

*If Not Now, When?: The Histories and Legacies of
Jewish Dissent from Zionism*

by


Andrew Farkash

A Thesis
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Bachelor of Arts
in the Department of History
at the University of California, Santa Barbara

May 7th, 2015

Abstract

Since its establishment on May 14, 1948, the State of Israel has received overwhelming support from the Jewish diaspora, with allegiance to Israel itself a major feature of Jewish identity. However, as the situation in the region persists, a growing number of Jews have begun to more openly and vocally challenge Israeli policy in the Palestinian territories. Although dissent from Zionism within Jewish communities is not a new phenomenon, it has gained a wider audience and a louder voice. In fact, in both the United States and Israel, where a majority of the world's Jewish population lives today, some Jewish organizations have had a long history of opposition to Zionism. This paper traces this relatively unknown history and analyzes their influence on the raging debate and heated discussions surrounding the intractable Israeli/Palestinian conflict.



Graffiti in Jaffa. It reads in Hebrew on the left and Palestinian Arabic on the right, "we have no other homeland."

Table of Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	4
MAPS OF ISRAEL/PALESTINE	5
PREFACE	7
INTRODUCTION	18
CHAPTER 1: THE AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR JUDAISM	26
CHAPTER 2: MATZPEN	40
CHAPTER 3: CONTEMPORARY FRICTIONS AND DEBATES	54
CONCLUSION: FACING THE OCCUPATION	66
BIBLIOGRAPHY	70

Acknowledgements

To my mentor, Professor Paul Spickard, for your unwavering guidance and support. Your belief in me pushed through times of discouragement and reminded me to write my truth.

To Professor Harold Marcuse, for your encouragement in our thesis seminar these past couple quarters. Thank you for challenging me to question my assumptions and teaching me how to be a more rigorous researcher and writer.

To my friends Ryan Orihood and Emily Schneider, for reading and commenting on rough drafts. Your friendship—and support of my project—means the world.

To Daren Spears, my best friend, love, and partner-in-crime, for always standing by me and for keeping me grounded throughout this process.



To my parents, Sigal and Ofer Farkash, my maternal grandparents, Fortunèè and Eli Elkiss, my paternal grandparents, Sara and Tzvi Farkash, and the rest of my family for providing me with the tools to pursue my passions in every which way they take me. I am forever indebted to you all.

And to my Jewish brothers, sisters, and ancestors, for never allowing me to forget my roots.

Maps of Israel/Palestine

ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES





Preface

“The antonym of forgetting is not remembering, but justice.”

–Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi

Like most children born to Jewish-Israeli families in the U.S., I was raised to love and support Israel unconditionally. I attended private Jewish schools in Los Angeles from pre-school to twelfth grade that fostered a deep connection to Israel through study of its language, culture, and history. I remember vividly the yearly celebrations of *Yom Ha'atzmaut*: the national day of Israel that commemorates the Israeli Declaration of Independence and the establishment of the Jewish State in 1948. Every year on *Yom Ha'atzmaut* at my elementary school, Adat Ari El, blue and white flags with the *Magen David*—or Star of David—flooded the school. As I walked to class, my eyes would follow the tiny plastic Israeli flags that were stuck in the flowerbeds. Classrooms were also decorated with Israeli flags, posters, and pictures and Israeli music blasted in the background. An entire day—aside from our regular lessons on Israel throughout the year—was dedicated to celebrating Israel's independence, perseverance, and continued existence.

Food was also a major component of these celebrations. My teachers would leave plates of blue-and-white cookies and Israeli chocolates on every table. At lunch we were fed all sorts of Israeli food, such as falafel, hummus, and Israeli salad. Although I ate most of these foods on a regular basis at home, there was something incredible about eating my favorite foods and listening to my favorite Hebrew music with all of my friends and teachers at school. After lunch, there was always a town hall where the principal would give a speech about the significance of this holiday. At the end, he would ask everyone to rise and we would begin singing the *Hatikva*, the national anthem of Israel. I remember

how loud and proud I would sing the last part of the anthem. The lyrics *lihyot 'am chofshi be'artzeinu, 'eretz-tziyon viyerushalayim* (to be a free nation in our land, the land of Zion and Jerusalem) would send chills down my spine. I was taught at home and at school that Israel embodied the liberation of the Jewish people from our oppression in exile and was a beacon of light, hope, and salvation in a dark world. These celebrations continued through junior high and high school and further reaffirmed these beliefs. I never skipped school on *Yom Ha'atzmaut*.

But subsequent to these celebrations was another holiday that was just as important as *Yom Ha'atzmaut*: *Yom HaShoah*, or Holocaust Remembrance Day. *Yom HaShoah* is celebrated immediately before *Yom Ha'atzmaut* and commemorates the approximately six million Jews murdered by Nazi Germany and its accessories during the Holocaust. For the remainder of this paper, when referring to the Holocaust I will use *Shoah*. I do this to decentralize the word 'holocaust' which is of Greek origin and means, "sacrifice by fire." For me, "sacrifice by fire" invokes an image of Jewish people walking into the Nazi gas chambers like sheep to slaughter. Instead, I am emphasizing the Hebrew word *Shoah*, which means "the catastrophe." For me, this word better encompasses the immense tragedy of this historical moment and makes more space for narratives of Jewish resistance to Nazi oppression.

Every Jewish school I attended, from elementary to high school, had some sort of monument that commemorated the *Shoah*. They were all somewhat different, but all of them had the Hebrew word *yizkor*, or remember (but was often translated as "never forget") etched somewhere on the monument. During *Yom HaShoah* at school, we *remembered* by studying the history of the genocide and reading survivors' testimonies. For

my family, this day was also an important reminder that we would not be in the U.S., let alone alive, if my paternal grandfather, Tzvi Farkash, had not survived the *Shoah*. Although most of his Hungarian-Jewish family perished during the *Shoah*, along with nearly 600,000 other Hungarian Jews, he kept his spirit high and his head even higher. He managed to escape from Hungary and eventually reached Israel, where he met and married my grandmother, Sara, whose family had also recently arrived in Israel fleeing antisemitic persecution in Egypt. These narratives, both the ones I learned in school and the ones passed down at home, ingrained in me the belief that if it were not for the Zionist movement and the establishment of Israel, not only would I not be here writing this today, but the Jewish people would remain vulnerable to another *Shoah*. Thus, *yizkor* was never enough. *Yizkor* was fighting for the safety and security of the State of Israel and for the well being of Jewish people everywhere.

This upbringing, along with regular trips to Israel to visit my family, instilled in me a deep love for *Eretz Israel*. But more significantly, it filled me with an even greater pride and affection for my people. I understood the necessity of a Jewish homeland, but the need for a strong and united Jewish community globally emerged paramount. By high school I had not only visited Israel plenty, but I had also lived there for months at a time through a program called *Tiferet* offered by my high school: Milken Community High School. During tenth grade, Milken took about half of my class to live and study abroad for a semester at Alexander Muss High School in Israel. This experience both strengthened and challenged my support of Israel, as the school we studied at was ardently Zionist. The history I learned there angered me as it quite plainly suggested that the new Nazis were the Arabs and that

the Jews were, for the most part, victims in their justified endeavor of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine.

But at the same time, my teachers at Alexander Muss were so obviously prejudiced that I began questioning some of the information I was being taught. I remember a teacher arguing that the Palestinian Arabs either voluntarily sold their property to the rapidly increasing Jewish population in Palestine or fled their homes in 1948 during Israel's war of independence (or what the Palestinians call the *Nakba*, which is Arabic for "the catastrophe").¹ I was taught that the Palestinian tragedy was a consequence of their inability to co-exist with the Jews and ultimately, a fabrication. I was taught to resist and deny the *Nakba*. But I did not buy into this. It was then that I began exploring the history of Israel from alternative perspectives: from Israeli historians critical of the national narratives and from Palestinian writers. However, regardless of my curiosity and the new information I was beginning to read, my love and support for the state of Israel remained strong.

During my senior year of high school, I was presented with an opportunity to visit the concentration camps in Poland where most of the Jews killed in the *Shoah* perished. I, along with most of my class and other Jewish seniors from another local Jewish high school, embarked on a two-week journey to Poland and Israel called *March of the Living*. The first week, which coincided with *Yom HaShoah*, was spent travelling throughout Poland with thousands of other Jewish students from across the U.S. visiting multiple concentration and death camps including Auschwitz-Birkenau, the largest Nazi concentration camp complex built during World War II. The second week, which coincided with *Yom HaZikaron*, which is

¹ For the remainder of this paper, I will generally refer to the Israeli War of Independence/the *Nakba* as the 1948 war.

Israel's memorial day for "fallen soldiers and victims of terrorism," as well as *Yom Ha'atzmaut*, was spent travelling, commemorating, and celebrating throughout Israel.² This trip was called *March of the Living* because on *Yom HaShoah*, the thousands of young Jews on the trip were to march silently from Aushwtiz to Birkenau. The *March*, which coincides with the Nazi perpetrated death marches that occurred towards the end of World War II, emphasized the significance of thousands of healthy and thriving Jewish students marching into—and out of—the very places many of their ancestors entered and never left.

I had been to Israel many times before this trip, but I had never been to Poland and I had never witnessed for myself the evidence that remains of the *Shoah*. I was told this trip would change my life, but I did not know that it would rattle me to the core as it did. I felt immense heartbreak and joy as I marched into Auschwitz on *Yom HaShoah* with an Israeli flag in my hand alongside thousands of other young Jews. We were supposed to be silent, but we could not stop ourselves from chanting, crying, and laughing. It remains to this day the most haunting and beautiful day of my life.




Figure 1: Me marching into Auschwitz with an Israeli flag on *Yom HaShoah* in 2011.

When we got to Israel, we were reminded of what we witnessed and felt in Poland. We were told to keep these memories close as we travelled throughout Israel. We were told that Israel was our *never forget*. I remember being bothered by this statement, but did not know why then. At Auschwitz, we were reminded that although the Jews were the primary

² See the Israeli Parliament's official website:
https://www.knesset.gov.il/holidays/eng/memorial_day_eng.htm

victims of the *Shoah*, the Nazi regime persecuted and murdered many other peoples. However, the organizers consistently emphasized the importance of never forgetting what this tragedy means for the Jews above all. It was not until after the trip that I began to realize why I was so frustrated with these notions: it was not because I disagreed, but because they were not enough.

Visiting the concentration camps placed me in front of an evil I did not understand—an evil without a name. I searched for answers, but could not find any that satisfied me. I understood that antisemitism fueled the *Shoah*, but I did not comprehend how anyone could be complicit in such heinous crimes. One day, I came across the writings of Hanna Arendt, a Jewish German-American philosopher and political theorist who fled Nazi persecution during World War II and who later reported on Adolf Eichmann's trial for *The New Yorker*. Eichmann was one of the major orchestrators of the *Shoah*. He was captured in Argentina by the Mossad, Israel's intelligence service, in 1960 and brought to Israel for trial where he was found guilty of war crimes and hanged in 1962. Arendt wrote in 1963 in *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*:

The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal. From the viewpoint of our legal institutions and of our moral standards of judgment, this normality was much more terrifying than all the atrocities put together.³

According to Arendt, Eichmann's evil and the evil of the *Shoah* more broadly were quite simply *banal*. This claim has been met with a lot of controversy, as it seems to imply that Eichmann's crimes against humanity were unexceptional. But this is exactly the brilliance—and tragedy—of Arendt's arguments. Arendt is not denying that Eichmann was

³ Hanna Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Penguin, 1994), 276.

an antisemite; rather, that his actions were ordinary in a system and society that normalized such evil. This does not forgive Eichmann of his crimes, but suggests that there is a potential Eichmann in all of us. Such evil, when legitimated and institutionalized, is far from exceptional. Arendt argues that this is what is most frightening about the *Shoah*.

Arendt lent me the words I was searching for and provided me with the tools to grapple with what I had just witnessed in Poland. She taught me that the *Shoah* was so tragic because it was normalized in Nazi society, allowing it to go unchallenged and unquestioned by much of the world as it was happening. Reading Arendt began to shift what I had learned on the *March*. *Never again* for the Jewish people became *never again for anyone*. If evil is banal, then not only could the *Shoah* happen again to the Jews: it could happen again to other peoples. And if evil is typical, then it certainly remains pervasive in our world today. I realized that the Jewish people would never be free in a world where others are oppressed. I held tight to these beliefs as I graduated high school and started my college career at the University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB).

