

EINE MEDIENKAMPAGNE?
THE GERMAN PRESS AND THE EARLY YUGOSLAV CRISIS (1989-1992)



A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF *NEUES DEUTSCHLAND*, *DIE FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG*, *DER SPIEGEL*, AND *DIE SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG*

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I wish to acknowledge the support of my loving Family, without whom I could not have accomplished this feat,

To my advisors Dr. Edgar and Dr. Marcuse for helping me along the way,

And to my friends in the former Yugoslavia, wherever they may reside, may their futures be happy and prosperous.

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations	4
Chronology of Events	5
Introduction.....	10
Abstract.....	10
Situation.....	10
Context	12
The Question.....	14
Methodology	16
Considerations	20
The Publications	20
<i>Der Spiegel</i>	21
<i>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)</i>	23
<i>Neues Deutschland</i>	26
<i>Die Süddeutsche Zeitung</i>	28
Method of Analysis and comparison	30
Historical Background	33
The Situation in Yugoslavia after 1980	33
<i>Background</i>	33
<i>Rise of Nationalism</i>	34
<i>Towards Independence</i>	36
Position of the European Community on the Yugoslav Crisis, Serbia and Croatia.....	41
Position of Germany on the Yugoslav Crisis, Serbia and Croatia	45
Coverage of Events	50
Events Before March 1991	50
<i>Kosovo</i>	50
<i>Political developments in Yugoslavia</i>	56
<i>Establishment of Serb Autonomous Oblasts in Croatia</i>	69
<i>Other Coverage of Note during this Period</i>	73
Events Between March and December 1991.....	76
<i>JNA Actions in Croatia</i>	76
<i>The 10-Day War in Slovenia (June 27th to July 7th 1991)</i>	85
<i>Internationalization of the Yugoslav Crisis</i>	97
<i>Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia</i>	104
Coverage of Events January-April 1992.....	110
<i>Destruction of EC Monitor Mission helicopter (January 7th 1992)</i>	110
<i>Passing of UN Security Council Resolution 743 (February 21st 1992)</i>	112
<i>Formal end of SFRY, Declaration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (April 27th 1992)</i>	115
Conclusions.....	117
Positions of the Various Publications	117
Was there a Media Campaign?	121
Problems and Issues.....	123
Map of Yugoslavia.....	125
Bibliography	126

List of Abbreviations

LCY: League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Formal title of the communist party of Yugoslavia composed of eight regional bodies from each of the six republics and the two autonomous regions. Formed in 1937 and dissolved in 1991

HDZ: (*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica*) The Croatian Democratic Union. Franjo Tudman's right wing part founded in 1990, an embodiment of Croatian nationalism that opposed communism and Croatia remaining in Yugoslavia.

The Presidency: The Collective Presidency of Yugoslavia. Designed to give the republics more power, the Presidency, promulgated in the 1974 Constitution, had 9 representatives, one from each republic and autonomous region and the head of the LCY (though he had no voting power). Each member was allowed a vote and a majority was needed to take action on any issue. During his lifetime Tito headed the Presidency, and after his death, other members rotated the Head of the Presidency each year to one of the representatives of a republic.

JNA: (*Jugoslavenska narodna armija*) The Yugoslav People's Army or Yugoslav National Army. Formed after WWII the JNA was Yugoslavia's primary armed forces including a navy and air force. In total it possessed around 600,000 soldiers and personnel with modern equipment produced in Yugoslavia itself and roughly 8 million reservists. Alongside the JNA each republic had a Territorial Defense Force and local police forces, though in theory these were under the purview of the JNA. The Presidency in theory issued the orders to the JNA, which the JNA general staff implemented. During the crisis, this chain of command would break down.

EC: The European Community in this paper's time frame refers to the European Economic Community (EEC). The EEC was the economic wing of the new European communities (the others being the Atomic Energy Community and the Coal and Steel Community) formed in 1958 after the Treaty of Rome went into effect. In 1967 the EEC's Commission took over the other two and formed a single European Council in charge of all three communities. These were transformed into the EU in 1993, however in the context of this paper EC refers to the European Council and its members between 1988 and 1992

WEU: The Western European Union. A military alliance of Western European states also in the EC formed in 1948 and dissolved in 2009. The WEU was never enacted, meaning the alliance was never tested. During the Yugoslav Crisis some leaders in Europe argued for the use of the WEU as a force to intervene in Yugoslavia, but the

idea never made it past discussion.

Chetnik: The word comes from old Slavic "*Cheta*" a band of troops, and refers to soldiers, usually of Serb origin who fought in the Balkans between 1900-1945. While this word may have referred to bands of Serb soldiers or just individual patriots who did not fight, it is usually connotated with the Serb forces who resisted the Axis in WWII. Lead by Draža Mihailović, they fought against the Axis and Tito's Partisans and sought to establish a new Serb state. During the breakup of Yugoslavia, bands of Serb paramilitaries referred to themselves as Chetniks in an effort to channel patriotic feeling while the Croats used the term as synonymous with "terrorist."

Chronology of Events

- May 4th 1980: Death of Joziph Tito.
- March 11th 1981: Beginning of Protests in Kosovo at the University of Pristina, first unrest in Yugoslavia.
- May 25th 1985: The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts publishes a memorandum on the Serbian people in Yugoslavia claiming they are being persecuted.
- April 24th 1987: Slobodan Milošević proclaims "No one will ever beat you" to a crowd of Serbs in Kosovo.
- October 6th 1988: Protestors topple the government in Volvidinja, and pro-Milošević politicians are installed.
- December 25th 1988: Branko Mikulić resigns as Prime Minister of Yugoslavia having failed to alleviate the situation he is replaced by Ante Markovic. Inflation stands at over 200%
- January 11th 1989, Protestors force the government of Montenegro to resign, and again pro Milošević politicians are installed.
- February 16th 1989: Workers at the Trepca Mine in Kosovo go on strike, the government declares a state of emergency in Kosovo.
- May 8th 1989: In the Slovenian capital, Ljubljana, the May Declaration is read to crowds of people asserting the right of Slovenia to sovereignty. On the same day Milošević becomes president of Serbia.

- June 1989
 - 11th: Franco Tudjman founds the HDZ, a nationalist party, in Croatia.
 - 28th: Milošević delivers a massive speech on the 400th Anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo to perhaps a million Serbs and speaks of the greatness of Serbia
- September 17th 1989: Slovenia drops the word "Socialist" from its official name.
- November 28th 1989: DEMOS, the Democratic Opposition in Slovenia, coalition forms from several non-communist parties to challenge the communist government in upcoming first free elections.
- December 1st 1989: An attempted demonstration by Serbs in Ljubljana is dispersed.
- January 1990:
 - 20th: The 14th and final conference of the LCY begins, two days later the conference ends when Slovenia walks out and the LCY dissolves.
 - 31st: In response to another strike, the Presidency orders the JNA into Kosovo and establishes military rule of the region.
- February 17th 1990: Parties demanding autonomy for Serb areas in Croatia form in the city of Knin.
- April 1990:
 - 8th: DEMOS wins first multiparty elections in Slovenia, defeating the communists.
 - April 22nd: HDZ wins the first round of elections in Croatia and in the runoff election wins a majority, imposing single party rule in Croatia. One month later the parliament elects Tudjman as President
- July 2nd 1990: Kosovo declares itself a republic within Yugoslavia, Serbia responds by abolishing the parliament of Kosovo, and further restricting the freedom of the region.
- August 17th 1990: The Serbs around Knin begin to blockade the roads using fallen trees to keep Croatian police out of Serb majority areas, the "Log Revolution." This is followed shortly by a unanimous positive referendum demanding autonomy.
- August 30th 1990: Croatian Courts rule the Serb Autonomous Regions in Croatia illegal, however there is no enforcement. One month later the regions

declare themselves autonomous republics within Yugoslavia.

- November 1990: In both Bosnia and Macedonia, anti-communist parties win elections and begin to push for more freedom from the government in Belgrade.
- December 1990:
 - 16th: After two rounds of voting, Milošević wins the presidency of Serbia and his party the Socialist Party of Serbia, but not by an overwhelming margin.
 - December 23rd: In a referendum on independence in Slovenia, an overwhelming majority vote for independence.
 - December 24th: Croatia drafts a new constitution, which limits the power of the federal government in Croatia and removes specified protections for minorities, including Serbs.
- January 9th 1991: Head of the Presidency Borisav Jović of Serbia requests the JNA act against Croatia and Slovenia. Kosovo, Serbia and Vojvodina and Montenegro vote for force. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia vote against the use of force. Deadlocking and defeating the request
- March 1991:
 - 1st: In Pakrac, Croatia local Serbs seize control of the police station, and engage in a skirmish with Croatian Territorial forces. The JNA intervenes and stops the fighting, forcing the withdrawal of Croatian forces.
 - 9th: Massive demonstrations in Belgrade against Milošević lead by students turn violent after the JNA fires on the protestors
 - 12th: The JNA, in an effort to preserve Yugoslavia, request the Presidency grant them emergency powers, the vote is split four to four with the same results as January 9th
- 29th: At the Plitvice Lakes Park in Croatia, Serb militias clash with Croatian Police, resulting in one death on each side. The JNA again intervenes and forces Croatian Police to withdraw.
- May 2nd 1991: In the Serb majority village of Borovo Selo Croatia, several Croatian police are taken hostage, and then killed. A massive fight follows suit with over 500 combatants total and 15 deaths. Again the JNA intervenes and divides the two sides. The Croatian public is enraged following the disclosure of evidence that dead bodies had been mutilated.
- May 16th 1991: Using a technicality in the rules of Presidency, Borisav Jović blocks his Croatian successor Stjepan Mesić from assuming the Head of Presidency, having four republics vote against approving Mesić 's assumption of the position. This situation lasts for 52 days.

- June 1991:
 - 25th: In keeping with their assertion three months prior, Slovenia, unsatisfied with negotiations over the future shape of Yugoslavia, declares independence from Yugoslavia. This occurs one day before the agreed upon date, an effort by Slovenia to preempt any move by the central government or JNA
 - 27th: Beginning of the 10-Day War. In an effort to keep Slovenia in Yugoslavia by force, the JNA defying government orders to stand down deploys the armed forces to Slovenia. However heavy resistance hind progress and a truce is declared after seven days.
- July 7th 1991: The Brioni Agreement between Slovenia, Croatia, Yugoslavia and the European Community. Slovenia and Croatia freeze their independence for a three-month period in order to continue negotiations, in return the JNA withdraws from Slovenia. This effectively makes Slovenia *de facto* independent.
- August 25th 1991: The Siege of Vukovar Begins. The first major act of the JNA's open offensive in Croatia, the JNA laid siege to Vukovar until November 18th effectively destroying the city in the process, the largest and most destructive battle in modern European history until the Siege of Sarajevo two years later.
- October 1991:
 - 1st : The Siege of Dubrovnik begins. The JNA shelled Dubrovnik in an effort to secure the Kotor Peninsula from Croatia. The siege lasts seven months, but after several months the threat is effectively ended.
 - 7th : Amidst battles with the JNA, Croatia declares independence from Yugoslavia in keeping with the Brioni Agreement. The government of Croatia hoped the act would garner international support, but the declaration was not immediately recognized by most nations.
- December 1991:
 - 9th: The Badinter Commission, part of a much larger peace conference in The Hague, provides its first legal opinion on Yugoslavia: "That the SFRY is in the process of dissolution."
 - 17th: The European Community plan to recognize Croatia and Slovenia. In the face of German demands and the worsening situation, under the context of incorporating nations from the former Warsaw Pact, the EC agreed to recognize the two republics collectively on January 15th 1992.
- 23rd: German recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. Though Germany delayed

actual implementation of recognition, until the January 15th, Chancellor Helmut Kohl announced German recognition for the two republics. The decision garnered controversy within the EC over the nature of Germany's act.

- January 1992
 - 7th: A helicopter full of EC monitors is shot down in Croatia. A JNA jet fighter killed five EC monitors, enraging the EC and bringing international pressure on Serbia to halt the fighting in Croatia.
 - 15th: In keeping with the December agreement, the EC recognizes Croatia and Slovenia.
- February 27th 1992: United Nations Security Council Resolution 743. Passed in the Security Council, the Protection Force (UNPROFOR) is mandated to establish Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia, to be enforced by 10,000 international peacekeepers, "Blue Helmets." The JNA shortly withdraws from Croatia after the Blue Helmets arrive.
- April 27th 1992: Formal end of SFR Yugoslavia. The Republic of Serbia, its two autonomous provinces, Volvidinja and Kosovo, and Montenegro reform their constitutions and establish the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The FRY attempts to claim the state as the successor to the SFRY, but this claim is rejected by the international community.

Introduction

Abstract

This project's goal is to debunk the myth of a collective media campaign in the German Press regarding events of the Yugoslav Crisis; that the German Press held a common position against Serbia and Yugoslavia. Proving this entails analyzing three separate newspapers from three regions and a national magazine from the period of 1989-1992. By examining these publications during the Yugoslav Crisis, this project will examine how events are reported, what context they are framed in, how much attention is given to particular events vs. others. By analyzing these features this project proves effectively that no such media campaign existed in the German Press in the reporting on Yugoslavia between 1989-1992.

Situation

On December 17th 1991 at a Christian Democratic Union party conference in Dresden in the newly reunified Germany, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl announced that on January 15th 1992, Germany would diplomatically recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia. The announcement came after months of debate within the government and the European Community as to if the decision to recognize would help to end the crisis in Yugoslavia or serve to make it worse. In November 1991 the EC finally agreed to recognize the republics provided they met certain qualifications. Before the members of his party Kohl declared the decision "A great development for us, for German diplomacy and for European diplomacy." The Belgrade foreign office responded that this decision calling it a "Direct attack on Yugoslavia."

The next day the German paper the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ) reported the event on the front page. The article quotes both Kohl and his

foreign minister Hans Genscher six times collectively and makes a point of noting the collective nature of the decision among the EC members to offer recognition. "In Dresden the Chancellor said the government, is prepared to recognize the other republics (Macedonia and Bosnia) in addition to Slovenia and Croatia, provided they fulfill the EC requirements." The piece presents a bright future for the republics, quoting Kohl saying, "I am very lucky that today I can say, Croatia will not be alone."

One week before the announcement the weekly magazine *Der Spiegel* published a piece on the anticipated recognition. It acknowledges the official decision of the EC, and the German desire to recognize the republics. However the article notes the strain within the EC over the issue; "A note from London questions if Croatia meets the international 'conditions' for a state." Despite Genscher's position: "In the end...our line will prevail in the EC," future complications are noted. For example how much aid will be required to help get Slovenia and Croatia on solid economic footing?

The day before the announcement the far left newspaper *Neues Deutschland* published a piece on the impending decision. The article argues that the recognition defies the United Nations: "Regardless of all United Nations concerns, Germany will recognize the Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Slovenia." Furthermore, recognition will hinder the deployment of peacekeepers in Croatia to stop fighting there. Three days following the conference, an opinion column on the decision ran, titled: "Is there a German threat in Europe?" Kohl's words from the conference are repeated however under a different interpretation. These words: "Reinforce the fact that Kohl's government is neither willing nor able to integrate the new power of united

Germany in Europe.” The author continues by claiming that Germany is seeking to abandon the EC and establish hegemony in Central Europe.

Two weeks before the announcement, *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung* reported on the efforts of the German government to persuade the EC to recognize the two republics. However the majority of the EC has no desire to recognize the republics believing recognition will only make the violent situation worse. Genscher’s travels to meet with the EC members to make the case that without recognition sanctions cannot be used against Serbia. Genscher’s chances of success are described as “50-50.”

The differences between the newspapers and publications in Germany on the Yugoslavia Crisis is the basis for this study and will be examined in depth throughout the course of this study.

Context

In my third year at university I studied in Germany and made six different trips to four of the seven former republics of Yugoslavia. I became fascinated with the history of the region and wanted to incorporate it into my thesis. The specific inspiration for this project came after reading the scholarly journal article *Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia* by Dr. Beverly Crawford, professor at UC Berkeley, published in *World Politics*, (vol. 4, 1996). In her work Dr. Crawford examines the forces both

external and internal that pushed Germany to recognize the republics prematurely.¹ Overall she concludes that while domestic factors played a part in defining Germany's position on the crisis, that is to recognize the republics, "Germany's growing power, underdeveloped multilateral regimes, and conflicting international norms lowered the costs of unilateralism and provided the permissive conditions for defection."²

In her analysis Dr. Crawford dedicates three pages to the role of public opinion, interest groups and the media.³ It concludes that media and domestic forces alone did not explain the shift in German policy. In this brief analysis Dr. Crawford asserts: "The influential *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, relentlessly portrayed a Croatia committed to "European" values, while caricaturing the Serbs as being hardly European at all."⁴ She is not the only one to question the neutrality of the FAZ's reporting. Dr. Alexander Neu, German politician and historian published a study in 2004 comparing the coverage of events in Yugoslavia 1991-1995 from the perspective of *The Times* and the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. He concludes the FAZ; "Put both the contemporary history of Yugoslavia in the final phase of a decidedly negative image. Here they defined civilization with fascism and anti-communism sentiments, and then portrayed Serbia as carrying this negative image

¹ Despite the agreed date of recognition for January 15th 1992 Germany recognized the republics on December 23rd 1991. This is the 'Unilateral defection' Dr. Crawford refers to and though the consequences were moot, the act shocked many in the EC.

² Beverly, Crawford, "Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia." *World Politics*, 1996 505

³ Ibin, 502

⁴ Ibin, 504

of Yugoslavia.”⁵ The book *Vampire Nation: Violence as Cultural Imaginary* by Dr. Tomislav Z. Longinović, Professor of Slavic and Comparative Literature at the University of Wisconsin, discusses the external representations of Serbia in the 20th century. Dr. Longinović also asserts the FAZ’s anti-Serb position and points to an FAZ article in 1993 that claims the Serbs need to be eliminated.⁶

That question of FAZ’s neutrality made me wonder about the reporting of other German newspapers. Slobodan Milošević former leader of Serbia and Yugoslavia said during his trial in The Hague in 1996 that an international conspiracy had destroyed Yugoslavia and that a German media campaign had preceded this. In 1998, *Covert Action Quarterly* published a piece written by Diana Johnstone, author of the book *Fools’ Crusade: Yugoslavia, Nato, and Western Delusions*, a controversial book for its denial of the Srebrenica Massacre. The article claims: “Nineteen months after German reunification...German media resounded with condemnation of an entire ethnic group (Serbs) reminiscent of the pre-war propaganda against the Jews.”⁷ Keeping these two ideas in mind I made up my mind to investigate the reporting of other German newspapers.

The Question

In this study I will be debunking the myth of a collective German media campaign either for or against Yugoslavia, Serbia or any other people of Yugoslavia. To do this

⁵ Alexander Neu. "Die Jugoslawien-Kriegsberichterstattung Der Times Und Der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung Ein Vergleich." *Berlin Information-Center for Transatlantic Security*, 2005. Accessed December 17, 2014. <http://www.bits.de/public/articles/ifsh166.htm>.

⁶ Toma Longinović, . *Vampire Nation: Violence as Cultural Imaginary*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011. 85

⁷ Diana Johnstone, "Seeing Yugoslavia Through a Dark Glass: Politics, Media and the Ideology of Globalization." *CovertAction Quarterly*, no. 65.

I will be examining four separate German publications between January 1989-April 1992.

For the case of this study I am defining a “collective media campaign” as a collective effort by multiple publications to portray events in Yugoslavia as a common narrative. In other words, if one of these publications dissents from a common story the collective media campaign theory falls apart. For the purpose of simplicity I will use FAZ as my measure, because its anti-Serb, anti-Yugoslav position is well documented. In this case dissent must be very obvious, if a publication dissents from the FAZ in more than half the events utilized in this study for comparison, then the argument of a media campaign collapses. This also includes the method by which the papers reported on events. While publications may share similar political views, if their reporting is different then the collective media campaign theory falls apart as well. Indeed, over the course of the timeframe in this study a consensus between certain publications develops on certain issues such as the fighting in Croatia or the European Community. However the manner in which this information is presented, context and the implied message is almost always different. Hence a collective media campaign theory also fails.

Through my analysis I found that each paper has a different view of events down in Yugoslavia, and will elaborate on them later. These views reflect the character of each paper and in the case of *Der Spiegel* the timeline of when it is published. Over the course of this investigation I will be highlighting the differences in how publications perceive the events in Yugoslavia, how much attention they give to certain events related to others, who they choose to quote, how much space is

given to who or what group and the choice of opinion pieces published.

Some historians have traced Germany's modern leadership in the EU today from the premature recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. Scholars and academics such as Dr. Stephen Saideman of Carleton University; T.W. Carr, assistant publisher, *Defense & Foreign Affairs Publications*; Dr. Carl Hodge of Okanagan University and Dr. David Gibbs of Arizona University all argue the German government exploited the situation in Yugoslavia to reconstruct German power in Central Europe, the first step of which culminated in the recognition of the Croatia and Slovenia. Regardless, the purpose of this study is not to delve into a debate on the merits of this hypothesis, rather to examine the responses within Germany to events leading up to and including recognition via the study of four major newspapers. The question of Slovenian and Croatian recognition developed into a major question for the EC and a newly unified Germany in the context of 1990s European diplomacy, and the reason this study centers on these event. The theory of a German quest for hegemony includes accusations of media coercion of the public and government. This study examines four major publications, each with a distinct position, providing a piece of the larger picture, and dispelling the myth of a collective media campaign.

Methodology

Dr. Crawford in her work only mentions three publications, FAZ, *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ), and the *Frankfurter Rundschau*. She also only points to three editorials from the FAZ as an example of its partisanship. If more research existed it is not noted. I believe that three articles do not constitute a full study. So I decided to

analyze four different publications. These consist of three daily newspapers: *Neues Deutschland*, *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* and the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, along with one weekly magazine; *Der Spiegel*.

My reasoning for this decision comes both in part from a lack of explained analysis on the part of Dr. Crawford. As I stated above I do not believe three editorials can establish the point of view of an entire publication. However FAZ's anti-Yugoslav position is well known, however I included the FAZ in my list of publications to analyze to more fully flesh out the position of the paper. I analyzed editorials, letters to the editor, and articles from the FAZ, over the course of three years. This volume I believe will better clarify the FAZ's alleged position.

The second reason for these particular publications comes from where they stood in Germany at the time and their regional connotations. I'll delve into the history of the papers more later in this work, however it is important to note each paper roughly corresponds to a region and *Der Spiegel* is a nationally read weekly magazine. *Neues Deutschland* in the early 1990s remained popular in the former East Germany. Despite declining circulation, 1 million in 1989 to 300,000 today, even by 1992 circulation was still over 700,000, making it an influential paper in the context of this study. SZ is a politically moderate newspaper, heavily influenced by its location in southern Germany. It often writes in opposition the ruling conservative party the CSU, helping to define its political position. Also of note is the large community of Croats in Bavaria and the possibility of their influence on the CSU, something SZ notes in several articles. Like *Neues Deutschland's* coverage, SZ is mostly read in southern Germany, making it a regional paper, which can provide a

regional perspective from southern Germany. *Der Spiegel* is a national magazine read in the whole of Germany. Known for investigative journalism and commitment to aloofness from politics, *Der Spiegel* presents a moderate, fairly neutral perspective of any subject they present. Its widely spread readership and excellent reputation makes it the perfect magazine to analyze the Yugoslav Crisis from a German perspective.

The analysis of the daily newspapers takes a different form from that of *Der Spiegel*. The reason being that while *Der Spiegel* published an edition once per week and perhaps had one article pertaining to Yugoslavia per issue, the daily newspapers (except for Sunday) and might have anywhere from 305-310 issues per year, over the course of three years that adds up to over 900 issues. Within the given frame of the project I simply do not have the time to read an estimated 2700 newspaper issues, accounting for all three newspapers, perhaps if I had an additional 5-6 months I could accomplish this feat, but this is not the case.

