel "himself does nothing, and what is done in his name is abominable."[232] And when Miguel proved, during the Liberal Wars (1828-1834) to be as avaricious as everyone claimed, Beresford, in defense of his actions in Portugal, could only meekly retort, with hunched shoulders, that "D. Miguel was the right heir."[233]

Beresford's failures in Portugal did not sit well with him. His ego had been bruised by his time there. In his twilight years he tried to reason away and make excuses for his fall. In a letter from the "old commander" to his one time star pupil and later enemy, his "dear friend" the Duke de Saldanha, Beresford congratulated Saldanha on his "high political situation." But Beresford warned his "dear friend" that no man can succeed, even with "the best and purest intention," against "the intrigues and factious opposition" inherent in Portuguese politics. Thus every man "must be prepared to fall."[234] The letter was more a letter to himself than to his "dear friend," Saldanha. Beresford protected his honor and comforted his ego with the belief that no man, especially a military man, could succeed in taming the spirit of Portugal. He took solace in his advice.

Empire beat steadily in the hearts of both Canning and Beresford. They were the enforcers, the proselytizers, and the tools of their Cæsar. However, do not be mistaken. This was no corporeal Cæsar—"in Beresford's day and now, the sovereign power was in parliament, not the current occupant of Buckingham Palace"—rather it was a force much more powerful than any bag of flesh could ever hope to conjure.[235] It was tradition and the failure to break from it that drove them. The British Empire in style and taste—a visitor to London cannot help but notice the multitude of Doric and Corinthian columns supporting

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[232] Wellington, *Despatches of Wellington*, 94.
[233] Carnota, *Memoirs of Duke de Saldanha*, 184.
[234] Ibid., 421.
[235] Quote taken from the observations of professor, John Sears Mcgee.

the cumbersome edifices there—wished to emulate the Roman Empire. Some British men and women consider themselves the true heirs of the Roman Empire. Thus in a desire to honor this lofty claim, they—Beresford and Canning included—endeavored to make sure all roads led to London. Depending on the period and the proselytizer, the assimilation—for the benefit of the British Empire—of other powers could be of the benign unwitting sort (such as through trade, literature, the nationalization of philosophical traditions and words, et cætera) or of the more candid sort (conquest and colonization). Nevertheless, in whatever fashion empire was spread the fact remained that a majority—there were exceptions—of British men and women assumed imperial growth was inherently beneficial to their own livelihoods. Beresford and Canning were of this majority. Thus with force of words and arms they expanded the boundaries of the British Empire. However, they differed in their method and had opposing philosophies on what the British Empire should be and what it should espouse. Beresford was of the old Roman soldier brood; he made a career of enforcing the British Empire's definition of order. He defended the realm so far as it suited him. He was the middle child—an illegitimate child for that matter—born into a family on the fringe of aristocracy. His circumstances were lowly. However, since he was a part of the nobility an ascent to the power elite of Britain was not unattainable. And, fortunate for him, during his period opportunities for preferment were available. Levellers, emboldened by the Enlightenment, wielded reason in their attack against the hereditary nobility of Europe. They wanted change, however bloody a form it may take. Thus with the extant social order under siege, Beresford made a career of enforcing the *ancien regime's* definition of order. The question then is: why did Beresford choose Portugal as his theatre of operations, rather than his native Ireland where Catholics were chafing the status quo? The answer is an exceedingly simple one. As an ambitious man covetous of royally bestowed privilege, Portugal offered an

easier path to a Dukeship than that of Britain. He was a big piranha in a narrow inlet and liked it that way.

Yet after seizing one of the Spanish Empire's colonies (Argentina) he did away with the restrictive economic policies there, declared free trade, and destroyed royal monopolies—all seemingly crown weakening. However, it made perfect sense that Beresford would declare free trade in Argentina and Madeira, for Britain's economic vitality was principally derived from trade. The strict mercantilism of Spain and Portugal were impediments to British trade; thus he made it his aim to destroy that draconian system of trade. However, although he wished to liberalize trade in the empires of others (thereby making them dependent on the British), he was not pleased, nor did he condone, the subsequent social changes that came along with free trade. Beresford's empire was a grafted one; he had grafted a liberal economic model, in which commoners could progress and gain ascendancy through self-enrichment, on to the rotting trunk of a hereditary aristocracy that enjoyed privilege over others simply because of their birth. A trunk so rotten and tottering could not long hold a branch so fruit-laden and heavy. Beresford was blind to the contradiction in his policy of defending the status quo while opening avenues of self enrichment to the very people he was trying to keep down. Should not the newly rich control the dictates of government? After all foreign policy can have adverse or positive effects on the economy and the government. Would it not be prudent for the titans of industry to hold the keys of government, rather than the landed gentry schooled in the trifles of the genteel life? Beresford did not think so. He had seen the evils of Revolution first hand. He saw it in the pallid faces of exiled American Tories during his first active military service in Nova Scotia. He saw the effects of the French Revolution in Portugal, where he bore witness to the atrocities of total war unleashed by Napoleon. He saw it in the bodies of