At UCSB, I declared a History and Feminist Studies double major and studied a variety of histories, cultures, and ideas that further challenged my values and worldviews. At the same time, I also continued reading outside of class about Israel, its history, and its conflict with the Palestinian Arabs. Slowly, I began developing a more critical and complicated relationship with Israel. I still, and always will, love my country and my people, but I began to more rigorously and openly question the history I was taught about Israel, its establishment, and its current policies in the Palestinian territories. I also discovered films that pushed me closer towards embracing alternative narratives about Israel: *5 Broken Cameras* (2011) and *The Gatekeepers* (2012):

5 Broken Cameras is a documentary co-directed by a Palestinian, Emad Burnat, and an Israeli, Guy Davidi. The film is a first-hand account of protests in Bil'in, a West Bank village affected by the Israeli West Bank Separation Wall. *The Gatekeepers* is a documentary directed by Dror Moreh about the Israeli internal security service the Shin Bet, known in Hebrew as the *Shabak*, from the perspective of six of its former heads. Both films, albeit from opposing perspectives, make tangible the reality that many Palestinians live under on a daily basis in the occupied territories. Even *The Gatekeepers*, which was filmed from an Israeli perspective and acknowledges Israel's security concerns, suggests at the end that the root of the problem in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the occupation. Avraham Shalom, head of the *Shabak* from 1980-1986, said controversially in the film that, "[Israel has] become cruel....to ourselves as well, but mainly to the occupied population....[our army] has become a brutal occupation force, similar to the Germans in World War II....similar, not identical."⁴ Shalom goes on to clarify his words, saying that he meant that Israel's treatment of the Palestinians in the occupied territories resembles Nazis' persecution of non-Jewish minorities.

These films and other literature concerning Israel/Palestine moved me towards accepting Shalom's position that the occupation is cruel and brutal and, in time, I found myself fiercely against it. However, unlike Shalom, I do not think that drawing comparisons to Nazism or the *Shoah* when talking about the Israeli military or the occupation is legitimate or responsible. Instead, I think that oppression and injustice—regardless of magnitude—should be questioned and challenged. If evil is banal, then oppression can worsen and morph into a greater evil where no one is theoretically incapable of committing

⁴ *The Gatekeepers*. Directed by Dror Moreh. 2012.

or becoming complicit in such cruelty. I return to the *Shoah* to remind myself that the Jewish people, as much as any persecuted peoples throughout history, know what oppression looks and feels like. The *Shoah* should be a reminder to defend and protect the Jewish people, but also to stand with others who are oppressed. But no matter what I learned or came to believe, I could not reconcile two seemingly contradictory beliefs: that Israel has the right to exist as a homeland for the Jewish people and that the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories—and continued colonization of the West Bank—is unjust and must end.

As I began my research for this project, I found my hesitations getting the best of me. What reinvigorated my passion was another trip to Israel, a trip where I got to see the realities of those living in the occupied Palestinian territories. Every other trip I have taken to Israel has hidden this reality from me.

When I booked my flight, my state of doubt and confusion was high. I was becoming angrier the more I learned about the injustices committed by Israel in the Palestinian territories, but I was also beginning to question the ferocity of my critiques and the manner in which I was speaking out about them. It was becoming increasingly difficult for me to challenge a community I am so deeply connected to and even harder to face my family who are Israeli and whose sacrifices there are the reason I live the life of comfort and privilege in the U.S.

With a U.S. passport in hand, I spent most of my trip traveling back and forth between Israel proper and the Palestinian territories. My first couple of days I stayed with a Palestinian family in East Jerusalem and from there I visited Bethlehem, Aida refugee camp, Hebron, and Ramallah. I rode Palestinian buses most of the time, crossed through a few

Israeli checkpoints, and took an Israeli settler bus once when traveling into Hebron. I met multiple Palestinian families and individuals across the West Bank.

My trip to Israel reminded me how much I love the culture and people there. It reminded how much I love speaking Hebrew and how beautiful it is to see menorahs lit in nearly every home and store window during Hanukkah. It reminded me that there is a lot of beauty to Israel and its vibrant Jewish community that is often left out of the media. And I forgot how proud I was, regardless of the circumstances, to call this place my home and these people, well, my people.

However, I did not realize how truly ugly the occupation of Palestine is. Though I had conceived of its calamity, seeing it with my own eyes solidified the existence—and the grave injustice—of the occupation. This was most clear in Hebron where an Israeli settlement sits at the heart of the city. Nearby is a street named Shuhada, which was closed to the Palestinians by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in 1994 after the Cave of the Patriarchs massacre, when American-Israeli Baruch Goldstein, a radical Jewish settler, opened fire on unarmed Palestinian Muslims praying inside the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron, killing twenty-nine worshippers. The IDF forcibly closed over

1000 Palestinian businesses and vacated hundreds of Palestinian homes on Shuhada St. But what infuriated me the most there was seeing the *Magen David* graffitied on the Palestinian



Figure 2: *Magen David* graffitied on Palestinian shop closed by the IDF on Shuhada St. in Hebron. Photo taken on December 26, 2014.

shops and homes the IDF emptied. To see a symbol I identify so strongly with used as a symbol of oppression made me furious, ashamed, and complicit.

This trip answered a lot of questions, but also raised more. It reconnected me with my roots, but also made me realize the severity of the violence the Israeli government and army is committing in the Palestinian territories. Most significantly, it brought me closer to accepting the complexities of my views and of my identity and reminded me that I cannot run away from these confusions, tensions, and contradictions, but rather, embrace them.

After returning home, I realized this preface needed to explain what brought me to this project and what ideological frameworks guide my writing. I will explore the history of Jewish people who have developed dissenting relationships with Zionism and its contemporary political manifestation, Israel. I do this for personal as well as collective reasons. I am writing for myself: to discover and trace the histories and legacies of the Jewish people who came before me that dared to question the status quo. I also write for my community: as a humble challenge to face the reality that Jews are not and never were in total consensus on Zionism and, more importantly, to begin wrestling with the very real and tragic problems produced by the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. I do this not as an act of betrayal, but as an act of deep love and care for my people and my country. For me, true love is not blind: it is open, fluid, and constructive. For me, ending the occupation is ending Jewish complicity in the oppression of another people and the beginning of the formation of a collective Jewish consciousness that fights as fiercely for the liberation and freedom of all peoples as it does for its own.

With that, I shall begin.

Introduction

Recently, there has been much controversy over what can and cannot be said about Israel. Many progressive activists and scholars are being furiously attacked by mainstream Jewish organizations and leaders for criticizing Israel and are quickly branded as antisemitic. If they are Jewish, they are called self-hating or traitorous. This is despite the fact that Jewish opposition to Zionism accompanied the founding proposals made by Theodor Herzl—the father of political Zionism—at the First Zionist Congress in 1897 in Basel, Switzerland, and has not ceased since then.⁵ Many of these attacks are reactionary and work to silence what are often legitimate critiques of Israeli state policy, specifically in the Palestinian territories. However, some of these charges are valid as they highlight the unchallenged antisemitism that remains pervasive in various movements and places throughout the world. Israel, as a modern nation-state, should not be immune to scrutiny, but that does not mean that all criticism of Israel is kosher. This line can be blurry and unclear, making it difficult to immediately discern between acceptable criticism and antisemitism. In part, this can be explained by the harsh circumstances that prompted the birth of Zionism and pushed the Jewish people into Palestine to begin with.

Although Herzl's solution to the problem of toxic antisemitism in Europe was criticized from the beginning, in time it caught the attention of many Jewish leaders and communities. Within a couple of decades Zionism became increasingly popular and by the 1940s it was widely supported by the Jewish diaspora. Herzl came from a European Jewish family that encouraged his secular education, leading him to eventually acquiring a

⁵ Theodore Herzl, *The Jewish State* (Rockville: Wildside, 2008), 63-72.

doctorate in law.⁶ After completing his studies, Hertzl became the French correspondent for a Viennese newspaper where he covered the Dreyfus Affair. The Dreyfus affair was a political scandal in France that lasted from 1894 until 1906 and involved an assimilated Jewish army captain Alfred Dreyfus. In 1894, Dreyfus was convicted with treason and imprisoned under wrongful accusations of espionage. In 1896, France discovered evidence identifying a French Army major as the spy; however, this evidence was heavily suppressed and the real culprit was acquitted. The Army then fabricated documents accusing Dreyfus of more charges prompting accusations of a cover-up. This instigated a massive scandal that deeply divided France and it was not until 1906 that Dreyfus was finally exonerated and released.

The injustice of the Dreyfus Affair influenced Herzl heavily. Herzl "became a Zionist in Paris," where he developed the ideas that would become the ideological foundations of political Zionism.⁷ The Dreyfus affair made evident to Herzl that antisemitism was



Figure 3: Theodor Hertzl in Basel, Switzerland, 1897.

pervasive in France and throughout much of Europe; therefore, any and all Jewish assimilation would ultimately be futile. Herzl argued that Jews could only ever be safe and free in a homeland of their own. Herzl's answer to the

"the Jewish Question" was a political one, arguing that the Jews "are one people" and are capable and strong enough "to form a state, and a model state."⁸ A year after publishing *The Jewish State*, Herzl organized the First

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

Zionist Congress out of which emerged the World Zionist Organization, an organization that still exists today. Herzl's writings sent shockwaves throughout the Jewish world, resulting in the rise of the Zionist movement, the Jewish colonization of Palestine, and eventually, the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. Today, Herzl is revered as one of the most important figures in the history of Zionism.

However, Herzl's Zionist ideologies were not static or universally accepted among the Jewish people. Since then, there have been various ideological detours and reactions to Zionism, making it nearly impossible to entirely define it. There are different types of Zionism such as Labor Zionism and Religious Zionism and various oppositions to Zionism such as postzionism and anti-Zionism. Today after more than a century of existence, Zionism has become extremely multifaceted and stands for a range of beliefs and believers. At its core, Zionism is a form of Jewish nationalism based on the idea that a Jewish state must exist as a refuge for Jews in Palestine, the area of ancient Israel. But there are different kinds of Zionists. There are those who call for the entire region of modern Israel/historic Palestine including areas still inhabited by Palestinians in the West Bank to be inhabited by Jews and only Jews. There are also Zionist Jews who believe that the Jewish people have a right to live and settle the Land of Israel, but acknowledge the existence and plight of Palestinians and other non-Jewish inhabitants in the region. There are even some who are open to the idea of a binational Jewish-Palestinian state or two separate, sovereign states—Israel and Palestine—living side by side in peace and cooperation. Overall, Zionism has various social, political, and religious forms, and there are differences on what a Jewish state should and should not look like within sects of the Zionist movement historically and presently.

Because of this history and the complex nature of Zionism contemporarily, there are deep ties between Zionist and Jewish identity. Thus it is no surprise that many Jews feel that critiques of Israel are antisemitic. Although Zionism is a modern phenomena that only emerged in the late nineteenth century, most Jews today would say that being Jewish is being Zionist. However, Judaism and Zionism were not always so intimately attached and there is a deep history of Jewish dissent from Zionism that reflects this. These histories have for the most part been forgotten or ignored by many Jewish communities in the U.S., Israel, and elsewhere. Tracing these histories challenges the notion that Zionism is Judaism by exposing a vibrant legacy of Jewish opposition to Zionism and the moral and ideological imperatives that grounded them. Although Jewish objection to Zionism and the modern state of Israel has been marginal, in the past decade these few voices of dissent have multiplied into the thousands in both the U.S. and Israel, where a majority of the world's Jewish population lives today.

As a result, there is a growing conflict within and between Jewish institutions and communities over what is and is not acceptable criticism of Israel. Many of these more critical Jews in the U.S. affiliate with organizations such as J-Street and Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP). In Israel, many affiliate with groups such as Breaking the Silence, B'tselem, and the New Israel Fund (NIF), organizations that are committed to ending, addressing, or at least acknowledging the social, political, and economic inequities produced by the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. However, a majority of influential Jewish institutions in the U.S. and Israel have not welcomed such opposition from within.

In the U.S., even J-Street—known as a progressive pro-Israel group that supports the two-state solution and opposes the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement

against Israel—was rejected in 2014 from membership into the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, the umbrella group for more than fifty U.S. Jewish organizations.⁹ At my college UCSB, a self-identified progressive Zionist named David Harris-Gershon was stopped from speaking at Santa Barbara Hillel about his book *What Do You Buy the Children of the Terrorist who Tried to Kill Your Wife?*, which is about his reconciliation with a Palestinian family, for writing in an older public blog post that he supported Palestinians who use BDS as a form of non-violent protest.¹⁰

In the U.S. more broadly, this exclusion of some dissenting voices has been widespread within Jewish families, synagogues, community centers, museums, high schools, and college campuses nationwide. Rabbi Sid Schwarz, of the Adat Shalom synagogue in Bethesda, Maryland, summed it well:

In a sector of the Jewish community, there's a feeling that there's a deepening animus against Israel, in the international community, the media, even in the U.S. If you're feeling besieged, you try to control the things you can control. That's why you see these controversies about who can speak where.¹¹

⁹ Peter Beinart, "The American Jewish Cocoon," September 26, 2013, www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/sep/26/american-jewish-cocoon/; In 2005, Palestinian civil society issued a call for a campaign of boycotts, divestment and sanctions against Israel until it "complies with international law and Palestinian rights." The Palestinian BDS National Committee coordinates the BDS movement, which calls for these various forms of boycott until Israel meets the following obligations: "(1) ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands occupied in June 1967 and dismantling the Wall; (2) recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality; and (3) respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN Resolution 194." See the BDS movement's official website: <http://www.bdsmovement.net/bdsintro>.

¹⁰ David Harris-Gershon, "I'm Now Another Jew Who's Been Barred from Speaking within a Jewish Building (in America)," January 11, 2014, <http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/01/11/1268682/-I-m-Another-Jew-Who-s-Been-Barred-from-Speaking-within-a-Jewish-Building-in-America>.

¹¹ Marc Fisher, "For Jewish groups, a stand-off between open debate and support of Israel," May 28, 2014, <http://wapo.st/1nUv3aR>.

