A Sixteenth Century Cold War: England, Spain, and John Hawkins

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Professor J. Sears McGee

UCSB History Honors Thesis, Spring 2018

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Table of Contents

Abbreviations

1. CSPF — Calendar of State Papers, Foreign
2. CSPS — Calendar of State Papers, Spanish

Introduction

Sir John Hawkins

"The use of sea and air is common to all; neither can a title to the ocean belong to any people or private persons, forasmuch as neither nature nor public use and custom permit any possession therof."

Elizabeth I

International trade underwent a revolution in the mid sixteenth century. In 1498 Portugal had established itself as the major power on the seas. They retained their control by establishing and domineering trade routes in the Indian Ocean. Spain created its own western empire composed of New Spain and colonies in the Caribbean and South America. This allowed them to challenge and sometimes overrule the established Portuguese power. England began its own

subtle forays into the foreign trade market at the beginning of the century. This was an era of uncertainty as these powers jockeyed for wealth and power. Insecurity was also heightened in England due to changing religious policies.

Protestant and Catholic conflicts were rife in the earlier part of the century in England. Mary I ruled from 1516 until 1558 and had committed herself and her administration to reversing the English Reformation enacted by her father, Henry VIII. According to John Foxe's Book of Martyrs, Mary had 284 heretics burned at the stake, earning her the moniker Bloody Mary.[1] She married the Catholic Spanish ruler, Philip II, towards the end of her reign in 1554 and remained married to him until her death in 1558. Her half sister Elizabeth I ascended to the throne on 17 November 1558 and ruled as a Protestant. She and her cabinet set about undoing the Catholic legislation of Mary I and she became a beloved ruler of English Protestants who saw her as their religious savior.

England and Spain remained official allies until the 1580s, yet their relationship was tumultuous. In terms of secular matters, the two nations supported one another but their differing religions were an area of contention. Philip II was a deeply religious man who was celebrated for being both powerful yet pious.[2] While his devoutness was of little concern in the predominantly Catholic Spain, it had unusual implications for his feelings toward England. Throughout the course of his reign, he twice had visions that he believed to be messages from God compelling him to retake England as a Catholic nation.[3] Despite this, until 1571 Philip II did not actively support any attempt on Elizabeth's life. The events of the 1560s and the actions of one man, John

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[1] John Foxe, *Foxe's Book of Martyrs* (London: The Religious Tract Society, 1900).
[2] Geoffrey Parker, Philip II ed. 1 (University of Michigan: Open Court, 1995), 58.
[3] Ibid.

Hawkins, perhaps contributed to his willingness to overthrow his "good sister". The deterioration of this relationship can be traced through rise and fall of Hawkins as a slave trader.

This paper focuses on the evolving tensions between England and Spain in the 1560s. I first depict the rise of John Hawkins through analysis of his family's monetary support and reputation that allowed for his ascent as a powerful trader. An analysis of his first slaving voyage reveals the character traits of Hawkins that enabled him to become a successful slave trader and draw the attention of Spain to him. I then discuss Elizabeth's royal proclamations in response to Spanish complaints about piracy against Spanish ships to demonstrate the duplicitous policy that Elizabeth adopted towards Spain in this period. Elizabeth becoming an adventurer of Hawkins's marks the official involvement of the crown in his exploits, tying his offenses against Spain to Elizabeth herself. I then examine the three voyages of Hawkins from 1562 to 1569, which demonstrate how he continuously disregarded Spanish law and progressively increased tensions between the two nations with his antics at sea and in Spanish ports. Ultimately I find that Hawkins was instrumental in the cold war style relationship between Spain and England that emerged in this period. I contend that no other sailor of Hawkins's time had anywhere near the type of impact he did due to his being the subject of so many complaints from Spain and his personal relationship to Spain that evolved before and after this period. While his voyages emerged in a time of tumult for both nations, I attribute these voyages as being far more important in the relationship between these nations because they brewed distrust between the two. They and Hawkins are also significant because these affronts occurred relatively early in Elizabeth's reign and set the stage for the later conflict with Spain, ending with the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1558.

Chapter I: The Home and Family of Hawkins



16th Century Plymouth

"Plymouth is on the east, Stonehouse in the centre, and Devonport on the west; and their eastern, southern, and western sides, are skirted and deeply indented by the broad, deep, and extensive creeks and harbours in the estuaries of the Tamar and Plym, which meet in Plymouth Sound"

William White of Sheffield, *History Gazetteer and Directory of the County of Devon*, 1879[4]

Plymouth is a small port city in Devon, southwest England. It is surrounded by Plymouth Sound, a large body of water that to this day is filled with ships from numerous nations and it is

[4] William White of Sheffield, *History Gazetteer and Directory of the County of Devon* (1879).

the home port for several Royal Navy vessels. Modern day Plymouth is a testament to its rich history. Trade still occurs as a result of its harbors. English power is still demonstrated by its ships and flags that decorate the port. Due to its location "alongside one of the major trade routes of Europe, the town attracted goods and traders from all over the known world."[5] Plymouth in the sixteenth century was a depiction of the economic condition of Western Europe. Its shores were home to merchants, traders, and often pirates that fit somewhere between the two. This little coastal town was also a symbol of the times in terms of exploration. Plymouth also holds a special place in Elizabethan history as the home of "the most colorful of Elizabeth's subjects, the 'sea dogs."[6] A precursor to these men was William Hawkins, a celebrated sailor from Henry VIII's reign. His contributions as a seaman and as a father had a lasting impact on the course of British history in the west.

The ambitions of the Hawkins family exemplify the sentiment of Plymouth itself in terms of it's trade dealings and foreign expeditions. Described as "a man for his wisdom, valour, experience and skill in sea causes much esteemed, and beloved of King Henry VIII," William Hawkins was renowned for his role in English trading.[7] More than a mere merchant, Hawkins was also an innovator in terms of foreign exploration. In 1530 and 1532, he "made three long and famous voyages unto the coast of Brazil, a thing in those days very rare, especially to our nation."[8] These voyages would prove to be extremely beneficial for both Hawkins and England, both monetarily and in terms of status. These voyages also set a precedent for English naval exhibitions. After these voyages it was expected that "Englishmen out to push their trade into the

[5] Harry Kelsey, *Sir John Hawkins* (London: University Press, 2003), 15.
[6] Walter Phelps Hall, *A History of England and the British Empire* (New York: J. Wiley & Sons, 1974), 421.
[7] Richard Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation* (London: G. Bishop, R. Newberie and R. Barker, 1598), 520.
[8] Ibid, 521.

new worlds notwithstanding the monopolies asserted by Spain and Portugal."[9] The expeditions of the elder Hawkins would challenge the Portuguese, yet did not precipitate violence between the two nations, leaving room for further conquests in later years. England's reputation was bolstered in terms of it's foreign conquests in the west. These expeditions began a tradition that would be continued by Hawkins's sons in their own lifetimes.