Portuguese farmers, strung up by Junot, dangling from cork trees. Indeed the French Revolution, like every revolution, was born out of oppression. But unfortunately, like steam bursting forth from the valves of a train, when the pent up anger was released it brought with it destruction and no clear policy or direction. The 1820 constitutionalists were upset, and rightfully so. They were being ruled over by a foreigner (Beresford) and a group of corrupt regents, who seemed to have little concern for their livelihoods. But the main motivation for Revolution, because after all nothing is more antirevolutionary than a full belly, was the destitute economy and abject poverty in Portugal. Beresford and the regents did nothing to ameliorate the economy. In fact he exasperated the economic straits Portugal was mired in after the Peninsular War. Beresford keeping order in Portugal, through violence and the threat of it, allowed British merchants to continue to trade in Brazil at lower rates than the Portuguese themselves. The longer he kept order the longer the court could remain in Brazil. Thus the ports there would remain open to British commerce. It is safe to say that Beresford believed the new republics springing up and movements for democracy were ephemeral and would not last. He thus saw no profit in their existence, and rather found them to be subversive rather than beneficial to trade. It was, for him, a temporary affliction, the sort that could be stamped out if sufficient force was applied. He did not share the same sentiments towards the revolutions that his contemporary William Blake gleefully expressed: "the nerves of five thousand years' ancestry tremble."[236] Rather he wished to steady the nerves of Europe, not completely destroy the *ancien regime* by giving military aid to "all the worst democrats," like some of his contemporaries wished to do. Little wonder then that Canning and Beresford were completely at odds with the other's vision for Portugal during

[236] William Blake and Bruce Woodcock, *The Selected Poems of William Blake: with an Introduction, Notes and Bibliography by Bruce Woodcock.* (Ware, Herfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 2000), 212.

the 1820s. The very fact that they could even argue over the direction Portugal should take shows just how much dominion the British had over the Portuguese during this period.

During the 1820s Portugal was a reflection of the two primary doctrines being argued over in Europe's courts. Portugal was split between the liberals and the absolutists, and during that decade each had an at bat and subsequently struck out. The year 1820 saw the liberals take charge by expelling Beresford and setting up a constitutional monarchy. However, the constitutional monarchy was a poorly run republic all but in name; the king had no veto power and could not liquidate the government. The government espoused all the noble sentiments of the Enlightenment, such as liberty, fraternity, equality, progress, and an end to privilege. Yet they had no practical way to enforce them. Their laws were ambiguous and favored some (liberals) while censuring others (anybody who did not swear to their constitution). It was more a reign of terror than liberation. Furthermore the army never truly embraced their tenets, for they were still ill paid under the monetarily poor government. Thus a conservative backlash was almost immediate. The government was deposed after the Miguel-led Vilafrancada in May 1823. With King João VI back on the throne it seemed Portugal would return to the pre-French Revolution days. This was not tenable, for Portugal had undergone too many changes; too many commoners and aristocrats had gained ascendancy during the king's long sojourn in Brazil. He had little choice but to adopt a moderate constitution. However this role reversal did not suit Miguel and his mother, the queen. Soon after declaring that a constitution would be granted and that liberals would be pardoned, the uncompromising duo of mother and son attempted to force the old king to abdicate in favor of them. It was during the Abrilada, and the foreign policy dilemma that ensued after it, that the schism between Beresford and Canning became pellucid. Beresford was in favor of supporting Miguel and his Holy Alliance absolutism, even