For example, the small but influential group Citizens Opposed to Propaganda Masquerading as Art (COPMA) has called on wealthy Jewish donors and institutions, such as the Jewish Federation, to cut funding from any community centers or organizations that “use our charitable donations to support activities harmful to the State of Israel.”¹² Recently, COPMA has attacked the Washington D.C. Jewish Community Center (DCJCC) for producing the play *The Admission* by Israeli playwright Motti Lerner, which centers on the disputed Tantura massacre of the 1948 Israeli-Arab war. Due to heavy pressure the DCJCC scaled down the production to a workshop series.¹³ Controversies such as these have increasingly made mainstream news and have strained and divided the U.S. Jewish community. This is not to imply that U.S. Jewry was always united; there have always been differences among U.S. Jewry, specifically religious, social, and political variances. However, as previously discussed, for many U.S. Jews the question of establishing and supporting a Jewish state was either answered decades ago or was never a question.

In Israel, there has been a growing discontent among some Israeli Jews with the current ruling party—under the leadership of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—and its policies. In a recent poll conducted by *The Jerusalem Post*, 60% of the Israelis polled don’t approve of Netanyahu’s leadership.¹⁴ Only 14% of the respondents were concerned with issues of social justice while the majority 34% were concerned with economic problems,

¹² Citizens Opposed to Propaganda Masquerading as Art, “About Us,” <http://www.copma.net/about-us/>.

¹³ Peter Mark, “Amid ‘Admission’s’ controversy at Teater J, DCJCC to host Israel perspectives series,” November 21, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/theater_dance/amid-theater-j-debate-jewish-community-center-to-host-series-on-perspectives-on-israel/2013/11/21/11f5ac16-52db-11e3-9ee6-2580086d8254_story.html.

¹⁴ Gil Hoffman, “Post’ Poll: 60% of Israelis Don’t Want Netanyahu Anymore,” December 05, 2014, <http://www.jpost.com/Israel-Elections/Post-poll-60-percent-of-Israelis-dont-want-Netanyahu-anymore-383724>.

namely alleviating poverty and resolving the socioeconomic inequalities among Israeli Jews. Some Israelis have also expressed a more explicit critique of Israeli policy in the Palestinian territories of Gaza and the West Bank. For example, thousands of Israeli Jews protested Israel's recent 2014 war on Gaza—Operation Protective Edge—at Rabin Square in Tel Aviv.¹⁵ These protesters were met with heavy backlash and violent opposition from counter-protestors.¹⁶ As more Israeli Jews begin to openly identify with political parties



Figure 4: Thousands of Israelis protest the Gaza war in Tel Aviv, July 26, 2014.

such as Meretz and Hadash and organizations such as Peace Now and NIF who are actively campaigning against the policies and actions of the ruling party, the veracity of Israeli society's hostility against them increases, especially from the Israeli right.

However when this aggression against Jews critical of Zionism in the U.S. and Israel is historically situated, it loses legitimacy and incites the need for a more nuanced understanding of Judaism and its relationship to the modern state of Israel. The tracing of Jewish dissent from Zionism also challenges the conflation of anti-Zionism with

¹⁵ Zafrir Rinat, "In Tel Aviv, Thousands Protest against Gaza Operation," July 27, 2014, <http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/1.607311>.

¹⁶ Haggai Matar, "The Night It Became Dangerous to Demonstrate in Tel Aviv," July 13, 2014, <http://972mag.com/the-night-it-became-dangerous-to-demonstrate-in-tel-aviv/93524/>.

antisemitism and reveals the historical processes that have stitched together Jewish and Zionist identity. In Chapter 1, I briefly sketch the rise of Zionism and its early Jewish objections in the U.S that led to the rise of the anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism in the 1940s. In Chapter 2, I shift my attention to Israel, first sketching the history of early Israeli-Jewish critiques of the Israeli government and its policies in the Palestinian territories. Next, I focus on the rise and history of Matzpen—or the Israeli Socialist Organization—an anti-Zionist organization founded by Israeli Jews in 1962. In Chapter 3, I outline the contemporary character of Jewish critiques of Zionism and Israel, focusing on the Open Hillel movement in the U.S. and recent tensions in Israel.

In doing so, I show that the Jewish people are not and never were in consensus on “the Jewish Question” Herzl posed over a century ago. I argue against the silencing of opposition to Zionism and suggest instead that Jewish organizations and communities of various backgrounds embrace these voices. I aim to show that honoring the perspectives of all Jews on Zionism and Israel—then and now—does not destroy Jewishness, but rather respects its long-standing and persistent heterogeneity. I also claim that these legacies of dissent and their contemporary manifestations provide useful strategies and frameworks that could help break the current impasse on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Lastly, I argue that these histories, once uncovered, instigate a serious struggling with the legitimacy and morality of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and necessitate a movement to build an Israel/Palestine that is more just, free, and equal for all those who feel that land home.

Chapter 1: The American Council for Judaism

Much has been written about the history of U.S. Zionism—how it was formed and how it spread—and the various leaders and organizations that fostered support in the U.S. for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. However, in the 1940s, when Zionists in the U.S. were engaged in a fierce struggle to help create this home, there was an organization that emerged as their strongest organized opposition within the Jewish community. In the 1940s under the leadership of Rabbi Louis Wolsey and Lessing Rosenwald, the American Council for Judaism (ACJ) was formed with the specific purpose of challenging Zionism. Since then not much has been studied and written about this organization and its leaders. Thomas A. Kolsky, in *Jews Against Zionism: The American Council for Judaism*, was the first historian to extensively study this history that—for the most part—has largely gone untold. Kolsky traces this history and argues that both Zionism and Jewish anti-Zionism are products of the powerful historical forces that have constructed the modern Jewish experience.¹⁷ In doing so, Kolsky exposes a deep and important history of Jewish opposition to Zionism. I argue that uncovering these histories disentangles Judaism from Zionism and shows that Jewish anti-Zionism is neither antisemitic nor treasonous.

Kolsky begins his book with a story about a conversation between the historian Joseph Klaussner and an American rabbi a few days before the first Zionist congress in 1897. When Klaussner asks the rabbi whether there were Zionists in the U.S., the rabbi responds, “Yes, there are two: a mad man named Stephen Wise and a mad woman [named] Henrietta Szold.”¹⁸ Although probably a myth this story illustrates the weakness and insignificance of

¹⁷ Thomas Kolsky, *Jews Against Zionism, The American Council for Judaism, 1942-1948* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), 1.

¹⁸ Ibid.

Zionism in the U.S. in the 1890s. It was not until the 1940s that Zionism in the U.S. became a formidable force through partnership with the Zionist movement in Palestine. In 1942, a group of Reform rabbis—led by Rabbi Wolsey—founded the ACJ in response to this rapid growth and proliferation. At first, the ACJ was primarily concerned with the rising support for Zionism within Reform Judaism. In 1943, Rabbi Elmer Berger and Lessing J. Rosenwald assumed leadership and transformed the organization into a predominately secular anti-Zionist group. It consisted of mostly middle-and upper-middle class Reform Jews of German decent. This is not surprising as Reform Judaism—a faith based on optimism, rationalism, and progress—was adopted by predominately German-speaking Jews who migrated to the U.S. from central Germany before 1880 and became popular in the U.S. during this time.

But initially Reform Jews had rejected Jewish nationalism, long before Herzl wrote *The Jewish State* in 1896. In 1841, at the dedication ceremony of Temple Beth Elohim in Charleston, South Carolina, Rabbi Gustav Posnanski declared that “this is our Palestine, this city our Jerusalem, this house of God our Temple.”¹⁹ Many Reform organizations attacked Zionism from the beginning as they believed that Judaism was “not political or national, but spiritual.”²⁰ For example, the Central Conference of American Rabbis (CCAR)—the primary organization of the Reform rabbis in the U.S. and Canada that gathered annually and issued non-binding resolutions on the principles and positions of Reform Judaism—declared in July 1897 at its yearly convention in Montreal its disapproval of any plans or attempts to establish a Jewish state. Similarly, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations approved a year later a resolution that rejected political Zionism and reaffirmed that the charge of

¹⁹ David Philipson, *My Life as an American Jew* (Cincinnati: John G. Kidd and Son, 1941), 137.

²⁰ Kolsky, *Jews Against Zionism*, 29.

Judaism was not to establish a nation-state, but “to spread the truths of religion and humanity throughout the world.”²¹ Even Isaac Mayer Wise, the architect of the Reform movement, dismissed Herzl—in his own words—as an egoist who played the role of a messiah. Wise called Zionism “a mere aberration” and questioned its legitimacy.

At the turn of the century, Rabbi Emil G. Hirsch, an author of the Pittsburgh Platform—a nineteenth century document issued by the American Reform Movement calling on Jews to adopt a modern approach to the practice of their faith—said that the “glitter of nationalism” was misguiding some Jews and that Zionism reflected “the despair and disillusionment of those who had lost hope in the visions of humanity.”²² However, organized political Zionism was not much of a force in the U.S. until after World War I. This was slowly destined to change in the early 1880s to the 1920s, when the makeup and size of the U.S. Jewish population radically transformed from a population of 250,000 and mostly of German ancestry to a population of four million of mostly Eastern European decent. Kolsky argues that these new Jewish immigrants were more likely to identify along national or ethnic lines, as they were not as integrated into U.S. society like German Jewry was. Thus, they were more inclined to support and join the Zionist Movement.²³ Open and widespread Jewish opposition to the Zionist movement would reach its peak in the U.S. with the issuing of the Balfour Declaration.

Dated November 2, 1917, the Balfour Declaration was a letter from the United Kingdom’s Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour to Baron Rothschild, a leader of the British Jewish community and a major financier of the Zionist project in Palestine. The

²¹ Philipson, *My Life*, 136-37.

²² Ibid.

²³ Kolsky, *Jews Against Zionism*, 2.

letter promised U.K. support for “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.”²⁴ The declaration also states, “nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.”²⁵ The Balfour Declaration was met with criticism from anti-Zionist Jews as well as Palestinian Arabs due to its ambiguity. Zionist leaders—in Palestine and the U.S.—approved of the declaration. However, they had hoped that the text would have been more strongly in favor of establishing a Jewish state in *all* of Palestine. The Palestinian Arab community opposed this declaration and criticized the conflicting promises of the U.K., who only a couple years earlier promised Palestine to the Arabs—albeit ambiguously—in the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence. Palestinian Arab leaders also challenged the language used in the declaration; they specifically contested the use of the phrase “non-Jewish communities,” which they argued erased the existence of a collective Palestinian culture and identity. Anti-Zionist Jews in the U.S. also opposed this declaration and reiterated their opposition to the “idea that Palestine should be considered the *homeland* of the Jews” when many Jews saw the U.S. as their home and felt themselves and their community an integral part of the American nation.²⁶ For the Zionist movement, the Balfour Declaration was a pivotal moment, as it became the basis of Western/European support for the eventual establishment of Israel in 1948. This declaration encouraged more Jews to immigrate to Palestine and—once publicized—was followed by the continued growth of the Zionist movement in the U.S.

²⁴ Balfour Declaration (1917), *Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East*, Akram Fouad Khater (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004), 131.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Charles Israel Goldblatt, “The Impact of the Balfour Declaration in America,” *American Jewish Historical Quarterly* 57 (New York: 1968), 460-4.

Anti-Zionist Jews used this moment to increase their agitations against Zionism, which did not begin to subside until 1922. There are two high points of active and organized Jewish anti-Zionist opposition during this time. The first was an anti-Zionist petition presented by Congressman Julius Kahn (R.-Calif.) in 1919 to President Woodrow Wilson for the Paris Peace Conference. This "Statement to the Peace conference" was supported and signed by 299 Jews. They denounced Zionists' aim of segregating Jews and marked the movement as a reversal of the historical trend towards emancipation. The statement challenged the idea of establishing an exclusively Jewish state in Palestine, arguing that such an entity would be contrary "to the principles of democracy." The statement demanded that Palestine instead be made into an independent, free, and democratic state.²⁷ The second was a testimony given by Rabbi David Philipson against the Lodge-Fish Resolution on Palestine of 1922. This resolution—which eventually passed despite Rabbi Philipson's impassioned speech—afforded U.S. approval to "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." Philipson argued that "no land can be spoken of as the national home of the Jewish people, as Jews are nationals of many lands...Zionists do not speak for all Jews."²⁸ These high profile oppositions to the Zionist movement from within the U.S. Jewish community reflect a consistent and parallel opposition to Zionism from its inception. However, this would begin to change in the 1920s, as many anti-Zionists began to shift to a more non-Zionist position: opposition to Jewish nationalism, but support of a Jewish cultural and religious hub in Palestine.

²⁷ "Protest to Wilson Against Zionist State," *New York Times*, 5 March 1919, 7.

²⁸ Herbert Parzen, "The Lodge-Fish Resolution," *American Jewish Historical Quarterly* 60 (New York: 1970), 71-81.