William Hawkins and his wife, Joan Trelawney, had two children. In 1519, she gave birth to William with his brother John following in 1532. Both of the brothers built on the talents of their father. William had the mercantile skills of his father and "launched himself upon a greater career in Atlantic commerce."[10] He did not share his father's enthusiasm for international travel, yet continued the trading success of his prominent family in Plymouth. In his capacity as a merchant and trader, William served as the partner and partial funder of his younger brother in his own activities. The younger Hawkins brother took a more hands on approach to the trading ventures of his family. As a young man he began to travel on the trading expeditions of his father's company. While both Hawkins brothers exhibited their father's proclivity for financial success in their own respective ways, John seems to have inherited his father's penchant for violence. Five years before his youngest sons' birth in 1527, the elder Hawkins had been "ordered before the court of common pleas in Westminster to answer allegations" that with a number of other men, he had participated in an attack on a man named John Jurdon "so as to endanger his life."[11] In 1552, John too demonstrated his violent nature in the murder of a local barber.[12] While this offense was excused by the local Plymouth court as an act of self defense,

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[9] P. S. Crowson and Malcolm Robinson, *Tudor Foreign Policy* (Sussex Tapes, 1975), 45.
[10] Kenneth Andrews, *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 116.
[11] Harry Kelsey, *Sir John Hawkins* (London: Yale University Press, 2003), 58.
[12] Nick Hazlewood, *The Queen's Slave Trader: John Hawkyns, Elizabeth I, and the Trafficking in Human Souls* (New York: William Morrow, 2005), 5.

not much else is known about the death of the barber except that it was a brutal killing at a pub.[13] Together the two acts of violence of the Hawkins men demonstrate the world that John lived and thrived in. His later ventures would depict a man perhaps not excited by violence, but not one bothered by it in the slightest either.

During this period, the Canaries were rich with pearls and slaves were brought in to collect them. The process of pearl diving was dangerous and with men like Hawkins running this operation, slave deaths occurred frequently. In the absence of his father, John established himself as his own trader, separate from his father and brother through "good and upright dealing being growne in love and favour with the people."[14] His primary contact and source of knowledge for the slave trade was Pedro de Ponte. He and his family acted as the primary funders of Hawkins's voyages in the Canaries and became his new business partners. Harry Kelsey asserts that de Ponte and his family were Hawkins's primary investors for his voyages to Guinea because they provided funds for this voyaged and procured skilled guides for Hawkins and his crew. The de Pontes and other sources in the Canaries also informed Hawkins "that Negroes were very good merchandise in Hispaniola, and that store of Negroes might easily be had upon the coast of Guinea, resolved with himselfe to make trial thereof."[15] This information would influence the next decade of his life at sea as he forced his way into an emerging market. His trip to the Canaries would prove a great point of transformation for Hawkins and his career. Upon his return to England Hawkins was quick to share his new insights with his contemporaries.

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[13] Ibid.
[14] Richard Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation* (London: G. Bishop, R. Newberie and R. Barker, 1598), 520.
[15] Richard Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation* (London: G. Bishop, R. Newberie and R. Barker, 1598), 520.

Traveling to London, Hawkins set about recruiting other wealthy traders in London to be his partners in his first voyage, this one to the West Indies. He proved an effective salesman much like his father and brother because "all which persons liked so well of his intentions, that they became liberall contributers and adventurers in action."[16] He touted his experiences in the Canary Islands as his basis for believing that this voyage too would be a success despite the fact that he had never made a trip like the one he proposed. Hawkins capitalized on his and his family's renown in Plymouth to attract a strong following of London men who found themselves eager to gain from this venture. Amongst these men were "Sir Lionell Duckett, Sir Thomas Lodge, Benjamin Gunson his father in law, Sir William Winter, M. Bromfield, and others."[17] These men were highly esteemed in British society at this time. Duckett and Lodge former mayors of London and very successful traders. Gunson, the father of Hawkins's wife Katherine and later his partner as the Treasurer of Marine Causes, was at this time the Surveyor and Rigger of the Navy. Winter was an admiral in the Navy and Bromfield a wealthy merchant. The men who shared in this partnership demonstrate the high status of Hawkins and his family in mercantile society. Their trust in Hawkins and his foreign partners may be attributed to a knowledge of the success of William Hawkins and his company or simply to greed. Never mind the motivation, Hawkins and his contemporaries were intent on having their plans to succeed.

Despite their ambition, Hawkins and his crew were not entering unclaimed waters. In 1498 Portugal had established itself as the European leader of trade with Vasco de Gama's voyage around the Cape of Good Hope to India.[18] Over the next four decades, Portugal retained and strengthened their control over routes around the Atlantic and Indian oceans and their

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[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Robert Marks, The Origins of the Modern World: Fate and Fortune in the Rise of the West (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 47.

domination of "the Atlantic cost of Morocco."[19] Despite their efforts to prevent foreign incursions on these routes, Portugal lost control not to European intervention but to a challenge of their power in Morocco. Beginning in the 1540s, the Moslem Saadians of the Saadi dynasty began to rise to power in this territory and by the end of the decade they had taken all but three Portuguese strongholds in Morocco.[20] This left the Portuguese fighting a foreign battle and thus distracted and undermanned at sea as foreign traders began to infiltrate their routes. After their defeat at the hands of the Saadians, the Portuguese also lost the control of the population which had so greatly contributed to their trading success in this region. After these losses, the Portuguese could "only maintain a modicum of security" against foreign traders by "mixing favours with brute force according to shifting circumstances."[21] The Portuguese were not alone in their claim to foreign lands, however.

While they maintained the north west coast of Africa as their own, the Spanish claimed the trade itself that Hawkins and his companions sought to enter. As a result, Spain "automatically regarded all other nations as pirates."[22] Despite this, Spain and England were allied in 1562 and Hawkins had no reason to spark an international incident for political purposes. Instead, this first trip was to act as a trial voyage.[23] Hawkins and his crews expected Philip II to permit their activities due solely to his relationship with the English crown, and they planned to capitalize on this trust.[24] The Spanish themselves, protecting their territories vigorously, ultimately "lacked the means to keep intruders out of the Caribbean."[25] Again timing

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[19] Kenneth Andrews, *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 103.
[20] Ibid, 104.
[21] Ibid, 103.
[22] Kenneth Andrews, *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 118.
[23] Ibid, 119.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.

was in the young Hawkins's favor because the Spaniards found themselves similarly distracted by a different foreign power. Since the 1520s, the Spanish had been facing a rising number of French pirates in their waters.[26] These problems for the Portuguese and the Spanish allowed for the commencement of Hawkins's career as a slave trader.