though he did not particularly approve of the young man's sense of decorum. Indeed Beresford was not especially opposed to the champions of the aristocracy, the Holy Alliance. Canning, on the other hand, was willing to spend all of Britain's treasure and spill all the blood necessary to oppose the Holy Alliance. It was not that Canning was especially in favor of liberals and their movements. In fact he wrote anti-Jacobin poetry during his Eton days. Rather he recognized that empire was evolving from one where the aristocracy could control the vast amount of the population by employing them as tenant farmers toward an industrial one sensitive to the caprices of the world market. Thus he saw profit in recognizing the liberal republics springing up all over the new world—in his phrase— "I called the New World in existence to redress the Old." Moreover liberal principles of equality would give more incentive to would be entrepreneurs and would increase the buying power of the middle class. It mattered little to Canning whether the republics and constitutional monarchies were considered to be legitimate by the rest of Europe. Legitimacy, however, was of the utmost importance to Beresford, for if "all the worst democrats" could rule then the whole social order—of hereditary aristocratic privilege—would unravel, in Beresford's estimation. He was not eager to see this happen in 1826 when the king died. To ensure that this scenario would not happen in Portugal, he exerted all of his influence and employed petty trickery at every turn in an effort to support Miguel. However the odium of the liberals was more than he could bear and, after all, he figured, Miguel and his troops would probably make quick work of the constitutional government on their own. Beresford's intervention and, later Canning's sending of troops to support the constitutional government inflamed both sides. Thus when Miguel came back to Portugal in 1828 and usurped the throne, it was not the beginning of the liberal wars (1828-1834). Rather it was just another battle in the long war between liberals and absolutists that began in 1820 and ended when the liberals

finally won in 1910 when Portugal's first republic was established. In some ways Beresford's verbal assurances— he made many backroom guarantees that the British would not intervene if Miguel usurped the throne—galvanized the Portuguese even more so during a time when compromise was possible. Furthermore Whig support for liberals gave that party hope and confidence, which further inflamed and propelled the Portuguese into a civil war. Beresford's and Canning's ideological struggle mirrored the struggle in Portugal between Miguel and the liberals and in the end both suffered from their lack of cooperation. Portugal continued to be embroiled in war and factional conflict; and for Britain their ancient ally was now more burdensome then beneficial. Portugal would continue to decline after the royal family left for Brazil in 1807. Beresford's intervention only exacerbated that decline.

Bibliographical essay

Lord William Carr Beresford has been the subject of several derogatory pamphlets, newspaper articles, scholarly articles, books, a dissertation, and letters. Nonetheless a definitive biography of Lord Beresford does not exist, though Malyn Newitt is currently working on one. There are, however, a few well-researched books that deal with different stages of Lord Beresford's life. The Argentinean historian, Bernando P. Almazán Lozier's book *Beresford William Carr: Governor of Buenos Aires, British General and Portuguese Marshal, Governor of Madeira and Senhor Supremo of Portugal : British Intentions for the Domination of South America in the XIX Century* [*Beresford William Carr: Governor of Buenos Aires, British General and Portuguese Marshal, Governor of Madeira and Senhor Supremo of Portugal: British Intentions for the Domination of South America in the XIX Century*], deals primarily with Beresford's invasion of Buenos Aires in 1806 and his subsequent escape, as well as some interesting insights on Beresford's childhood. Covering Lord Beresford's years in Portugal up to his expulsion in 1821 is Malyn Newitt's and Martin Robson's book, *Lord Beresford and British Intervention in Portugal, 1807-1820*. Both of these books are scholarly analyses of specific portion of Lord Beresford's life. Not as scholarly but entertaining and well researched is Rose Macaulay's charming essay, "*King Beresford: Este Britânico Odioso.*" The essay can be found in her book, entitled *They went to Portugal Too*. S.E. Vichness deals with Beresford's military career in his doctoral thesis, "Marshal of Portugal: the military career of William Carr Beresford." R.C. Willis provides an excellent description of Lord Beresford's career during the 1820s in his brief article, "Wellington and Beresford: Portugal and Brazil." Apart from these secondary sources there are a bevy of primary sources one can read, the only problem being that Lord Beresford's letters are scattered all over the world. His letters can be read in North Ireland,

Buenos Aires, Lisbon, London, and at the Huntington Library in California—to name a few locations. A good place to start for any student or scholar who wishes to study Lord Beresford's career would do well to read the biographical sketch of him in the *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*. There one has access to a helpful bibliography and a useful, succinct rundown of Beresford's life. The reader may have noticed the frequent use of memoirs and published letters, such as Wellington's, Chateaubriand's, Neuville's, Canning's, and Saldanha's. These published letters are from a contemporary or friend of Beresford, and they provide useful reflections from people who lived during the period. However, one must read and approach the subject matter carefully, for they are very much one-sided. Neuville's, in fact, contained much outright fabrication. I have also made use of travel diaries, such as Mrs. Baille. There also some very interesting and fun-to-read articles in *The Times*.

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