This shift began for multiple reasons, but one was most definitive: in 1921 and 1924, the United States enacted strict immigration laws, making Palestine one of the few areas of refuge open to Jews. Many Reform rabbis opposed to Jewish nationalism began to better understand the Zionist movement and were more open to cooperating with its leaders. The CCAR, which had previously condemned Zionism outright, was beginning to see its number of political Zionists growing. Young pro-Zionist rabbis began to challenge their older counterparts, paving the way for cooperation between anti-Zionist and Zionist Jews. But by the 1930s, the position of anti-Zionism in the Jewish community was severely weakened as the Reform movement's ideology shifted dramatically. In Europe and the U.S., antisemitism was on the rise. The emergence of Nazism in Germany signified the end of popular anti-Zionism within the Reform movement. For many, Nazism supported Zionist claims on the pervasiveness and extensiveness of antisemitism and the unpredictability of Jewish existence in the diaspora.

By the late 1930s and early 1940s, the U.S. Jewish relationship with Zionism had all but solidified. Kolsky writes:

Between 1917 and 1939, the world Zionist movement was closely allied with Great Britain.... Within less than two decades under the British mandate, Zionist settlers created a viable national—exclusively Jewish—community in Palestine. In May 1939, when growing Arab resistance to Zionism and a deteriorating international situation led the British to impose severe limits on Jewish immigration into Palestine and to assert unequivocally their unwillingness to collaborate in creating a Jewish state...the world Zionist movement, in a drastic policy shift, decided to turn to the United States and seek the backing of its Jews, general public, and government for Zionist political objectives.²⁹

In the 1940s, the U.S. Zionist movement—backed by the World Zionist Organization—permeated its ideology throughout U.S. Jewish communities. As rumors of the *Shoah*

²⁹ Kolsky, *Jews Against Zionism*, 3.

spread, many U.S. Jews, including those who had initially opposed it, began to support the Zionist movement. Further, the few places that were open to Jewish immigration were closed and between 1938 and 1942, Jewish immigration to the U.S. was heavily restricted. Also, in 1939, the British issued the White Paper, which ordered the end of Jewish migration to Palestine. Although it acknowledged this history and understood the formidability of the Zionist movement, the American Council for Judaism formed in 1942 in response to the intensification of U.S. Zionism. The birth of the ACJ was specifically triggered by the passage of a resolution supporting the construction of a Jewish army in Palestine by the CCAR at its annual convention in Cincinnati.

This move infuriated Jewish opponents of Zionism, as it was in violation of a 1935 CCAR agreement to remain neutral on the issue of Zionism. Some critics in attendance opposed this resolution because they feared it suggested that U.S. Jewry was a separate nationality and worried about the consequences of associating Judaism with militarism.³⁰ Many of the Jews against this resolution came from within the Reform movement, where there remained a group opposed to the Zionist movement. Angered by this resolution and committed to sustaining an active Jewish voice critical of Zionism, thirteen rabbis met at Temple Rodeph Shalom in Philadelphia on November 2, 1942 where they began planning the formation of a formal organization: the ACJ. At this meeting, they characterized their movement as the last stand against Zionism in the U.S., which would require a strong and calculated public relations campaign to succeed. The ACJ also hoped to educate the Jewish community about the political nature of Zionism and its potential consequences. Initially, the ACJ was optimistic, but its official formation came a day after the U.S. State Department

³⁰ *Central Conference of American Rabbis Yearbook (CCARYB)* 52 (1942), 173-178.

confirmed rumors of the Nazis' mass displacement and extermination of European Jewry on November 24, 1942.³¹ Although the ACJ would continue working on establishing the organization, many members became hesitant and frightened about openly opposing Zionism.

Nonetheless, the ACJ moved forward with its plans. On August 31, 1943, the ACJ approved and adopted the following statement as its platform, which it published a month later in the *New York Times*:

We believe that:

1. The basis of unity among Jews is religion.
2. Jews consider themselves nationals of those countries in which they live and those lands their homelands.
3. The present tragic plight of our fellow Jews can be remedied only through ultimate victory for and a beneficent program of reconstruction and rehabilitation, for men of all faiths, undertaken by the United Nations.
4. The United Nations should attempt to provide the earliest feasible reparation or resettlement under the best possible conditions of all uprooted victims of Axis aggression.
5. Numerous localities must be found throughout the world where resettlement can be effected under favorable auspices. Palestine, due to its splendid accomplishments, should continue to be *one* of the places where resettlement should be fostered.

³¹ "The Jewish Holocaust in progress," *New York Times*, 25 November 1942, 10.

6. Any hopeful future for Jews in Palestine depends upon the ultimate establishment of a democratic government there, in which Jews, Moslems and Christians shall be justly represented.

We oppose:

7. The effort to establish a Jewish National State in Palestine or elsewhere, and its corollary, a Jewish Army, as a project that has and will be deleterious to the welfare of Jews in Palestine and throughout the world.
8. All philosophies that stress the racialism, the nationalism and homelessness of the Jews as injurious to their interests.³²

This statement illustrated the ACJ's explicit support for the political and social liberation of Jews in the countries they inhabited despite its opposition to the creation of an exclusively Jewish state in Palestine. The ACJ's statement also reiterates earlier arguments made by early Jewish dissenters of Zionism that such a plan was undemocratic and against Jewish religious ethics.³³ With this statement, the ACJ argued that a democratic state should be established in Palestine where Jews and Arabs share the government equally and where the entire population has the same civil, social, and political rights. Lastly this statement—though not entirely dismissing the concept of Jewish peoplehood—refuted the Zionist merging of Jewish identity with nationalism. Immediately after publishing this significant and provocative statement, the ACJ began its public campaign against Zionism. The ACJ quickly found itself in the spotlight.

Rosenwald, who assumed leadership of the ACJ in 1943, published in the same year an article titled "Reply to Zionism" in the June 28 issue of *Life*. This article was based on the

³² "Statement of the American Council for Judaism," *New York Times*, 31 August 1943, 4.

³³ Kolsky, *Jews Against Zionism*, 4.

ACJ's official statement and also made additional arguments. Rosenwald argued that Zionism was founded on racist and nationalist theories—the very ideologies that Jews suffered under in Europe, and most recently, in Nazi Germany. Many Zionists denounced this article, causing uproar and controversy in the organized U.S. Jewish community and making public the Jewish debate on Zionism.³⁴ This was followed by the 1943 convention of the CCAR, where the question of U.S. Jewish support for Zionism was to be debated again. Zionist leaders feared a public controversy and hoped to quell attention by ordering that this debate take place in a more confidential “executive session.” Also, during the opening speech of the convention, the ACJ was attacked for fostering an impression of disunity among Jews within the CCAR and more broadly.³⁵

The debate happened as planned in the executive sessions. These sessions began with the question “Are Zionism and Reform Judaism Incompatible?” on which a paper—as well as other presentations and positions—were given. According to reports by Rabbi Wolsey of the ACJ (the debate was not recorded), the discussion was heated. Wolsey claimed that at one point Stephen Wise—the leader of the reform Zionist movement—threatened to transform the CCAR into a “Zionist Conference of Rabbis” if it did not censor the ACJ. Wolsey, in response, called the Zionists “fascists” and said “Wise has revealed by his tyranny over the non-conformist what the Zionists would do to the Arabs.”³⁶ This conversation culminated with the passing of two resolutions by the CCAR on June 25, 1934 that represented yet another immense blow to the ACJ. The first resolution declared that there was “no essential incompatibility between Reform Judaism and Zionism” and the

³⁴ L. J. Rosenwald, “Reply to Zionism,” *Life*, 28 June 1943, 4.

³⁵ James G. Heller, “The President’s Message to the Fifty-Fourth Annual Convention of the Central Conference of American Rabbis,” *CCARYB* 53 (1943), 183-189.

³⁶ Kolsky, *Jews Against Zionism*, 73.

second urged the rabbinical members of the ACJ to “terminate” the organization.³⁷ This was a major victory for the Zionists—and a major failure for the ACJ—in their pursuit of establishing extensive and concrete Jewish support for Zionism in the U.S. Zionists also began to win similar support from the non-Zionist American Jewish Council (AJC). By the end of 1943, there were three major Jewish positions on Zionism within the U.S. First, the Zionist movement, led by Stephen Wise and Abba Hillel Silver under the AZEC, was committed to seeing the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Second, the non-Zionist AJC held onto its position of neutrality on Zionism, but supported a UN trusteeship over Palestine. And lastly, the anti-Zionist ACJ remained committed to its position of total objection to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.

However, despite major setbacks and harsh criticism from the Zionist movement, the ACJ continued to grow. By the end of 1948, the ACJ grew from a group of sixty-seven dissident rabbis and other Jewish leaders into an organization with approximately fourteen thousand members and thirty-seven local chapters in the U.S.³⁸ Although the ACJ’s numbers swelled during this period, it faced a long and difficult battle and ultimately failed in its attempts to quell the Zionist movement in the U.S. Many of the leaders and members of the ACJ knew they faced a losing battle, but nonetheless they continued to fight and organize. But by the end of 1945, the ACJ was facing significant financial and organizational difficulties and was unable to garner any significant institutional support for its cause in the now largely Zionist U.S. Jewish community. The ACJ knew this, but maintained its opposition as it became increasingly concerned with the growing violence in Palestine. Led by Rosenwald, it issued numerous statements and resolutions. Of interest are the ten

³⁷ CCARYB 53, 92-94; *New York Times*, 26 June 1943, 9.

³⁸ Koslky, *Jews Against Zionism*, 242.

resolutions passed at the ACJ's third annual conference in 1947, which in summary stipulated the following: (1) no Jewish organization or individual—including the ACJ and its leaders—could on any occasion speak for all Jews; (2) it reiterated the distinctions between the terms *Jew* and *Zionist*; and (3) it condemned “all those who practice terror in Palestine,” including Jews and Palestinian Arabs.³⁹

These statements reiterated the ACJ's anti-Zionist positions immediately before the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. It was in many ways its last attempt at being heard by a Jewish community now deeply invested in Zionism. On May 14, 1948, at 4:00 P.M. from the Tel Aviv museum, David Ben-Gurion—a leader and founder of the Zionist movement in Palestine—read the Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel in the area designated Jewish land in the United Nations partition plan. The ACJ—despite its persistent and vocal opposition to Zionism and its consequences for the indigenous Palestinian Arab population—was unable to stop the hegemony of Zionism in the U.S. and the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Quickly after, President Truman granted Israel *de facto* recognition.⁴⁰ This marked the triumph of the Zionist movement—in Palestine and in the U.S.—and the total defeat of the ACJ.

Overall, the ACJ was no match for the Zionist organizations as they appealed to emotion and were able to inject a sense of urgency in U.S. Jewry.⁴¹ The ACJ was barely able to establish ties with even one prominent U.S. Jewish institution at the time.⁴² This was in part because Zionist organizations often painted the ACJ and Jewish dissenters as self-

³⁹ Ibid., 243.

⁴⁰ Harry S. Truman, *The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman. Years of Trial and Hope: 1946-1953* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1956),

⁴¹ Kolsky, *Jews Against Zionism*, 40.

⁴² Ibid., 199.

hating and treasonous—which persists still today—while the ACJ was cautious in its attacks. Kolsky argues that the ACJ's failure was a result of three major factors: its timing of formation, the unemotional character of its ideology, and the ostensible impracticability of its plan for Palestine. Kolsky also argues that despite Zionist claims otherwise, the ACJ's philosophy was situated in a deep historical tradition. Only fifty years before the ACJ's formation, its beliefs reflected that of most U.S. Jews.⁴³

I contend that the ACJ managed to establish an important history of Jewish objection to Zionism that has been largely ignored. This resistance to Zionism within the American Jewish community—even in the late 1940s when the establishment of a Jewish state was all but destined—suggests that Jews were never in consensus on Zionism. The ACJ also predicted many of the troubles Israel continues to face today, particularly those produced by the ongoing occupation of the Palestinian territories. Recounting this history of rebellion within U.S. Jewish communities additionally suggests that both Zionism and anti-Zionism are products of historical socio-political processes and therefore neither is inherently illegitimate. Moreover, the case of the ACJ's rebellion against Zionism immediately before the establishment of Israel reflects the complicated relationships that Jewish peoples have always had with Zionism, Israel, and nationalism more broadly. Confronting this history helps separate and unpack the historical solidification of Jewish and Zionist identity and exposes a significant and consistent Jewish opposition to nationalism—and later, to Zionism—even before the birth of the Zionist movement.

The history of the ACJ and of Jewish anti-Zionism is an important facet of Jewish history in the U.S. and therefore deserves deeper study. Its statements and ideologies may

⁴³ Ibid., 199.

also provide useful tools and frameworks that can be drawn on by Jewish critics of Israeli state policy contemporarily. Today, many Jews in the U.S. are beginning to *again* challenge Zionism; in the contemporary context, this has manifested in a questioning and challenging of the justifications and overall morality of the ongoing Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories. This growing controversy in the U.S. will be discussed further in Chapter 3 with a focus on the rapidly growing Open Hillel movement. In the next chapter, I draw my attention to the history of Jewish dissent within Israel after its formation in 1948, focusing on the period surrounding the founding of Matzpen—the Israeli-Jewish anti-Zionist organization—in the 1960s.

Chapter 2: Matzpen

In 1998, as Israel was about to celebrate its fiftieth birthday, a public controversy erupted over a television series shown on the Israeli public broadcasting channel.