Chapter II: The First Voyage

In October 1562 Hawkins made his first slave trading expedition. The scale of this voyage indicates his desire to keep it from drawing attention from the Spanish. He embarked

[26] Ibid.

with only three ships, The Salomon (120 tons), The Swallow (100 tons) and the Jonah (40 tons).[27] He also took "with him not above 100 men for fear of sickness and other inconveniences."[28] This voyage was meant to be stealthy enough to avoid hostility from foreign nations or attention that would hinder the plans that Hawkins and his investors had made. Kenneth R. Andrews describes Hawkins's interactions with the Spanish during this voyage as having a "dangerous ambiguity."[29] Hawkins and his crew, while quite assured that no international incident would break out because of this small trip, were still wary of their



Coast of Guinea

[27] Nick Hazlewood, *The Queen's Slave Trader: John Hawkyns, Elizabeth I, and the Trafficking in Human Souls* (New York: William Morrow, 2005), 40.
[28] Richard Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation* (London: G. Bishop, R. Newberie and R. Barker, 1598), 520.
[29] Kenneth Andrews, *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 120.

The Swallow During the Spanish Armada

Spanish counterparts. The venture was meant to see how far this new venture of his could proceed in the current political climate.

Hawkins's first exploit is described in Richard Hakluyt's *The Principall Navigations of the English Nation* as one of "prosperous success and much gaine to himselfe, and the aforesaid adventurers."[30] After leaving Plymouth, Hawkins and his crew landed at Teneriffe and faced no major incidents. From there they travelled to Sierra Leone on the coast of Guinea, West Africa. Hawkins conducted his first slave raid and created an incident with the Portuguese. Hakluyt describes how "Partly by the sword and partly by other meanes" the Englishmen increased their number of slaves to three hundred.[31] This was done by raiding villages and imprisoning Africans. He also raided a Portuguese ship. The Portuguese soon learned that if "the line between trade and plunder was thin," Hawkins often crossed it.[32] He seized "half a dozen ships… plus cargoes of

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[30] Richard Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation* (London: G. Bishop, R. Newberie and R. Barker, 1598), 523.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Kenneth Andrews, *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 121.

cloves, wax, ivory, and nearly four hundred black slaves."[33] After infuriating the Portuguese, Hawkins next angered the Spanish.

With the first object of his mission completed, Hawkins crossed the Atlantic to the Caribbean island of Hispaniola to sell their cargo. After arriving at the Port of Isabella, Hawkins, "trusting the Spaniards no further than that his own strength was able to still matter them," sold his captured slaves without proper license to the Spanish residents of the island. He then traveled to Puerto de Plata to sell more slaves and trade with the locals there. While no conflict arose during this leg of the journey, Spain began to take notice of the illicit activities of John Hawkins. As a result, they sent a young officer, Lorenzo Bernaldéz, to stop Hawkins and his ships from continuing their activities.

While initially Bernaldéz was supposed to use force to halt the English captain, he instead issued him a faulty license to trade with. Prior to the Spanish officer's arrival, Hawkins had been ignoring the liscence requirement to trade slaves with the Spanish subjects. While it was a common practice that traders sometimes "dispatched ships without license" and "sent more slaves than their licenses allotted," the Englishman had lost the luxury of being known as just another trader.[34] The fact that Spain took such energetic measures to halt Hawkins's progress is proof of the profits he was gaining and the controversies he was causing. Bernaldéz wrote the license in such a way "that it would have no value at all" and told the colonists that Hawkins planned to trade with that it was "a great joke" so as to dissuade further trade.[35] He forfeited an

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[33] Harry Kelsey, *Sir John Hawkins* (London: University Press, 2003), 42.
[34] Kenneth Andrews, *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 118.
[35] Harry Kelsey, *Sir John Hawkins* (London: University Press, 2003), 45.

unspecified amount of his spoils to the Bernaldéz to appease the Spanish powers and left the island unscathed. Hawkins returned home to the acclaim of his investors in September of 1563.[36]

While Hawkins may have set out to simply test the waters on his first voyage, he elicited much more attention than his small provisions and crew implied he wanted. While originally distracted by other powers, the Portuguese and the Spanish soon took notice of Hawkins and his expedition. Their respective ambassadors wrote to Elizabeth in hopes of finding a peaceful solution to what would become known as The Hawkins Matter. While the queen attempted to placate the Spanish with proclamations condemning attacks on Spanish shipping at the same time she was forming her own partnership with John Hawkins. The proclamations that she issued after Hawkins's return portray her as a queen intent on peace with Spain, yet in actuality these were the beginning of her deception of the Spanish.

[36] Ibid, 46.

Chapter III: Elizabeth's Response to Spanish Anger

"Intention that she always had and yet hath to maintain the good and ancient amity betwixt her majesty and the king of Spain her good brother."[37]

Ordering Arrest of Subjects Injuring Spanish Shipping, February 1564

The Tudor Royal Proclamations demonstrate the image that Elizabeth I cultivated during the 1560s in regards to English and Spanish relations. These documents focus on the relationship that she wanted England to maintain with Philip II and Spain, her condemnation of France, and her censure of English subjects that fraternized and aided French pirates. While these proclamations depict a leader intent on transparency between nations, they were simply tactics to deflect blame and suspicion from England in light of the recent plundering of Spanish ships. It is important to note that proclamations were not law and did not actually incur any punishment under the common law. This chapter focuses on how Elizabeth I deceived Spain by issuing these proclamations to maintain peace so that the crown could profit from the voyages of Hawkins.

Elizabeth issued the *Ordering Arrest of Subjects Aiding French Pirates* on 8 February 1563. This proclamation had three purposes. Elizabeth wanted to distance herself from the piracy of her subjects. This document stated that while the queen had received complaints from the Spanish ambassador due to "attacks out of Newhaven on shipping", she had no knowledge of them.[38] By depicting these trespasses as the actions of a few and being unsanctioned by the crown, Elizabeth rejected responsibility for these attacks and avoided claims of English-French collusion on a national scale. This proclamation warded against future acts of piracy by declaring that foreign ships passing through English waters were "to be favorably used and preserved as

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[37] "Ordering Arrest of Subjects Injuring Spanish Shipping" Paul L. Hughes and James Francis Larkin, Tudor royal proclamations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 243.
[38] "Ordering Arrest of Subjects Aiding French Pirates" Paul L. Hughes and James Francis Larkin, Tudor royal proclamations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 208.

her own natural subjects."[39] In affording Spanish sailors and traders the same security as "her own natural subjects", Elizabeth continued her effort to align the English with Spain rather than France. This declaration concluded with a discussion of the punishments that would befall whoever did not abide it. It stated that "her majesty will no wise spare from extremity of punishment without favor or remission."[40] The "extremity of punishment" referred to was a prison term and a seizure of all goods that were plundered. While this statement has a veracity intended to deter English subjects from plundering or aiding in the assault on Spanish ships, it is unlikely that any punishment occurred. This is due to the fact that this proclamation was not truly enforceable and even should it have been, the crown had no way to control every English subject at sea. John Hawkins is proof of this because he never received any official sanction of punishment for his actions on the water. Despite this lack of follow through, Elizabeth issued a similar proclamation that expounded on the intents of her first proclamation.