In light of this debacle I have chosen to focus on the time frame around certain events pivotal to the breakup of Yugoslavia. For example, the Gazimestan Speech, given by Milošević in September 1989 and seen as one of the turning point in the relation between the Yugoslav republics. First I search within each paper four to five days before and after the event for any pertinent reporting on the subject of Yugoslavia and the event in question itself. Then I will compare the reporting between the four publications.

It is important to note that reporting on Yugoslavia did not gain increased attention in the German media until mid 1991, after violence had broken out. This is

another reason reading every issue for all three years is an ineffective use of time, papers published comparatively few articles on Yugoslavia before the fighting. Accordingly in the later half of 1991 due to the increased coverage of events I decided to look at whole months. For example I read virtually all issues May through September of 1991 and November 1991-January 1992 looking for articles related to Yugoslavia. I kept the dates and subject matter on many additional articles I did not read or print but related to Yugoslavia. Whether I analyzed an article rest on if it related to the list of events or if the title indicated it might provide insight into political views of the paper.

One major feature in addition to published articles is opinion pieces. These come in the form of letters written by readers, editorials, and opinion columns. . Though it could fall into the realm of speculation, the choice of which letters to publish and other opinion based publications, could serve as a gauge on the political view of the paper.

It is important to note, that in analyzing these article all opinions are those of the paper. I have refrained from inserting my own opinions to the best of my abilities. In the analysis, all opinionated statements are meant to reflect the position of the papers being analyzed. Furthermore, though certain articles may be written by a specific correspondent or reporter, for the sake of this study I am assuming anything published in the paper reflects the opinion of the paper itself, this includes opinion articles and reprints as the paper itself choose to publish this material.

In total I read and printed over 150 articles and letters to the editors in addition to a handful of political cartoons.

Considerations

It is important to keep in mind the international situation in the years between 1989-1992. Of the publications analyzed almost all paid much more attention to the international situation as opposed to Yugoslavia before July 1991. In these years communism collapsed in Eastern Europe and the USSR, the Gulf War fought in Kuwait, the Chinese government massacred protestors in Tiananmen Square, and Apartheid ended in South Africa.

Overshadowing all of this, and of particular importance for this project, is the reunification of East and West Germany. Such a pivotal event in German history naturally captured the nations attention for much of the period especially before 1991. Knowing this, the analysis of the various publications will be considered as well within the context of reunification. Because of this some events may not be covered or only given minimal coverage, but this too is a clue as to what the examined publications consider important.

The Publications

For much of its history, Germany had a highly developed newspaper industry. In West Germany press freedom is protected under the constitution. In East Germany featured a tightly controlled press, with *Neues Deutschland* dominating the media until reunification. Nonetheless in the 1990s studies showed that Germans read daily newspapers at a higher percentage than any other peoples in Europe. This trend has a long history: prior to World War II political parties ran many of

Germany's presses as a platform for their views and their papers read devoutly by their constituents. This trend had largely disappeared in the post-war era, though papers with certain political perspectives do persist, as the following paragraphs will clarify.

This study examined four publications for the period of January 1989-April 1992. Over the course of the study the political views and leanings of each publication became apparent. Here each publication is presented and that publication's particular point of view is expounded.

Der Spiegel

Der Spiegel is a weekly magazine published in Germany since January 4th, 1947. The name translated into English means "mirror" the idea being an emphasis on investigative journalism and taking a hard look at society. Originally a newspaper established by the British occupational authorities in Hannover to provide objective news, Germans themselves took over the magazine when the British authorities were confident the magazine would remain objective. According to their website since 1989 around 1 million copies are sold weekly and those are read by around 6 million Germans.

Der Spiegel played a part in German history itself, often clashing with the government. The first and most notorious instance of the magazine clashing with the government is known as the *Der Spiegel* Scandal. In 1961 following rising tensions between the magazine and the government, German Chancellor Conrad Adenauer took action against the magazine. The reason, according to the

government was an article published in October 1962 that reported on the results of a NATO exercise. The NATO commander quoted as saying "German forces are only partially ready to defend to Germany," a statement interpreted by the Minister of Defense, Franz Strauss as a danger to German security. German police arrested the publishers and author and the publishing office closed. However the people struck back with massive protests throughout Germany, on such a scale that Chancellor Adenauer's party the CDU lost the next election. Historians assert that this moment in history marked a turning point in the post-war culture of Germany, a rejection of the old authoritarian culture and the genesis of the new liberal German culture.

In covering events on Yugoslavia *Der Spiegel* often framed the events within the greater context. For example the Croatian Declaration of Independence or the creation of the Serb Oblasts in Croatia received round-up coverage, in other words not their own articles on the event. In both of these cases the stories formed smaller parts of a larger article. This is because *Der Spiegel* publishes editions only once per week or about 50-52 per year and they cover a weeks worth of news within one article.

In terms of their view on the Yugoslav Crisis *Der Spiegel* takes a relatively neutral line not appearing to take one side or the other. *Der Spiegel* interviewed numerous individuals involved in the crisis from both sides. This includes leaders of nations such as Franjo Tudjman or Alija Izetbegović, to activists and economists.⁸ *Der Spiegel* provides the readers an inside look into the thoughts of both sides in

⁸ "Jeder kämpft gegen jeden" *Der Spiegel* July 22nd 1991, "Wir wollen souverän sein" *Der Spiegel* June 18th 1990, "Uns rettet nur Europa" *Der Spiegel* May 13th 1991, and "Nur 6000 Prozent Inflation" *Der Spiegel* October 2nd 1989

their own words. *Der Spiegel's* work is also not afraid of being critical of each side, for example Milošević, the JNA, Stephan Mesic and the UN are not above both criticism and praise. Especially noted is *Der Spiegel's* willingness to be critical of Tudjman and his actions in Croatia. In contrast of the FAZ which almost never criticizes Tudjman or his leadership, *Der Spiegel* compares Tudjman to Milošević, points out his desire to partition Bosnia, and reminds the reader about the Croatian fascist organization the Ustache in several articles dedicated to the history of the region.

After the 10-Day War though *Der Spiegel* is increasingly critical of Serbia and Yugoslavia. This criticism is directed at Milošević, the JNA and the Serb militias, and not a generalization of the Serb people, in fact *Der Spiegel* takes pains to separate the Serbs from their leaders. That said *Der Spiegel*, unlike FAZ, does not automatically believe recognition is the best course of action and ran several articles on the disagreement within the EC on the issue and one article on the potential consequences for the republics should they succeed. *Der Spiegel* also continues to disparage Tudjman for his racist attitude and uncompromising stance against Croatian Serbs. However *Der Spiegel* is under no illusion as to who the aggressor in the whole conflict is: "Yugoslavia was not destroyed by a conspiracy of international powers, but by Serbian megalomania."⁹

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)

Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung is among the most read newspapers in Germany along side other large daily papers such as *Die Welt* (The World) and the *Die*

⁹ "Krakeel auf dem Balkan" *Der Spiegel* December 23rd 1991
23

Sueddeutsche Zeitung. In English, "Frankfurt General Newspaper," FAZ began publishing in 1949 with permission of the American occupational authority and despite the name, printed in the city of Mainz until 1950. The newspaper is broken into sections such as *Politik*, *Wirtschaft* and *Reiseblatt* (Politics, Economics and Travel) with the Politics and Economics section dominating most non-advertising pages of the paper. Though envisioned as a politically neutral newspaper, the FAZ has acquired a reputation among the German people as more politically conservative than the other major papers of the country.¹⁰ According to Peter Humphries, Professor at Manchester University, in 1993 the circulation of the FAZ stood at around 391,000 readers, the largest in Germany at the time.¹¹ The scope and influence of the paper is relevant to note owing to the possible influence it could exercise among its readers. FAZ has historically and continues to claim today that it has the largest number of international correspondents, which gives it credibility in international news reporting.

An academic review of Libal's *Limits of Persuasion* mentions the FAZ editor in chief Johann-Georg Reissmueller's "one-man editorial crusade for recognition of Slovenia and Croatia."¹² Dr. Crawford cites the FAZ as the most aggressive paper in pushing support for Croatia and Slovenia. This study has confirmed these assertions of the FAZ's position as exemplified in their writings and selected publications. FAZ evolves from a pro-Slovenia and Croatia stance to a pro-independence stance to a

¹⁰ This is in part thanks to the close relationship of the paper to the first *Wirtschaftsminister* Ludwig Erhard, whom used the paper to garner support for his economic recovery program in the early 1950s.

¹¹ Peter Humphries, . *Mass Media and Media Policy in Western Europe*. Manchester [England: Manchester University Press;], 1996. 85

¹² Christian A. Nielsen. "Review of Libal, Michael, *Limits of Persuasion: Germany and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1991-1992*," H-Net Reviews.

pro-recognition stance to simply an anti-Serbia stance. Their position could also be described as merely anti-Serbian, but it does take the aforementioned evolutions through the course of the study.

FAZ's position becomes clear through careful reading of their content. Typically the FAZ articles almost never quote sources directly from Serbia except for magazines in Serbia, but never individuals from Serbia. However numerous Croatian and Slovenian officials are quoted time and time again, along with everyday people from those countries. FAZ also plays up the difference between the Serbia on the one hand and Slovenia and Croatia on the other; claiming among other things that the Croats and Slovenes are democratic compared to the tyranny of Serbia. Also Serbs are mostly depicted as backwards, nationalistic, terrorists. In none of the FAZ articles I examined neither Tadjman or Croatia faced any kind of criticism, no questioning of the legality of the succession of the northern republics and specifically in terms of the Serb Oblasts, no realistic examination of the motives of certain actors.

There are several possibilities why the FAZ takes this stance. It may be because of the historical connections of Slovenia and Croatia to the German speaking world. The cultural elites of Austria and Germany, allegedly, sought to see the two republics brought back into the 'German Sphere' of Europe. Several articles in *Neues Deutschland* allege this, in addition to the historian David Gibbs author of *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. It is also possible that individual reporters may have favored Croatia and Slovenia. In addition to George Reissmueller, Victor Mierer an FAZ reporter received the highest

honor from the government of Slovenia for his reporting.¹³ However the reason most likely is FAZ being a conservative newspaper took the line that Serbia represents an old communist-imperialist force, hence the dichotomy between Serbia and Slovenia/Croatia. Support abounds for this theory: "Serbian Communists, now known as 'Socialists,' won two elections,"¹⁴ or "Croatia wishes to be free of Serbian imperialism at any cost."¹⁵ Quotes such as these are seen numerous times throughout this study.

Neues Deutschland

Neues Deutschland (ND), which literally translates into "New Germany", is a largely regional newspaper in the former East Germany. According to their own website ND is the most read and circulated daily newspaper among the population of the former East Germany.¹⁶ Much like the demographics of former East Germany, the total readership of ND has plummeted since reunification. In fact according to the Information Community to Determine the Reach of Advertising, a company that monitors advertising and the advertising medium, the total circulation fell from over one million in 1990 to around 350,000 in 2012. Paid circulation also plummeted down to around 36,000, one of the greatest circulations losses in modern German publishing history. However these losses are modern, and ND is a valuable part of

¹³ Neu. "Die Jugoslawien-Kriegsberichterstattung."

¹⁴ "Grosse Mehrheit in Slowenien fuer einen unabhaengigen Staat" *Frankfurter Allegemine Zeitung* December 26th 1990.

¹⁵ "Warum Kroatien Stillhielt" *Frankfurter Allegemine Zeitung* July 15th 1991

¹⁶ "Ist ND in den oestlichen Bundeslaendern nach wie vor die am meisten verbreitete und gelesene ueberregionale Tageszeitung"

this analysis because as of 1990 the readership still massive, on par with FAZ or *Der Spiegel*.

Neues Deutschland began publishing in 1946, earlier than any other newspaper examined in this work. However despite this age the newspaper has been tainted by its role as the central organ of the ruling SED Party (Socialist Unity Party of Germany) in the former East Germany. The paper took over the former papers of the SPD (Socialist Democratic Party) and KPD (Communist Party of Germany) and became the most read paper in East Germany, followed closely by its youth edition paper *Junge Welt* (Young World).

The paper stood as a tool of the central ruling party and its name became synonymous with "East Germany." The degree to which the paper followed and supported the government is astounding. For example after John Kennedy's speech in Berlin, the paper published an article criticizing the United States for rearming West Germany.¹⁷ Immediately before reunification, like the government of East Germany, *Neues Deutschland* attempted to reform itself, with a new format and editor in chief. However the readership declined to about 700,000 by 1992 and the paper faced bankruptcy. The government of West Germany planned to liquidate the paper's assets, but local support saved the paper, which formed a partnership with the Party of Democratic Socialism, now The Left Party. Despite this new partnership, *Neues Deutschland* is committed to independence, and has adopted the mantra of a "socialist daily paper," and still reflects many of the values from the SED.

¹⁷ "Blick auf die Wahrheit raubte Kennedy den Überblick über die Lage" *Neues Deutschland* June 27th 1963

Neues Deutschland's position evolved throughout the course of the study. In the early stages of the study *Neues Deutschland* wishes to see communism in Yugoslavia remain. Upon the collapse of the old communism in Yugoslavia, which coincidentally happened only two months after the paper reformed themselves, *Neues Deutschland* shifted to advocating for Yugoslavia in some form, federal or confederation. After the succession of Croatia and Slovenia *Neues Deutschland* takes a more anti-conflict and increased anti-nationalism stance. *Neues Deutschland* opposed the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia because the paper believed that action would lead to greater conflict. In this anti-conflict stance, both Croatia and the Serb militias are criticized because of their violent actions, and the deployment of UN peacekeepers is praised.

Die Süddeutsche Zeitung

Die Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), which literally translates into "The South German General," is a newspaper based in southern Germany. The paper is currently the most widely subscribed to daily newspaper in all of Germany with over 380,000+ daily subscribers. Though like all other German newspapers since the mid-2000s, readership has declined from a high of 450,000 in 2006 down to the current number. Like the FAZ it is broken into sections, including *Nachrichten Deutschland*, (German News) *Nachrichten Ausland* (Foreign News), *Wirtschaft* (economy) and *Meinung* (Opinion), occasionally there are also special features as well as letters to the editor. Most of the articles read for the analysis come from the foreign news section as well as a few pieces from the opinion section.

SZ has the unique distinction of being the first newspaper allowed under the U.S. occupation authorities. It began to publish in May 1946; only one month after *Neues Deutschland* began circulation. It did not begin daily circulation until 1949, but since then has become one of the most influential papers in Germany. It has regional offices all over Germany including the former East Germany. The paper is read across regions in Germany but home in Bavaria, and it includes special sections for news pertaining to Munich, capital of Bavaria, where it is published, leading some to describe it as a regional paper of southern Germany.

SZ's political stance is described as Left-Center or moderate. According to a story by *Die Zeit*, SZ's publishing philosophy is for a "free and democratic society shaped by liberal and social principles."¹⁸ Because of the moderate nature of the paper, there is a joke that the SZ is the only political opposition to the conservative CSU that rules in Bavaria from 1949 to the present day. In addition to their moderate stance SZ is well known for its excellent writing, winning dozens of German publishing awards since the 1990s.

SZ's moderate nature is visible in its reporting on Yugoslavia. Through the articles in this study rarely does SZ break a neutral point of view and blatantly lay the blame on one party or the other. This does not mean the SZ does not have a position; the SZ gradually becomes more anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslavia after the 10-Day War. But this position is not directly laid out, but can be inferred from the focus on the negative actions of the JNA, Serb militias and Milosevic's politics, SZ displays

¹⁸ Ludwig Maaßen. *Die Zeitung: Daten, Deutungen, Porträts : Presse in D. Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Heidelberg: V. Decker & Muller, 1986. 95

very few positive acts by the previously mentioned parties, giving the reader a negative perception. Nonetheless SZ refuses to unequivocally endorse recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and skeptically explores the role of the EC and UN.

Method of Analysis and Comparison

The comparison of these publications centers on several features: context, quotes, length of a particular article, opinion pieces published, title of article and terms used. These features when analyzed provide key insight into the story the individual publication is trying to tell.

First and most important is context. Does the article or report give enough or any context to the general situation? It can be as short as one sentence or as long as a paragraph. FAZ for example often provides very little context except when it goes against the Serbs, and with the exception of letters to the editor some of which attempt to fill in the historical gaps. *Neues Deutschland* also provides selective context. For example in their coverage of the collapse of the Yugoslav Communist Party in January 1990 the FAZ wrote several paragraphs on the tensions between Slovenia and the tyrannical Serbs at the party conference, while *Neues Deutschland* brushed over the split and optimistically reported on the future possibilities for democratic socialism without the party, ignoring the critical fact that 40 years of party rule tainted the legacy of socialism. *Neues Deutschland* as I will show prefers a united if not united and socialist Yugoslavia while FAZ's opinion is the individual republics should be allowed to be independent. The amount of context reflects these views.

Quotes are also a major factor to be examined. The individual(s) the publication chooses to quote reveals much about their position. *Der Spiegel* for example often quotes two different sides in any article, the Serb side and then Slovenian/Croatian side. Though sometimes *Der Spiegel* quotes individuals that probably do not represent major population groups such as extremists or nationalists, they do an excellent job of giving the reader both sides in their own words. In all the articles studied in this examination, FAZ almost never quotes an individual from the Serb side of the crisis except for Milošević, Serb Extremists and Yugoslav Generals. But FAZ almost always quotes Franjo Tudjman, president of Croatia, and generously quotes Milan Kucan, leader of Slovenia in addition to individual citizens of those nations.

The length of particular articles can be telling. In some cases this means the event is less important in the eyes of the paper. For example the destruction of the EC helicopter in January of 1992 resulted in several small articles in *Neues Deutschland*, but several long articles in FAZ. A Yugoslav Air force pilot shot down the helicopter, a fact FAZ played up as an example of Yugoslav aggression and that *Neues Deutschland* tried to subtly blame on the Croats before acknowledging briefly the guilt of Yugoslavia in a subsequent article. In other cases the lack of an article's length is an attempt to hide or give greater context. For example in discussing the first free elections in Croatia, both *Der Spiegel* and SZ dedicated several paragraphs to describing Tudjman and his party the HDZ. *Der Spiegel* paints him as an extreme nationalist while SZ points out the international, conservative, support of the party.

Opinion pieces can provide an insight into the publication's position via what

they choose to publish. Even in cases where the letters do not directly reflect the papers opinion their publications these letters provide a more personal side to one part of the narrative. For example SDZ's opinion column showed the collapse of Yugoslavia as creeping Serb nationalism through the eyes of one reporter. And compared side by side, the opinion pieces from FAZ and *Neues Deutschland* are as different as night and day. FAZ's letters to the editor and special features often are in support of Croatia and Slovenia, while *Neues Deutschland* often published opinion pieces critical of Croatia and Germany for supporting Croatia.

Titles as a tool of analysis give some of the most interesting insight. Titles are the first thing a reader will see and set the tone for the article to follow. Extreme titles can set a tone for the rest of the article, but also sum up the sentiment in a single phrase. When the Yugoslav Army (JNA) moved to occupy Slovenia in the 10-Day War, *Der Spiegel* predicted the end of the JNA's special role in Yugoslav politics with the title, "The End of the Solider" while *Neues Deutschland* celebrated the action as one of heroism, "The Army Will Save Yugoslavia!" These titles reflect the positions of the publications, anti-JNA and pro-Yugoslavia respectively.

Sometimes articles or opinion pieces contain certain phrases or terms that help establish the point of view of the paper. These terms are often derogatory or stereotypical. For example FAZ terms the Serb militias in Croatia as terrorists and extremists and use the term Chetnik as derogatory. *Neues Deutschland* refers to the Serb militias as Chetniks as well, but also terms Croatian extremists and weapon smugglers. With these terms applied broadly to entire groups a publication's position become clear, either for one side or the other. *Der Spiegel* often specifies

when referring to groups, such as various Chetnik organizations that existed in Croatia and mostly avoids generalizations. *FAZ* and *Neues Deutschland* both have stories to tell, which almost always involve painting the other side as a monolithic force.

Historical Background

The Situation in Yugoslavia after 1980

Most historians agree that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia broke apart from the dual pressures of economics and nationalism. Beginning in the 1980s Yugoslavia began to face increased economic difficulties caused by a mix of external and internal changes. Exacerbated by economic hardships, nationalism became resurgent among the peoples of the various republics. This nationalism led to violence and ultimately the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

Background

The first official use of the name Yugoslavia transpired when the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes restructured and the nation adopted name "Kingdom of Yugoslavia." During World War II while occupied by the fascist powers a communist resistance movement of Partisans led by Josip Broz Tito rose to prominence and liberated much of the nation by 1945. After the war Tito became unquestioned leader and reorganized Yugoslavia along the line of a socialist federation. It consisted of six republics and two autonomous regions based roughly along ethnic

lines each represented in the Federal Assembly.¹⁹ The Constitution, amended in both 1963 and 1974, strengthened the power of the constituent republics. In the 1974 Constitution each of the eight represented regions acquired equal voting and veto power.²⁰ This intended to promote equality among the republics, however it would later be used as a tool of repression.

Rise of Nationalism

In the 1980s Yugoslavia faced a declining economic life. By 1987 inflation hovered around 170% and unemployment stood at 16%.²¹ Adding to this, Tito's death in 1980 left a void that could not be filled. However political activity continued with what became known as the Presidency of Nine, called so for each representative and President of the League of Communists, assuming power. They continued the practice from the 1974 Constitution by which each of them held the head of the Presidency for one year. But if their efforts to combat the plummeting economy failed, any effort to prevent the rise of nationalism faced catastrophe.

The first clashes of nationalism came from Kosovo the poorest region of Yugoslavia. A 1981 protest by university students over food turned into a region wide protest by Kosovo Albanians, in the end suppressed and the Kosovo Communist party purged. Things quieted for a few years, however in 1986 the Belgrade Academy of Arts released a memorandum that gave the perception of the

¹⁹ The republics include: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. Within Serbia Vojvodina and Kosovo were autonomous regions.

²⁰ Trifunovska, Snezana. "The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." In *Yugoslavia through Documents: From Its Creation to Its Dissolution*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994. 227

²¹ OECD Economic Surveys: Yugoslavia 1988, p. 9

Serbs as victims of persecution and fleeing Kosovo.²² One year later the Serbian Communist party sent Slobodan Milošević to Kosovo to calm the Serbs there. Instead Milošević delivered a famous decree that “No one would hit you (Serbs) ever again.” He became a viewed by Serbs throughout Yugoslavia as their protector and by 1989 he maneuvered himself into the position of President of the Socialist Republic of Serbia. In 1989 he helped draft a new constitution in Serbia, stripping Kosovo of autonomy but retaining a vote in the Presidency. In a separate series of events known as the Anti-bureaucratic Revolution, Milošević organized protests to topple the governments of Vojvodina and Montenegro and installed allied to secure their votes in the Presidency.²³

While Milošević tightened his control of Serbia the other republics pursued their own national agendas. Slovenian intellectuals, among the first after Tito’s death to demand more intellectual freedom, became active. In May of 1989 the “May Declaration,” read to the public in the capital of Ljubljana, declared the right of Slovenia to be a sovereign state. DEMOS, the Democratic Opposition of Slovenia defeated the Communist Party of Slovenia in April of 1990.²⁴ Even before then Milan Kucan, head of the Slovenian Communists began to liberalize rule in Slovenia. Croatian nationalism also began to resurge. In 1989 the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) formed in Zagreb, representing center right virtues. The party, headed by Franco Tudjman a former partisan and ardent nationalist, defeated the opposition

²² Trifunovska, Snež. *Former Yugoslavia through Documents: From Its Dissolution to the Peace Settlement*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999. 12

²³ In November of 1988 the Presidium of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was abolished reducing the presidency to eight.

²⁴ Crampton, R. J. *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century and After*. 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 1997, 455.

and established what historians have described as single party rule.²⁵ Both in Slovenia and Croatia the victorious parties favored reorganizing Yugoslavia into a confederation of independent states. However with Milošević's grip on Serbia and Montenegro secure, the possibility for confrontation heightened.