Tekumah, Hebrew for renewal or rebirth, provided viewers with an overview of Israel's history by contrasting original footage with contemporary interviews. Limor Livnat, at the time Israel's minister of communications, said that she refused to let her daughter watch the series because she believed that it was sympathetic to the Palestinian cause:

"[*Tekumah*] distorts the great Zionist deeds and causes severe and probably irreparable damage to our image."⁴⁴ Ariel Sharon, at the time a cabinet minister, reaffirmed Livnat's position. Many Israelis were outraged and demanded that *Tekumah* be taken off the air.

Other Israelis regarded this national controversy differently. One observer characterized the anger as a reflection of a deep and widespread guilt and denial in Israel: "we don't want to know and we can't bear the sense of guilt. The establishment of the State of Israel was justice for the Jews, but was accompanied by a terrible injustice for the Palestinians."⁴⁵ Marita Sturken, a scholar of American collective memory, argues that scandals over national histories are less about the past and more about "how the past affects the present."⁴⁶ Thus, it is no surprise that many Israelis were outraged; their national history is as much a lens through which they view their past as it is a lens through which they interpret the events of the present and future. *Tekumah* challenged and rattled the very foundations on which Israeli national identity was built. This controversy, however, was only a part of a wider cultural conflict in Israel over its national and

⁴⁴ *New York Times*, April 10, 1998.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Marita Sturken, *Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic, and the Politics of Remembering* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 2.

collective memory that was ignited a few years before the broadcasting of *Tekumah*. This began with the rise of a group of critical Israeli historians and sociologists who came to be known as “the new historians.”

These historians—with access to then recently declassified Israeli state documents—“shattered a firmly established self-image and exposed as mere myths a large number of long accepted truisms.”⁴⁷ In 1986, Israeli historian Tom Segev published in Hebrew *1949: The First Israelis*, one of the first historical accounts that rigorously contested Israelis’ national identity. Segev refuted various Zionist myths based on these documents, including the following ideas: (1) that Israel had done everything possible to bring peace in 1948 and in the following years, but the Arabs continually refused; (2) that the Palestinian Arab refugees had willingly left their homes; (3) that the primary purpose of the state of Israel was to provide a safe haven for persecuted Jews in “exile”; (4) that Israel provided these Jews a place where they could live freely without political, economic, or social discrimination; (5) and that only in Israel could Judaism truly thrive.⁴⁸ Segev refuted many of these commonly accepted beliefs using the newly uncovered state documentation. Segev argued that the Arabs had not always refused to discuss peace with Israel, that many Palestinian Arabs were expelled from their homes during and after the 1948 war, and that Jewish immigrants from Arab countries were often discriminated against as a part of explicit state policies and actions.⁴⁹ Segev and the other new historians published in Israel various books and articles that not only disputed national Zionist myths; they retraced and rewrote the histories the Israeli state had concealed for decades.

⁴⁷ Tom Segev, *1949, The First Israelis* (New York: Free Press, 1986), viii.

⁴⁸ Ibid. vii.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

Another great example that emerged out of this new historiography was Benny Morris's *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949*, which he published in 1987. Morris, among the other young scholars that gained access to these newly declassified documents, quickly realized that the available evidence directly challenged the dominant narratives of Israeli history. Morris's research in this book focuses on retelling the story of the period of 1947-49 and tries to explain the flight of the approximately 700,000 Palestinians from Israel during the 1948 war.⁵⁰ He wrote that the evidence suggested that:

From the new documents of that period it became clear that much of what had been told to the people—to children at school and adults in newspapers—in the memoirs and historical writings—was in the best instances distortion and in many other instances, simply the ignoring of facts and plain lies.⁵¹

Morris exposed these lies and explained the Palestinian exodus village by village. He resoundingly showed that the Zionist narrative that had ascribed primary responsibility for the flight to the Arabs—which exonerated the Israelis of any blame—was false. Instead, using the declassified state evidence, Morris argued that this flight occurred because of multiple factors, but an important and significant factor was the deliberate expulsion and acts of violence by the Israeli military forces and by unofficial Israeli military units.⁵²

This controversial group of Israeli scholars and historians came under heavy fire from Zionist critics, who labeled their movement as "postzionism." Many Zionists equated postzionism with anti-Zionism, or direct opposition to the state of Israel. Some of these

⁵⁰ The numbers of how many Palestinians fled or were expelled from their homes during and after the 1948 war is disputed and ranges from 600,000-800,000. Here, I am citing Benny Morris's estimate in *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949* (1987).

⁵¹ Benny Morris, *1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 40.

⁵² *Ibid.*

scholars, including Segev, came to identify openly with the term postzionism and have ardently challenged their opponents since then. On the other hand, many of the new historians view themselves as loyal and concerned Israeli citizens who believe their criticism of the official Zionist narratives and histories are a necessary step in constructing a more complex and realistic view of the past and present, which strengthens the possibility of building a more fully equal and democratic future.

Alongside the work of these and other new historians, some Israeli sociologists were also beginning to question the leading narratives and representations found throughout Israeli society. One of the dominant ideas that mainstream Israeli sociology rests on is that Israel is a national refuge—an “ingathering of the exiles.” In his Hebrew anthology *Israeli Society: Critical Perspectives*, Israeli sociologist Uri Ram famously challenged this representation and called for a more complicated view of Israeli society and identity by incorporating the perspectives and views of women, Mizrahi Jews⁵³, and Palestinian Arabs: groups that were often ignored in mainstream Israeli sociological writings. Ram, like Segev, is one of the few Israeli scholars to openly embrace the term postzionist. He wrote that whereas Zionist ideology “promoted the idea of an identity among unequals and the exclusion of the others,” postzionist sociology imagines an Israel that is “characterized by equality among non-identiticals and the inclusion of the others.”⁵⁴

However, postzionist critique did not emerge in a vacuum. It was not limited to Israel and, more importantly, the controversial critiques of the new historians were not new. There is a long and deep history of Jewish dissent from Zionism within Israel that

⁵³ Jews from Middle Eastern countries and/or of Arab descent.

⁵⁴ Uri Ram, *The Changing Agenda of Israeli Sociology: Theory, Ideology, and Identity* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 206.

began long before the new historians surfaced. In this chapter, I will focus on a particular organization of interest: Matzpen.

Matzpen, Hebrew for "Compass," was a revolutionary socialist, Marxist, and anti-Zionist organization founded in Israel in 1962 and was active until the early 1980s. Its official name was the Israeli Socialist Organization, but it became known as Matzpen after the title of its notorious monthly publication. Former members of Maki, or the Israeli Communist Party, founded Matzpen after being expelled from Maki over disagreements about their support for the policies of the Soviet Union.⁵⁵ Maki itself was a descendant of the Palestine Communist Party, which was established in 1923 and in its early years was



Figure 5: An example of Matzpen's monthly publication from 1974. In Hebrew it reads, "What does the government guarantee you? Another war. Increasing exploitation."

predominately Jewish.⁵⁶ Matzpen offered a more focused and critical analysis of Zionism and

succeeded in mobilizing Jewish and Arab activists from various left-wing affiliations. This group of Arab and Jewish citizens of Israel hoped to promote the following principles:

.... Rejection of Zionism, unequivocal stand for revolutionary socialism, rejection of the cult of the Soviet Union and its ideological and political implications, absolute rejection of Stalinism and the cult of personality, support for genuine international solidarity, support for the integration Israel in a socialist Arab union, on the basis of self-determination.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Matzpen. "About Matzpen." <http://www.matzpen.org/english/about-matzpen/>.

⁵⁶ Jacob Hen-Tov, *Communism and Zionism in Palestine During the British Mandate* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2012), 151.

⁵⁷ Arie Bober, *The Other Israel: The Radical Case against Zionism*, (New York: Anchor Books, 1972), 208.

In the beginning of May 1967 following the Israeli victory in the Six Day War—and Israel's subsequent occupation of the Palestinian territories of Gaza and the West Bank—Matzpen issued its first public press release. This statement marked the nineteenth anniversary of the establishment of the state of Israel, traced the history of the Israeli-Arab conflict, and argued that the persistence of the "Palestine problem is still...a heavy burden on the economic resources of the region; a pretext for the imperialist aggression and military intervention; [and] a grave threat to world peace."⁵⁸ In this document, Matzpen argued that Israel was responsible for the tragedies of the 1948 war, which dispossessed and displaced hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs from their ancestral homes and lands. It also argued that the remaining Arabs in what became Israel faced economic, civil, and national oppression. Matzpen then proposed what it believed was the best solution to resolve this conflict: a revolutionary change that transforms Israel from a Zionist state into a socialist state that upholds the rights and interests of all of the peoples who live in it.⁵⁹ It advocated for the abolishment of the Law of Return—which grants every Jew in the world the right to immigrate to Israel and become a citizen of it—and for the right of return of all Palestinian refugees (or reparations if they choose not to).

In this statement, however, Matzpen did not only characterize its anti-Zionist position; it also articulated the various nuances of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Matzpen wrote that Zionism—although undoubtedly a colonial movement complicit in Western imperialism—is notably different from the colonization of other countries. It argued that the distinctiveness of Zionism rested in its removal and replacement of the Palestinian

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 210.

Arabs whereas in other countries the settlers built their economy upon the exploitation of the labor of the indigenous population. Thus, Matzpen contended that the Hebrew nation that was built in place—with its own economy, language, and other national characteristics—could not be erased.

Here, Matzpen deviated from the position of nationalist Palestinian leaders of the time who called for a *jihad*, or struggle, for the liberation of Palestine. It argued that “[the nationalist Palestinian leaders] ignore the fact that even if Israel would be defeated militarily and cease to exist as a state, the Hebrew nation will still exist” and so therefore, the Jewish masses that were brought to Palestine by the Zionist movement—and by the *Shoah*—are not responsible for the wrongs of Zionism.⁶⁰ Matzpen insisted that penalizing the Israeli masses would not solve the Palestinian problem; it would make matters worse. The resolving of the Palestinian problem, Matzpen argued, must be coupled with “the recognition of the right of the Hebrew nation to self-determination.”⁶¹ Further, this statement argued that “the only solution consistent with the interests of both Arab and Israeli masses is the integration of Israel as a unit in an economic and political union of the Middle East, on the basis of socialism.”⁶²

This statement hoped to initiate a conversation in Israel and throughout the Middle East about a political alternative to the prevailing nationalist and capitalist ideologies that Matzpen believed oppressed all peoples in Israel/Palestine and throughout the Middle East. Although Matzpen’s anti-Zionist position emanates strong in this document, it is also paired with a critical analysis of Zionism and the historical factors that necessitate a

⁶⁰ Ibid., 211.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid., 212.

nuanced solution. The statement, however, failed to delve deeper into the histories of toxic and violent antisemitism that diseased Europe for centuries and prompted a dire need for a movement to liberate the Jewish people by glossing over the deeper historical complexities and tragedies that pushed the Jewish people into Palestine.

Matzpen's statement seems to fill more holes than it digs. In uncovering the ills of Zionism, it rewrites the dark histories Israel worked—and works—to erase. Israeli scholar Gabriel Piterberg, in "Erasures," argues that there are three foundational myths that underlie the master-narrative of Zionism, which together legitimized the ethnic cleansing of the indigenous population of Palestine in 1948. These myths are the 'negation of exile' (*shelilat ha-galut*), the 'return to the land of Israel' (*ha-shiva le-Eretz*), and the 'return to history' (*ha-shiva la-historia*), which Piterberg contends is all inextricably intertwined. He argues that the negation of exile myth produces a link between the ancient Jewish sovereignty over the land of Israel and the present resettlement of Palestine. He also claims that this discursive connection rejects exile, or a non-territorial existence, and complements the return to the land of Israel myth. He argues that jointly these myths posit that exilic Jews have always longed to return to the land of Israel and that the land itself has been in exile awaiting redemption. He also writes that the return to history myth is grounded in the idea that "the natural and irreducible form of human collectivity is the nation."⁶³ Therefore, return to Zion *returns* Jewish people into the pages of the history of civilized peoples and thus implies that the Jews were outside of history in exile. Piterberg argues that these myths ideologically enabled the Zionist colonization of Palestine and that

⁶³ Gabriel Piterberg, "Erasures," *New Left Review* 10 (July-August 2001), 32.

the massive displacement of the Palestinian Arab population was (and remains) inherent to the Zionist project.