Philip II of Spain

[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.

On 1 September 1563, the same month that Hawkins returned from his first voyage, Elizabeth issued a proclamation titled *Ordering English to Defend Spanish Shipping*. This proclamation further extended English support for the Spanish and aimed to promote their relationship. In this document, Philip II is repeatedly referred to as her "good brother."[41] While this term was used because of Philip II's previous marriage to Elizabeth I's half sister, Mary Tudor, in this context this familial reference was a powerful tool to depict the close relationship of their nations. This statement built upon the February edition by calling on her English subjects to aid the Spanish to perform their normal activities in English waters without "trouble, vexation, or molestation."[42] To accomplish this, Elizabeth commanded her subjects to "employ their whole force to aid, defend, and rescue . . . as if belonging to her own natural citizens."[43] This call for action indicates her veracity convey England's alliance with Spain. This alone depicts a loyalty to Spain, it is her identification of the French as enemies of Spain that I find most significant in this document. This proclamation states that it is the French who are "haunting the seas as pirates" and that it is them solely who are attacking the Spanish in English waters.[44] It is important to note that at this time of this documents publication Hawkins had just returned from his first voyage that had already upset the Spanish powers. The identification of the French as the faction responsible for attacking Spanish ships may be read as another attempt of Elizabeth to remove blame and attention from England. Attacking the French was a further effort on the part of the crown to diminish notions of a sanctioned English and French partnership. The queen was

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[41] "Ordering English to Defend Spanish Shipping" Paul L. Hughes and James Francis Larkin, Tudor royal proclamations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 235.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.

seemingly transparent in her attempts to maintain peace, yet this was compromised by her next proclamation.

In the months before Hawkins's second voyage two proclamations were issued that were steadfast in their support of Spain and their condemnation of piracy. The first was a proclamation, *Ordering Arrest of Subjects Injuring Spanish Shipping,* that was published on 18 February 1564. It extended the goals of the previous proclamations but was complicated by the context that it emerged in. This declaration continued claims of a desire for peace between England and Spain, stating that "she always had and yet hath to maintain the good and ancient amity betwixt her majesty and the king of Spain, her good brother."[45] As Hawkins was to embark on his second voyage just months after this proclamation, perhaps this sentiment was meant to distance Elizabeth and the crown from his forthcoming actions. It is unbelievable that Elizabeth was unaware of this impending voyage and so it is far more likely that this statement was meant to get ahead of the backlash that would soon come from Philip II. This work also addressed that "sundry complaints have been made by certain of the King's subjects that certain English men of war, being upon the seas, have molested and in some part spoiled them."[46] The proclamation does not give these much attention and does not delve into the specific persons alleged to have spoiled Spanish ships, yet the timing of Hawkins's return lends way to thinking that he is the primary person being discussed. Philip's allegations are responded to with a reward being offered for the apprehension of any English subject that has participated in this.[47] Every indication is given that the queen does not condone acts of piracy against Spanish ships. This impression is continued two months before Hawkins would leave on his second voyage.

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[45] "Ordering Arrest of Subjects Injuring Spanish Shipping" Paul L. Hughes and James Francis Larkin, Tudor royal proclamations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 243.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.



Ruy Gómez de Silva, Spanish Ambassador

The following proclamation, *Ordering Peace Kept on Seas, and Pirates Arrested*, that was published on 31 July 1564 similarly condemned acts of piracy. It was published one week after the Spanish ambassador, Ruy Gómes de Silva, wrote to the queen to prevent John Hawkins from making a second voyage.[48] This document called for the disarmament of ships at sea "so as to not offend any subjects of the kings and princes with whom her majesty is in amity."[49] This statement is representative of the method that Elizabeth adopted to interact with Spain in this period. A pattern emerged where Elizabeth would briefly placate Spain with proclamations and letters like this one and then when Hawkins would inevitably offend them, Elizabeth would deny having any knowledge of his plans or actions. At the time of this proclamation the queen was fully aware that Hawkins and his contemporaries would soon embark again, fully armed, and

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[48] CSPS, 370.

[49] "Ordering Peace Kept on Seas, and Pirates Arrested" Ordering Peace Kept on Seas, and Pirates Arrested" Paul L. Hughes and James Francis Larkin, Tudor royal proclamations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), 253.

with her donated warship. While the young monarch would continue to feign ignorance about Hawkins's activities, it would become more clear over time how well informed she truly was.

These proclamations reveal the strong role that deception played in the relationship between Spain and England in the 1650s. Hawkins, while never named, was central to this emerging conflict. Elizabeth utilized declarations to present a show of support for Spain, a rejection of piracy against their ships and a lack of knowledge about English piracy. These works give every indication that the queen is opposed to pirating subjects and only wants peace yet the coming voyage of Hawkins delegitimizes her protests. Had Elizabeth truly meant all that was said in these documents, Hawkins would not have been allowed to perform any further privately funded voyage at all, let alone one that was partially funded by her.

Chapter IV: The Partnership

Queen Elizabeth I

"A monarch at peace could not commission them to command royal vessels or privateers; they were technically pirates, but with royal connivance."[50]

Walter Phelps Hall, A History of England and the British Empire

The kind of partnership that Elizabeth and Hawkins made was not unusual. While Hawkins was a merchant, a trader, and in some senses a national hero, his opponents denounced him as a pirate. In the reign of Elizabeth's predecessors, "pirates could not have carried on their trade without the support of merchants, gentlemen, and officials, and measures taken against such abettors of piracy were for the most part ineffective, since all too frequently those

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[50] Walter Phelps Hall, *A History of England and the British Empire* (New York: J. Wiley & Sons, 1974), 292.

responsible for executing the law were notorious offenders."[51] This was especially true in the case of John Hawkins. He and his family were members of groups that allowed for and contributed to the abilities of English pirates. His familial connections alone gave him at a great advantage. His father-in-law was Benjamin Gonson, an English naval administrator and the first Surveyor of the Royal Navy. His London backers were all wealthy merchants with political influence. Hawkins rose in notoriety on the sea while his brother continued to grow his reputation as a Plymouth merchant. Hawkins himself was a merchant, trader, and now a trusted servant of the queen much like his father had been to Henry VIII.