Towards Independence

The first clash came at the 14th Party Congress in January 1990, a meeting of all chapters of the LCY from the republics and autonomous regions. The party agreed to surrender their monopoly on power and shift from 'authoritarian socialism' to 'democratic socialism.' However, beyond this Milošević and his voting block opposed any major concession demanded by the Slovenian representatives such as proposals to reorganize Yugoslavia into a confederation. In the end the Slovenes walked out of the conference hall and the party effectively dissolved.

Another point of difference between the republics grew from Serbia's treatment of the Kosovo situation. The revoking of autonomy and after January 1990 the dispatching of the army to restore order and peace received harshly criticized by Croatia and Slovenia and contributed to the walkout at the party conference. The victory of DEMOS and the HDZ in spring of that year encouraged the Albanians of Kosovo who declared their region to be the seventh republic in Yugoslavia. However Serbia suspended the Kosovo parliament to the condemnation of the other republics.

²⁵ Jović, Dejan, and Christopher K. Lamont. "Introduction Croatia after Tudman: Encounters with the Consequences of Conflict and Authoritarianism." *Europe-Asia Studies* 62, no. 10 (2010): 1609-1620. 1614.

In December 1990 the population of Slovenia voted overwhelmingly in favor of independence in a referendum established by the government. At the same time the HDZ amended their constitution with measures also effectively declaring autonomy: "Federal laws, other regulations and other enactments...shall not be applied in the Republic of Croatia if they...endanger her sovereignty or interests."²⁶ The Croatian government began to dismiss Serbs from positions of employment within Croatia. The official rationale, an ethnically balanced workforce, failed to calm the Serbs, and gave the impression to the Serbs in Croatia of a revived fascist government much like in WWII.²⁷

In response Serb nationalism struck back. In August 1990 the Serbs in several areas of Croatia where they formed a majority began to barricade the roads in an event that became known as the Revolution of the Logs, because they used fallen trees. These Serbs began to assert their right to succeed from Croatia and remain within Yugoslavia on the same principle that Croatia had (effectively) left Yugoslavia. In October they declared themselves Serbian Autonomous Oblasts and their members began to take up arms to enforce their claim.²⁸ Though the courts in Croatia ruled the formation of these oblasts illegal, Croatia had no measure to stop the Serbs.

Part of Croatia's helplessness, The Yugoslav Army (JNA). The fifth largest military in Europe, the JNA played a critical role in the unfolding crisis. Most of the

²⁶ "Communiqué from the Meeting of the Presidents of the Yugoslav Republics Concerning the Constitutional Reorganization of Yugoslavia." Published *Review of International Affairs* 20. IV 1991. Featured in Trifunovska, *Yugoslavia through Documents*, 281.

²⁷ Wolchik, Sharon L. *Central and East European Politics from Communism to Democracy*. 2nd ed. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011, 285.

²⁸ The three Serb Oblasts in Croatia formed the Republic of Serbian Krajina

officers saw the dissolution of Yugoslavia as a loss of their status and opposed the new political changes. In January 1991, in response to the growing autonomy of the republics, the Army and the Serb Head of the Presidency Borisav Jovic attempted to force the Presidency to declare a state of emergency, actions according to Warren Zimmerman, last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia "amounted to a military coup."²⁹ This act failed because only a minority in the Presidency voted in favor of the action, but the JNA played its hand again later on.

Despite the upheavals the republics did make several effort to try and maintain some form of Yugoslavia, albeit futile efforts. Especially noted is the work of Prime Minister Ante Markovic who continually tried to hold Yugoslavia together via negotiations. In April of 1991 the leaders of all republic met at Kranj to discuss the possible future of the republics. The same act played out, Croatia and Slovenia in favor of a confederation of states, where Serbia and its voting block wanted a preserved federation, and the other republics in the middle. At the end of this meeting, representatives from Croatia and Slovenia, both already held referendums on independence, stated that if no common solution materialized, they would declare independence by the end of June 1991.³⁰ Though Croatia held off declaring independence, Slovenia declared independence on June 26th 1991

Shortly after the Slovenian Declaration of independence on June 26th 1991 the JNA rolled into Slovenia. Though historians debate if the government ordered the army or if officers acted alone a Presidency document shows: "The presidency of

²⁹ Zimmerman, Warren. "The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia." *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 2 (1995): 2-20. 10

³⁰ "[EC] Statement on Yugoslavia." EC Press Release 42/91. Featured in Trifunovska, *Yugoslavia through Documents*. 285

the SFRY has been informed of the favorable international reaction and support to the preservation of Yugoslavia's integrity and that no foreign country has recognized the unilateral actions of Croatia and Slovenia.³¹ The fighting quickly ground to a halt, the Slovenes quickly seized all the roads and blockaded the army's barracks in Slovenia. Though the European Community firmly supported maintaining Yugoslavia's territorial integrity, the fighting in Slovenia brought them into a conference on the Brijuni Islands in Croatia.³² There the Europeans along with the representatives from Yugoslavia, Croatia and Slovenia signed the Brioni Accords. These accords stipulated that the JNA withdraw from Slovenia and in return Slovenia and Croatia postponed their independence for three months and agreed to continue negotiating with the government in Belgrade. In reality this only confirmed Slovenia independence, as Milošević had no designs on Slovenia. Slovenia lacked any Serbian population, and with Slovenia out of Yugoslavia Milošević's power only increased.³³

However, Milošević had already demonstrated his power in a move that finally dispelled once and for all any notion of democracy or that Yugoslavia still existed. In May of 1991, before the 10-Day War, the traditional rotation of the President of the Presidency designed Croatian Prime Minister Stjepan Mesić as next in line. While it is not known exactly how much Milošević played in the controversy most witnesses and those involved including ambassador Zimmerman assumed he played a role. The Serbian representative requested a vote on whom should hold the

³¹ "Stands and Conclusions of the SFRY Presidency Concerning the Situation in Yugoslavia." Published *Review of International Affairs* 62. X, 1991. Featured in Trifunovska, *Yugoslavia through Documents*. 307

³² Libal, *Limits*. 20.

³³ Warren. "The Last Ambassador." 13.

office. Because Milošević's camp held four votes out of eight, Mesić did not become president. Nonetheless after the war in Slovenia international pressure restored Mesić as the head of the Presidency.³⁴³⁵

But Mesić or not, violence had already begun in Croatia. In March local Serbs began to clash with Croatian police. At first the army intervened between the warring camps. However after Slovenia left the federation, the army decided to preserve Yugoslavia by force, defeating Croatia militarily. The army rapidly lost the multinational character and increasingly only Serbs remained. Officers began to provide support to the local Serbs in Croatia and the army attacked the towns of Dubrovnik (October 1991) and Vukovar (August 1991). When the European Community and the United States finally recognized this fact they both imposed an embargo on all of Former Yugoslavia.³⁶

Fighting dragged on in Croatia as the Serb population continued to agitate against the government there. Despite the deployment of monitors violence only increased. In October of 1991 following their three-month moratorium both Croatia and Slovenia (again) declare their independence.

³⁴ Tagliabue, John. "Conflict in Yugoslavia; How Yugoslavs Hold Off Full-Fledged Civil War." New York Times, July 7, 1991. Accessed November 12, 2014. <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/07/world/conflict-in-yugoslavia-how-yugoslavs-hold-off-full-fledged-civil-war.html>.

³⁵ Mesić would resign in December to work in Croatia

³⁶ . "Announcement of the US State Department Concerning the Trade Embargo on Yugoslavia." Published *Review of International Affairs* 62. XII 1991. Featured in Trifunovska, *Yugoslavia through Documents*, 426.

Position of the European Community on the Yugoslav Crisis, Serbia and Croatia

The European Community (EC, another name for the European Economic Community, and after 1993 the European Union) established trade relations and kept cordial diplomatic contact with Yugoslavia during the Cold War. As the Yugoslav Crisis began to unfold the EC hoped to preserve a democratic Yugoslavia or a confederation of some form, then recognized the situation had drastically changed and searched for a new solution, which lead up to recognizing Slovenia and Croatia.

Despite being a communist nation Yugoslavia had never truly fallen into the Soviet Sphere of Influence in Eastern Europe. In 1967 the Yugoslav government passed a law allowing for foreign investment in the country, which opened the door to EC investment.³⁷ In 1980 a general cooperation agreement signed between the EC and Yugoslavia to, "Promote overall cooperation between the Contracting Parties with a view to contributing to the economic and social development of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."³⁸ Speculation abounded that Yugoslavia would shortly join the EC however nothing concrete came about before the crisis unfolded.

Much like Germany the EC focused on other issues in 1989 and 1990, paying little attention to the developments in Yugoslavia before violence erupted in 1991. Of the four European Commission meetings in 1990 the most pressing subjects on

³⁷ Artisien, Patrick, and Peter Buckley. "Western Investment the New Law in Yugoslavia." *Journal of World Trade* 19, no. 5 (1985): 522-536. 528.

³⁸ "Cooperation agreement between the European Economic Community and the Socialist Federal Community and the European Coal and Steel Community, of the one part, and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, of the other part. Final act. Signed in Belgrade on 2 April 1980." University of Pittsburgh, Archive of European Integration. March 26, 2013. Accessed November 20, 2014. <http://aei.pitt.edu/41150/1/A4827.pdf>

the table were the Gulf Crisis, emergency aid to Eastern Europe and talks with the Soviet Union, European Integration and the Maastricht Treaty. A small note cited Yugoslavia's economic difficulties in the December 1990 European Commission's meeting report, and in October the EC expressed hope that "democratic developments would meet with success," the only attention paid by the EC as a whole to Yugoslavia in 1990 despite the deteriorating situation.³⁹⁴⁰

Only in May of 1991 did the EC begin to pay more attention to the unfolding crisis. In response to fierce protests in Split, Croatia the EC expressed their concerns over violence, which they would do numerous time over the coming months without much effect. The EC also dispatched the Troika, a commission of three EC ministers to Yugoslavia attempting to arrange a cease-fire and negotiate a settlement. The Troika did draft the Brioni Agreement ending the 10-Day war and sent monitors to help stabilize the situation, however the monitors had no authority and faced obstructions in Croatia. In July of that same year the EC expressed its hope that the Ohrid Conference would provide "an early start to negotiating the future of Yugoslavia," an empty statement as Slovenia stood *de facto* independent by this point.⁴¹ The EC in the early stages of the crisis failed to recognize the fundamental changes taking place with the multi-ethnic state.

As violence progressively worsened in Croatia the EC began to acknowledge the complexity of the situation. The first sign came in August 1991 when the EC

³⁹ "The European Council Rome 14-15 December 1990." University of Pittsburgh, Archive of European Integration. April 15, 2004. Accessed November 24, 2014. http://aei.pitt.edu/1406/1/Rome_dec_1990.pdf.

⁴⁰ "The European Council Rome 27-28 October 1990." University of Pittsburgh, Archive of European Integration. April 15, 2004. Accessed November 24, 2014. http://aei.pitt.edu/1404/1/Rome_oct_1990.pdf

⁴¹ "[EC] Statement on Yugoslavia." EC Press Release 67/91. Featured in Trifunovska, *Yugoslavia through Documents*. 322

announced, "that any change of internal or international borders by use of force would be unacceptable," and by extension, not recognized.⁴² The EC also finally recognized the Serb paramilitaries primarily responsible for the violence and the JNA no longer neutral in the conflict, aiding the Serbs in Croatia. In the EC's opinion, "it is a deeply misguided effort on the part of the Serbs to try to solve problems expected in a new constitutional order through military means."

In another attempt to gain more understanding of the crisis the EC convened a peace conference in The Hague, which included the Badinter Arbitration Committee for legal advice, in August 1991. Lord Carrington of the UK chaired the conference in addition to five high ranking judges from EC states and attended by representatives from each of Yugoslavia's republics. The conference handed down a number of legal opinions on the Yugoslav Crisis, the first of which at the end of November.⁴³⁴⁴ The conference represented a new perspective of the EC, confirmed where the EC condemned the Yugoslav government in October, "They [the EC] are not prepared to acknowledge any decisions taken by a body which can no longer pretends to speak for the whole of Yugoslavia."⁴⁵

With the opinion of the EU rapidly turning against the Serbian dominated Yugoslav government November saw the affirmation of these opinions. That month the EC suspended the Trade and Cooperation Agreement with the government in

⁴² "Declaration on Yugoslavia (Adopted at the EPC Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting), EC Press Release 77/91. Featured in Trifunovska, *Yugoslavia through Documents*, 330.

⁴³ Trifunovska, Snezana. "Opinion No. 1 of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia," *International Legal Materials* Vol. 31 1992 Featured in Trifunovska, *Yugoslavia through Documents*, 415.

⁴⁴ An additional six opinions were handed down in January 1992 and the remainder was handed down at times outside the scope of this paper.

⁴⁵ "EC Declaration on the Situation in Yugoslavia," *UN Documents*, S23114 Annex II. Featured in Trifunovska, *Yugoslavia through Documents*: 351.

Belgrade.⁴⁶ NATO and the Western European Union began to discuss military intervention to allow humanitarian aid to the threatened populations in Vukovar and Dubrovnik. But the final blow came at the end of November when Lord Carrington handed down the first opinion from the peace conference, which stated in light of evidence that, "the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution."⁴⁷ This verdict essentially attempted to dispel any notion of the Yugoslav Crisis as an internal matter, it became an international issue because of the declarations by the republics of their independence and the violence that followed. The EC effectively supported Carrington. In mid December the EC published guidelines for any republic seeking to be recognized and EC members secretly agreed to recognize the republics of Slovenia and Croatia in January of next year, however Germany preempted them for reasons discussed later. The EC recognized Croatia along with Slovenia on January 15th 1992.

The EC's course of action developed over the months leading up to recognition. Initially the goal was to sustain a Yugoslav state, however as the crisis deepened the EC recognized that violent circumstances had torn apart Yugoslavia and the republics needed recognition to avoid violence.

⁴⁶ "EC Declaration on the Suspension of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Yugoslavia." Published *Review of International Affairs* 62. XII 1991. Featured in Trifunovska, *Yugoslavia through Documents*, 378.

⁴⁷ Pellet, Allain. "'The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples'" *Tilburg Law Review: Journal of International and European Law* 3 (1992): 178-185. 179.

Position of Germany on the Yugoslav Crisis, Serbia and Croatia.

Germany long had a fluctuating view of the Balkans and in particular of Serbia and Croatia. Up until the end of World War II Germany's attitude towards the region remained hostile or indifferent, but during the Cold War Yugoslavia and Germany fostered excellent relations that declined as the crisis unfolded. On the surface Germany's position mirrored that of the EC for most of the crisis, but internally Germany shifted their support to the breakaway republics sooner than the rest of the EC.

Prior to German unification the only German-speaking Austrian Habsburg Monarchy had any stake or influence in the Balkans. However cultural links existed. For example Goethe wrote a letter thanking Leopold von Ranke, a German historian, like so many others writing on the Serbian revolution in the late 19th century, for "The exquisite Serbian songs" that had given him "a great deal of pleasure."⁴⁸ The rise of nationalism and the concept of the nation state prompted many historians and scholars to investigate the peoples of the Ottoman Empire, including Serbia, bringing knowledge of the nation to the wider German audience and may have contributed to Otto von Bismarck decision at the 1876 Berlin conference to recognize Serbia as independent.

Unfortunately that same rise in nationalism turned cultural admiration into animosity. Though the thought of going to war in the Balkans seemed foolish or pointless to many German leaders, summed up by Bismarck's quip "The Balkans

⁴⁸ Ivanji, Andrej. "Good Morning Serbia!" *The German Times for Europe*. December 1, 2009. Accessed November 10, 2014. http://www.german-times.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=24056&Itemid=152.

aren't worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier," Germany none the less set the stage for conflict. Germany's staunch support of the Habsburg Monarchy made conflict with Serbia inevitable, a fact played out in World War I. Austria opposed Serbian independence because of the vast number of Slavic peoples in the Monarchy might see in Belgrade a path to freedom and the breakup of the monarchy. A letter sent from the German Kaiser Wilhelm II to the Austrian emperor Franz Joseph spelled out his opinion on the issue. "The Slavs are born not to rule but to obey, this must be brought home to them. If they imagine they can look to Belgrade for their salvation, they must be cured of this belief."⁴⁹

In WWII Germany invaded Yugoslavia in early 1941, crushing resistance in a matter of weeks. The Axis occupied Yugoslavia, with the exception of Croatia. Adolf Hitler needed a client state in the Balkans; to that end he approved the formation of the Croatian Free State. Historically a Catholic nation, Croatia possessed well established connections with the German speaking world. This collaborationist government killed an estimated 400,000 Serbians along with Jews and Roma people an act that haunted German-Serbian relations for years to come.

No peace treaty between Yugoslavia and Germany exists; a unilateral declaration from Belgrade declared peace in 1951. Despite not having normal diplomatic relations with (West) Germany because of the *Hallstein Doctrine* until Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* Germany and Yugoslavia nonetheless continued to have intense economic cooperation. This time new dimensions took hold. Following a

⁴⁹ "Serbia and Greece Declare War on Ottoman Empire in First Balkan War." History.com. Accessed December 1, 2014. <http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/serbia-and-greece-declare-war-on-ottoman-empire-in-first-balkan-war>.

1969 agreement around 500,000 guest workers (*Gastarbeiter*) immigrated to Germany from Yugoslavia bringing with them their culture and helping to fund Yugoslavia's economy by sending money back home.⁵⁰ They became the second largest guest workers behind the Turkish workers and their descendant's in Germany number 1.2 million.⁵¹ Also following the 1970s thousands of Germans made the Yugoslavian coast (Specifically the Dalmatian Coast in the Croatian SR) their primary vacation destination which helped shape many of the perceptions German's had about the region.

Despite these positive changes and diplomatic interactions, the situation in Yugoslavia began to deteriorate after the death of Tito. The German government like the EC, found itself preoccupied with other issues such as their own reunification. According to Libal, "Until June 1991 Foreign Minister Genscher was not overly concerned about the situation in Yugoslavia."⁵² However the situation soon came home to the German government. A leading Social Democratic Party (SPD) member in the Bundestag Norbert Gansel published a report in May of 1991 following a trip to Yugoslavia in which he expressed his belief that nothing could be done to hold together the multi ethnic state, despite the goals of the EC, a democratic and unified Yugoslavia.⁵³

⁵⁰ Shonick, K. "Politics, Culture, and Economics: Reassessing the West German Guest Worker Agreement with Yugoslavia." *Journal of Contemporary History* Vol 44, no. 4 (2009): 719-36. 719

⁵¹ Slavkovic, Filip. "Yugoslav Guest Workers Torn Between Germany and Home | Germany | DW.DE | 07.12.2008." DW.DE. July 12, 2008. Accessed November 6, 2014. <http://www.dw.de/yugoslav-guest-workers-torn-between-germany-and-home/a-3847033>

⁵² Libal. *Limits*. 5.

⁵³ Lantis, Jeffrey S. *Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy since Unification*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002. 85

Regardless Germany stuck with the EC and did not immediately recognize the independence of Slovenia when the republic declared sovereignty in June. In fact Germany in helping to negotiate the Brioni Accords forced Slovenia and Croatia to hold off on independence for 3 months, a sign that Bonn's official policy of territorial integrity stood firm.⁵⁴ However Chancellor Helmut Kohl addressed the German people on July 1st stating his support for EC policy in Yugoslavia, but making clear he would not support a Yugoslavia at the expense of basic rights. Genscher also sharply criticized the Serbian leadership and the JNA for their actions and presented the position of the German government that any use of force would be considered illegitimate.⁵⁵ At this point Libal wrote "In the future Germany would put the emphasis on supporting the democratization of individual Yugoslav republics; it would insist that the democratically expressed will of these republics be respected; and it would not support the preservation of Yugoslavia at any cost or by any means."⁵⁶

Officially the German government supported the idea of "Self Determination" of the Yugoslav peoples to choose their own future. However, Genscher never intended to support the claims of the local Serbs in Croatia to leave Croatia. The reason for this being that the German government as well as the EC only sought to negotiate with what they believed to be legitimate governments. The ruling governments in Slovenia and Croatia, which had won elections and held referendums on independence, measured by the standards of the EC and Germany

⁵⁴ Libal. *Limits*. 25.

⁵⁵ Libal. *Limits*. 24.

⁵⁶ Libal. *Limits*. 16.

the legitimate governments. The local Serb Oblasts by contrast, formed by force of arms and maintained by arms. The Third Opinion of the Peace Conference stated that "The former [internal] boundaries become frontiers protected by international law," unless changed by collective agreement.⁵⁷

And no collective agreement could be found. August saw the outbreak of more heavy fighting in Croatia where Serb irregulars along with the Yugoslav Army began to attack cities to control the areas inhabited by Serbs. German politicians began to see the conduct of the Yugoslav Army as one of an occupying army.⁵⁸ These actions combined with anti-German propaganda from Belgrade and the murder of German journalist Egon Scotland hardened German government against Belgrade.⁵⁹ Despite this the German government floundered on how to proceed; they spoke of UN or EC intervention, but they did not want to send German personal, as some believed it went against German Common Law.

Regardless, the continued behavior of the Yugoslav Army and the obstinacy of the Presidency in Belgrade made recognition the only option. Gansel stated in November 1991, "There was no need to always declare that one would not recognize frontiers changed by force if one did not at the same time recognize the state that had these frontiers."⁶⁰ Germany worked with the EC in agreeing to recognize the republics by January 15th 1992. However Kohl said in a speech in

⁵⁷ Pellet, "Opinions." 180.

⁵⁸ Gow, James. *Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. 168

⁵⁹ Hintermeiner, Hannes. "Nicht Nach Glina! Dort Schießen Die Tschetniks!" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 23, 2011. Accessed November 20, 2011. <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/feuilleton/medien/kriegsverbrechen-nicht-nach-glina-dort-schiessen-die-tschetniks-11106735.html>.

⁶⁰ Libal. *Limits*. 78

November, "I believe that before Christmas one must come to a decision on this matter," in addition to a personal promise to the leaders of both republics.⁶¹ In that spirit Germany chose to recognize the republics in what has become known as the Christmas Recognition, as it occurred on the 23rd of December 1991, though not implemented until the 15th of January.

On the surface this decision appeared a large deviation from Germany's traditional foreign policy of collective action with the EC, especially considering Germany had the support of several other EC members. Considering Germany's large role in the EU today, some historians view this move as a turning point in German foreign policy. However exploring such a theory is outside the scope of this study.

Coverage of Events

Events Before March 1991

Kosovo

The nationalistic unrest that resulted in the disintegration of Yugoslavia began in Kosovo almost immediately following the death of Tito. Belgrade made various efforts to calm the situation, including sending Slobodan Milošević to the region as a mediator.

⁶¹ Ibin

Gazimestan Speech (June 28th 1989)

The speech delivered by Milošević on June 28th 1989 at the site of the famous Battle of Kosovo on the 600th anniversary of the event is seen as a turning point in the crisis of Yugoslavia. The speech is open to interpretations, but many historians now and observers then categorized the speech as a national call to war.⁶²

FAZ published a small article titled "One million Serbs remember the battle at the field." The paper quotes Milošević about the "armed battles yet to come," speculating Milošević may have been referring to the conflict in Kosovo between Albanians and Serbs.⁶³ The paper also noted that Milošević spoke of unifying all Serbs. The quoted selections sound as though Milošević is a warmonger, as the parts of the speech where he discussed Serbia's history of multiculturalism and tolerance are missing. The FAZ choose to depict Milošević as a tyrant and danger.

The SZ printed a much more balanced look at the speech. The title reflects this: "Milošević: Serbia an example for Yugoslavia." While the paper notes the nationalistic tone of the speech it also points out the reconciliatory passages: "Those critics who claim this is a return to Great-Serbian Politics they find a reassurance: 'Serbians are a great people, but have never used their power to oppress others.'"⁶⁴ However the article also describes the tense situation political situation in Kosovo between Serbs and Albanians. The SZ tows a neutral line in reference to the issue of Kosovo, criticizing the hypocrisy of the Serbs, but at least giving the speech fair coverage.

⁶² Goldstein, Ivo *Croatia: A History*, C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 1999. 203

⁶³ "Eine Million Serben gedenken der Schlacht auf dem Feld" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 28th 1989.