Matzpen's 1967 press release retraced the histories Zionism erases at an early point in Israel's existence. In doing so, it not only emerged as a significant challenge to the Zionist myths Pitrborg articulates; it also rewrote and resurfaced the histories the Israeli state was fiercely committed to expunging. This positions Matzpen—a marginal group in Israel—as a powerful physical and ideological challenge to Zionism. It is no surprise then that it received the backlash it did from the Israeli government, media, and public long before the new historians published their critical histories in the 1990s. Although Matzpen never numbered more than a few dozen members (its supporters reached a few hundred), their direct struggle against Zionism—and the 1967 occupation of the Palestinian territories—turned them into an abhorred and isolated minority.⁶⁴ Akiva Or, one of the founding members of Matzpen, said that in the 70s in Israel it was “in’ to hate Matzpen. If you didn’t hate Matzpen, you weren’t a patriot; you were garbage.”⁶⁵

After the publication of its statement immediately after the Six Day War of June 1967—which called for immediate withdrawal from the occupied territories—Matzpen faced various attacks and threats from the state and media, especially against its Arab members. However, after the war, many more people in Israel were being drawn to radical politics, making it difficult to write off Matzpen as merely a fringe movement. After the 1967 war and during the 70s, the label “matzpenik” was applied to anyone who voiced any criticism of Israel and it quickly became synonymous with “self-hater” and “traitor.”⁶⁶ In

⁶⁴ *Matzpen: Anti-Zionist Israelis*. Directed by Evan Torbiner. 2012.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Bober, *The Other Israel*, 3.

the March 31, 1970 issue of *Yediot Aharonot*, a popular Israeli newspaper, M. Bar-On, former chief educational officer of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), said:

Matzpen is nothing more than a gang of traitors....Matzpen is the same as Fatah....They are the real initiators and planners of the poisonous Fata propaganda against Israel...[that is] distributed in Britain and Europe....Matzpen doesn't want peace....they are traitors and self-haters and their only wish is to destroy Israel and its people and to erase their name from under the sun.⁶⁷

Matzpen also faced threats of physical violence. Vigilante groups sworn to "cleansing the nation" of these supposed traitors and would harass and attack Matzpen organizers and protestors wherever they were found.⁶⁸ This violence did not only come from vigilantes; the Israeli police regularly attacked Matzpen and its Arab members tended to face the strongest backlash. In one incident, Khalil Toame, a prominent Arab member of Matzpen, was sought out by Israeli police for his involvement in the organization and was sentenced to nine months in prison in 1969 after a swift trial by a military court. Although the Jewish members of Matzpen received similar threats and also faced violence by vigilantes and the police, they were far less often arrested. If they were, they were not held for as long as the Arab members. Although the exact details of Toame's indictment are not entirely clear, his case reflects the racism of the Israeli judicial system where merely being a Jew—even a nonconforming one—offers significant protection from legal persecution.

Another element of repression Matzpen faced was heavy censorship. In 1966, the "Censorship Agreement" was signed between representatives from the media and the IDF. The media agreed to follow the orders of the Military Censor, while the IDF agreed not to abuse its power. The main points of the Censorship Agreement are: "...to prevent the publication of security information that could be useful to the enemy or harm the state's

⁶⁷ *Yediot Aharonot*, March 31, 1970.

⁶⁸ Bobcr, *The Other Israel*, 3.

protection...no censorship on political issues or the expression of opinions and assessments, unless there is any hint of classified security information...[and the Military Censor] will inform the press which issues require its approval."⁶⁹ Under this agreement, Matzpen had entire articles from its regular publication prohibited. In the most extreme case, the censor suppressed and prohibited twelve out of sixteen articles in its December 1969 issue from being printed. However, the censorship of Matzpen's Arabic publication was more drastic. Around this time, Matzpen proposed an Arabic-language edition of their publication—*El Nurr* (the Light)—and the censor entirely banned it from being produced.

Even when Matzpen had its protest leaflets or publications approved by the censor, the police often stopped the members from distributing or selling them. Its members were often harassed, arrested, and detained for hours when they did so against police orders. But despite these various campaigns to stop Matzpen, its membership and support continued to grow and its activities began raising eyebrows in the government, so much so that some began discussing whether Matzpen should be banned outright. On June 4, 1970, Knesset⁷⁰ member Matilda Gez of the parliamentary caucus of the ruling Labor Party raised and discussed a motion to outlaw Matzpen. The Prime Minister at the time, Golda Meir, opposed the step because, as she put it, "Matzpen would be more dangerous underground than it is now."⁷¹ The Israeli newspaper *Ma'ariv*, on July 15, 1970, reported:

The Foreign and Justice Ministers were invited to a meeting of the coalition leadership to make a final decision on the action to be taken. There was general agreement that this phenomenon must be stopped....Mr. Y Klinghoffer [member of the Knesset] said that he will press for a law permitting revocation of the citizenship of Israelis who slander the state...⁷²

⁶⁹ Sarah Lipkin, "Types of Censorship" (1996), <http://lib.cct.ac.il/pages/item.asp?item=2085>

⁷⁰ The national legislator and legislative branch of the Israeli government.

⁷¹ *Ma'ariv*, June 5, 1970.

⁷² *Ibid.*

Such a law never passed as many members of Knesset felt that Matzpen was merely a small splinter group and ultimately unimportant. Nonetheless, these campaigns of repression against Matzpen continued. But why continue repressing a small, insignificant organization? Matzpen, although it was small, posed a significant threat to the fabric of Israeli society despite claims otherwise. At the time, Matzpen was the only Jewish anti-Zionist political group in Israel. Matzpen's politics resonated with many in Israel—such as workers and youth—who felt that the Zionist movement had abandoned their needs. This fear led many in the Israeli government, as shown above, to attempt to contain their growth. How could it allow a Jewish anti-Zionist movement to rise from within? Matzpen's history exposes Israel's deep and systematic sensitivities to critique—and the threat such criticisms pose to the stability of Israeli society and the Zionist ideology it rests on.

Although Matzpen continued organizing amidst the backlash, it began dealing with internal conflicts and pressures. In 1970, two groups broke off from Matzpen: the Revolutionary Communist Alliance and the Workers' Alliance. In 1972, another split occurred, creating the Revolutionary Communist League. The 1972 split was especially damaging as this group did not leave Matzpen over disagreements about politics or issues regarding Israel. Matzpen spanned a broad spectrum of revolutionary Marxian ideas and many members began to disagree about where Matzpen should rest on this scale. Since then, Matzpen's visibility in Israel decreased drastically and was no longer the force it was in the 60s and early 70s. In 1982, some members of Matzpen were active in forming the Progressive List for Peace (PLP), which ran for elections in the Knesset. The PLP comprised of two components: one Israeli-Jewish and the other Palestinian-Arab. After the elections, Matzpen demanded that these two components be unified and that the PLP be open to all

regardless of their nationality. Most of the PLP leaders rejected this and some of the Matzpen members left the PLP for good. However, a significant amount of Matzpen



Figure 6: Matzpen's demonstration in front of the Labour party's building in Tel Aviv, protesting the settlement in Hebron on April 12, 1981.

members remained in the PLP and disassociated themselves with Matzpen, which further weakened the already waning organization. A year later, Matzpen distributed its last publication.

Since then, members of Matzpen continue to gather occasionally, but they are no longer an active and organized group. Many members of Matzpen went off to join other progressive groups and coalitions in Israel. Although Matzpen failed to become a truly formative force, it left behind an incredible and fascinating legacy of Israeli Jewish dissent from within Israel. Many on the left in Israel are in tune with the history of Matzpen and owe their ability to organize as openly as they do now to the courageous and bold actions Matzpen took long ago. However, most in Israel today have forgotten about Matzpen and the youth are largely unaware that it even existed. Nonetheless, its history shows that there

were Jews in Israel questioning Zionism long before the new historians received access to those declassified state archives that shattered many of the dominant narratives of the state. Its history also shows that Jews, even in Israel, were never in consensus on Zionism. The path of Jewish dissent from Zionism Matzpen left behind in Israel trails on and it is a path some Israelis continue to march down as they fight for a better future.

In the following chapter, I will briefly trace contemporary Jewish objections to Israeli policy in the Palestinian territories in both the U.S. and within Israel and show that they are a product of the histories of Jewish dissent from Zionism that I have sketched thus far.

Chapter 3: Contemporary Frictions and Debates

Today, in both the U.S. and Israel, many Jews are beginning to more openly challenge and critique Israel and its policies in the Palestinian territories. In the U.S., there has been a massive growth of support from U.S. Jewry for organizations critical of the status quo in Israel. Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP), for example, saw its numbers swell after the 2014 Israeli-Gaza war. Immediately after the war, five new JVP chapters were established in the U.S. and another sixteen are in development.⁷³ The recent war in Gaza also pushed some Jews from organizations like J Street—an organization in favor of the two-state solution, opposed to continued Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank, and opposed to the BDS movement—to join more far-left organizations like JVP. Seth Morrison, chair of J Street's Washington D.C. chapter, left the organization as a result of Israel's 2014 Operation Protective Edge in Gaza:

It became really obvious that the Israeli government was going to do nothing constructive, and nothing J Street was going to do would make a big enough difference. It's very clear that the occupation is the root cause of all of these problems. Only the tough love of BDS, of cutting U.S. aid, of really strong steps, is going to make Israel change.⁷⁴

For Morrison and others like him, J Street's less confrontational approach is not pressuring Israel—and foreign policy makers in the U.S.—enough to instigate any sort of meaningful change in the region. In 2009, J Street was strongly and openly opposed to Israel's Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, angering many in the pro-Israel U.S. Jewish community. In 2014—after receiving heavy backlash after its 2009 statement—issued a more neutral position on the war in Gaza:

⁷³ Debra Nussbaum Cohen, "Gaza War pushes some to the left of J-Street," <http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/jewish-world-features/.premium-1.609063>.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

J Street strongly supports Israel's right to defend itself proportionately against the threat of relentless rockets and to destroy tunnels leading into Israel. But it's now time for Israel to look for a way out of Gaza. Ultimately, there is no military victory over an ideology and no military solution to a fundamentally political conflict. We adamantly oppose calls for Israel to 'reoccupy Gaza.'⁷⁵

This neutrality, along with the massive Palestinian civilian death toll of the recent war, saw J Street lose some long-time members like Morrison. But in the process, it also opened its doors to more center-right pro-Israel Jews in the U.S., and as a result, the organization has slightly grown since the 2009 Israeli-Gaza war.

However, this month, the tensions over Israel among U.S. Jews nearly erupted when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accepted an invitation by John Boehner, the Republican Speaker of the U.S House of Representatives, to give a speech to the U.S. Congress about Iran's nuclear weapons program—without the consultation or support of the Obama administration. The White House is currently in negotiations with the Iranian government to contain its nuclear program, which Netanyahu adamantly opposes. President Obama and other leaders in the Democratic Party saw Netanyahu's acceptance of Boehner's invitation as an insult and harshly criticized his decision. Dozens of Democrats boycotted the speech and many issued harsh statements against Netanyahu. But despite the backlash, Netanyahu went through with his plans. In his speech to the U.S. congress on March 3, 2015, Netanyahu challenged the Obama administration's approach to dealing with Iran. He characterized the current U.S. government's strategy as a "bad deal" and called on the U.S. to stop negotiating with Iran:

Before lifting those restrictions [on Iran's nuclear program], the world should demand that Iran do three things. First, stop its aggression against its neighbors in the Middle

⁷⁵ Ibid.

East. Second, stop supporting terrorism around the world. And third, stop threatening to annihilate my country, Israel, the one and only Jewish state.⁷⁶

In response, many of the Democrats that boycotted the speech said that they felt Netanyahu said nothing new about Iran and were frustrated that he would risk further hurting the already fragile U.S.-Israel relationship by snubbing President Obama and undermining his ongoing negotiations with Iran in front of Congress. After the speech, House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi said, “as one who values the U.S.-Israel relationship and loves Israel, I was near tears throughout the prime minister’s speech—saddened by the insult to the intelligence of the United States.”⁷⁷

But this speech—more than anything—arguably marked the beginning of when many lovers of Israel in the U.S. felt like they could openly say that they can support Israel without fully accepting all of its decisions and policies. And at synagogues and Jewish community centers across the country, many people openly and strongly debated Netanyahu’s speech and other related differences of opinion over Israel. This speech was certainly another strain to the somewhat fragile—but still monumentally strong—U.S./Israel relationship. But more than anything, it marked a rising rejection by pro-Israel Jews in the U.S. of the notion that disagreement over Israel is a threat to its existence. Instead, many pro-Israel Jews in the U.S. are recognizing that there are many disagreements even within the Israeli government and throughout Israeli society over Israel’s current policies, including debate about the expanding of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Ironically, by coming to the U.S. to criticize its foreign policy in front of its

⁷⁶ Zeke J. Miller, “Transcript of Netanyahu’s Speech to Congress,” March 3, 2015, <http://time.com/3730318/transcript-netanyahu-speech-to-congress/>.

⁷⁷ Jeremy Ben-Ami, “Bibi Speech Gave Us Green Light To Openly Debate Israel – at Last,” <http://forward.com/articles/216122/bibi-speech-gave-us-green-light-to-openly-debate-i/#ixzz3TdvXgso5>.

Congress, Netanyahu opened the door for more U.S. citizens and U.S. Jewry to feel more comfortable and willing to speak their minds on Israel—despite how much they may love or support it.

Numerous opponents of Netanyahu in Israel also opposed the speech, including several current and former high-ranking officials and politicians. Ex-Mossad chief Meir Dagan said “the person who has caused Israel the most strategic damage when it comes to the Iranian issue is the prime minister” and characterized the speech as a guise to deflect from the more serious threats Israel is facing, which he said was the perpetuation of the status quo in the Palestinian territories. Dagan also said that “Netanyahu’s actions are leading us towards a bi-national state, and I don’t want a bi-national state. I don’t want Abbas as the prime minister of my country. Continuing to establish facts on the ground in the territories will inevitably lead us to an apartheid state.”⁷⁸ Dagan and other Israelis opposed to Netanyahu’s government have also openly spoke out against the speech, similarly marking it as a way for Netanyahu to ignore the more pertinent issues facing Israel today. Others in Israel said that the speech was Netanyahu’s ploy to garner more support in Israel for his party—Likud—in the recent Israeli elections.