It had become a common practice to employ pirates prior Elizabeth's ascension. The English "government was quite prepared to adopt pirates a means of waging war by proxy."[52] While at the beginning of their partnership Elizabeth might not have had these intentions, over time Hawkins and men would come to play this role. Piracy, though violent and immoral, itself at this time was more a product of "poverty and unemployment among seamen as Hakluyt, John Hawkins, Captain John Smith, and Mainwaring all testified."[53] During her reign, both Elizabeth and pirates at sea cooperated because they needed each other. Elizabeth needed revenue for the crown and to infiltrate the trades of other nations to expand the English economy. While Hawkins and his wealthy contemporaries were motivated by greed, their crews had the same motivation as Elizabeth on a much smaller scale, they simply needed money to live.

While Elizabeth supported Hawkins both monetarily and through her calming of foreign objections to his activity, it is important to understand the nature of her motivations. Queen Elizabeth was not an imperialist. The crown "did not share the notions of overseas empire or

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[51] Kenneth Andrews, *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 28.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.

oceanic power floated by men like Hawkins, Raleigh, Hakluyt."[54] This was not the beginning of the British Empire but rather an investment meant to procure money for her cash strapped state and to strengthen her position on the European stage. In 1558 Elizabeth and her closest advisor, William Cecil, inherited a financial mess. With "a debased currency, dislocated trade, a heavy national debt, and poor governmental credit," Elizabeth and her advisors had improved the nation's finances through frugality and the reissuance of coins which ended the debasement of the currency. So by the time the partnership of the crown and Hawkins occurred in 1564, Elizabeth was intent to continue her financial success, this time by way of foreign trade. Any expansion she sought, it was motivated by money, not the racism that would lead to eventual colonization. While Hawkins himself may have had colonial enterprise in mind in some sense, Elizabeth did not allow it to proceed in the 1560s.

The interpretation of Hawkins's voyages as a colonial venture implies a racial motivation that simply did not exist in this period. The English themselves "were not equipped with a definite set of ethnic stereotypes nor with anything like a racial ideology."[55] That is not to say that there were not prejudices against Africans, but these were based on "ancient conceits" rather than our modern understanding of racism.[56] The notion that white meant light, purity, and goodness automatically ascribed a connotation of unclean, impure, and treacherous to the color black. This certainly shaped English perception when they came into contact with Africans. While the English did not share the Spanish moral disdain for the slave trade, the queen herself

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[54]Kenneth Andrews, *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 11.
[55] Walter Phelps Hall, *A History of England and the British Empire* (New York: J. Wiley & Sons, 1974), 420.
[56] Nick Hazlewood, *The Queen's Slave Trader: John Hawkyns, Elizabeth I, and the Trafficking in Human Souls* (New York: William Morrow, 2005), 57.

did not favor extreme violence.[57] This set her on a different plane than that of Hawkins and his crew. It did not mean that Elizabeth was committed to "saving" the Africans stolen from their homes either.

These were not civilizing missions nor were they religiously motivated. Elizabeth dealt solely with the international relations aspect of these trips while Hawkins and his men committed the moral infractions. They, while not a part of any moralistic mission to save the Africans, may have believed that they had a "moral license."[58] This allowed him to make these cruel slaving voyages, while at all times playing the role of a pious man. His whiteness and country of origin would have established him as above the Africans he enslaved due solely to this being the general English understanding of their distinctive roles as white men and women. Hawkins was the racial justification to Elizabeth's "English pragmatism."[59]

At the time of her initial partnership with Hawkins, Elizabeth had neither personal nor nationalistic interest in these voyages. Money for the national treasury was her primary goal. Queen Elizabeth's official involvement in Hawkins's voyages was meant to be a mutually beneficial relationship based on profit. When Elizabeth became one of Hawkins's "adventurers in action," she allowed the transition from this being a wholly private operation to one of the public.[60] An adventurer in this context was simply someone who invested in an expedition in hopes of procuring a return after the voyages' end. Elizabeth was a partner of Hawkins in much the same way his wealthy counterparts in London were. Her status as queen helped aid Hawkins

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[57] Nick Hazlewood, *The Queen's Slave Trader: John Hawkyns, Elizabeth I, and the Trafficking in Human Souls* (New York: William Morrow, 2005), 58.
[58] Ibid, 60.
[59] Kenneth Andrews, *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 12.
[60] Richard Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation* (London: G. Bishop, R. Newberie and R. Barker, 1598), 520.

because he was given substantial funding and other aide to trouble those advisors who hoped to maintain a strongly positive relationship with Spain. While Elizabeth made no public comment on her support for Hawkins, in private it was no secret. Before his first voyage for Her Majesty, a meeting between the two was held during which "the queen was keen to voice her support for John Hawkyns."[61] Her monetary and perhaps, moral, support for Hawkins was demonstrated in her gift of a warship.



The Jesus of Lübeck

The Jesus of Lübeck was Elizabeth's first major contribution to the new partnership. The structure alone gave Hawkins and his voyages a greater legitimacy on the seas in the eyes of foreign ships and their governments as "the royal standard flew from its mast."[62] To challenge Hawkins was now to challenge the crown. It was a depiction of the queen's backing and her support, causing further concern for the Spanish. Built for Henry VIII when William Hawkins was still England's revolutionary explorer, it was in poor condition by the time the younger

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[61] Nick Hazlewood, *The Queen's Slave Trader: John Hawkyns, Elizabeth I, and the Trafficking in Human Souls* (New York: William Morrow, 2005), 67.

[62] Harry Kelsey, *Sir John Hawkins* (London: University Press, 2003), 51.

Hawkins acquired it. Despite this, the ship had many useful features for the business he sought to grow. The Jesus of Lübeck was nearly seven times the size of Hawkins and his brother's largest ship thus far, *The Salomon*. Its sheer size would allow him to "gather" even more goods on his subsequent voyages. The Lübeck also came equipped with a large hold, one that Hawkins wanted to store the slaves he would acquire.[63] This ship marked the beginning of the partnership between Hawkins and the queen and would be utilized in his next three voyages for the nation.

[63] Ibid, 52.