⁶⁴ "Milosevic: Serbien Beispiel fuer Jugoslawien" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* June 29th 1989

The JNA occupies Kosovo (January 31st 1990)

FAZ ran an article highly critical of the use of force in Albania. The piece quotes the government of Yugoslavia claiming a desire to protect threatened citizens and peace in Kosovo via a dialogue. The paper then points out that this "dialogue" only involves the use of police forces, implying it is not a dialogue at all. Albanian terrorism is cited by Milošević as the justification to arm Serb villagers in Kosovo for self-defense. This is contrasted by an account of police forces killing three Albanians and injuring numerous more out of revenge. The criticism of this article focuses on the brutal use of force by Yugoslav and Serbian forces against helpless or innocent Albanians. The FAZ's uses Serbia's hypocrisy and accounts of brutality to portray the nation as a tyrannical force in Yugoslavia.⁶⁵

Der Spiegel did not directly cover the event but did run an article titled: "The Biological Time Bomb," a reference to the demographic shift in Kosovo that lead to the crisis. *Der Spiegel* subtly criticizes the inability of the Yugoslav government to resist the nationalism of Milošević and to resort to the only option they know "by sending special police forces to the crisis area."⁶⁶ Both sides of the clash are given a quote. The Kosovo leader, Rugova demands that the occupation end and an investigation of, "the murder terror and abuses." On the other side a Serb speaker in the Yugoslav Parliament, Bogdan Kecman is quoted demanding 400,000 Albanians be expelled from Kosovo. A trend throughout *Der Spiegel's* articles, is quoting Serbs

⁶⁵ "In Angelegenheiten des Kosovo verweigert Serbien den Dialog" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* February 1st 1990.

⁶⁶ "Wußte nur ein einziges Heilmittel: Spezialeinheiten der Bundespolizei in das Krisengebiet zu schicken." "Biologische Zeitbombe" *Der Spiegel* February 12th 1990, <http://www.Der Spiegel.de/Der Spiegel/print/d-13498001.html>.

that sound like fascists or ultranationalists, which hints at an anti-Serb position, however responsibility for the conflict is not explicitly assigned to either side.

Neues Deutschland's anti-nationalist sentiment embodies their interpretation of the Kosovo situation. One article title "No Peace for Kosovo," lacks any sort of reference to the ethnic nature of the conflict. *Neues Deutschland* supports the Albanian demand for a republic within Yugoslavia, however dismisses the claim that 250,000 Albanians fled Kosovo as propaganda. This claim is equaled by the reference to Milošević and the Macedonians, both supporting the army's presence, as nationalists. The article concludes that military force will not solve this "deeply political" conflict. Only the elevation of Kosovo to equal status in Yugoslavia, a political solution will solve the conflict. *Neues Deutschland's* political views exclude any possibility of interpreting the conflict within nationalist framework, because at this time the paper still promoted a united Yugoslavia.⁶⁷

The SZ reporting incorporates a sense of danger over the escalating conflict. SZ reminds readers the disagreement over Kosovo played a part in dissolving the League of Communists.⁶⁸ An opinion piece published one day before the arrival of the army titled, "Belgrade Swims against the Current," points out "For the Serbs to suppress the Albanians of Kosovo with violence...only makes the situation worse."⁶⁹ The decision to send the army, stated by the Presidency, "'As a means of protecting peace and security, currently threatened by ethnic conflict,'" is contrasted with

⁶⁷ "Kein Frieden fuer Kosovo" *Neues Deutschland* February 3/4th 1990.

⁶⁸ "Panzer und Flugzeuge im Kosovo", *Süddeutsche Zeitung* February 1990

⁶⁹ "Lage in Kosovo leicht entspannt", *Süddeutsche Zeitung* February 3rd 1990

numerous reports on the number of killed Albanians.⁷⁰ SZ's coverage reflects a sense of concern over the conflict, and the number of Albanian killed implies Serb responsibility.

Declaration of the Republic of Kosovo (July 4th 1990)

SZ writes about the event disregarding official statements and forming alternative conclusions. One article justifies the act claiming, "The Serbian Parliament prepared to effectively strip the region (Kosovo) of any autonomy."⁷¹ The article further explores this possibility:

That 114 of the 180 Albanian members of the Kosovo Parliament would attempt to rescue their situation with an "independence declaration" reveals the nature of the act as a desperate, but inadequate, attempt to prevent the removal of Kosovo Autonomy by Serbia. After that, Serbia can claim its constitutional and legal right (to Kosovo).⁷²

The article concludes that the Kosovo leaders are going to meet with the government in Belgrade to discuss the situation. This article lays out the steps by which Serbia attempts to suppress the freedoms of Kosovo and to dispel the statements from officials and extremists.

FAZ's coverage of the proclamation centers on the Serb reactions as a means of displaying their tyrannical nature. Various Serb magazines are quoted claiming the actions in Kosovo are leading to the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The democratic nature of the Albanian actions is played up against the Serb decision to strip the autonomy of the region and annex it to Serbia. The claim of the Serbian Interior

⁷⁰ "'Sondermaßnahmen' fuer den Kosovo", *Süddeutsche Zeitung* February 1st 1990

⁷¹ "Teilrepublik Slowenien erklart sich fuer souverain" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* July 4th 1990

⁷² "Dass 114 der insgesamt 180 Mitglieder des Kosovo Parlaments mit ihrer 'Unabhaengigkeit eklaerung' die Drohende Aufhebung der Kosovo-Autonomie zu unterlaufen versuchten, ist nach Lage der Dinge nur ein verzweifelter, aber untauglicher Versuch, die bevorstehende Aufhebung der autonomie durch serbien verhindern. Denn Serbien pocht auf seine verfassungsmässigen legalen Rechte," *Ibin*.

Minister of bringing peace and order to the province contrasts with the report that all Albanian speaking media has been shut down. In the view of the FAZ, the Serb annexation of Kosovo is a crime and freedom for Kosovo is a just decision regardless of the consequences.⁷³

Neues Deutschland mentions the event briefly, declaring that the situation between the Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo has deteriorated in response to the declaration.⁷⁴ It is possible that the lack of attention given to this event in *Neues Deutschland* is because the event coincides with the economic integration of the East and West Germany in July of 1990.

In regards to Kosovo all papers in this study displayed some form of nominal support for the plight of the region. However the level of support differs. *Der Spiegel* and *SZ* demand a restoration of the status quo prior to the disturbances. Those two papers blame Serb revanchism, exploited by Milošević, for all of (*Der Spiegel*) or at least part of (*SZ*) the growing crisis. *FAZ* takes an extreme angle painting Milošević as the head of an army of Serb nationalists crushing the rights of Kosovo. *FAZ* never advocates for the freedom of Kosovo despite condemnation of Serbia, illustrating the anti-Serb position of the paper, by using Kosovo as evidence to condemn Serbia. *Neues Deutschland*, while acknowledging the nationalist overtones, focuses on the political nature of the conflict, condemning nationalist activity on all sides. This is exemplified in the proposed solution, elevating Kosovo to a republic with political rights

⁷³ "Serbien verteidigt rigoroses Vorgehen im Kosovo" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* July 7th 1990 and "Nach der Souveränitätserklärung scharfe Töne aus Serbien" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* July 4th 1990

⁷⁴ "Republik Kosovo ausgerufen" *Neues Deutschland* July 3rd 1990

Political developments in Yugoslavia

Almost immediately after the death of Tito both Croatia and Slovenia began to test the limits on free speech and political pluralism. While Milošević's Anti-Bureaucratic Revolution along with a new constitution in Serbia secured his voting block in the presidency with four of eight votes.

These divergent paths put strain on the League of Yugoslav Communists, the single communist party in all of Yugoslavia, represented in each republic. At the 14th Party Congress delegates from several countries walked out and the party effectively dissolved, ending 40 years of rule.

Toppling the government of Montenegro (January 22nd 1989)

At the time of the Bureaucratic Revolution the question of genuine or organized remained unanswered, the artificial nature came out after the end of the Yugoslav Wars.

FAZ perceived the toppling the government through the lenses of anti-Milošević sentiment. The title of one article, "Milošević closer to his Goal?" sums up this sentiment. Milošević is depicted as cunning, using the economic difficulties of the republic and mistakes of the existing government to topple it. This theory is supported by one of the ousted Montenegrin leaders termed suppressing the previous demonstrations a mistake. The balance of power in the Presidency has been altered, not without consequence, warns the FAZ. The FAZ's interpretation of

the coup is of Milošević as a tyrant on the move.⁷⁵

Neues Deutschland only mentions the protests briefly in the context of the increasingly uncertain role of communism in Yugoslavia. Roughly one week after the event, an article titled "Discussion of the Unique Party of the LCY," mentions the protests.⁷⁶ According to *Neues Deutschland* the government of Montenegro like that of Volvodinja and Kosovo, resigned because they failed to improve the standard of living. To do so is only possible with economic reform and "broad agreement," a criticism of the LCY itself in failing to effect real change.⁷⁷ The implication is the resigning governments are to blame. *Neues Deutschland's* analysis sees the resignations of these governments as part of a process of political change, not as the first steps of Serbia to hegemony as FAZ does, at the time *Neues Deutschland* still presented a united Yugoslavia, downplaying internal problems.

Der Spiegel did mention the resignation briefly in a larger context over the political differences between republics exploring the danger of the development. According to *Der Spiegel* the new leaders in Voivodinja and Montenegro are under Milošević's graces.⁷⁸ Interestingly this piece quotes the Croatian Representative to the presidency Josip Vrhovec "Today we have in the League of Communists two parties," referring to the split between the Serb block and Slovenia.⁷⁹ *Der Spiegel's* places the resignations of governments not as a focus on Milošević's increasing

⁷⁵ "Milosevic naeher an seinem Ziel?" *Frankfurter Allegemine Zeitung* January 13th 1989

⁷⁶ "Diskussion über Sonderparteitag des BdKJ" *Neues Deutschland* January 20th 1989

⁷⁷ Ibin

⁷⁸ "Neuer Trainer" *Der Spiegel* February 2nd 1989

⁷⁹ Ibin

power, though that is mentioned, but rather on the effect of dividing the collective leadership of Yugoslavia.

SZ presents a mild response to the fall of the government in Montenegro. In fact the term fall is not even used, the term resignation is. The protests are presented as legitimate demands of a government unable to care for its people. The words of the protests reflect an anger and frustration, "We are hungry!" or "Our children want bread!" SZ also notes the resignation of the entire Yugoslav central government in Belgrade only weeks before, giving the impression of a general crisis that has spread to the entire country. In that light, the protests in Montenegro are not a ploy by a dictator to seize power, but a manifestation of genuine popular anger.⁸⁰

May Declaration (May 8th 1989)

The Declaration in the Slovenian capital received minimal coverage possibly because of the opening of the Iron Curtain in Hungary.

FAZ mentions the event in a larger article about Serbian policy in Kosovo threatening to divide the nation. Slovenia's history of tension with the JNA and the central government is elaborated giving the JNA the role of oppressor. The demand for national sovereignty is coupled by a report of students protesting the army's role in the democratic process, that the army will reverse the democratization. FAZ rarely provides background unless it serves their position. The democratization of

⁸⁰ "Montenegros Führung tritt Zurück" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* December 12th 1989

Slovenia is a positive development according to the FAZ and the JNA's role as a reactionary force is the perfect foil for the progressive Slovenes to the FAZ.⁸¹

Formation of Slovenian Opposition parties (Late November 1989)

Neues Deutschland only examined the change in party politics in the context of the communists. A small two-paragraph article in *Aussenpolitik* section discusses the Party of Democratic Reform. The party's platform advocates Yugoslavia joining Europe and a round table conference between all parties of Yugoslavia for a common governing policy. However *Neues Deutschland* downplay the idea of a "European Link," that implies Slovenia leaving Yugoslavia and emphasizes the round table.⁸² *Neues Deutschland* until late 1991 advocated for a reformed Yugoslavia including all republics. *Neues Deutschland* stood in favor of a socialist Yugoslavia, also as a counterbalance to the growing power of the EC.

FAZ also covered the changes within Slovenian communism, a new party symbol without the red star of communism and free elections in the republic, as a positive development. Milan Kučan, head of the Party of Democratic Reform is given attention. He is quoted stating that it isn't clear whether Slovenia must find its way to Europe alone or as a pioneer for Yugoslavia, but that Slovenia moved towards Europe. The counter forces to democracy are the Serbs, planning a demonstration in the Slovenian capital against the new policies of the party. This event is termed an "invasion," a reference to Milošević's tactics during the Bureaucratic Revolution. The theme is "that Slovenia has created free elections that are not found in Serbia,

⁸¹ "Die serbische Kosovo-Politik droht Jugoslawien mit spalten," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* May 13th 1989

⁸² "BdK Sloweniens gab sich einen neuen Namen" *Neues Deutschland* February 5th, 1990.

forming two separate systems in Yugoslavia.”⁸³ FAZ often plays up the differences between Serbia on the one hand and Croatia and Slovenia as opposing forces of tyranny vs. democracy.

SZ did not cover DEMOS's formation, but reported on the formation of the Socialist Youth League of Slovenia (SYLS). The goals of the party are emphasized, “Parliamentary democracy, rights of people and citizens, market based economic reform and the beginnings of ecological policies.”⁸⁴ The cooperative nature of Slovenian politics is implied, Milan Kucan is quoted saying his party is prepared to enter into a coalition government post elections.⁸⁵ Kucan's reforms as leader of Slovenia, such as removing the word “socialist” from the name of Slovenia, are touted. The heavy criticism from Serbia and JNA leadership are noted. This article plays up the reform-oriented nature of Slovenia, though with no real comparison. Unlike FAZ SZ is not attempting to portray one side as democratic and the other as tyrannical.

Dissolution of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (January 22nd 1990)

The event, so important to FAZ, received front-page coverage and two stories the day after the walkout of the Slovenes. FAZ focuses on the party structure and the tyranny of the Serbs. If the existing structure of the party remained in place it would leave no room for democratic federalism of the Slovenes. The Slovene delegation: “Could no longer ignore the will of the people; no longer interested in developing democracy under the ‘reactionary tendencies’ of the eastern republics.” The party's

⁸³ “Kosovo-Serben vor dem marsch auf Laibach” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* November 21st 1989.

⁸⁴ “Slowenischer Jugendverband bildet Partei” *Süddeutsche Zeitung* November 7th 1989

⁸⁵ *Ibid*

divisions are an analogy for the whole country. Even Prime Minister Ante Markovic's efforts to preserve the party are dismissed. FAZ notes that the walkout of Slovene Delegation does not necessarily mean the end of Yugoslavia, nonetheless one title boast: "Yugoslavia no longer needs the party." FAZ paints a picture of division with Yugoslavia between progressives and reactionaries, between Slovenia and Croatia and Serbia and the Army.⁸⁶

Neues Deutschland on the other hand reports on the collapse of the party in more optimistic light. Echoing the FAZ, the differing opinions of the western vs. eastern republics and the disagreement over the ongoing economic recovery program are cited. The demands of the Slovenian branch of the party for reforms are termed an "ultimatum," a subtle implication of Slovenian fault, despite the previously mentioned disagreements. The end of the party is not a disaster, "This allows for a radical reformation of Yugoslav society, a chance to build a country of democratic-socialism with political pluralism and free elections." This optimistic tone overlooks tensions between republics, reflecting *Neues Deutschland's* desire for a socialist Yugoslavia to endure.⁸⁷

Der Spiegel positioned the collapse of the party in the context of rising tensions within Yugoslavia. *Der Spiegel* writes the lack of compromise between the reformist Slovenes and the majority federal Serbs lead to the party's collapse. Opposing viewpoints are given, but it is made clear, if the federal state is preserved,

⁸⁶ "Die jugoslawischen Kommunisten koennen sich ueber nichts mehr einigen" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* January 24th 1990 and "Jugoslawien braucht die Partie nicht mehr" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* January 24th 1990

⁸⁷ "Die jugoslawische Gesellschaft radikal zu reformieren und einen demokratischen Sozialismus im Lande zu errichten, der politischen Pluralismus und freie Wahlen einschließt." From "Abbruch des Parteitages-wie nun weiter im BdKJ" *Neues Deutschland* January 26th 1990.

it only benefits Serbs, giving them reason to avoid compromise. Like FAZ the Slovenes are painted as democratic and progressive, and the Serbs are implied tyrannical. Despite the divergent paths, "the trend of the republics of Yugoslavia is following the model of Slovenia." The collapse of the party weakens Yugoslavia at a critical juncture, but does not explicitly point to a collapse of Yugoslavia. Serbian political domineering is to blame for the collapse according to *Der Spiegel*.⁸⁸

SZ, much like FAZ points to the disagreement between Slovenia and Serbia as the main cause of collapse of the party, however not blaming the party structure itself. The Slovenian calls for reform such as free elections and a looser LCY clash with Serbian refusal to compromise. Head of the Slovene delegation claims: "We did not want to be 'responsible for the agony of the party,'"⁸⁹ but the walkout was inevitable because of the voting of the Serbian block. However acts to reform the party are included, such as a statement from the party chief Milan Pančevski: "To remain united, the party must surrender its monopoly on power in favor of 'democratic socialism,' nonetheless remain an avant-garde party."⁹⁰ The results of that vote are also reported, only 28 of the 1654 delegates voted against abolishing the party monopoly. Even the title of an article after the break suggests it is not the total end of the party: "Yugoslavian Communists in a Impasse." The coverage depicts two rival forces destroying an old institution, with no implication of blame.

⁸⁸ "der Trend in Jugoslawien geht eher in die Richtung der moderneren Slowenen," from "Biologische Zeitbombe" *Der Spiegel* February 12th 1990,

⁸⁹ "Jugoslawiens Kommunisten in der Sackgasse" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* January 24th 1990 and "Jugoslawiens Kommunisten tief gespalten" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* January 22nd 1990

⁹⁰ "Jugoslawiens KP droht Spaltung" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* January 22nd 1990

Croatian elections and appointment of Franco Tudjman as President of Croatia (April 22nd, May 7th, and May 30th 1990)

There is no direct coverage of elections, however *Der Spiegel's* analyzes Tudjman's background and his politics before the elections. An article titled, "Janissaries with Colts," largely refers to Tudjman.⁹¹ The piece describes Tudjman and his party as ultranationalist with the dream of creating a "Greater Croatia" by annexing Bosnian territory and what *Der Spiegel* claims is a great hatred of the Serbs. The term Janissaries to refer to Tudjman's bodyguards, a reference to the elite soldiers loyal only to the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. The comparison places him on par with Milošević in terms of nationalism and political control. *Der Spiegel* break the story of a good-evil dichotomy often played up during discussion of Serbia vs. Croatia/Slovenia. This critical look at Tudjman reflects *Der Spiegel's* reputation of neutrality, and even-handed reporting in the early days of the crisis.

Neues Deutschland mentions the election in a one-paragraph blurb under the *Umschau* (survey, in effect "other news") section. It merely states Tudjman's party won 159 of the 239 seats in the Croatian Parliament and that the Communist League of Croatia only won 39 seats. According to *Neues Deutschland*, victory of the HDZ means, "The federation (Yugoslavia) in its previous form, faces an uncertain future."⁹² The little amount of attention is probably the result of events in East Germany at this time, specifically economic integration with West Germany and the first free elections. Either way *Neues Deutschland* would not want to give credit to

⁹¹ "Janitsharen mit Colt" *Der Spiegel* April 16th 1990 <http://www.Der Spiegel.de/Der Spiegel/print/d-13499126.html>

⁹² "Ungewisse Zukunft für das Staatsgefüge Jugoslawiens" *Neues Deutschland* May 30th 1990

the victory of a borderline fascist organization (HDZ) and their open desire to break Yugoslavia apart.⁹³

According to the FAZ, the victory of the HDZ questions the concept of Yugoslavia, "How long should we tolerate a country united by socialism and a federal institution not democratically elected?" In contrast Tudjman and his party's victory is credited to democratic institutions in Croatia. Tudjman's democratic nature is used to downplay nationalism. Tudjman's claim to parts of Bosnia is moderated with a statement that all peoples should be allowed to decide their futures. The size of the race in Croatia, with over 1700 candidates from 30 parties vying for 356 seats is published to play up the victory of opposition over communism. Tudjman's victory is celebrated by the FAZ, and is hinted to be the first step toward dissolution of the federation.⁹⁴

SZ examine the election in a cautious manner exploring the possible consequences. One title, "Communists in Croatia face Defeat," encapsulates the cautious, but realistic nature of SZ. The views of the Communists opposition and its fears of Tudjman's policies are included. Like *Der Spiegel*, SZ highlights Tudjman's nationalist tendencies, such as him denying Bosnians as a people, or the HDZ supported by the Catholic Church and foreign Croats. SZ understands Tudjman is the most likely victor in the race, and explores what his strong nationalism means for the future of Yugoslavia when the HDZ clearly wants more freedom from Belgrade.⁹⁵

⁹³ "Wahlen in Kroatien haben klaren Sieger" *Neues Deutschland* May 10th, 1990.

⁹⁴ "Kucan Praesident Sloweniens Sieg der Opposition in Kroatia." *Frankfurter Allegemine Zeitung* April 24th 1990, "Kroatian wählt auch gegen Milošević" *Frankfurter Allegemine Zeitung* May 7th 1990 and "Ungewißheit nach der Wahl in Kroatien" *Frankfurter Allegemine Zeitung* May 8th 1990

⁹⁵ "Kommunisten in Kroatien vor einer Niederlage" *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, April 24th 1990 and "Titos Erben vor dem Bankrott" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* April 22nd 1990

Slovenian independence referendum (December 23rd 1990)

The results found 96% of the population in favor independence from Yugoslavia as opposed to a new confederation. The Yugoslav government attacked the referendum calling it dangerous and claiming the CIA facilitated it.

After the referendum FAZ published a piece titled, "A Great majority in Slovenia for an Independent State."⁹⁶ A Slovenian politician is quoted over the results: "No longer (are we) speaking exclusively of a new order *within* Yugoslavia." Despite the efforts by republics to reform Yugoslavia into a confederation, FAZ gave the efforts negligible coverage, focusing on the desire for total independence. FAZ claims Serbian nationalists and the army control the government in Belgrade so Slovenia's only option is independence. On the referendum results FAZ claimed the 4% against independence were "presumably Serbs," this despite the fact that Serbs only made up a little over 2% of the population in Slovenia.⁹⁷ The election in Serbia is mentioned, where a majority in the first round of elections did not elect Milošević. However his subsequent majority is ignored to play up the image of his illegitimacy.⁹⁸ FAZ's support of Slovenia is supported by the image of a tyrannical, illegitimate government in Belgrade.

Neues Deutschland covered the event critically, arguing for a new Yugoslavia.

Neues Deutschland questions the constitutionality of the referendum, points out the

⁹⁶ "Grosse Mehrheit in Slowenien fuer einen unabhaengigen Staat" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* December 26th 1990.

⁹⁷ Ibin

⁹⁸ These were from the first round of elections on December 9th where Milosevic only won 46% of the vote, but in the second round Milosevic won 65% of the vote and his party a clear majority.

economic problems of Slovenia and the 20,000 JNA troops stationed in the territory.