In Israel, Netanyahu’s speech emerged in the context of growing frictions in the country over various economic and social issues. In recent years, the left has risen to historic strength in Israel, which has caused divisions in both the Israeli government and throughout Israeli society. If the results of Israel’s March 18 elections are any indication, there is a rapidly growing divide between the far-right and left in Israel. Although Netanyahu and his party Likud has emerged as the undisputed winner of these elections by

⁷⁸ Nahum Barnea and Shimon Shiffer, “Netanyahu Has Caused Israel the Most Strategic Damage on Iran,” <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4631634,00.html>.

earning thirty seats in the new Israeli Knesset (Israel's parliament), the center-left Zionist Union party and the far-left coalition of Arab parties—which is called the Joint List and includes the Jewish-Arab party Hadash—earned twenty-four and fourteen seats respectively. These results mirror the growing rift between Israelis over its numerous economic and social issues—in Israel proper and in the Palestinian territories—and indicate that, like in the U.S., Jewish voices critical of Israel *within* Israel are rapidly rising.

Still, the struggle over what can and cannot be said about Israel within Jewish communities has been most prominent in the U.S. and particularly evident at college and university campuses nationwide. In 2010, Hillel International, a Jewish community organization with hundreds of local campus chapters across the U.S., released new guidelines advising local Hillels not to host speakers who “deny the right of Israel to exist as a Jewish and democratic state with secure and recognized borders, delegitimize, demonize, or apply a double standard to Israel or support boycott of, divestment from, or sanctions

against the State of Israel.”⁷⁹ These guidelines essentially bar Palestinians from speaking at Hillel, as any critique of Israeli policy would violate these guidelines. Even Jewish people



Figure 7: A poster made by Jewish Voice for Peace that pictures a Jewish woman wearing a Magen David earring with “I refuse to occupy” written on her face.

⁷⁹ Beinart, “The American Jewish Cocoon.”

can be excluded from Hillel under these guidelines, especially groups like Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP) that fully endorse the BDS movement.⁸⁰

These guidelines have been used to exclude various Jewish individuals and groups from hosting events at Hillel community centers if their political views on Israel are not aligned with Hillel International's guidelines. One of the first controversies these guidelines ignited was the barring of JVP at Brandeis from becoming a member of Brandeis University's Hillel chapter.⁸¹ Since then, there have been dozens of similar cases reported across college campuses. Although they are labeled as "guidelines," Hillel International has threatened to disaffiliate with schools that do not follow them. In defiance of these guidelines, some Hillels, beginning with Swarthmore Hillel and the Vassar Jewish Union, have declared themselves "Open Hillels." This has sparked a larger nationwide campaign led and organized by Jewish students to combat Hillel's restrictive policies on Israel. Its campaign website reads:

We believe deeply in the ideal, expressed in Hillel International's mission statement, of a vibrant, pluralistic Jewish community on campus, in which all people, regardless of their religious observance, past Jewish experience, or personal beliefs, are welcome. In many ways, Hillel has been remarkably successful at fostering such a pluralistic and inclusive community.... we believe that this pluralism should be extended to the subject of Israel, and that no Jewish group should be excluded from the community for its political views.⁸²

The Open Hillel movement has continued to grow, spread, and has garnered the support of many nationwide, including some Zionist Jews. However, Hillel International has held tight to its Israel guidelines. Although the campaign has repeatedly made mainstream

⁸⁰ Jewish Voice for Peace, "Statement on Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions, 2015," February 2, 2015, <http://jewishvoiceforpeace.org/content/jvp-issues>.

⁸¹ Ariel Wittenberg, "JVP rejected from Hillel umbrella organization," March 11th, 2011, <http://thebrandeishoot.com/articles/9864>.

⁸² Open Hillel, "About Us," <http://www.openhillel.org/about.php>.

news, the most Hillel International has agreed to do is construct a committee with Open Hillel student leaders to discuss these issues. An agreement to remove or alter Hillel International's guidelines does not seem likely at this point as the organization "fosters an enduring commitment to Jewish life, learning, and Israel."⁸³ Hillel International's mission statement defines and constructs Jewishness as inherently attached to identification with and support of the Israeli state, thus explaining its opposition to abandoning or moving away from the Israel guidelines. Also, local Hillels on campuses nationwide receive their funding differently; however, Hillel International funds most Hillels. Some Hillels are also funded by other mainstream Jewish organizations in the U.S. such as the Jewish Federation and local Jewish donors. If a Hillel that is funded by these sources declares itself an "Open Hillel," it jeopardizes its finances institutional support from Hillel International. It could also mean less funding for a local Hillel's regular programming, which includes many Jewish cultural, religious, and social events in addition to pro-Israel events. There are some Hillels—such as Swarthmore Hillel and the Vassar Jewish Union—that receive funding from their host university and can therefore risk disaffiliation and declare themselves an Open Hillel without much fear of repercussions.⁸⁴ Nonetheless, even Hillels that are in a better position to "open" they can still face repercussions. On March 17, 2015, Swarthmore Hillel voted to remove "Hillel" from its name after it received "ultimatums and legal

⁸³ Eric Fingerhut, "Out Community Conversation on Israel," May 2, 2014, <http://www.hillel.org/about/news-views/2014/05/02/our-community-conversation-on-israel>.

⁸⁴ Isable Knight, "Open Hillel Decision Paves Way For New Discussion," January 30, 2014, <http://daily.swarthmore.edu/2014/01/30/open-hillel-decision-paves-way-for-new-discussion/>.

threats" from Hillel International for refusing to abide by its Israel guidelines.⁸⁵ Eric

Fingerhut, head of Hillel International, wrote the following to Swarthmore Hillel:

I hope you will inform your colleagues on the Student Board of Swarthmore Hillel that Hillel International expects all campus organizations that use the Hillel name to adhere to these guidelines. No organization that uses the Hillel name may choose to do otherwise.⁸⁶

At UC Santa Barbara (UCSB) in recent years, the tensions surrounding Israel have also increased. Santa Barbara Hillel, in line with Hillel International's Israel guidelines, stopped David Harris-Gershon from speaking in its building. SB Hillel was concerned over Harris-Gershon's blog posts that expressed support for Palestinians who use non-violent BDS tactics to resist the occupation. This incident manifested within a moment of political tension at UCSB regarding Israel. In recent years, Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) has submitted resolutions to undergraduate student governments across the University of California (UC) system and other universities nationwide calling on the university to divest from companies profiting from the occupation of Palestine. Although this resolution has failed at UCSB multiple times, SJP at UCSB is committed to continue pressuring the university to remove its investments from corporations that perpetuate social injustices.⁸⁷ At the completion of this thesis, seven of nine UCs have passed resolutions supporting divestment; only UCSB and UC Merced have not.⁸⁸ And most recently, the UC Student

⁸⁵ Amanda Borschel-Dan, "Swarthmore Hillel changes name after 'threats' from parent body," March 17, 2015, <http://www.timesofisrael.com/swarthmore-hillel-changes-name-after-threats-from-parent-body/>.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Katlen Abu Ata, "'What Side of History Will You Be On?': A Closer Look at the Dialogue Surrounding Divestment," April 28, 2014, <http://dailynews.com/2014-04-28/what-side-of-history-will-you-be-on-a-closer-look-at-the-dialogue-surrounding-divestment/>.

⁸⁸ Students for Justice in Palestine, West, "On to the Regents: In Historic Vote, UC Student Association Endorses Call for Divestment in Support of Palestinian Rights,"

Association (UCSA)—the official representative of the student body of the University of California—endorsed a divestment resolution in support of Palestinian rights in the occupied Palestinian territories.⁸⁹ SJP West, the coalition of west coast SJP chapters, said UCSA's decision is "undoubtedly the largest victory thus far in the campus divestment movement in the United States" and urged its supporters to carry forth this call to the UC Regents, the governing body of the UC system.⁹⁰

This movement has prompted Hillels throughout the U.S. to rally strongly against SJP and these divestment resolutions. SB Hillel has—so far—been successful at curbing the divestment movement at UCSB. However, SJP at UCSB remains committed to bringing forth divestment resolutions to UCSB's student government until one is passed. SB Hillel argues that SJP's political actions are direct attacks on Jewish students and claim that its activities create a polarized and unsafe campus climate.⁹¹ Rabbi Evan Goodman, director of SB Hillel, after UCSB's Associated Students Senate voted against divestment from Israel last year, stated that:

A divestment resolution such as this creates a polarized climate on campus. Unfortunately, it is set up to determine a winner and a loser. It doesn't move the Israelis and Palestinians any closer to peace, and it harms the campus climate for students at UCSB.⁹²

<http://sjpwest.org/2015/02/09/onto-the-regents-in-historic-vote-uc-student-association-endorses-call-for-divestment-in-support-of-palestinian-rights/>.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ McKinley Krongaus, "UCSB Votes Down Divestment from Israel," April 26, 2014, <http://www.independent.com/news/2014/apr/26/ucsb-votes-down-divestment-israel/>.

⁹² Ibid.

SB Hillel—and the Jewish students opposing such divestment campaigns nationwide—claim that these resolutions are antisemitic because they single-out Israel.⁹³ As I showed and argued in Chapter 1, the Zionist movement in the U.S. succeeded precisely because it was able to sow together Jewish and Zionist identity. Thus, it is not surprising that many Jewish students in the U.S. have felt threatened by these divestment campaigns when their Jewish identity—at home, at synagogue, and often at school—has been so intimately attached to Israel.

However, the young Jewish students and leaders that are leading the Open Hillel



Figure 8: A Jewish student wearing a t-shirt in support of BDS at the first annual Open Hillel conference held from October 11-13, 2014 at Harvard University.

movement are beginning to challenge the ostensibly inseparable ties between Judaism and Zionism by fighting for the inclusion of Jewish voices who oppose Zionism and/or Israeli policies in the Palestinian territories within Jewish communities and organizations

throughout the U.S. Last year, I attended the first Open Hillel conference, which brought together hundreds of Jewish students, leaders, activists, writers, and thinkers from across the political spectrum—including some Palestinian activists and speakers—to discuss the Israeli occupation, the U.S./Israel relationship, and other issues affecting Jews in Israel and the U.S. This conference gathered individuals from various backgrounds to collectively

⁹³ David Jackson, "A.S. Votes Against Divestment from Israel," <http://dailynexus.com/2014-04-25/a-s-votes-against-divestment-from-israel/>

debate and model a Jewish community that values, honors, and acknowledges a diversity of beliefs and political orientations. Rachel Sandalow-Ash, Open Hillel's Internal Coordinator, said that she and other Open Hillel leaders did not organize this conference out of malice or hate of Hillel: "Hillel is really great and accepting to people of all kinds of beliefs, but we come up against a wall when it comes to Israel-Palestine."⁹⁴

By providing equal space for both anti-Zionist and Zionist expressions, the Open Hillel movement promotes the acceptance of all articulations of Jewish identity. Open Hillel's rapid growth and success in mobilizing and organizing so many young Jews to debate, discuss, and engage with the various issues facing their community and their people—in the U.S. and Israel—shows that accepting contemporary critiques of Israeli policy and history within the larger Jewish social and political tent does not destroy or taint Jewishness. Rather, it reflects that Jewish identity, like all religious and cultural identities, is not monolithic. Embracing these complexities honors and acknowledges the diversity of Judaism and varied Jewish relationships to Zionism, Israel, and nationalism more broadly.

The rise of Open Hillel and other progressive and more critical Jewish organizations, movements, and political parties in the U.S. and Israel is no longer something to be ignored. Only a decade ago it could be argued that these voices were too marginal to make much of an influence. Today, Jewish people everywhere are beginning to embrace more nuances in their conversations and debates about Israel and Zionism in their families, communities, and organizations. This shift is beginning to rattle many mainstream and politically influential Jewish organizations—in the U.S. and Israel—and is pushing more and more Jews to question Israel and its policies. Further, as Jewish voices critical of Israel continue

⁹⁴ Jane Eisner, "Rachel Sandalow-Ash – Forward 50 2014," November 9, 2014, <http://forward.com/specials/forward-50-2014/rachel-sandalow-ash>.

to grow, staunch Jewish supporters of Israel are more readily being forced to defend—and therefore grapple with—the grave injustices of Israel’s ongoing occupation of Palestine.

Conclusion: Facing the Occupation

“If I am not for myself, who will be for me? If I am not for others, what am I? And if not now, when?”

-Rabbi Hillel the Elder

In tracing the histories of Jewish dissent and its contemporary manifestations, I have shown that Jews never were—and are not now—in consensus on the question of Israel. For many Jews, this question was answered in 1948 and there is simply nothing more to talk about. But in outlining these histories of Jewish critique, I have not only shown that Jews have been engaging in debates about Zionism—and then Israel—since its inception, but that these difficult and important conversations rage on. In raising these histories I have shown that it is no longer possible to deny that what happened in 1948 to the Palestinian people was deeply catastrophic and that the creation of Israel was directly responsible for this tragedy. At the same time, in critically reexamining the untold narratives of Jewish difference over Zionism, I have also been able to discuss the histories of persecution, expulsion, and genocide that forced many Jewish people into Palestine to begin with.