Chapter V: The Voyages of Hawkins (1564-1569)

"I know they hate me."[64]

John Hawkins to Cecil

The following voyages of John Hawkins were incendiary. He continued to violate Spanish waters and used threats of force to trade with Spanish citizens. News of his actions reached the Spanish and soon the ambassador, Ruy Gómez de Spes, was again writing to Elizabeth I. Hawkins's voyages were a primary factor in the deterioration of English-Spanish relations in the 1560s. Previous scholarship has identified several other factors such as religious differences, the problems in the Low Countries, and the enduring Spanish support for Mary Queen of Scots. While I agree that these all certainly influenced the devolution of this relationship, I find that more attention should be paid to the actions of Elizabeth that warranted the mistrust of Philip II. Elizabeth's response, or lack thereof, to the criticism of Hawkins's voyages demonstrates the duplicity and deceit that she used in this period to placate and mislead the Spanish. Elizabeth's own approval of challenging Spanish power is demonstrated in the second and third voyages of Hawkins. While his first voyage may have aggravated Spain, the ones that followed had a far greater impact on the futures of these nations as allies.

The context of the second voyage is necessary to understand the Spanish reception of it. Hawkins had certainly attracted a great deal of attention in his previous foreign exploit and other English sailors also began to plunder Spanish ships. Spain was continuously aggravated by French and English acts of piracy against their vessels in English waters. Elizabeth's previous proclamations had done little to stem the attacks and perhaps the crowns lack of action against

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[64] Sir Julian Stafford Corbett, *Drake and the Tudor Navy: With a History of the Rise of England as a Maritime Power, Volume 1* (New York: Burt Franklin, 1964), 99.

these pirates had increased Spanish suspicion of her loyalty to Philip II. Hawkins's fraternization with the French Captain Jean Ribault, a man who "had previously established a colony of Huguenot soldiers on the coast of Florida," an obvious challenge to Spain's control of the New World, further increased tensions between the two powers.[65] The growing tensions were common knowledge to Hawkins and those involved in this coming slaving expedition.

On 5 July 1564, MP John Challoner wrote to Hawkins about the strained relationship between England and Spain. Challoner wrote that this period was "the worst time between them [England and Spain] for twenty years," and advised Hawkins to gain the favor of the king prior to embarking on his next trip.[66] This could be done, he wrote, by "promising 4,000 to 5,000 ducats" to the king.[67] There is no documented reply to this letter and no indication that Hawkins listened to Challoner's advice. Challoner's warnings to Hawkins indicate the nature of Anglo-Spanish relations prior to his disembarking. This coming voyage was not intended to be a great military expedition nor was it supposed to inflame these tensions. Perhaps Challoner meant to remind Hawkins of this. Spain made a similar effort to quell these tensions just a month later.

The Spanish made this voyage a conflict between the two nations rather than just between them and Hawkins. This is depicted in a 1564 letter to Elizabeth from Spes, the now Spanish ambassador. He wrote to Elizabeth on 22 August 1564 to beg "that they may be restrained so that his masters subjects may not suffer the same losses as they formerly have."[68] These pleas fell on deaf ears as the preparations for this next expedition continued. Just two days later on 24 August 1564, Oliver Leson wrote to Challoner stating that "the Queen has delivered captains ships to

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[65] Kenneth Andrews, *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 122.
[66] CSPF, 545.
[67] Ibid.
[68] CSPF, 629.

Mr. Studley bound for Florida and to Hawkins and Cobham and others who are bound for Guinea and Portuguese Indies."[69] A private funder of the second voyage, Leonard Chilton similarly wrote to Challoner on 2 September 1564 informing him that "there is great preparation in England for 15 or 16 ships to go to Guinea and Mr. Hawkins for captain."[70] On 15 October 1564, the queen's slave trader departed on his second trip.

Licensing was a central factor in this expedition. On two occasions Hawkins was refused a license to trade with the Spanish citizens and each time he reacted with threats of violence. The first time this occurred was at La Margarita in the Caribbean.[71] Rather than yield to his demands, the governor of the town evacuated his citizens and Hawkins left without trading.[72] In April 1565 an incident like this occurred in Barburata.[73] This time however, after facing threats of violence from Hawkins, the governor secured a license for their English guest. While the governor sent word back to Spain that this was a forced trade only done under the threat of violence, suspicions remain about the actual circumstances. As trade would bring more revenue to the people of Burburata, it is also possible that the the threat of violence was just a story concocted by the governor to avoid punishment for trading with Hawkins. While we do not know the actual circumstances, either of these scenarios is sure to have angered the Spanish, whether it be a case of English pirates dominating a small Spanish colony or the Spanish colonists simply defying the orders of the king. At Rio de la Hacha the problem of securing a license again caused threats of English violence against the Spanish citizens. Again the threat of force was used by Hawkins and his crew, but there are allegations that "only token resistance was offered" by the

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[69] Ibid, 633.
[70] Ibid, 649.
[71] Kenneth Andrews, *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 123.
[72] Ibid, 123.
[73] Ibid, 123.

Spanish.[74] In all three instances no acts of violence against the Spanish citizens. This adds to either narrative. Perhaps Hawkins and his crews were so threatening that violence was not necessary or perhaps the Spanish colonists were just fabricating the veracity of these threats. We cannot know for sure. On the last leg of this journey, Hawkins again angered Spain.

While aiming to reach Española, Hawkins and his crew lost their way.[75] Landing on the south coast of modern day Cuba, they encountered a failing French colony.[76] Seeing their dire situation, Hawkins offered his aid.[77] The captain in charge of the colony, Laudonnière refused Hawkins's offer to take them all back to England, but he did accept supplies as documented in his personal journal.[78] He noted that he received "the gift of a 50-ton bark, victuals, shoes for his soldiers ad other stores" in the same passage that he credited Hawkins with saving his and the lives of his men.[79] Their survival was short lived, however. A month after Hawkins and his crew had left the Spanish arrived, led by Pedro Menéndes de Avilés, and slaughtered all of the remaining Frenchmen.[80] The timing of this attack is suspicious.

There is no record to explicitly prove that the Spanish knew what Hawkins had done. Despite this, for all intents and purposes the Spanish seemed to have a fair knowledge of where Hawkins and his crews were throughout this period. It would not be surprising then if they knew he had found this colony. This would be especially clear once Avilés and his crew had landed and come across the wares that Hawkins had given to the Frenchmen. One cannot say for sure,

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[74] Ibid, 124.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid, 125.
[78] *The Modern Part of an Universal History: From the Earliest Account of Time. Compiled from Original Writers. By the Authors of The Antient Part* (S. Richardson, T. Osborne, C. Hitch, A. Millar, John Rivington, S. Crowder, P. Davey and B. Law, T. Longman, and C. Ware, 1763).
[79] Ibid.
[80] Ibid.

but this would be yet another area where Hawkins blatantly disregarded Spain's control of the West as he had been doing for the past three years at this point.