One article speculates that:

For a number of foreign policy reasons it is assumed Slovenia even in the case of a 'positive' outcome of the referendum will reach an agreement with the other republics on the future together in a completely new basis: the republics would be independent and only loosely connected.⁹⁹

The statement effectively claims that Slovenia is attempting to use the referendum as leverage in negotiations with the republics over the future of a Yugoslavia confederation. The nationalist dangers are also noted: *Neues Deutschland* claims the voters in the republics themselves are driving Yugoslavia to the breaking point. A review of a paper written by France Bučar, a Slovenian lawyer, asked an important point asking; "Do we need to redraw the map of Europe?" The anti-nationalist and pro-Yugoslavia sentiment of the newspaper reflects a lack of support from *Neues Deutschland* on the idea of Slovenian independence.¹⁰⁰

SZ covered the referendum on its own in a more prudent manner than other publications. SZ acknowledged the greater meaning of the referendum in the title of its articles: "Yugoslavia is no longer viable," or "Slovenia wants quick Independence."¹⁰¹ However SZ does not rush to conclusions quoting Slovenian foreign minister "succession is our last resort," and emphasizing the nonbinding nature of the referendum. SZ cautions the possible dangers of breaking up the federation: Markovic's economic reforms would fall apart and without the common

⁹⁹ "Deshalb und aus einer Reihe aussenpolitischer Gründe ist zu vermuten, daß Slowenien auch bei „positivem“ Ausgang des Referendums- zunächst versuchen würde, mit den anderen Teilrepubliken eine Übereinkunft über das künftige Zusammenleben auf völlig neuer Grundlage abzuschließen: Die Republiken wären selbständig und nur lose miteinander verbunden." From "Referendum in Slowenien vertieft Zwist in SFRJ" *Neues Deutschland*, December 21st 1990.

¹⁰⁰ "Aufwind für Kräfte der Unabhängigkeit" *Neues Deutschland* December 27th 1990.
and "Bruch?" *Neues Deutschland* December 28th 1990.

¹⁰¹ "Slowenien will rasch selbstaendig werden" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* December 29th 1990 and "Jugoslawia nicht überlebensfähig." *Süddeutsche Zeitung* December 28th 1990

market the economies of each republic could be devastated. An opinion piece sums up the wait-and-see attitude of SZ: "If the former federation is to be transformed, a large part is the right of nationalities to their identities. These question must be answered in the next six months."¹⁰²

Der Spiegel did not cover the referendum as it occurred. Their publications from the time are primarily concerned with German reunification and the rising tensions in the Middle East that preceded the Gulf War.

New Constitution in Croatia drafted (December 24th 1990)

Following the election of Tudjman and his party the government of Croatia adopted a new constitution. This new constitution defined the Croatia as a national state "and a state of members of other nations or minorities who are citizens."¹⁰³ The Serbs of Croatia, outraged that they were not specifically protected, feared their rights might not be respected.

FAZ's reports on this event centers on Croatian concerns. Counter to the normal sentiment in FAZ this article makes clear that this new constitution does not necessarily mean the Croatia is leaving Yugoslavia, though no expressed desire to see Yugoslavia preserved is seen. The article acknowledges the removal of the clause protecting Serbs as an official minority, but brushes off the issue citing a promise of allowing citizens to use whatever writing script they want. Tudjman

¹⁰² "Wenn die bisherige Federation so umgebildet wird, dass Ihre Teile größere Rechte erhalten verschiedenen Nationalitäten leichter zu Ihrer Identität finden koennen. In den kommenden sech monaten muss diese Frage geklaert werden." From "Jugoslawiens auseinanderreibende Teile" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* December 27th 1990. "Vielvölkerstaat Jugoslawien vom Zerfall bedroht." *Süddeutsche Zeitung* December 24-26th 1990 and "Republik Slowenien lenkt ein." *Süddeutsche Zeitung* December 24-26th 1990

¹⁰³ "The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia." Promulgated by the Decision of the Sabor of the Republic of Croatia, No. 6301-90-9, 1991. Featured in Trifunovska, *Yugoslavia through Documents*, 252.

Croatia to become independent as nationalist and dangerous. *Der Spiegel*, and to a great extent SZ, paint, a hazardous picture of Yugoslavia at this time. The publications focus on the dangerous injection of extreme nationalism into the political life of Yugoslavia of Milošević and Serb revanchism, of Tudjman and Croat nationalism. SZ in particular attempts to caution readers, downplaying the independence referendum, but acknowledging the reality, that the HDZ in Croatia wants independence. FAZ on the other hand emphasizes every development justifies Croatia and Slovenia leaving Yugoslavia. The rise of Milošević and collapse of the LCY demonstrate Serb determination to dominate Yugoslavia and the reforms of Slovenia and elections in Croatia justify and provide the rationale for independence.

Establishment of Serb Autonomous Oblasts in Croatia

As Croatia moved away from Yugoslavia the Serbs of Croatia began to express their discontent. At first merely political but eventually the Serbs formed militias and took up arms.

Revolution of Logs (August 17th, 1990)

FAZ's coverage is contradictory in portraying the Serbs. The title of one article, "Armed Serbs Blockade Roads in Croatia," gives the impression of the Serbs as organized terrorists.¹⁰⁶ There is the implication of involvement from Serbia, allegedly the Head of the Presidency Borisav Jovic (Serbia) encouraged the actions and another article states "The Croatian Leader (Tudjman) saw the hand of

¹⁰⁶ "Strassensperren Bewaffneter Serben in Kroatien" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* August 19th 1990

Milošević behind the Serbian agitation in the Republic."¹⁰⁷ And yet the Croatian-Serbs are also described as just a few radicals and Knin, the center of activity as a backwards village. FAZ's contradictory coverage is the paper's desire to portray Croatia in positive light. Serbs are either disorganized radicals or disciplined terrorists, whatever the FAZ needs them to be, without giving any rationale for their actions.¹⁰⁸

While *Der Spiegel* did not cover events in real time it did mention the events in a later issue. In mid October 1990 a piece ran on the unsteady state of Yugoslavia, in the article *Der Spiegel* sums up the situation as Serbs seizing towns and fighting with the Croatian police. Again failing to provide an explanation for the autonomy demand. The article also quotes a Croatian newspaper "It is time to drive out the political exhibitionist from Belgrade with batons," giving another glimpse at the Croatian side of the issue.¹⁰⁹ The article goes further, claiming the army, despite being run by Serbs, would not intervene because the officers would not risk the mutiny of the multi ethnic force. So despite leaving out the Serbian side of the issue *Der Spiegel* does its usual good job of trying to examine all sides of the conflict.

SZ briefly mentions the event, in the context of the ethnic politics. A paragraph report, mentions the barricades and weapons, but most of the attention

¹⁰⁷ "Die kroatische Fuehrung sieht die Hand Milosevic hinter der serbischen Agitation in der Republik." From "Anzeichen eines Missglueckten Interventionsversuchs der Armee in Kroatian," *Frankfurter Allegemine Zeitung* August 19th 1990.

Historians debate how much influence Milosevic actually had among the Serb Organizations in Bosnia and Croatia, the International Court found him innocent of the crimes they committed such as the Massacre at Srebrenica. However the court noted that Milosevic did not do everything in his power he could have to stop the Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia.

¹⁰⁸ "Kroatien Fuehlt sich nach dem missgluetckten Aufstand in Knin gestaerkt" *Frankfurter Allegemine Zeitung* August 23rd 1990.

¹⁰⁹ "Am Pulverfaß," *Der Spiegel* November 5th 1990, <http://www.Der Spiegel.de/Der Spiegel/print/d-13501145.html>.

is on the government in Belgrade. The central government clarifies the Serbs cannot claim independence and that they have gone against the will of their government (Croatia). The government is calling on the two sides to talk; the implication is the problem can be solved politically. Since SZ is not trying to support Croatia, the event is given little attention instead the papers reporting on the coming German reunification.¹¹⁰

Declaration of the Serbian Autonomous Oblast of Krajina (October 1st 1990)

In October the Serbs around Knin declared themselves an autonomous republic within Yugoslavia, separate from Croatia. Croatia declared this act illegal and no nation ever recognized the declaration. This event took place two days before German Reunification became official, so lack of coverage is not surprising.

Oddly enough *Neues Deutschland* featured a piece on the issue two days later, October 3rd, the day of German Reunification, and on the front page. However unlike other publications, *Neues Deutschland* claims the Croats are responsible for the unfolding crisis. The article cites the mass arrests made by Croatian police units in contested areas and Serbs fleeing from their home to army barracks for protection. There is a brief but concise explanation for the actions of the Serbs, the establishment of national councils and the referendum on independence held earlier in the year. *Neues Deutschland* justifies the action of the Serbs, and claims Croatian nationalism is threatening a civil war.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ "Belgrade ruft Serben und Kroaten zum Dialog auf" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* August 22nd 1990

¹¹¹ "Im Westen Jugoslawiens droht der Bürgerkrieg" *Neues Deutschland* October 3rd 1990.

SZ briefly notes the declaration. In a straightforward article titled "Serbs Declare Autonomy," SZ clarifies the reasons why the Serbs acted as they did. The alleged terror of the Croatian government, according to Serb leaders in their own words, is the reason for the uprising. A later article quotes the Yugoslav Government blaming Croatian policemen, but both of these articles imply the danger of the Serb actions to further destabilizing Yugoslavia, as it drives the republics further apart and further from Belgrade. SZ's coverage concerns itself with the dangers of further weakening Yugoslavia.¹¹²

The short coverage of these events is not surprising, coming just before German reunifications, but nonetheless the previous trends of the publications are reinforced. *Der Spiegel* gives the impression of a worsening situation, not as a critical turn in the crisis, but did acknowledge the role of Serbia in encouraging events. FAZ took events as a dangerous expansion of Serb nationalism. The Serbs are portrayed negatively either as a force about to devour Croatia or drunken radicals incapable of action, and regardless they are pawns of Belgrade. This danger understandably legitimizes Croatia's demand for independence. Opposing this view is *Neues Deutschland* citing the brutality of Croatia's government and police in driving the Serbs to action. *Neues Deutschland* opposes the nationalism of Tudjman's regime in addition to and because of the paper's support of socialism in some form of a united Yugoslavia.

¹¹² Serben Proklamieren Autonomie *Süddeutsche Zeitung* October 3rd 1990 and "Slowenien und Kroatien verurteilt *Süddeutsche Zeitung* October 4th 1990

Other Coverage of Note during this Period

The conflict in Kosovo continued to maintain a large media presence until mid 1991. *Der Spiegel* terms the conflict a "civil war" and harshly criticizes the treatment of Kosovo: police brutality, military law, political blackmail and collectively sacking intelligentsia in Kosovo to weaken any resistance. In respect to the whole situation, *Der Spiegel* claims: "Only with the rise of Milošević did the open fighting between nationalities in Kosovo begin," and "The Yugoslav government passively observes the excesses of the Serbs... both too weak and incompetent to stop Milošević."¹¹³ *Der Spiegel* focuses their criticism on Milošević's nationalistic tendencies for the crisis, not blaming any particular group, but faulting the Yugoslav leadership.

FAZ published several articles on Kosovo, in support of the plight of the region. A reference to protests in Slovenia against Yugoslav action in Kosovo, citing the formation of "Committees for the withdrawal of Serbs from Kosovo," and that "it is heard among people in Slovenia that the Serbs want only conflict (in Kosovo)."¹¹⁴ Another article with the inflammatory title, "An oppression, not even seen in South Africa is here!" opens the question, "does Yugoslavia still exists?"¹¹⁵ All these articles express support for Kosovo, portraying Milošević and the Serbs as a whole as unquestioned tyrants of Yugoslavia.

¹¹³ "Mit dem Aufstieg des populistischen Slobodan Milosevic zum serbischen Parteichef steigerte sich der Zwist um das Kosovo zum offenen Kampf zwischen den Nationalitäten" from "Heilige Erde." *Der Spiegel*, March 4th, 1989. <http://www.Der Spiegel.de/Der Spiegel/print/d13493203.html>. and "Flausen Austreiben" *Der Spiegel* November 15th 1990 <http://www.Der Spiegel.de/Der Spiegel/print/d-13502144.html>

¹¹⁴ "Kosovo-Serben vor dem marsch auf Laibach" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* November 21st 1989.

¹¹⁵ "Eine Unterdrückung, wie das nicht einmal in Suedafrika der Fall ist" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* September 21st, 1990.

Outside of Croatia and Slovenia political developments continued, the role of the army in the growing crisis and the elections in Serbia.

Der Spiegel examines the elections in Serbia, and the politicians who oppose Milošević. An article titled "On the Powder Keg," looks anti-Yugoslav Serbs. One such person, Vuk Draskovic, opposes Milošević's warmongering and wants an equally negotiated end to Yugoslavia. In giving equal time to the opposition in Serbia despite the fact that Milošević won the election two months later, *Der Spiegel* shows a calm approach to the situation, and not jumping to conclusions, unlike the FAZ that quickly wrote off Draskovic giving him very little attention.

Neues Deutschland also covers Serbian politics, specifically the new constitution. In a piece titled, "Is Disintegration Programmed?" *Neues Deutschland* seems to lament the pattern of republics modifying their constitutions and removing references to "communism." *Neues Deutschland* portrays the fracturing of Yugoslavia as a negative event, because it remained "officially" a communist nation. Regardless *Neues Deutschland's* coverage of events until mid 1991 make it clear that those publishing the paper want to see a unified Yugoslavia in some sense be it federation or confederation.¹¹⁶

SZ also covered extensively the Serbian elections in December 1990 where Milošević won a majority. SZ provided almost as much attention to Draskovic as *Der Spiegel* did. Importantly despite Milošević's victory, SZ ponders if an alliance between Draskovic's party and other opposition parties could "challenge a direct mandate (by Milošević)." After the second round of elections however the concern

¹¹⁶ "Ist Zerfall programmiert?" *Neues Deutschland*, October 1st 1990.

of SZ increases. "(the elections) Could lead the multiethnic state down the path of national conflict." Milošević himself is given little attention unlike in *Der Spiegel*, the focus is on the larger forces than individual actors. The SZ never assigns blame or characterizes one side or the other in an insulting manner, but acknowledges the danger in the victory of Milošević and the old communists to the situation in Yugoslavia.¹¹⁷

Der Spiegel also heavily covers the rising influence of the army on politics. The JNA saw itself as the protector of Yugoslavia's borders both internal and external threats, according to *Der Spiegel*. The army crushed waves of massive student protests against Milošević in Belgrade. The protestors demanded Milošević's resignation, and *Der Spiegel* theorizes the army supported Milošević to keep the peace, but opposed his policies. The speculation is the army would establish military rule in Yugoslavia to keep it from coming apart due to nationalism. Eventually the alliance between Milošević and the army became clear, but *Der Spiegel* did not rush to conclusions. Examining the army's allegiance in Yugoslav politics and opposition forces within Serbia represents a deeper understanding of the conflict, and not merely painting it as black and white.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ "Milosevic bleibt Praesident Serbiens" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* December 12th 1990 and "Vielvölkerstaat Jugoslawien vom Zerfall bedroht." *Süddeutsche Zeitung* December 24th 1990

¹¹⁸ "Nie so einsam" *Der Spiegel* March 25th 1991, <http://www.Der Spiegel.de/Der Spiegel/print/d-13490096.html>.

Events Between March and December 1991

JNA Actions in Croatia

As the overall situation deteriorated in Yugoslavia armed confrontation first sprang up in Croatia. In the year leading up to 1991, Croats had begun to smuggle weapons into Croatia for self-protection from what they perceived as a JNA run by Serbians who would try to oppress them. The Serbs of Croatia, having already proclaimed their independence took up arms to defend their towns against what they perceived as a fascist state in Croatia after the election of Tudjman and his party. A skirmish was only a matter of time.

JNA As Mediator between Croats and Serbs (March-May 1991)

The early skirmishes between Croatian Police and Serb Militias were short and after each the JNA stepped in and forcibly separated the warring parties. The military leadership wished to preserve the state and sought to end the conflicts by standing between the two groups. In March 1990 clashes at Pakrac and Plitvice ended quickly with few deaths. However the skirmish in the village of Brovolo Selo in early May witnessed the first major clash with over 500 combatants fighting after Serbs took several Croatian policemen hostage, killed then mutilated them.

In documenting these clashes *Der Spiegel* gave little attention to the fighting but placed the clashes within the political framework of Yugoslavia. After Pakrac, *Der Spiegel* published an article about the army, not just at Pakrac but against new protests in Belgrade. What potential role might the army play to preserve

Yugoslavia? The officer corps's pledge to protect Yugoslavia from both external and internal threats, implies the possibility of a coup. *Der Spiegel* notes, Borisav Jović, Serb head of the Presidency illegally ordered the tanks to Pakrac. Jović's effort to use the military in Belgrade is curtailed by the votes in the presidency; nonetheless *Der Spiegel* continues to categorize the collective presidency as a weak institution. Another article, with an ironic title, "New Thinking," mentions the Plitvice clash in an ever-worsening situation. In reference to Plitvice, Tudjman claims the worst of the crisis is over. However *Der Spiegel* counters citing the weakness of the Presidency and Ante Markovic, the scheming of Milošević and Tudjman, the militias in Serbia and Croatia and the deepening economic crisis to remind readers, "The national problems remain." The Battle at Borovo Selo is reported as a turning point in the crisis. One article title encapsulates this idea: "We are already in a Civil War."¹¹⁹ This piece details the horrible fighting and as before ponders the role of the army. Tudjman and Milošević are put on similar footing as instigators of the current fighting. Milošević for stirring up national sentiment among Serbs in Kosovo and Croatia, Tudjman for refusing to be flexible with the Croatian Serbs, a subtle criticism of his stance on a unified Croatia. The piece also lambasts the US and European Community for ignoring the situation and demanding a unified Yugoslavia despite the fact that none is possible now. Borvolo Selo is painted as a turning point, no longer is it the threat of civil war, but now it is actual civil war.¹²⁰

¹¹⁹ "Wir sind schon im Bürgerkrieg" *Der Spiegel*, May 13th 1991

¹²⁰ "In Die Kasernen" *Der Spiegel* March 18th 1991, "Wir sind schon im Bürgerkrieg" *Der Spiegel*, May 13th 1991 and "Neues Nachdenken" *Der Spiegel*, April 14th, 1991

FAZ's coverage carries the usual condemnation of the Yugoslav government. An article: "Croatia Receives Ultimatum from Central Yugoslavia (Government)," places Croatia as the victim of an aggressive central government. Tudjman is quoted



A cartoon from the FAZ implying that only the force of the JNA is holding the nationalities of Yugoslavia together. (FAZ May 16th 1991)

as he claiming he no longer considers the existence of the Yugoslav Presidency following the events at Pakrac. Serb tyranny is demonstrated in a statement from the Serbian Socialist Party, Milošević's party, demanding the elections in Croatia be overturned and the republic submit to the will of the Presidency. Serb hypocrisy for wanting autonomy in Croatia, but denying it to the people of Kosovo is also referenced several times. The JNA is also shown as a tool of the government trying to suppress Croatia. "It is clear to Croatian leaders that in the event of an open intervention by the army to immediately declare independence and mobilize popular resistance," claims one commentary.¹²¹ A letter to the editor claims the term "civil war" is inaccurate, that the proper term is actually "occupational war", that the JNA is openly aggressive in Croatia. Only dissolving Yugoslavia can prevent the tyrannical behavior of the central government against noble Croatia according to the FAZ.¹²²

Neues Deutschland's interpretation of events represents their anti-nationalist stance. For Pakrac, the Croats are at fault. An opinion piece in response to Tudjman

¹²¹ "Gespannte Ruhe in Jugoslawien" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* May 10th 1991

¹²² "Kroatian begut sich Ultimatum der jugoslawischen Zentrale" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* March 3rd 1991, "Merkmale serbischer Toleranz" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* May 2nd 1991 and "Serbischer Terror" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* September 11th 1991

dispatching police: "The events on the weekend show how little he (Tudjman) cares for a peaceful solution."¹²³ A separate opinion piece attacks Tudjman's policy against the Serbs: "Confrontation over compromise is the reason Yugoslav brothers are enemies."¹²⁴ The Serb leaders of Pakrac are quoted claiming the Croats are posing a direct threat to a peaceful solution. Since January 1990 hundreds of Serbs had fled Croatia for Serbia to escape danger, according to the article. These attacks on Croatia and Tudjman extend even subtly. A critique titled "A first step to building a Greater-Serbia," paints Plitvice as an effort towards single Serb state. The argument is, if Yugoslavia collapses the borders should be redrawn to consider ethnicities, which would favor the Serb cause. However *Neues Deutschland* acknowledges this could mean a civil war, "Soon the whole region will be alight."¹²⁵ The condemnation of Croat nationalism through these articles suggests that Tudjman and Croatia are destabilizing Yugoslavia, against *Neues Deutschland's* long held position of preserving a socialist Yugoslavia in some form.¹²⁶

SZ's coverage of fighting in March carries the familiar tone of concern for peace in Yugoslavia. The disputes over Pakrac and Plitvice are portrayed as making the situation in Yugoslavia worse between two sides, without one side being assigned responsibility. The paper quotes Tudjman and Mesic attacking the JNA, however SZ also quotes a JNA officer claiming the Croat police provoked the incident

¹²³ "ie wenig ihm an einer friedlichen Beilegung der schwelenden Nationalitätenkonflikte gelegen ist, zeigten die Ereignisse am Wochenende

"Nun auch Kroatian" *Neues Deutschland* March 5th 1991

¹²⁴ "Claus Dumde", *Neues Deutschland* May 7th 1991

¹²⁵ "Lage um kroatischen pakrac normalisiert sich." *Neues Deutschland* March 6th 1991

¹²⁶ "Ein erster Anlauf zur Bildung Großserbiens," *Neues Deutschland* April 3rd 1991. And "Lage um kroatischen pakrac normalisiert sich." *Neues Deutschland* March 6th 1991

in Pakrac. Overall the army's role is neutral if not uncertain, one opinion column remarks most of the officers are Serbs, but some of the highest commanders are Croats. A different opinion piece takes a side on the conflict, accusing Belgrade of inciting the revolt of the Croatian-Serbs to take territory from Croatia, that Croatian-Serbs are merely pawns. The paper's position is the disputed status of the Croatian-Serbs will hinder any kind of effort to bring peace to Yugoslavia. Unlike FAZ, SZ rejects the practicality, if not the idea, of Croatia and Slovenia declaring independence to solve the crisis. The two republics would not receive international recognition, and it might provoke a civil war outright.¹²⁷

Aggression of the JNA in Croatia (August-November 1991)

Following the conclusion of the 10-Day War the position of the leadership of the JNA shifted. The leadership of the army resolved to keep Croatia within Yugoslavia militarily in a quick victory, a dual thrust through the south Adriatic and east Slavonia. These actions shifted the course of events. At the beginning of the offensives in September the army still possessed a multi-ethnic character, but as fighting went on non-Serb soldiers and officers deserted. As the army's moral declined the JNA recruited extremist Serbs to fight with them. The major battles included Dubrovnik and Vukovar.

Der Spiegel's coverage of illustrates a shift in the paper's position to condemning the JNA, Serbia and the rump Yugoslavia. One of the first articles "The Ordered War,"

¹²⁷ "Belgrade Provoziert Zagreb" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* March 4th 1991, "Konflikt in Kroatien weiter verschäuft" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* March 4th 1991, "Kroatien begut Belgrads Ultimatum" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* March 5th 1991 "Jugoslawiens einzige Chance" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* March 22nd 1991, "Jugoslawiens Bund vor dem Ende" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* March 29th 1991, "Jugoslawische Armee trennt Kroaten und Serben", *Süddeutsche Zeitung* April 2nd 1991, "Kroatien bleibt trotz Ultimatus hart" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* April 3rd 1991,

points to the coldly calculated nature of the war. The JNA's attack on the Adriatic Coast is described as a desperate gamble. "The largest nation of the South Slavs (Serbia) wants to secure disintegrating multinational state."¹²⁸ *Der Spiegel* wrote of the army: "The army, self-conscious of defeat in the Slovenia, desired to take revenge through attacking a defenseless Croatia."¹²⁹ The foreign minister of Serbia claimed "The army only protects the endangered Serbs," but *Der Spiegel* points out the army hypocrisy, attacking non-Serb towns. The Serb irregulars (Chetniks) the army came to increasingly rely on are, "No better than common robbers." In Vukovar, "The Chetniks shot and killed mercilessly any surviving civilians who wore a Croatian uniform or even boots out of revenge."¹³⁰ *Der Spiegel* since 1990 cautioned possible aggression by the army and with its materialization condemned the institution and the state of Yugoslavia.¹³¹

Neues Deutschland's anti-war, anti-nationalism and pro-Yugoslav sentiments manifest in a strange mix during the coverage of fighting. Croatia is a region full of amateur, unprofessional but heavily armed soldiers, not a recipe for peace. Neither side wants to stop the war politically, however Tudjman is more heavily condemned. One example, the article, "Tudjman's Call: Only Violence can End the War," exemplifies this. Belgrade it is implied, actually want peace, despite the

¹²⁸ "Damit will sich die größte Nation der Südslawen im auseinanderfallenden Vielvölkerstaat" from "Bestellter Krieg" *Der Spiegel* September 16th 1991.