However, acknowledging these nuances is not enough. The status quo in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories—as it stands today—is no longer sustainable. Despite the immense and awful histories of antisemitism throughout Jewish history, we can no longer pretend that we are not in a position of power and domination over the Palestinian citizens of Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. I was taught that the decades long and present occupation of the Palestinian territories is about assuring the safety and security of Israeli Jews. However, in studying and exploring the Jewish voices critical of Israel, I have discovered and illustrated ample evidence that shows that such sentiments are just not true. I know now that the occupation uses the idea of security and protection as

a guise to maintain the exploitation and oppression of a people who have been systematically denied and excluded many very basic rights and privileges that all Israeli Jews hold. But the occupation, for the most part, is out of sight and out of mind for many Israelis.

We can no longer stand idly by in the midst of this enduring discrimination against the Palestinian people within Israel proper and throughout the territories. Through home demolitions, theft of resources, and expropriation of land in the West Bank—and seemingly




Figure 9: "We can't live, so we are waiting for death." Separation Wall at the Aida Refugee Camp in Bethlehem, Palestine. Photo taken on December 22, 2014.

incessant bombing campaigns on Gaza that have taken the lives of thousands of Palestinian civilians—Israel has been able to maintain its control over nearly all facets of Palestinian life, society, and economic development. Further, in the West Bank, which is divided into Areas A, B, and C,⁹⁵ Israel subjects the Palestinians to continuing and increasing territorial separation, bantustanization, and restrictions of movement through checkpoints, bypass roads, and the Wall. This also includes Israel's discretionary use of collaborators—undercover *mista'aravim* army units—and administrative detention, arrest, trial, and torture to rule and subdue West Bank Palestinians.⁹⁶

Despite our allegiances to our family and our people, it is time that we stop assuming that the occupation is safe—for Jews and Palestinians—and begin confronting the vast human rights abuses Israel regularly commits in the territories to sustain its hegemony over the Palestinian people. I believe that learning and being open to other peoples' suffering will make us much safer than any wall, bombing raid, or required military service. I believe that it is time to face—and end—the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories.

I began this conclusion with a quote from the famous Rabbi Hillel the Elder, which first appears in Pirkei Avot—or Chapters of the Fathers—and of which there are many interpretations. Hillel says, *if I am not for myself, who will be for me?* If I do not embark on this endeavor of understanding the history of Zionism and of how Jewish nationalism rose

⁹⁵ Area A, approx. 3% of the West Bank, is under full Palestinian civil and military control; Area B, approx. 25%, is under Palestinian civil control and Israeli military control; and Area C, approx. 72%, is under total Israeli civil and military control and includes most Israeli settlements. Area C also contains most of the West Bank's natural resources and open land, but Israel entirely forbids Palestinian development in Area C.

⁹⁶ John Halper, "The 94 Percent Solution: Israel's Matrix of Control," (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 64.

in the hearts of many Jewish people around the world, how could I expect my people to understand and embrace critiques and alternatives to Zionism? How can I expect the U.S. Jewish community and my Israeli family to be open to these ideas if I am not well versed in this history from all of its angles?

Zionist Jews often characterize Jewish critiques of Zionism as illegitimate and borderline antisemitic. Some in my own community have called me a self-hating Jew for openly critiquing Israel. I know well that I am not. But *if I am not for myself*, if I do not defend my Jewishness in spite of those who claim otherwise, do I then actually become a self-hating Jew? And *if I am not for others*, if I abandon my people because many of them hold political views I at times disagree with, *who am I*? However, if I am only for my people, and not for other peoples, what histories do I ignore? What oppressions and discriminations are replicated in my name? I have been told by many to keep my ideas to myself. I have been told that they are reckless, rebellious, and even treasonous. But as I have shown, they are not new and do not just belong to me. I have also been told that I should be silent because I have not lived the histories of my ancestors. And so, I wrote this *to know*. I wrote this to assert that I will learn and keep my mind open, but I will not wait until the taboo of questioning Zionism and/or Israel is entirely broken. Because *if not now, when?*

Bibliography

- "About Matzpen." Matzpen.org. Accessed February 26, 2015.
<http://www.matzpen.org/english/about-matzpen/>.
- Abu Ata, Katlen. "'What Side Of History Will You Be On?': A Closer Look at the Dialogue Surrounding Divestment." *The Daily Nexus*. April 28, 2014. Accessed October 15, 2015. <http://dailynexus.com/2014-04-28/what-side-of-history-will-you-be-on-a-closer-look-at-the-dialogue-surrounding-divestment/>.
- Arendt, Hannah. *Eichmann in Jerusalem; a Report on the Banality of Evil*. New York: Penguin, 1994.
- Balfour Declaration (1917), *Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East*, Akram Fouad Khater. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004.
- Barnea, Nahum, and Shimon Shiffer. "'Netanyahu Has Caused Israel the Most Strategic Damage on Iran'" *Ynet*. February 27, 2015. Accessed March 18, 2015.
<http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4631634,00.html>.
- Beinart, Peter. "The American Jewish Cocoon." *The New York Review of Books*. September 26, 2013. Accessed September 18, 2014.
<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/sep/26/american-jewish-cocoon/>.
- Ben-Ami, Jeremy. "Bibi Speech Gave Us Green Light To Openly Debate Israel - at Last." *The Jewish Daily Forward*. March 6, 2015. Accessed March 10, 2015.
<http://forward.com/articles/216122/bibi-speech-gave-us-green-light-to-openly-debate-i/#ixzz3TdvXgso5>.
- Bober, Arie. *The Other Israel: The Radical Case against Zionism*. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1972.
- Broschel-Dan, Amanda. "Swarthmore Hillel Changes Name after 'threats' from Parent Body." *The Times of Israel*. March 17, 2015. Accessed March 18, 2015.
<http://www.timesofisrael.com/swarthmore-hillel-changes-name-after-threats-from-parent-body/>.
- Central Conference of American Rabbis Yearbook* 52. 1942.
- Cohen, Debra N. "Gaza War Pushes Some to the Left of J Street." *Haaretz*. August 5, 2014. Accessed August 15, 2014. <http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/jewish-world-features/1.609063>.
- COPMA. "About Us." *Citizens Opposed to Propaganda Masquerading as Art*. Accessed October 17, 2014. <http://www.copma.net/about-us/>.

- Fisher, Jane. "Rachel Sandalow-Ash - Forward 50 2014." *The Jewish Daily Forward*. November 9, 2014. Accessed December 10, 2015. <http://forward.com/specials/forward-50-2014/rachel-sandalow-ash>.
- Fingerhut, Eric. "Our Community Conversation on Israel." Hillel International. May 2, 2014. Accessed October 15, 2015. <http://www.hillel.org/about/news-views/news-views---blog/news-and-views/2014/05/02/our-community-conversation-on-israel>.
- Fisher, Marc. "For Jewish Groups, a Stand-off between Open Debate and Support of Israel." *Washington Post*. May 28, 2014. Accessed October 17, 2014. <http://wapo.st/1nUv3aR>.
- The Gatekeepers*. Directed by Dror Moreh. Performed by Ami Ayalon, Avraham Shalom, Avi Dichter. Israel / USA: Dror Moreh Productions / Sony Pictures Classics, 2012. DVD.
- Halper, Jeff. "The 94 Percent Solution: Israel's Matrix of Control." In Joel Benin and Rebecca Stein, *Struggles for Sovereignty: Palestine and Israel 1993-2000*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006.
- Harris-Gershon, David. "I'm Now Another Jew Who's Been Barred from Speaking within a Jewish Building (in America)." *Daily Kos*. January 11, 2014. Accessed August 15, 2014. <http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/01/11/1268682/-I-m-Another-Jew-Who-s-Been-Barred-from-Speaking-within-a-Jewish-Building-in-America>.
- Heller, James G. "The President's Message to the Fifty-Fourth Annual Convention of the Central Conference of American Rabbis," *CCARYB* 53, 1943.
- Hen-Tov, Jacob. *Communism and Zionism in Palestine during the British Mandate*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2012.
- Herzl, Theodor. *The Jewish State*. Rockville: Wildside Press LLC, 2008.
- Hoffman, Gil. "'Post' Poll: 60% of Israelis Don't Want Netanyahu Anymore." *The Jerusalem Post*. December 05, 2014. Accessed December 10, 2014. <http://www.jpost.com/Israel-Elections/Post-poll-60-percent-of-Israelis-dont-want-Netanyahu-anymore-383724>.
- Israel Goldblatt, Charles. "The Impact of the Balfour Declaration in America," *American Jewish Historical Quarterly* 57. New York: 1968.
- Jackson, David. "A.S. Votes Against Divestment from Israel." *The Daily Nexus*. April 25, 2014. Accessed October 15, 2015. <http://dailynexus.com/2014-04-25/a-s-votes-against-divestment-from-israel/>.
- "The Jewish Holocaust in Progress." *New York Times*, November 5, 1942.
- Knesset.gov.il. Accessed February 1, 2015. https://www.knesset.gov.il/holidays/eng/memorial_day_eng.htm.

- Knight, Isable. "Open Hillel Decision Paves Way For New Discussion." *The Daily Gazette*. January 30, 2014. Accessed October 15, 2015.
<http://daily.swarthmore.edu/2014/01/30/open-hillel-decision-paves-way-for-new-discussion>.
- Kolsky, Thomas A. *Jews against Zionism: The American Council for Judaism, 1942-1948*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990.
- Korngaus, McKinley. "UCSB Votes Down Divestment from Israel." *Independent*. April 25, 2014. Accessed October 15, 2015.
<http://www.independent.com/news/2014/apr/26/ucsb-votes-down-divestment-israel/>.
- Lipkin, Sarah. "Types of Censorship." 1996. Accessed March 1, 2015.
<http://lib.cet.ac.il/pages/item.asp?item=2085>.
 [Translated from Hebrew]
- Ma'ariv*, June 5, 1970.
- Marks, Peter. "Amid 'Admission's' Controversy at Theater J, DCJCC to Host Israel Perspectives Series." *Washington Post*. November 21, 2013. Accessed October 17, 2014.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/theater_dance/amid-theater-j-debate-jewish-community-center-to-host-series-on-perspectives-on-israel/2013/11/21/11f5ac16-52db-11e3-9ee6-2580086d8254_story.html.
- Matar, Haggai. "The Night It Became Dangerous to Demonstrate in Tel Aviv." *+972 Magazine*. July 13, 2014. Accessed August 15, 2014. <http://972mag.com/the-night-it-became-dangerous-to-demonstrate-in-tel-aviv/93524/>.
- Matzpen: Anti-Zionist Israelis*. Directed by Evan Torbiner. YouTube. August 28, 2012. Accessed March 1, 2015. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hfcFno2pqJg>.
- Miller, Zeke J. "Transcript: Netanyahu Speech to Congress." *Time*. March 3, 2015. Accessed March 10, 2015. <http://time.com/3730318/transcript-netanyahu-speech-to-congress/>.
- Morris, Benny. *1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
- . *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- New York Times*, June 26, 1943.
- New York Times*, April 10, 1998.
- "Open Hillel: About Us." Open Hillel. Accessed October 15, 2015.
<http://www.openhillel.org/about.php>.
- Parzen, Herbert. "The Lodge-Fish Resolution," *American Jewish Historical Quarterly* 60. New York: 1970.

- Philipson, David. *My Life as an American Jew: An Autobiography*. Cincinnati: J.G. Kidd & Son, 1941.
- Piterberg, Gabriel. "Erasures," *New Left Review* 10, July-August 2001.
- "Protest to Wilson Against Zionist State." *New York Times*, March 5, 1919.
- Ram, Uri. *The Changing Agenda of Israeli Sociology: Theory, Ideology, and Identity*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995.
- Rinat, Zafir. "In Tel Aviv, Thousands Protest against the Gaza Operation." *Haaretz.com*. July 27, 2014. Accessed August 15, 2014. <http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/1.607311>.
- Rosenwald, L. J. "Reply to Zionism." *Life*, June 28, 1943.
- Segev, Tom. *1949: The First Israelis*. New York: Free Press, 1986.
- "Statement of the American Council for Judaism." *New York Times*, August 31, 1943.
- "Statement on Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions." *Jewish Voice for Peace*. February 2, 2015. Accessed March 1, 2015. <http://jewishvoiceforpeace.org/content/jvp-issues>.
- Students for Justice in Palestine, West. "On to the Regents: In Historic Vote, UC Student Association Endorses Call for Divestment in Support of Palestinian Rights." *SJP West*. February 9, 2015. Accessed March 10, 2015. <http://sjpwest.org/2015/02/09/onto-the-regents-in-historic-vote-uc-student-association-endorses-call-for-divestment-in-support-of-palestinian-rights/>.
- Sturken, Marita. *Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic, and the Politics of Remembering*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
- Truman, Harry S. *The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman. Years of Trial and Hope: 1946-1953*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1956.
- Wittenberg, Ariel. "JVP Rejected from Hillel Umbrella Organization." *The Brandeis Hoot*. March 11, 2011. Accessed October 15, 2014. <http://thebrandeishoot.com/articles/9864>.
- Yediot Aharonot*, March 31, 1970.