Hawkins returned to England in September of 1565. His voyage was acclaimed as a great success as his investors reaped a 60 percent return on their investment.[81] Despite the discontent with Spain, Elizabeth remained a backer in Hawkins's expeditions. A third voyage began to be planned with Hawkins and his second cousin, Francis Drake, leading it. News of this reached de Silva who achieved an audience with the queen as described in his letter to Philip II recounting this experience. In October 1565, de Silva wrote:

On the twenty-fourth I had audience of her and begged her to order measure to be adopted in the ports to prevent the sailing of armed ships in this time of peace to inquire what voyage of three going to be undertake by captain John Hawkins of Plymouth and to make him give security that he would not plunder your Majesty's subjects.[82]

He succeeded in persuading Elizabeth and Hawkins was replaced with Captain John Lovell.[83] He followed the same routes as Hawkins did but was not at all as successful. Lovell seemingly did not have Hawkins's propensity for manipulation and threats. At Rio de la Hacha where Hawkins had just recently found success and moderate peace with the colonists, Lovell was "met with a blank refusal and had no choice but to put ashore 'ninety-two pieces of Blacks, all old, and very sick and

[81] Kenneth Andrews, *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 125.
[82] CSPS, 370.
[83] Kenneth Andrews, *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 125.

thin' without payment."[84] This voyage was a failure compared to Hawkins's second voyage and there is no mention of Lovell in the tales of the fourth and final slaving voyage of the 1560s.

These expeditions of the mid 1560s exacerbated Spain but they were not militaristic. There was no large scale national intent to provoke Philip II into a battle or war between the nations, yet these were certainly contributing factors to the tensions between England and Spain. Elizabeth's nature as a ruler was showcased during these voyages and her handling of Spanish discontent. Her outright denials of knowledge or approval of them, all the while funding said voyages demonstrates the deceit that she used to placate Spain. While we cannot know for sure what Elizabeth's intent was with these early voyages, the last one of John Hawkins gives a more overt notion of English power.

[84] Ibid.

Chapter VI: The Final Voyage



HAWKINS AT ST. JUAN DE ULLOA.

"The Judith forsoke us in oure greate miserie."[85]

Captain John Hawkins

Hawkins's third voyage was a national endeavor. In the context of the growing discontent of Spain I find this voyage and its events absolutely essential to the deterioration of the English and Spanish bond. The sheer size of it sets it apart from its predecessors. While it was not an official military venture, it depicts a show of English authority in the face of Spanish anger at the previous voyages of Hawkins and Elizabeth's continuing allowance of his slave trading voyages. Perhaps most importantly, this trip depicts a subversive alteration of foreign policy towards Spain. On 2 October 1567 Hawkins and his crew departed from Plymouth.

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[85] John Hawkins, *A true declaration of the troublesome voyadge of M. Iohn Haukins to the parties of Guynea and the west Indies, in the yeares of our Lord 1567 and 1568* (London: Thomas Purfoote, 1569).

The sheer number of ships and crew members involved in this voyage delineated it from its predecessor. Six ships were used in this trip. The Hawkins brothers contributed four of these crafts, the *William and John (*1the tons), the *Swallow* (100 tons, the same ship used in his first slaving voyage), the *Judith* (50 tons), and the *Angel* (30 tons).[86] Two naval ships, the previously donated *Jesus of Lübeck* and the new addition, the *Minion* were also employed for this trip. The many ships used on this voyage holds a two-fold significance. Firstly, it indicates the large number of slaves and other spoils that Hawkins expected to return to England with. The number of ships may have been intended to send a message to the Spanish as a symbol of English naval power and a more obvious threat to Spanish control of the seas.



Interior, Jesus of Lübeck

[86] Nick Hazlewood, *The Queen's Slave Trader: John Hawkyns, Elizabeth I, and the Trafficking in Human Souls* (New York: William Morrow, 2005), 185.

Unlike Lovell's previous slave trading expedition, Hawkins found great success in acquiring viable slaves. After disembarking from Plymouth he and his crews faced a brutal storm that forced him to consider returning to England.[87] Despite these initial fears by November his fleet had stopped in Tenerife and landed in Guinea by 18 November 1657.[88] While traveling between Cape Verde and Sierra Leone Hawkins and his crew plundered various Portuguese ships of their slaves as well as simply capturing Africans along the coast.[89] A new partnership also emerged during this period as Hawkins joined forces with an African tribe looking to attack a neighboring village.[90] After conquering the residents there, Hawkins and Drake made slaves of the prisoners of war and accepted these as payment for their help.[91] By January of 1568 he and his convoy had acquired roughly three hundred slaves and by the time they left for the Caribbean this number had increased to five hundred.[92]

From here his route followed its usual pattern. He went to La Margarita as he had done during his second voyage and replenished the supplies of his crews. The fleet then returned to Burburata where Hawkins had previously used threats to secure a license. The trouble of 1562 was avoided in 1568 as Hawkins was allowed to trade freely while here despite not having a valid license to do so. He and his crew remained here for a month after which they sailed to Rió de la Hacha where this voyages success began to flounder.

Upon entering the port, Hawkins's request to trade was immediately rejected. The governor, Castellano's, reasons for this was an unwillingness to "break the clear royal

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[87] Kenneth Andrews, *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 127.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid, 128.
[90] Ibid.
[91] Ibid, 129.
[92] Ibid.

prohibition of trade with the English pirates."[93] It is far more likely due to their previous willingness and even connivance to trade with Hawkins, however, that Lovell's previous visit had simply soured the relationship of these subjects to the English. The sick, elderly slaves that Lovell had offered during his time here had seemingly left the Spanish subjects wary of accepting any others from the English. This is evidenced by the justifications Hawkins offered for a continued slave trade with these subjects. Hawkins argued that Lovell was simply giving them the slaves that they had expected to get from him but he was still not allowed to do business here.[94] There are varying accounts of what happened at Rió de la Hacha.

This is one instance where Hawkins himself gave his own version of events. In 1569 he wrote *A true declaration of the troublesome voyadge of M. Iohn Haukins to the parties of Guynea and the west Indies, in the yea|res of our Lord 1567. and 1568.* In this work he wrote of the inconveniences he and his crew faced upon arriving:

> the treasurer who had the charge there, woulde by no meanes agre to anye trade, or to suffer vs to take water, he had fortyfyed hys towne wyth dyuers bulwarkes in all places where it might be entred, and furnyshed hymselfe wyth a *100* Hargebusiers, so that he thoughte by famine to haue inforced vs to haue put a lande our Negrose: of which purpose he had not greatlye failed vnlesse we had by force entred the towne:* whiche (after we coulde by no meanes obtaine his fauour) we were inforced to dooe, and so with *200* men brake in vppon there bulwarkes, and entred the towne with the losse onelye of. ii. men of our parts, and no hurt done to the Spanyardes because after there voley of shotte discharged, they all fled.[95]

[93] Harry Kelsey, *Sir John Hawkins* (London: University Press, 2003), 78.
[94] Kenneth Andrews, *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 132.