¹²⁹ "Als die Armee im selbstbewußten Slowenien geschlagen worden war und sich durch einen Angriff auf das schutzlose Kroatien rächen wollte" from "Wir alle haben verloren" *Der Spiegel* November 25th 1991, <http://www.Der Spiegel.de/Der Spiegel/print/d-13492410.html>

¹³⁰ "Serbische Tschetniks jeden überlebenden Zivilisten, der ein kroatisches Uniformteil oder auch nur Stiefel trug, aus Rache gnadenlos erschossen" "Wir alle haben verloren" *Der Spiegel* November 25th 1991, <http://www.Der Spiegel.de/Der Spiegel/print/d-13492410.html>

¹³¹ "Die Armee macht viele Fehler DER SPIEGEL-Interview mit Serbiens Außenminister Vladislav Jovanovic über den jugoslawischen Bürgerkrieg" *Der Spiegel* October 7th 1991 and "Gebt uns unsere Söhne" *Der Spiegel* September 9th 1991.

paper's acknowledgment of Serb aggression, in a bizarre intersection of anti-nationalism and anti-war views. Despite lamenting the fighting, *Neues Deutschland* still advocates for a Yugoslavia in some form, encapsulated by quoting Milošević asking that the EC help end the conflict, but respect, "Yugoslavian Institutions." This is another example of clashing positions anti-war, but also pro-Yugoslav, the army which *Neues Deutschland* once hailed as heroes are now the enemy of peace and Yugoslavia.^{132 133}

From the outbreak of major operations in Croatia the FAZ's argument for the need to recognize the republics became louder. The titles of certain articles convey this: "Belgrade Creates a Military Dictator with Horrible Consequences" or "The People of Osijek are Living in Cellars, Croatia Needs the Help of the World." These titles reflect the two-part narrative, the aggression of the army and Serbia and vulnerability of Croatia. The JNA according to FAZ has taken control of the government in an effort to preserve Yugoslavia with Milošević's blessing and the utilization of Serb nationalists. The FAZ quotes Markovic, that the army's violence is "the last act in the destruction of Yugoslavia." Milošević himself is a force of evil. The Hague Conference blamed Milošević for not taking enough means to ensure peace and FAZ translates this into Milošević being responsible for the whole conflict, and determined to pursue it, regardless of the consequences. This crisis has only one solution, recognition. According to FAZ:


¹³² "Dörferkrieg in Slawonien," *Neues Deutschland* October 7th 1991, "Serbien will schnelle Entscheidung der Krise erzwingen," *Neues Deutschland* October 24th 1991, "Hilfskonvoi erreichte belagerte Stadt Vukovar," *Neues Deutschland* October 24th 1991, "Mit seiner Parteinahme für Zagreb gießt Bonn Öl ins Feuer" *Neues Deutschland* October 8th 1991.

¹³³ "Kontrolle über Armee in Kroatien verloren" *Neues Deutschland* August 30th 1991 and "Tudjman ruft zum Kampf: Gewalt kann Krieg stoppen" *Neues Deutschland* November 11th 1991

The independence of Slovenia made it easier for Croatia to recognize and resolve the conflict of statehood (of whether or not to declare independence). Europe has the choice between a war in the Balkans and a political solution, which opens the door of democratic republics to join the European Community.¹³⁴

The FAZ extensively covered the conflict in Croatia because the nature and intensity of the fighting backed their claim to aiding Croatia and provided ample opportunity to condemn Serbia.¹³⁵

A cartoon from the SZ critiquing the EC inaction in the face of JNA aggression against Croatia, implying recognition might be the only option (SZ October 8th 1991)



SZ's more cautious neutral tone of reporting remained, though SZ began to gradually adopt an anti-Serb position, exemplified by their choice of quotes and their reporting of Serb actions. Overall what is left of Yugoslavia is characterized as a military dictatorship. Ante Markovic's vain attempt to reign in defense minister Veljko Kadijevic, and Kadijevic's further troop movements symbolize the new military rule. The mobilization of reservists from other republics is declared illegal, especially in Bosnia where troops from Serbia needed to cross to reach Adriatic-Croatia. According to one article the event represented: "A break in Yugoslav history: effectively, so many see, the army has

¹³⁴ "Die Unabhängigkeit Slowenien machte es einfacher, die Eigenstaatlichkeit des benachbarten Kroatien anzuerkennen und den Konflikt beizulegen. Man habe die Wahl zwischen einem Krieg auf dem Balkan und einer politische Lösung, die den Republiken das Tor zum demokratischen Europa oeffne," from "'Belgrad errichtet Militardiktatur mit allen schrecklichen Folgen'" *Frankfurter Allegemine Zeitung* October 2nd 1991.

¹³⁵ "Die Menschen in Osijek fristen ihr Leben im Keller Kroatien braucht Unterstützung von außen" *Frankfurter Allegemine Zeitung* October 21st 1991, "Die Serben halten sich nicht an ihre Zusagen Europäer drohen mit Sanktionen" *Frankfurter Allegemine Zeitung* October 14th 1991, "'Belgrad errichtet Militardiktatur mit allen schrecklichen Folgen'" *Frankfurter Allegemine Zeitung* October 2nd 1991 and "Die Jugoslawisches Volksarmee" Ruestet zum Angriff auf Ostslawonien" *Frankfurter Allegemine Zeitung*, November 20th 1991

largely taken power of the state."¹³⁶ The army is described as denying care to civilians, breaking ceasefires, and regularly bombarding cities. These reports are matter of fact, but select quotes such as Mesic calling on troops to desert the army or the Tudjman claiming 2000 children died in Vukovar, provides the impression of JNA brutality in the face of a helpless nation. The army is also no longer a force that only wants to preserve the state, their alliance with the Serbs Militias in Croatia and efforts to resettle Serbs in Eastern Croatia have transformed them into a tool of Serbia. The government of Yugoslavia is now described as a "rump-presidency," implying the illegitimacy of the Serb block. While the tone of SZ's reporting in covering these events does not change, the position of the paper is now that the Serbs and the JNA are the aggressors in Croatia.¹³⁷

The outbreak a major violence proved a serious turning point in coverage. Both SZ and *Der Spiegel* began to modify their positions and became increasingly critical of the actions of the central government, Croatian-Serbs, and Milošević. According to *Der Spiegel* the central government went from subtle aggression and subtle tactics to hold Yugoslavia together to blind aggression. SZ shifted their depiction of Yugoslavia as a nation in crisis to a nation under a military dictatorship and controlled by extremists, overall the army's actions soured SZ view of the

¹³⁶ "Einen Einschnitt in der Geschichte Jugoslawiens; de facto, so interpretieren das viele, habe nämlich jetzt die jugoslawische Volksarmee die Macht im Staat weitgehend uebernommen." From "Im Visier: President Tudjman" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* September 23rd 1991

¹³⁷ "Jugoslawische Armee setzt Offensive in Kroatien fort" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* November 21st 1991, "Kroatische Nationalgarde in Vukovar ergibt sich bedingungslos" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* November 20th 1991, "Armee fordert Kroaten zur Kapitulation" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* October 28th 1991 "Kämpfe in Kroatien lassen offenbar nach" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* October 21st 1991 "Hilfskonvoi der EG kehrt um" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* October 15th 1991 "Serben treten zu einer neuen Offensive an" "Jugoslawiens Armee droht mit massiver Vergeltung Staatsprasidium uebernimmt alle Regierungsfunktionen" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* October 3rd 1991 and "Juaoslawischer Burgerkrieg wieder voll entbrannt" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* September 22nd 1991

situation. For FAZ, the early conflicts evidenced the sinister alliance of Serb nationalists and the JNA against Croatia, and the later fighting only confirmed this. The response of FAZ to later fighting included demanding recognition of the republics louder and more fervently. *Neues Deutschland* initially hoisted much of the blame on the Croats for escalating the fighting, but after the intervention of the army and the brutality of the conflict their position shifted. *Neues Deutschland* began to advocate for peace and an end to fighting on equal terms for all. Croats still bear much of the blame, but the reputation of the army is diminished in the paper.

The 10-Day War in Slovenia (June 27th to July 7th 1991)

The first open battles between major forces in the disintegration of Yugoslavia came when Slovenia unilaterally declared independence. The JNA mobilized rapidly, without orders, but quickly bogged down in street fighting despite superior equipment. An international conference ended the fighting; agreeing that the army would withdraw and Slovenia would wait three more months before declaring independence.

Following this event the reporting on Yugoslavia increased drastically for all publications. I could not able to cover all articles on the topic so I have examined seven *Neues Deutschland* articles, eight SZ articles, nine FAZ articles, and the five articles from the *Der Spiegel* issue published when the war began

Slovenian (and Croatian) Declaration of Independence (June 25th 1991)

At a negotiation among all the republics six months prior to the outbreak of the war both Slovenia and Croatia threatened they would leave Yugoslavia if they found no compromise to the question of state organization. However to catch the government off guard the republics declared their independence one day earlier in an effort to quickly gain recognition and prevent a war.

FAZ covered the event with celebration, playing up the credibility of the declarations. The article on the day of the declarations began with, "In the face of the departure of Croatia and Slovenia the end of Yugoslavia is complete." The legitimacy of the acts are emphasized: a guarantee for the Serb minority, which is actually a general guarantee for human rights, and the referendums held in the previous months that establish the legitimacy of the elected governments. The justification and the first six points of the declaration are included in the article, "Under the centralized and totalitarian nature of Yugoslavia, Croatia can not protect its political cultural and economic interests." FAZ gives unanimously positive coverage to the declaration, any problems that might arise, arise from the reaction of Serbia and the JNA.¹³⁸

Neues Deutschland takes a negative view of the declarations, citing concerns over the future of Yugoslavia. The peaceful process, which *Neues Deutschland* has supported, to try and preserve Yugoslavia as a confederation is now lost or at least weakened. This assertion is supported by reports of violence: for example 22 people killed in clashed between police and militias in the last several months. This negative development "defines" the Croatian and Slovenian aspirations for

¹³⁸ "Der Vielvoelkerstaat Jugoslawien am Ende Kroatien und Slowenien beschliessen den Austritt" *Frankfurter Allgemeine* June 26th 1991

independence. There is also a small paragraph on the disapproval of the United States, playing up the negative international reaction. The position of *Neues Deutschland* against the declarations mirrors their positions against nationalism and violence, as it is implied Slovenian independence will increase violence.¹³⁹

As the declaration of the two republics loomed nearer, SZ again covered the issue with realistic caution. That Yugoslavia would be fundamentally changed, titles such as "Yugoslavia before X-Day" or "Slovenia builds New Border" acknowledge the fact. The destruction of Yugoslavia by Serbian nationalism and the ineptness of the EC are also noted, however the barriers to independence are regularly mentioned: "Political and economic pressure of the EC, the USA, the World Bank, and the World Community are pushing for a united Yugoslavia."¹⁴⁰ Additionally Ante Markovic's continuous efforts to hold the federation together are featured in several articles. Moreover the consequences of independence are not ignored, such as the threat of civil war or the economic difficulties of establishing a new country, one commentary pointing to the increasing price of wine in Slovenia as an example. SZ recognizes the event as a turning point in the Yugoslav Crisis, but is careful not to overplay the actions and explores the possible consequences.¹⁴¹

The 10 Day War in Slovenia (June 27th to July 7th 1991)

¹³⁹ "Kroatien und Slowenien erklären Unabhängigkeit," *Neues Deutschland*, June 26th 1991.

¹⁴⁰ "Jugoslawien vor dem Tag X" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* June 21st 1991

¹⁴¹ "Zweifel verdrängen die Euphorie" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* June 26th 1991 "Teilrepubliken beharren auf Unabhängigkeit" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* June 24th 1991. "Jugoslawien vor dem Tag X" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* June 21st 1991 "Baker wirbt für einigtes Jugoslawien" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* June 25th 1991 "Teilrepubliken Slowenien und Kroatien verlassen den jugoslawischen Staatsverband" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* June 26th 1991



„Herr Präsident, die jugoslawische Armee erklärt auch ihre Unabhängigkeit!“ A cartoon from *Der Spiegel* examines the implications of the JNA's actions during the 10-Day War (*Der Spiegel* July 8th 1991)

Der Spiegel's position on the conflict turned firmly against Serbia and the JNA essentially accusing them of destroying Yugoslavia and starting the conflict. The edition published just after the conclusion of the 10-Day War bears the title, *Serbian Terror, Yugoslavia Prison of Nations*. It features a violent man (assumed to be Serb) ripping through the

Yugoslav Flag with his fist. *Der Spiegel* quotes the JNA Chief of Staff Blagoje Adzic that because of the circumstances they cannot obey Mesic's orders to stand down in Slovenia, there will be, "War until the end." *Der Spiegel* argues this is the 'terror' of Greater-Serbia, and the army, "which sees itself as the 'seventh republic' in this conflict," as the tool.^{142 143} The army's desire to preserve their privileged position in the federation is cited as a reason for their unilateral action to preserve Yugoslavia through force. *Der Spiegel* lambasts the EC for missing the opportunity to prevent violence, for not applying pressure on Belgrade, claiming in the modern age self-determination should be a right. An interview with Mesic confirms this. A *Der Spiegel* interviewer inquires into the role of the army and Serbia repeatedly, illustrating the publication's interest in the JNA's role. Discussions of the Croatian-

¹⁴² "Nicht nur deshalb gerieten sie mit der Armee, die sich als "siebte Republik" im Lande versteht, zunehmend in Streit" From "Krieg bis zum Ende" *Der Spiegel*, July 8, 1991.

¹⁴³ "Terror der Serben Völkergefängnis Jugoslawien." *Der Spiegel*, July 8, 1991. <http://www.DerSpiegel.de/DerSpiegel/print/d-21113940.html>

In this case the literal translation is to "Prison of Peoples," However since the republics of Yugoslavia were created based off ethnicity, I believe it is referring to the constituent republics of Yugoslavia.

Serbs are laden with accounts of cruelty towards Croats, the Serbs also a privileged ruling class unwilling to give up their status and ready to fight to the death for it. Tudjman is quoted as saying these Serbs are "A terrorist Bridgehead of Serbian Imperialism." *Der Spiegel's* positions turned firmly against the Serbs and Yugoslavia during the 10-Day War.¹⁴⁴

In the FAZ the 10-Day War received headline coverage every single day, and for a week after hostilities ceased, (June 26th to July 15th). While coverage of fighting itself remained minimal, three themes are present: support for Croatia and Slovenia, the evil behavior of Serbs, and that recognition is the only option.

Support for Slovenes and the mythos of a struggle is omnipresent. On the first day of the fighting Slovenian President Kucan is quoted: "We cannot wait any longer for the world to support our separation from Yugoslavia," in an appeal to emotion.¹⁴⁵ A separate piece titled, "For a Long Time have the Peoples of Yugoslavia Died Apart," claims, "Albanians, Slovenians, Croats want to escape the Oppression of the Serbians," making it appear as though the moment Tito died all sides wanted to leave the federation, despite the 10 year difference between the crisis and Tito's death.¹⁴⁶ The story of the underequipped but inspired young soldiers of Slovenia and Croatia meant to instill hope. One article explains why the JNA cannot conquer these republics: "The 10 year long bloody oppression by the Serb-

¹⁴⁴ "Für den kroatischen Präsidenten Franjo Tudjman sind die Krajiner "ein terroristischer Brückenkopf des serbischen Imperialismus," From "Terroristischer Brückenkopf" *Der Spiegel* July 8th 1991, "Drei Tage lang am Telefon Wie sich Hans-Dietrich Genscher bemühte, die jugoslawische Krise zu lösen" *Der Spiegel*, July 8th 1991 and "Das Ende der Soldaten," *Der Spiegel*, July 8th 1991

¹⁴⁵ "Slowenien und Kroatien bestehen auf ihrer Unabhägigkeit" *Frankfurter Allegemine Zeitung* June 24th 1991

¹⁴⁶ "Seit Langen streben die Voelker Jugoslawiens auseinander" *Frankfurter Allegemine Zeitung* June 28th 1991

Communists...results in the rise of desertions from the JNA."¹⁴⁷ The Slovenes are David facing down a Serb Goliath.

And the Serbs are indeed portrayed as Goliath, that the army is a tool of a Greater-Serbia, but also in a contradictory sense as weak. One article has the titled, "Giving the Peoples Army (JNA) Credit for Brutal Behavior," in an effort to stir emotions. The article asserts the JNA is a Serbian instrument, pointing out the large percentage of Serbs in the Officer Corp and claims the army is centralized in Belgrade under Serb officials. The FAZ claims many in Slovenia believed, "The image that the army had turned to a purely Serbian direction."¹⁴⁸ An assertion supported by the allegation that only Serbs and Bosnian-Serbs mobilized for the conflict in Slovenia; giving the impression of a Serb war of conquest. Even the opposition to the army in Serbia is "Oriented towards a Greater-Serbia," according to the FAZ.¹⁴⁹ One article however points to outdated equipment and poor training in the JNA as an example of the army's weakness and why Slovenes can beat it. This contradiction is utilized only to portray the Slovenes in a positive light and the Serbs as evil or weak depending on the circumstance.

The third major theme is that recognition is the only option available; reconciliation with Belgrade is not possible for Slovenia and Croatia. For example American Secretary of State, James Baker is portrayed as foolish for supporting a united Yugoslavia, he and other foreign ministers are so caught up in the idea they simply cannot understand the true situation. FAZ published an interview with

¹⁴⁷ Ibin

¹⁴⁸ "Die Kommunistischen und grossserbischen Kraefte nehmen in der Armee das Heft in die Hand" *Frankfurter Allegemine Zeitung* July 3rd 1991

¹⁴⁹ Brutales Draufschlagen ist der 'Volsarmee' zuzutrauen *Frankfurter Allegemine Zeitung*. June 28th 1991

Tudjman, who claims the EC and the US should not be talking to Markovic anymore as he has no more real authority over Yugoslavia, by extension implying Yugoslavia is already dissolved.¹⁵⁰ Tudjman continues that the agreement of the army to "return to the barracks" negotiated by EC meant the army would return to Croatia and threaten his state, only recognition of Croatia and Slovenia could protect them from JNA aggression. In domestic German politics a statement from the Bundestag calling for the preservation of democratic Yugoslavia is lambasted in the FAZ. Such a statement gives Belgrade permission to act with impunity and is supported by quotes from the heads of the major political parties criticizing the lack of EC action.¹⁵¹ A separate article exploring Genscher's efforts to have the conflict mediated, quotes him saying "The people have the right 'self-determination and democratic decisions, regardless if they wish to live in a confederation or not.'" ¹⁵² This is followed again by quotes from Bundestag members in support of recognition. These statements contrast a *Der Spiegel* article that cited critics of recognition as well as supporters, a discrepancy that gives the illusion of Bundestag unity in favor of recognition.

Neues Deutschland covered the war keeping with a pro-Yugoslav perspective. Unlike *Der Spiegel*, the army's actions are trying to save Yugoslavia from destruction and that recognition is a mistake. Only a few days got front-page coverage on the conflict, the other days, news relegated to the *Ausland* section.

¹⁵⁰ "Tudjman: Neuer Realismus der EG" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* July 2nd 1991

¹⁵¹ "In Bonn Denkt man derzeit nicht an die Anerkennung Sloweins und Kroatiens" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* June 27th 1991

¹⁵² "Genscher: Beobachter nach Slowenien" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* July 1st 1991

The first day of fighting made the front page: "Tanks on the move in Slovenia."¹⁵³ The last paragraph cites the German Federal Cabinet's, not the government, refusal to recognize the republics calling for the reorganization of Yugoslavia into a confederation. The cabinet is the chancellor and ministers. The cabinet may have been against recognition, but it is known certain members of the Bundestag supported recognition. *Neues Deutschland* wants the impression that the whole government opposes recognition, just as FAZ wanted to give the opposite impression. A reprint from a Paris magazine, "Liberation" accuses Slovenia of beginning the democratization of Yugoslavia then abandoning it to Serbian centralism and asserts that both republics have hidden agendas.¹⁵⁴

The perceived role of the army as a positive force separates *Neues Deutschland* from the other publications. *Der Spiegel* saw the army as killing democracy and FAZ saw it as a tool of Greater-Serbia. In the eyes of *Neues Deutschland*, Prime Minister Markovic can use the army, because the Presidency is deadlocked, to end the fighting and continue his economic recovery. Once that is done "the ground for a new negotiation between the warring parties can begin."¹⁵⁵ One article titled, "The Army will Save Yugoslavia," asserts the efforts of the army to intervene in previous conflicts came from a desire to preserve the state, not from an ethnic allegiance or political protectionism.¹⁵⁶ Where previously the Presidency

¹⁵³ "Panzeraufmarsch in Slowenien" *Neues Deutschland* June 26th 1991

¹⁵⁴ "Was Wird aus Jugoslawien" *Neues Deutschland* June 27th 1991

¹⁵⁵ "das Feld für neue Verhandlungen zwischen den zerstrittenen Völkern vorbereiten." In Jugoslawien steht die Entscheidung bevor *Neues Deutschland* June 27th 1991.

¹⁵⁶ "Die Armee soll nun Jugoslawien retten" *Neues Deutschland* June 28th 1991.

voted down efforts to use the army, now the army can act freely.¹⁵⁷ *Neues Deutschland* acknowledges Serbs dominate the Officer Corp, but the Serbs stand against Slovenia and Croatia leaving Yugoslavia and the army will be used as a tool responsibly in the most positive assessment of the situation from any publication examined here.

Also covered under *Neues Deutschland* is the effect of the crisis on politics. One article titled "Bonn in the pull of the Balkan Crisis," examines the rapid shift of opinion in the German government over the conflict. Three days after the conflict began Genscher, according to the paper, changed his opinion in collaboration with leaders of his party, "Convicting the government in Belgrade of violence."¹⁵⁸ However despite this turn around the paper then immediately quotes the President of the Croatian Parliament, who calls for a new Yugoslav confederation and the foreign minister of Romania who also calls for preserving Yugoslavia to prevent more violence. Even in acknowledging the reality of the situation *Neues Deutschland* clings to their view that Yugoslavia can and should be preserved, despite reality to the contrary.

One more feature that *Neues Deutschland* covers, that *Der Spiegel* mentioned in their publications, is the opposition protests to the war. In an opinion piece immediately after the fighting stopped a writer describes the protests in Zagreb and Belgrade of mothers and fathers demanding the governments "Bring our sons

¹⁵⁷ Belgrade (March 1991) Croatia (January 1991)

¹⁵⁸ "Ungefähr gleichzeitig hatte dann auch Genscher Gewaltausübung der jugoslawischen Zentralregierung verurteilt..." from "Bonn in Sog der Balkankrise." *Neues Deutschland* June 29th 1991

back!"¹⁵⁹ Though the writer terms this a "novelty" they believe that these people are the majority faction in Yugoslavia, who only want protection and security for life and love ones. Another report from a Belgrade correspondent, describes the political opposition in Belgrade demanding an end to the fighting, because, essentially Yugoslavia is not Serbia, and these people do not want to die for Yugoslavia. The piece quotes an opposition party member who opposes Milošević, stating, "Chauvinism is not constitutive."¹⁶⁰ These publications are a credit to *Neues Deutschland*, as FAZ almost never examines the opposition with Serbia or Yugoslavia to the conflict. Though *Neues Deutschland's* overall position on the preservation of Yugoslavia is an ignorance of reality and an absence of certain facts such as the behavior of the army.

SZ's coverage of the 10-Day War focuses more on the politics and the background of the fighting. Combat is mentioned, but only briefly. SZ's position is the conflict is of two opposing parties, however the influence of the army is depicted with concern.

Almost everyday describes the conflict's politics. One point emphasized often is control of the Yugoslav borders between Italy, Austria and Hungary. This officially is the reason the army acted in the first place. Border control is described by one article as, "The power struggle between Ljubljana and Belgrade."¹⁶¹ Markovic's efforts to stop the fighting are highlighted regularly. His final compromise to stop the conflict, three month moratorium on independence and withdrawal of the JNA,

¹⁵⁹ "Leib und Leben" *Neues Deutschland* July 8th 1991

¹⁶⁰ "Aus Belgrad berichtet Hannes Hoffbauer" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* July 5th 1991.

¹⁶¹ "Neue Machtprobe zwischen Ljubljana und Belgrad" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* July 6th 1991

later implemented by the EC is analyzed. The reception by the Army and the Slovenes is icy. The Slovenes refuse to redact their independence in the face of conflict and the army initially refuses to bow to political pressure. The nature of the conflict is described more in political terms than ethnic terms, unlike in the FAZ. The government in Belgrade is depicted as helpless in the face of the widening conflict, not only against the Slovenes but the JNA itself.¹⁶²

The role of the JNA according to the SZ is a disconcerting one. One of the issues noted by SZ is the overwhelming force used by the JNA: surface to air missiles, tanks, and jet fighters against barely armed Slovene Territorial Forces. More concerning however is the fact that the army acts alone. One article claims: "The further course of the Yugoslav crisis hardly depends on the politicians, but the army"¹⁶³ The army's free will is supported by several quotes from generals who claim Belgrade is interfering with their right to act and that the JNA lost the war because of lack of political will. Both Mesic and Markovic condemn the military and order them to return to their barracks, to no effect, speaking to the independence of the military. An opinion piece claims the initial EC proposal to return the JNA to their barracks would not work. Instead it would give the JNA the impression it won the conflict and sow the seeds for future struggle.¹⁶⁴

A final theme in SZ's coverage of the 10-Day War is criticism of the EC for not doing enough or being divided. According to one opinion piece the crisis in

¹⁶² "Slowenien lässt Ultimatum Belgrads verstreichen Tote bei schweren Gefechten im Osten Kroatiens" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* July 8th 1991 and "Slowenischer Minister: Es herrscht Krieg" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* June 28th 1991

¹⁶³ "Mit einem Rundumschlag in den Bürgerkrieg" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* July 3rd 1991

¹⁶⁴ "Wieder schwere Kämpfe in Slowenien" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* July 3rd 1991 "Wieder schwere Kämpfe in Slowenien" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* July 2nd 1991

Yugoslavia will be a test for the future of the EC in dealing with the newly freed nations of Eastern Europe. A separate piece points to the disunity of the EC in finding a solution. Though they formulated a peace agreement the EC remained divided on the issue of recognition. SZ's position on the EC in relation to the crisis is a negative one in light of the organizations inability to solve the issues at hand.¹⁶⁵

The two declarations of independence and the 10-Day War, despite their massive scale merely reinforced the positions the papers. FAZ showered praises on the two republics for bravely declaring independence and condemned any nation, including Germany for not immediately recognizing. The brief war gave plenty of opportunity to accuse the Serbs of every measure of atrocity and play up the mythos of the noble freedom fighting Slovene or Croat. *Der Spiegel* also condemned the JNA for its terrible actions in Slovenia and defying the orders of the central government implying the end of any legitimate government in Belgrade. SZ though cautious to make judgments as before also condemns the JNA and portrays the institution as reckless and out of control. However the war itself is categorized as a political dispute and not a campaign of conquest by a Greater-Serbia as FAZ stated and *Der Spiegel* implied. *Neues Deutschland* stands against the declarations of independence, questioning their legality, asserting they will lead to more violence and the end of Yugoslavia. The independent action of the army is a positive factor according to the paper, though this position will change later and the development of *Neues Deutschland's* anti-war position by pointing out the anti-war protests.

¹⁶⁵ "Nagelprobe Jugoslawien" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* July 1st 1991 and "EG droht Jugoslawien mit Sperrung der EG-Hilfe" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* June 29th 1991 and "Hilflos in der neuen europäischen Unordnung" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* June 27th 1991

Internationalization of the Yugoslav Crisis

While fighting began in certain parts of Slovenia and Croatia other political developments occurred both within and without Yugoslavia. These events such as the Peace Conference at The Hague, illustrate the changing nature of the crisis that is, becoming more international.

Blockade of the Presidency (May 16th 1991)

The event received front-page attention on the day it occurred, with FAZ placing the blame on Serbia and the JNA. FAZ states Serbia and its allies blocked Mesic's presidency because they wanted to preserve Yugoslavia as a federation, and Mesic stood in favor of reorganization. The JNA, FAZ claims, prepared, ready to move against the presidency and impose military rule. The condemnation of western powers supports FAZ's position that Yugoslavia is now illegitimate. Moreover the FAZ's longtime accusation of the JNA collaborating with Serb nationalists is now confirmed. The Croatian independence referendum the next day overshadowed news of the presidency's blockade. The event became a backdrop for placing blame for Yugoslavia's woes on Serb shoulders until the crisis resolved after July 1991¹⁶⁶

Neues Deutschland portrays events in a fairly serious light and acknowledges the dangerous politics at play. Since the constitution has no contingency if the nominated president cannot get the majority of votes, there is no end insight and Yugoslavia is leaderless. *Neues Deutschland* even quotes the Slovenian representative claiming "silent coup" on the part of the Serbs. Montenegro, in the

¹⁶⁶ "Das Jugoslawische Staatspräsidium ist Führungslos" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* May 17th 1991

Serb camp, acknowledged as the crucial factor for not voting conveys an understanding of the power politics at play. After the Kosovo representative is proclaimed the new president, Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia respond that they will only acknowledge Mesic. The situation described by *Neues Deutschland* of a country in serious crisis. The paper repeatedly reminds leaders, Mesic wants a reformed confederation of Yugoslavia and the implications of his blockade are devastating to the idea of a untied Yugoslavia.¹⁶⁷

"A warning shot across the bow would get them back on course!" An SZ cartoon speculates the JNA's response to the Presidency blockade (SZ May 18th 1991)



SZ covered the blockade of the presidency with a mix of concern for Yugoslavia and disgust for Serb politicians. The lack of a leader feared the SZ would lead to a civil war or army coup. According to an opinion piece, without a leader, the JNA, "Will rattle their chains and using their tanks, ensure the

existence of the 'Socialist Order.'"¹⁶⁸ SZ also acknowledges the power play of the Serbs, claiming their candidate, the representative from Kosovo, to oppose Mesic is a puppet and that opposition to Mesic is opposition to his idea of a new Yugoslav confederation. The blockade is a confrontation of two forces, those for the old

¹⁶⁷ "Wahl des Präsidenten zum dritten Mal gescheitert" *Neues Deutschland* May 18th 1991 "Jugoslawien politisch führungslos" *Neues Deutschland* May 18th 1991 and "Eklat: Jugoslawien ohne Staatsspitze" *Neues Deutschland* May 16th 1991

¹⁶⁸ "Führungslos ins Chaos", *Süddeutsche Zeitung* May 16th 1991

federation, the JNA and Serbia and those for a new confederation, Croatia. This confrontation and the blockade mean Yugoslavia effectively no longer exists.¹⁶⁹

Formation of the Hague Peace Conference (August 27th 1991)

The very first opinion of the commission handed down found Yugoslavia "In the process of dissolution."¹⁷⁰ All these publications did provide opinions on the conference itself and the actors.

Der Spiegel heavily criticizes the inability of the EC to act in the face of aggression by Serbia. The internal divisions in the community are highlighted, England opposed any kind of intervention, and France and other members remained unable to pressure president Tujman to be flexible with the Croatian-Serbs in an effort to ensure peace. Germany alone demanded recognition, but could not deploy their armed forces in other countries and Germany's major weapon, economic sanctions, had up to this point failed while media outlets of Western Europe, stirred fears of an expansionist Germany.¹⁷¹ The EC is depicted as unable to deal with the Milošević. That the EC cannot formulate a collective response to Milošević's demand for all the peoples of Yugoslavia to be allowed a referendum on where they wish to live earns the EC leadership the title of "paper tigers."¹⁷² Additionally it is worth mentioning the UN is also the subject of the same criticism by *Der Spiegel*. The UN observers are weak, their measures, "paper draconian" measures without any

¹⁶⁹ "Parlament schickt neue Mitglieder ins Presidium", *Süddeutsche Zeitung* May 17th "Montenegro blockiert Wahl Mesics", *Süddeutsche Zeitung* May 18th 1991 and "Kroate bei der Wahl zum Präsidenten gescheitert!" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* May 16th 1991

¹⁷⁰ documents

¹⁷¹ "Verheerend Folgen" *Der Spiegel*, September 23rd 1991.

¹⁷² "Neues Gefaengnis" *Der Spiegel*, November 11th 1991.

means of enforcement.¹⁷³ This inability of the European Community or the UN to diplomatically solve the crisis is a point of criticism from *Der Spiegel*.

FAZ displays contempt for the Peace Conference because it did not provide an immediate path to recognition. FAZ hopes the conference can convince France and other EC states to recognize the republics so Germany will not have to go it alone. The inability of the conference to stop the violence is made obvious, reads one title, "In spite of EC peace efforts, fighting continues in Croatia."¹⁷⁴ On the day the peace conference opened, while the Battle of Vukovar raged, FAZ posits, "One must wonder, that if Slovenia and Croatia become casualties of a war for Greater-Serbia then what marginal help can a peace conference provide?"¹⁷⁵ This scathing condemnation summarizes the opinion of FAZ on the conference that is only useful if it can further the cause of recognition.

Neues Deutschland's position on the conference is largely negative. Despite *Neues Deutschland's* anti-war stance, the conference clashes with its pro-Yugoslav stance. Milošević's attendance at the conference is explained as him seeking special legislation to protect the rights of the Croatian-Serbs. The portrayal of Milošević and Serbia as rational actors aligns with *Neues Deutschland's* search for a peaceful solution to report on. An EC proposal for a "common state," a term not defined, without the word "Yugoslavia" is defeated, for reasons also undefined and despite

¹⁷³ "Im Maul des Krokodils" *Der Spiegel*, December 9th 1991.

¹⁷⁴ "Trotz der EG Friedensbemuehungen gehen die kaempfe in Jugoslawien wieter" *Frankfurter Allegemine Zeitung* September 2nd 1991.

¹⁷⁵ "Wirtschaftler Riese, politischer Zwerg, militarischer Wurm" *Frankfurter Allegemine Zeitung* September 8th 1991.

acknowledging this, *Neues Deutschland* still adheres to the idea of a Yugoslavia.¹⁷⁶ An opinion piece advocates peace, but not at the expense of the rights of the Serbs in Croatia to follow their own destiny, a destiny under threat by Croatia's continuing illegal weapons import. The best way to solve the crisis is a common state where all peoples are equal, a solution heard numerous times before in *Neues Deutschland* articles without substance or a plan. *Neues Deutschland* continually paints the Croatian-Serbs as a minority denied rights by Tudjman, which keeps with their anti-nationalist view. Regardless the view of *Neues Deutschland* shapes their criticism of the peace conference, not because it is weak and ineffective, and not because it will not recognize the republics, but because it might recognize the republics.^{177 178}

SZ takes a critical attitude of the conference similar to that of *Der Spiegel*. A major point of the coverage of SZ is that the republics of Croatia and Slovenia are not withdrawing their independence declarations. By extension, holding these talks is merely pandering to the Serb aggressors in the conflict and legitimizing their views. The Conference's efforts to provide guarantees for the Serb minority in Croatia are criticized because the Serb minority has committed acts of aggression, thereby limiting the goodwill of the international community. Creating a homogenous Serb territory in Croatia or autonomous region would justify the cause of Belgrade, which has "Used the minority issue as a tool to start a great fire."¹⁷⁹ By and large the conference is categorized as ineffective, unable to come up with concrete solutions,

¹⁷⁶ "Trotz Friedenskonferenz erneut heftige Kämpfe" *Neues Deutschland* November 6th 1991.

¹⁷⁷ "Terroristischer Brückenkopf DER SPIEGEL-Reporter Erich Wiedemann über den Kampf serbischer Extremisten in Kroatien" *Der Spiegel* July 8th 1991.

¹⁷⁸ "Friedenskonferenz ohne Frieden in Jugoslawien" *Neues Deutschland* September 7th 1991.

¹⁷⁹ "das Minderheitenproblem als Instrument fuer die Verwirklichung maßloser Ansprüche benutzt from "Ein Fall für die Vereinten Nationen" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* November 7th 1991

though diplomatic recognition is not explicitly stated as a solution, instead UN mediation is proposed several times.¹⁸⁰

Croatian Declaration of Independence (October 7th 1991)

The FAZ only mentioned the event within the general push to have the German government recognize Croatia and Slovenia. Throughout the later half of 1991, after the 10-Day War the FAZ published articles pushing for recognition and criticizing the government for not doing so. Various letter to the editor also pushed for recognition, one letter asking how many Croats must die before recognition?¹⁸¹ On the occasion of Croatian Independence FAZ's front page ran another article demanding recognition. The article discussed among other issues the possible sanctions against Yugoslavia, but points out that they would apply to Croatia and Slovenia as well. The piece also notes that Germany cannot make any trade agreements without recognition. It ends by quoting Genscher on the need to "Begin the course to recognize the independence declarations of October 7th of Slovenia and Croatia."¹⁸²

Neues Deutschland's pro-Yugoslav position is reinforced in criticizing the declaration. In response to independence declarations *Neues Deutschland* comments that: "It seems as though sober calculations are no longer capable, or the parties would see they are ruining their economies."¹⁸³ The message being that economics

¹⁸⁰ "EG-Ratsvorsitzender zieht Serbien der 'Lüge'" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* October 28th 1991, and "Lord Carrington beruft neue Runde der Friedenskonferenz ein" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* October 1st 1991

¹⁸¹ "Vorurteile gegen Kleinere Staaten" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* September 8th 1991

¹⁸² "Die Parteien draegen die Regierung zu Anerkennung Kroatiens und Sloweniens." *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* October 9th 1991.

¹⁸³ "Zu nüchternem Kalkül scheinen die ohnehin nicht mehr fähig, sonst sähen sie, daß ihre Wirtschaft längst schon dem Ruin entgegentreibt." From "Düstere Aussicht" *Neues Deutschland* October 8th 1991

are the center of the struggle within Yugoslavia. *Neues Deutschland* reminds readers that independence of the two republics will lead to further violence, in an effort to undercut the declarations of independence. The primary message is the whole crisis is based on hysteric nationalism, a position *Neues Deutschland* has consistently held.

SZ received Croatia's independence with a tone of necessity. Part of the coverage focused on the criticism of the EC failing to live up to their promise of recognizing the republics three months after the 10-Day War. "Today the moratorium expires and the EC must treat the two republics as States, unless they want to declare their own compromise void," reads one column.¹⁸⁴ Croatia stood now *de jure* as well as *de facto* independent according the SZ. The rest of the coverage focused on the danger Croatia found itself in, facing Serb militias and the JNA, now waging an open war against Croatia. One article went so far as to describe the JNA's actions as a war of extermination. Recognition by the EC isn't explicitly stated as necessary, but the with the self-declared sovereignty of Croatia, the EC (and UN) should be doing more to aid Croatia according to SZ.¹⁸⁵

The papers in discussing the political developments find some common ground. All the papers oppose the Serb power play that blockaded the presidency and all paper criticized the weakness of the Hague Conference, EC and the UN. Though these agreements come under different circumstances. SZ and FAZ harshly judge the Serb actions in blockading the presidency, accusing the Serbs of a power play that destabilizes the country, though for FAZ that is irrelevant, Yugoslavia is

¹⁸⁴ Heute läuft das Moratorium ab. und die EG ist nun gezwungen, die beiden Republiken als souverane Staaten zu behandeln, wenn sie nicht selbst ihren eigenen Kompromis fuer null und nichtig erklären will. From "Übertriebener Euro-Pessimismus" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* October 7th 1991

¹⁸⁵ Offenes Spiel mit gezinkten Karten October 9th 1991 Endzeitstimmung in Kroatien October 8th 1991

destined to fall, this is one more nail in the coffin. *Neues Deutschland* fears the blockade of the Presidency will hinder efforts to reform the nation, a fear the blockade will hasten the end of Yugoslavia. Similar issues are seen with perceptions of the peace conference. *Der Spiegel* and *SZ* lambast the conference for being unable to actually provide peace or meaningful dialogue, *FAZ* views the conference as useless if it cannot speed up the recognition of the two republics and *Neues Deutschland* is afraid the conference *might* recognize the two republics and seal the end of Yugoslavia.

Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia

Months of ineffective action by the EC finally prompted Germany to be more forceful. The EC had agreed to recognize the republics on January 15th 1992 in keeping with the policy of incorporating the other nations of the former Soviet Block, for example Hungary and Poland. However Germany declared they would recognize the republics before Christmas in keeping with a personal promise made by Helmut Kohl to the leaders of both republics. This decision proved controversial within the EC, however the member states followed through and recognized the two other republics on January 15th 1991.

German Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia (December 23rd 1991)

Der Spiegel perceives the idea of recognition as a needed development, but not necessarily a positive one. The road to this decision by Germany is termed a, "Zigzagging" path and the division within the EC over the question is emphasized.

The opposition of Great Britain and the US are noted, London fearing, "Serbia will, after the recognition, take a more aggressive line against the remaining two republics Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia."¹⁸⁶ *Der Spiegel* concedes the reality of the situation: combat troops in Croatia to keep peace, to enforce recognition, something no nation wants, and supporting the new republics financially. However *Der Spiegel* thinks recognition is a better solution than walking a political tightrope between two warring parties. "Will the Serb generals carry their war of conquest into Bosnia and Macedonia when those republics seek recognition?" Questions *Der Spiegel*.¹⁸⁷

As recognition is the culmination of the FAZ position it is no surprise the decision to recognize got front-page coverage. An article filled with quotes from Genscher and Kohl, explain and justify the decision. According to Genscher it is, "A great moment for German and European politics," and Kohl is happy to say, "Today Croatia is no longer alone."¹⁸⁸ Kohl hopes the act sends a clear message to leadership in Belgrade to end the bloodshed. FAZ makes an effort to dispel the myth of German power, pointing out the conditions for joining the EC included a joint agreement with France. The positive outcomes of the decision to recognize are already occurring according to FAZ. The UN is taking charge of the refugee crisis and Germany is giving 30 million Marks in aid and the group "Serbian Mothers from Croatia for Peace," is demanding peace and only the right to their "home and heard."

¹⁸⁶ "Serbien werde die Aufnahme der Beziehungen zu den beiden abtrünnigen Republiken zum Anlaß nehmen, aggressive Vorstöße auch in das nach Unabhängigkeit strebende Mazedonien sowie gegen Bosnien und die Herzegowina zu unternehmen," From "Die Frist läuft ab" *Der Spiegel* December 12th 1991

¹⁸⁷ "Krakeel auf dem Balkan" *Der Spiegel* December 23rd 1991

¹⁸⁸ "Annerkennung Kroatiens and Slowenen am 15th Januar", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* December 19th 1991

FAZ dismisses critics of recognition, especially UN Special Envoy Cyrus Vance. Vance is given two quotes, very short quotes when compared to all the lines given to Genscher and Kohl, "The premature recognition is more a negative move than a positive factor."¹⁸⁹ Vance's fears are that it might make it difficult to station UN peacekeepers if Germany angers the Serbs. Regardless Vance's two quotes are followed by eight paragraphs of details on the fighting in Croatia and Serb violence. Any reader would quickly forget the concerns of Vance in relation to the travesties of the Serbs. FAZ celebrated, without hesitation, the decision to recognize Slovenia and Croatia.¹⁹⁰

Neues Deutschland reacted negatively to the news of recognition, especially the idea of resurgent Germany. Germany's defiance of international organizations took center stage; "Despite what everyone thought at the UN, Germany will recognize Croatia and Slovenia as independent countries." *Neues Deutschland* believes recognition will make it harder to deploy peacekeepers. An opinion piece titled, "A Teutonic Threat in Europe?" evoked the mythos of German imperialism. The writer takes Kohl's quote "This is a great moment for German politics," as an imperial declaration. The writer claims Germany is abandoning the EC to form an economic sphere in Central Europe. The debate within Germany over deploying the army as peacekeepers in Yugoslavia is a first step towards imperial action. *Neues Deutschland* shares Germany's blame for recognition with the EC, "The collective work of the EC to recognize the republics, develop and strengthen ties." Recognition will only increase violence. Recognition also gives credibility to the fascist state that

¹⁸⁹ Vance article

¹⁹⁰ "Hilfe der Vereinten Nationen fuer Fluetlinge," *Frankfurter Allegemine Zeitung* December 17th 1991

is Croatia, which denies rights to its Serb minority and illegally imports weapons to suppress them. *Neues Deutschland* opposes recognition based on its anti-nationalism, and anti-intervention stance.¹⁹¹

SZ, much like *Der Spiegel* realizes the need to recognize the republics, but acknowledges the difficulties for Germany. Germany's justifications are given: The EC does not want to recognize until the UN affects a ceasefire, however Germany is concerned about China's veto power. Kohl's personal guarantee to the leaders of Croatia and Slovenia are hinted to be more than just a personal promise. The violence of the previous months perpetuated by the JNA, makes recognition politically appealing to Germany. On the other hand, numerous articles point out the EC is reluctant to recognize the republics because they are waiting for Carrington's opinion on whether those nations meet the requirement for statehood. Genscher is depicted as isolated in the community, and his chances of convincing the community to recognize the republics are described as "50-50." However in the end, Germany recognizes the republics and SZ's reporting on the event portrays it as ultimately the only, if not correct, decision to be made.¹⁹²

¹⁹¹ "Bonn will Kroatien/Slowenien anerkennen" *Neues Deutschland* December 16th 1991, "Gibt es eine teutonische Gefahr in Europa?" *Neues Deutschland*, December 20th 1991, "Volle Beziehungen zu Republiken Jugoslawiens" *Neues Deutschland*, December 20th 1991, and "Wird Serbien Kroatien anerkennen?" *Neues Deutschland* December 27th 1991.

¹⁹² "Die Mehrheit der EG will keine Anerkennung" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* December 3rd 1991, "Deutschland will Kroatien und Slowenien im Dezember anerkennen" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* December 6th 1991 "Kohl sichert Anerkennung Sloweniens zu" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* December 3rd 1991

EC recognition of Slovenia and Croatia

FAZ reported on the decision of the EC to recognize enthusiastically. The decision is universally popular, "Unanimous Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia expected."¹⁹³ The process by which the EC recognized is glossed over. Lord Carrington noted that Croatia had no guarantees within its new constitution for protecting minorities and so he recommended it not be recognized on January 13th, but a guarantee from Croatia to add a new amendment to their constitution placated the EC. Though this is mentioned by the FAZ the details are not giving as to how Croatia intends to protect their minorities. Recognition rested on a promise from the Croatian leadership, not any kind of guarantee or treaty. This is a large fact to overlook but it illustrates the transition from pro-recognition reporting within the FAZ to simply pro-Croatian.¹⁹⁴

Neues Deutschland's analysis of the event attempts to downplay the recognition of the two republics. The *de facto* independence of the Serbs in Croatia exists because Croatia can only be recognized within the territory it controls. A Serb politician claims the new Yugoslavia will contain 70% of the old one, the implication being that the Serb Oblasts in Croatia will join the new Yugoslavia. Counter statements from the EC, UN and the Croatian Government on the integrity of the former borders illustrate how the conflict has only worsened since recognition. Again Germany's expansionist policies are played up. A quote from acting Head of

¹⁹³ "Annerkennung Kroatiens und Sloweniens am 15th Januar" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* December 19th 1991, "Die Länder der Europäischen Gemeinschaft erkennen Kroatien Slowenien an" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* January 16th 1992 and "Einhellige Anerkennung Sloweniens und Kroatiens erwartet," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* January 9th 1992

¹⁹⁴ Ronald Rich, "Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union." *European Journal of International Law* 1, no. 4 (1993): 37-65. 49

the Presidency, Branko Kostić, supports the notion: "The expansionist policies of Germany found in Slovenia and Croatia fertile ground."¹⁹⁵ A statement designed to make the reader sympathize with the Serbian government, and oppose this alleged act of German aggression. Even stranger is a quote from Prince Alexander Karageorgevich II, son of the last King of Yugoslavia, deeply disappointed with the actions of the EC believing they will not contribute to peace. The theme of these two messages is anti-recognition on the grounds that recognition is illegitimate, suppresses the right to self-determination, specially applied to Serbs in Croatia, and will only lead to more conflict, also hints of German imperialism.¹⁹⁶

SZ, as with the initial recognition of the republics by Germany, covers the various viewpoints on the issue. Even four days before the agreed upon recognition SZ ran an article titled: "EC calls for Calm Attitudes," that emphasized the doubt within the community despite the December agreement. Britain and France are still waiting to hear from Lord Carrington on whether Croatia meets the requirements for an independent state, two leaders of the EC are uncertain. The President of the EC claims the negotiations for peacekeepers are more important than the act of recognition. An opinion column asserted, "Yugoslavia is dead, but every radicals is potential for a new war, many new ambassador will not change anything. Did Bonn consider this?"¹⁹⁷ However, Germany defends their position; Genscher claiming without Germany the fighting would have never stopped. Recognition is however,

¹⁹⁵ "Einhellige Annerkennung Sloweniens und Kroatiens erwartet" *Neues Deutschland* January 15th 1992.

¹⁹⁶ "Belgrad: Kroatien nur in Teilen selbständig," *Neues Deutschland*, January 17th 1992 and "Von expansionistischer BRD-Politik erzwungen," *Neues Deutschland* January 17th 1992

¹⁹⁷ "Allein nach Zagreb" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* January 16th 1992, "EG will Vermittlung vorantreiben" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* January 11th 1992 "Wenn die Logik zum Verbündeten wird" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* January 12th 1992 and "Alle EG-Staaten erkennen Slowenien und Kroatien an Deutschland nimmt diplomatische Beziehungen auf" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* January 16th 1992

the best option, according to the SZ. Croatia is now legitimized, a state fighting an external enemy and not just a territory in a civil conflict.

Recognition both by the EC and Germany received largely the same reception in all publications. FAZ unanimously celebrated the events, downplayed any naysayers and simply ignored the opposing sides. There is the lack of any notion of disagreement between the members of the EC or within Germany itself on the issue. SZ on the other hand, as well as *Der Spiegel* presented both events as necessary actions, but not actions taken without great considerations. Both publications regularly aired the concerns of other EC members over recognition. *Neues Deutschland* reacted with dismay at the events. The paper appeals to the fear of an expansionist Germany, defying all international well being to gain access to new markets and territory, notions that stem from both a desire to see Yugoslavia preserved but also socialism endure as well as fear of a revival of German nationalism.

Coverage of Events January-April 1992

Destruction of EC Monitor Mission helicopter (January 7th 1992)

EC monitors monitored the situation in Yugoslavia after the Brioni Accords. They had little power, almost no weapons and every publication in this survey criticized them for being ineffectual in halting fighting



or creating a solution. On January 7th a jet fighter from the Yugoslav Air Force, destroyed a helicopter with five monitors flying to Croatia from Hungary, killing all on board.

FAZ reported the event as a both a direct attack on the EC and a turning point for the end of Serb terror in Yugoslavia. One title, "Again the Serbs are Afraid," asserts the Serbs are afraid of international intervention claiming it would end their reign of terror. The act, is a sinister ploy to dissuade EC intervention, "It is almost impossible" according to FAZ, "that a single pilot committed this terrible act."¹⁹⁸ FAZ debunks the excuse of the army, that the helicopters followed a smuggler's path, pointing out the Brioni Agreements provide for freedom of monitor movements. This violation of free airspace for free airspace is another reason for the need for intervention in Croatia. The FAZ's line, which began to advocate intervention in Croatia after recognition, now shifts now heavily advocating UN intervention of Croatia as a means of saving the country.

Neues Deutschland criticized the event as an escalation of violence and making the unstable situation worse. The attack makes deployment of UN peacekeepers in Croatia more problematic. However the blame for the tragedy is to be shared by Croatia. Belgrade's criticism of Germany and the EC is published, "In spite of the weapons embargo weapons continue to be provided to Croatia," a statement giving subtle credibility of the claim by the JNA that the helicopters carried smuggled weapons.¹⁹⁹ *Neues Deutschland* has previously discussed the issue of weapons smuggling, but they take this moment to bring it up again to strategically place the

¹⁹⁸ "Auch den Serben sitzt der schreck in den Gliedern" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* January 9th 1992.

¹⁹⁹ "EG-Hubschrauber bei Zagreb abgeschossen" *Neues Deutschland* January 8th 1992.

implied blame on Croatia and by extension the EC. *Neues Deutschland's* anti-war position prompts them to focus on the causes of the tragedy, according to them, weapons smuggling into Croatia.

SZ reported the tragedy with an air of skepticism on the intention of Serbia. SZ highlights the continued disagreement between Serbia and the UN over the peacekeeping plan for UN troops in Croatia. Serbia is depicted as resisting the efforts of the UN to station troops in Croatia, by extension preventing the peace process from succeeding. The tragedy is not described as an accident of any kind, and is compared to, Henry Wijnaendts an EC envoy, also shot at in a helicopter, one-year prior. One EC official is quoted saying, "We can only wonder how an air force pilot can accidentally shoot down a helicopter in broad daylight and good visibility?"²⁰⁰ SZ depicts the rump-Yugoslavia in a more negative light than previously in response to the obviously aggressive nature of the act in the middle of difficult negotiations.

Passing of UN Security Council Resolution 743 (February 21st 1992)

The UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 743 in an effort to stop the endless violence. The resolution created the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) of over 13,000 "blue helmets" to be deployed in Croatia.²⁰¹ They would establish a buffer zone between the Serb militias and Croatian police until a negotiated peace could come into effect. This ended the fighting in Croatia apart

²⁰⁰ "Hubschrauber mit fünf EG-Beobachtern abgeschossen Jugoslawische Armee macht Front gegen Friedensplan" *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, January 8th 1992.

²⁰¹ "UN Security Council Resolution 743." UN News Center. February 21, 1992. Accessed February 24, 2015. [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/743\(1992\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/743(1992)).

from sporadic raids. This also meant the withdrawal of the JNA to Bosnia and the end of any kind of effort by rump Yugoslavia or the army to reincorporate Croatia into Yugoslavia.

FAZ happily reported the news as it supported their pro-Croatia position and painted it as the first step to Croatia joining the world community. One article, titled: "Genscher says Croatia and Slovenia need help of Bonn," covers the efforts of Genscher to have Croatia and Slovenia admitted into the EC as well as the UN. Genscher claims the Hague Conference must continue because "The future of Croatia and the other states of former Yugoslavia cannot be decided by UN troops alone," along with the hope that the presence of UN troops would keep the Serbs at the peace conference.²⁰² FAZ pushed the idea of intervention since recognition of the two republics as a means of securing peace in the war-torn land. With this now a reality, FAZ covers the development positively without reservation.

Neues Deutschland, heavily in favor of peacekeepers, reports positively on the development. However it also explores the problem of deploying UN Troops in depth. First it is pointed out that there is a clash in perceived jurisdiction. Zagreb wants a commissioner with the UN Troops in Serb towns, the Serbs reject this. The Serbs on the other hand reject the idea of giving up their weapons. The emphasis on the clash between the Serbs and Croats epitomizes the need to end the struggle quickly, and hence the support for the deployment of peacekeepers.²⁰³

²⁰² "Genscher sagt Slowenien und Kroatien die Hilfe Bonn zu," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* February 24th 1992

²⁰³ "UN-Chef strebt trotzdem Einsatz der Blauhelme an" *Neues Deutschland* February 21st 1992.

Der Spiegel is uncertain the deployment of UN peacekeepers will make any difference in the current situation. An article titled, "Amuck in the Balkans," refers to Serbia's role in the violence of the previous years. The article, while acknowledging that Croatia nationalist ambitions, criticizes the idea of Vance and the UN that all parties involved are equally responsible is rubbish in the face of Serb aggression. But in regards to the UN Peacekeeping Troops the article says: "Their mission is to act as the Opera for the white clothed EC monitors." *Der Spiegel* in the past criticized the EC monitors for being unable to halt fighting or make real change, and now paints the UN in the same light. *Der Spiegel's* perception of the UN mission is critical in the face of a continued lack of peace in Croatia and the increasing violence in Bosnia.²⁰⁴

SZ while acknowledging the importance of the UN mission questioned the effects the UN presence. SZ claims the deployment is, "The only means of securing a political solution." Nonetheless, the UN is still described as weak and letter to the editor asserts, "the UN is only laughed at in Belgrade."²⁰⁵ The disagreements over the plan, mentioned by *Neues Deutschland*, are repeated, "Belgrade sees the use of the 'blue helmets' as a guarantee on the annexation of the conquered (liberated) areas; to Zagreb the peacekeepers will create conditions for the restoration of Croatia's territory."²⁰⁶ The enormous cost of stationing troops is explored. The UN is broke, Zagreb cannot pay, and Belgrade claims no responsibility, a claim making

²⁰⁴ "Doch deren Mission wirkt ohnehin so operettenhaft wie die der weißgewandeten EG-Beobachter." "Amok auf dem Balkan" *Der Spiegel* May 11th 1992

This article is technically outside the scope of my paper, but I searched just outside my chronological borders for relevant information that may have been reported late.

²⁰⁵ "EG und UNO sind nur Papiertiger" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* January 18th 1991

²⁰⁶ "Träume des Großkapitals" *Süddeutsche Zeitung* January 24th 1991

Serbia appear like a political magician, as they are responsible for encouraging the conflict according to SZ. The economic effects of an influx of peacekeepers are explored: brothels, foreign investment banks taking advantage of the situation, and local companies profiteering are predicted. SZ cautiously explores the proposed mission noting its scope and possible impact, though to resist the aggression of the Serbs it is necessary.

Formal end of SFRY, Declaration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (April 27th 1992)

After December 1991 only Serbia and Montenegro, under Serb control, wanted a new Yugoslavia. This rump Yugoslavia officially existed when Serbia and Montenegro created the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the *de jure* end of Tito's Yugoslavia. Though this new Yugoslavia claimed succession to Tito's Yugoslavia, it failed to convince the international community.

FAZ covers the story with airs of skepticism, keeping in line with their anti-Serb attitude. After the account of the constitution's drafting, FAZ points out correctly that the citizens of Kosovo have no rights under the new republic despite constitutional guarantees. FAZ speculates that Milošević, in keeping Yugoslavia alive, is trying to keep open the question of annexing Serb controlled territory in Bosnia and Croatia. And the JNA, in Bosnia, is technically stationed on foreign soil helping the Serbs in Bosnia asserts the FAZ. The main point of the piece is summed up as follows: "One hopes that this (creation of the FRY) the international community will recognize for what it is, as a power grab and not allow this

Serbian ploy to influence them.”²⁰⁷ FAZ’s coverage keeps its anti-Serb line, assuming Milošević still wants to absorb the disputed territory despite the fact that he agreed to the UN intervention in the first place.

Neues Deutschland rejects the idea of a successor state. The FRY is not the legal successor because it refuses to acknowledge the “The EC principles from the previous December,” those being the 8-10th opinions of the Hague Conference.²⁰⁸ Those opinions asserted that the SFRY is dissolved, and that each successor state must reapply for membership in international organizations. *Neues Deutschland*’s brief coverage reflects its position of anti-war. Though this is not explicitly stated, *Neues Deutschland* supports the efforts of the EC to prevent further conflict, and so by invoking the EC, *Neues Deutschland* delegitimizes the FRY.

Der Spiegel echoed the same sentiments as the other publications, dismissing and condemning the effort of Serbia to claim succession. Serbia is termed “Europe’s last Stalinist bastion,” and the “Pariah of Europe.”²⁰⁹ These titles impress the totalitarian nature of the Yugoslav State and that its actions have isolated it from the European Community of nations. This reflects *Der Spiegel*’s overall interpretation of events as it evolved from neutral to taking a side against Milošević’s Serbia. The article ends with the warning to the nations of the world: “(Serbia) must be

²⁰⁷ “Man hofft dass sich auch die internationale Staatenwelt diesen Standpunkt zu eigen macht und sich nicht von Täuschungsmanövern der serbische Seite beeinflussen lässt.” From “Zwei Republiken erheben Anspruch auf rechtliche Kontinuität.” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 28th 1992.

²⁰⁸ “Neu-Jugoslawien ist kein Rechtsnachfolger” *Neues Deutschland* April 29th 1992

²⁰⁹ Amok auf dem Balkan” *Der Spiegel* May 11th 1991

catapulted from international organizations and diplomatic placed under quarantine by the EC and the International Monetary Fund,"²¹⁰

SZ does not support the formation of the new state, and the danger it poses such as the JNA on Bosnian soil. SZ reports that almost no nation supports the claim of the new nation to be the legal successor to Tito's Yugoslavia. The Serb legal team that justified the succession of the state is described as inadequate and lacked unanimous consensus. Serbia's rejection of the Carrington's opinion and continued oppression of Kosovo are cited painting the FRY as a new dictatorship, a danger furthered by the fact that 50,000 JNA troops remain in Bosnia and may support the Serb population in those areas. In short SZ makes no effort to legitimize the new state.²¹¹

Conclusions

Positions of the Various Publications

Through this long examination, I have clearly established that each paper has a specific story to tell or angle to examine the events of the Yugoslav Crisis. Two of the publications examined, *Der Spiegel* and SZ follow a similar line, beginning with neutrality in January of 1989, however by September 1991 both took an increasingly anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav position in response to the violence in Croatia. *Neues Deutschland* gradually evolved their position from support from unconditional support of Yugoslavia (January 1989) to support of the idea of

²¹⁰ Ibin

²¹¹ "Widerstand gegen neues Jugoslawien" *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, April 24th 1992

"socialism" in Yugoslavia (January 1990) to peace and anti-EC intervention (June 1991), which evolved to include a pro-UN intervention sentiment (September 1991). FAZ held an a consistent anti-Serb, anti-Yugoslav position. This manifests in almost every major event, and any event or person critical of Croatia and Slovenia is either down played or criticized itself.

FAZ from the outset and until the end of the chronology features a prominent anti-Serb, anti-Yugoslav sentiment. This sentiment is expressed in many forms. A severe lack of quotes from individuals involved with the various factions related to Serbia, such as Chetniks, Serb government officials, or even normal Serb citizens gives an extremely one sided view of the situation. On the other hand various Croatian and Slovenian leaders are quoted multiple times throughout a single article in addition to the quotes from normal Croatian individuals. These quotes help to humanize the Croats and Slovenes, give them a history and a past to restore and have the right to recreate regardless of the consequences. The Serbs and their supporters on the other hand are tyrannical, oriental, communists whose only history is conquest and destruction of the freedom. FAZ either directly or indirectly advocates for the dissolution of Yugoslavia until the 10-Day War, regardless of the consequences. The paper depicts the government's of Slovenia an Croatia as flawless, almost unable to do wrong. Between the 10-Day War and December 1991 FAZ pushed the cause of diplomatic recognition ceaselessly. Simply recognizing the republics could solve any ill befalling them, be it the Serb militias in Croatia or the Slovenia's economic ills. The Hague Peace Conference could only serve good if it furthered the cause of recognition. After the 10-Day War, every shell that fell on

Vukovar or Dubrovnik became another justification for the need to recognize. The rump-Yugoslavia needed to be stopped from tyrannically threatening the Croats and the people of Kosovo. And even after recognition the paper continued to lambast Serbia and Yugoslavia, demonizing every development.

Der Spiegel reported on events with a degree of detachment and fairness, though modified their position throughout the chronology. Throughout the study *Der Spiegel* often quoted multiple sides in a single article, this included civilians and leaders, military men and protestors. Until March 1991 *Der Spiegel* focused more on the forces at work in Yugoslavia: rampant nationalism, and the economic crisis. Milošević at this time is a force of nationalism. As events progressed *Der Spiegel* took the opinion that Serb Nationalists and Milošević were primarily to blame for the escalating crisis, though this criticism of Serbia is not generalized, and is directly pointed at a group of extremists, Milošević, or the JNA. Additionally the obstinacy, nationalism and violence of Tudjman and his Croats were noted as late as December 1991. The role of the JNA is of great interest and is the focus of or at least mentioned in many articles. During and after the 10-Day War *Der Spiegel* heavily criticized the JNA, and Milošević stood no longer at odds with the JNA, but an equal partner in destruction. The suffering of the people, brutality of the JNA and the inept attitude of the EC and the UN became central features of articles from September 1991-December 1991. Recognition of the republics is not assumed to solve any problems; several articles examine the possible consequences of independence. What is seen overall is *Der Spiegel's* reporting style remained objective, only turning against Serbia and the JNA with the outbreak of major fighting.

Neues Deutschland also evolved its position, but a closer examination reveals some continuity. In the opening months of 1989, *Neues Deutschland* advocated for the preservation of Yugoslavia. This changed however after October 1989, when East Germany's government collapsed and *Neues Deutschland* became a "socialist newspaper." It then advocated reform in Yugoslavia, but only along line of "democratic socialism." In the federation-confederation debate, *Neues Deutschland* supported a reformed confederation. *Neues Deutschland* often criticized Croatia and Slovenia, depicting them as the ones gradually destroying Yugoslavia, mostly ignoring the increasing tyrannical attitude of Milošević. Many articles in 1990-1991 described a solution to the crisis just around the corner, be it through the JNA, which could forcibly preserve the state, or Markovic's economic reforms. When Slovenia and Croatia finally leave, *Neues Deutschland* became increasingly critical of violence and the JNA, attacking both Serbs and Croats in the published articles. This stance against violence extended into a criticism of German support for the two republics. This particular fear comes from *Neues Deutschland's* anti-imperialist stance, and the perception that Germany created or exploited the conflict in Yugoslavia for its own gain. Croatia, faced accusations of being nationalistic and imperialistic in response to the conflict with the Serb militias. Therefore *Neues Deutschland* became a major advocate of UN intervention as a counter weight to Germany's alleged ambitions. In sum, *Neues Deutschland* favored the preservation of a socialist state, even if no longer officially socialist, and then when the situation disintegrated *Neues Deutschland's* anti-imperialistic and anti-nationalistic views came into play.

SZ's reporting follows a pattern much like *Der Spiegel*. In January 1989 a neutral

point of view, without pretenses, however by September 1991 the style of reporting shifted. What makes SZ different from *Der Spiegel* is that published articles almost never directly attacked Serbia, Yugoslavia or the JNA. The reporting style however reflects a gradual turn away from neutrality and towards an anti-Serb sentiment. A cursory glance reveals Croatian individuals are gradually quoted more and more in comparison to their Serb counter parts after 1991. Though interestingly up until late 1991 Milošević is not the subject of focus. Coverage of the 10-Day War focuses on the political disagreements and the JNA, as opposed to an ethnic struggle as in the FAZ. The brutality of the JNA was not hidden or downplayed. Every attack against Vukovar or Dubrovnik, a “heavy” or “brutal” assault, and the blockade of medical supplies to besieged peoples by the JNA received much attention. Again, though this is not an ethnic conflict, Greater-Serbia is viewed more politically than ethnically. Like *Der Spiegel*, SZ cautioned diplomatic recognition of the two republics regularly running articles both for and against it. In the end recognition is viewed as a necessary outcome, but it is never explicitly stated recognition is a positive development.

Was there a Media Campaign?

Taking all the analysis into account it can be definitively established that there existed no “collective media campaign” in the German press either for or against Yugoslavia between 1989-1992.

Each paper had a different take on events, some not even covering certain events. Though SZ and *Der Spiegel* were relatively similar in their evolution of

opinions, from neutral to anti-Serb, FAZ and *Neues Deutschland* were on the opposite ends of the spectrum. If the spectrum is anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslavia to pro-Serb and pro-Yugoslavia the publications would be listed: FAZ, *Der Spiegel*, SZ and *Neues Deutschland*.

In essence, this analysis reconfirms Dr. Crawford's assertion about the reporting of the FAZ and the other studies that asserted the FAZ's covered events in Yugoslavia in a substantially anti-Serb manner. *Neues Deutschland*, the polar opposite political of the FAZ helps to reinforce this argument. By contrasting the two, the positions of both become increasingly clear. The other publications, at least to the research done before this study, before now have never been analyzed exclusively on this subject.

In relation to the question of recognition these papers answer more than a few questions.

If in fact recognition of Slovenia and Croatia were the beginning of the rise of German power in the European Community than this study confirms that not all Germans approved of the move, some even resisting it. The internal divisions reflect the difficulty of German democracy, which is very inclusive. The media campaign theory overrides and erases the internal debates within Germany at this juncture. To overlook such evidence is bad scholarship and it is my hope that this project can help provide a greater understanding of domestic conflict within Germany.

This project also provides a larger understanding and reminds us that Germany, even politically united, was not and still is not truly unified. When viewed through the lenses of a controversial foreign policy issue the cracks between West Germany

and the former East Germany become clear. This opens the door for further study of the east-west division, via examining domestic media responses to other foreign policy matters.

However if there was no effort of the media to put pressure on the German government then what explains German recognition of the two republics? Dr. Crawford asserted that media did not play a substantial role in convincing the German government to recognize the republics, arguing instead weak international opposition to the act. I have chosen to explore this question, however, as I believe taking this analysis as the final word is a mistake. Even if Kohl was not forced to act by the papers this is still worth a study. Governments will work and on occasion defy the will of their peoples, hence an examination of the people's opinion outside of the government holds merit. An interesting follow up study might be the reaction of Serbian newspapers to their government's actions. I have not studied enough publications to make a wide statement on German public opinion on the early Yugoslav Crisis, however this research has added to the bigger picture of German public opinion.

Problems and Issues


Despite the completion of this project there are issues to be considered and problems addressed. This subject could be expanded upon, a more comprehensive study perhaps with one or two more papers over a longer period of time, perhaps covering all the Yugoslav Wars until 1999.

One problem is my methodology in relation to the time frame I had to conduct research. I worked on this project for 6 months and of those only 4 months concerned with primary source research. I stated before about the potentially overwhelming number of sources to analyze and hence I had to limit myself. Some of the events in this analysis are long-term events such as the Siege of Vukovar that went on for 87 days or the Peace Conference that went on for 8+ months. In this case I had to limit the number of articles picked to analyze. Sometime the title justified the choice of article, the first subject a reader would notice, and set the tone of the article. It is possible though that I may have missed an article or series of articles that expresses a position counter to the narrative I have described. This is unlikely, and even if so, I doubt it would drastically change the overall narrative I have presented. Nonetheless it should be considered.

Another problem is the formatting of the chronology. It is heavily laden after mid 1991. For example 13 events occurred May 1991-April 1992 11 months, whereas only 12 events occurred January 1989-May 1991, 28 months. I based this on the ration that coverage of events in Yugoslavia only increased with the outbreak of violence in March 1991. And that is true, however events as early as January 1990 events in Yugoslavia were making front-page headlines. I made efforts to balance the study by including several more events before March 1991 throughout the course of the study, but the possibility of imbalance exists. Also the events of the timeline were chosen not only for their perceived importance in understanding Yugoslavia's dissolution, but in the hope that they might have received international attention. This may have caused me to overlook certain events critical to the

breakup that might not have been noticed, such as the various clashes within the presidency January 1991-March 1991. Also events focus on the main nations of the early breakup, Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. Bosnia did not play a large role in the early breakup of Yugoslavia. The country being the subject of a brutal civil war later, but the recognized breakup of Yugoslavia centered on Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia and Kosovo, while Bosnia played a small part and Macedonia, largely no role at all. However the multi-ethnic republic suffered the same ethnic disorder in Croatia, albeit on a smaller scale in the early stages of the crisis. Therefore I believed they were unnecessary for in depth analysis, but their existence should be noted.

Map of Yugoslavia



(Map of Yugoslavia, courtesy of the United Nations)

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