Despite this initial refusal, Hawkins alleged that "partly by frendship of ye treasurer, we obtained a secrete trade: whervppon the Spanyardes reforted to vs by night."[96] Previous speculation about the honestly of Spanish subjects who claimed they were forced to trade with Hawkins legitimizes this claim. We also know of Hawkins's penchant for deceit, however, and thus it can be assumed that he is also an unreliable narrator in this passage.

The two other stories of these events place far more blame on Hawkins. One account states that Hawkins's men stole treasures from the local church and held them and the rest of the town for a ransom and the ability to trade.[97] In this version of events, after selling two hundred slaves Hawkins gave the treasures back and made other reparations.[98] This agrees partially with Hawkins's claims of "frendship" as the reparations he offered in this version were supposedly grand and more than made up for the Spanish losses. The accounts that Castellanos offered, however, was much different. He said that Hawkins made him pay the ransom and then simply left seventy-five sick and decrepit slaves for him to sell, not nearly recovering enough money to pay for the damages Hawkins's men had caused in the town.[99] We cannot say conclusively what happened at this port but past accounts of Hawkins's preferred method of trade legitimizes Castellanos version of events. From Rió de la Hacha, the fleet the fleet moved west to Santa Marta where, after some brief trading, they attempted to reach Cartagena.[100] There was a minor scuffle with the Spanish presence and outnumbered and lacking resources, Hawkins and his crews began their return to England.

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[95] John Hawkins, *A true declaration of the troublesome voyadge of M. Iohn Haukins to the parties of Guynea and the west Indies, in the yeares of our Lord 1567 and 1568* (London: Thomas Purfoote, 1569).
[96] Ibid.
[97] Harry Kelsey, *Sir John Hawkins* (London: University Press, 2003), 73.
[98] Ibid, 73.
[99] Ibid, 74.
[100] Ibid.

On the last leg of the expedition they encountered more powerful storms that damaged two of the fleets ships. On the advice of a pilot in his fleet, Bartolomé González, Hawkins changed the ships course to Vera Cruz, San Juan de Ulúa.[101] They arrived on 16 September 1568. Initially they were able to stay in the port unmolested. Even after the arrival of the *flota*, with the viceroy of New Spain aboard, hostages were exchanged and verbal peace agreements were made so that the English could repair their damaged ships. Despite these initial peacekeeping agreements, on 22 September Hawkins saw a ship carrying Spanish soldiers near the coast line.[102] Hawkins sent a crew member named Robert Barret to ascertain what their intent was.[103] The Spanish responded by arresting Barret.[104] Hawkins went on the deck to get a look at what the Spanish were doing when suddenly an arrow was sent from the Jesus and a shot was returned by the Spanish.[105] At ten in the morning the Battle of San Juan de Ulúa began.

This conflict was an overwhelming defeat for Hawkins and Drake. Both sides took hostages but the Spanish forced the English to abandon theirs under an onslaught of fire.[106] Hawkins's men looted on the island during the battle but their plunder was also forced to be abandoned.[107] The English ships took a brunt of the damage and many English prisoners were taken, never to reach the shores of Plymouth again.[108] The largest blunder of this battle was Drake's abandonment of his cousin and the rest of the English sailors. Hawkins's later wrote that "The Judith forsoke us in oure greate miserie."[109] While Hawkins and Drake of course reconciled

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[101] Ibid, 75.
[102] Ibid, 76.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid, 77.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Ibid.
[107] Ibid, 78.
[108] Ibid.
[109] John Hawkins, *A true declaration of the troublesome voyadge of M. Iohn Haukins to the parties of Guynea and the west Indies, in the yeares of our Lord 1567 and 1568* (London: Thomas Purfoote, 1569).

upon reaching England, both faced great criticism for this move and its contribution to the English loss at San Juan. This battle raged for a little under month until Hawkins and his remaining men, just one hundred of his original four hundred, were able to disembark on 16 October 1568.[110] Hawkins and his crew returned to England in January 1569 and an official commission of inquiry was launched into investigating what happened at Rio de la Hacha.



Notes of Commission of Inquiry into Hawkins's Third Voyage

The significance of this battle is dependent on context. In the grand scheme of English-Spanish relations it is a small hiccup, but in the context of Hawkins it is a great failure of the English. After seven years of plunder, threats of violence and ignoring Spanish anger, Hawkins had finally faced a powerful defeat. Spanish mistrust of Hawkins played a large role in their launching an attack and this mistrust likely stemmed from his previous manipulation and disregard for the Spanish crown. The partnership between Hawkins and Elizabeth made this

[110] Ibid.

national expedition a national embarrassment as he and his remaining crew were forced to struggle back to English waters. This event would also spark continuing English resentment of Spain as as the series of events at San Juan de Ulúa was manipulated by either side with neither accepting blame for the mass causalities. Hawkins returned home without most of his crew, virtually no profit and a scar on his reputation as a trader. He would never embark on another trading voyage. This early conflict would later influence Hawkins and Drake in their famed exploits during the Spanish Armada where they once again became English heroes.

Chapter VI: Conclusion

The Spanish Armada

The 1560s were a transformative period in the relationship between England and Spain. John Hawkins and his actions at sea and in Spanish ports created the Spanish anger that Elizabeth I was then forced to answer for. While his initial voyage in 1562 was solely a trading expedition, over time his trips took on a nationalist theme. This first trading venture, though a great success monetarily, failed in its purpose to simply test how far the Spanish would let him trespass in their territories. Instead he sparked an interest that would endure for the rest of this decade and would divide Elizabeth I and her ally, Philip II. His 1564 partnership with Elizabeth made him a national figure rather than just a wealthy trader from Plymouth. This national venture was a failure as his investors got no return and tensions with Spain broke out in the Battle of San Juan de Ulúa, a vast embarrassment for England. Despite the tumult of this time, the relationship between Spain and England would only become more complicated in the 1570s

and the first half of the 1580s before the Spanish Armada began in 1588. The loss of the Battle would only serve to complicate Hawkins's position in the relationship between the two nations.

In the next two decades the former slave trader continued to play a decisive role in foreign relations. Perhaps influenced by the negative feelings he had come to have for Spain during his voyages, Hawkins remained staunchly anti-Spanish for the rest of his life. This is demonstrated by the deception he used when asked by Philip to be an operative in the Ridolfi Plot. Letters between the Spanish Ambassador and the king in 1570 demonstrate how greatly Philip II wanted Hawkins to turn on his ruler. After numerous requests were sent to Hawkins he finally consented. His role in the plot was to ferry soldiers to England to invade and kill Elizabeth. His new employer did not know that Hawkins was already working for Elizabeth's spy master, Francis Walsingham. After learning the intricate details of the plot he foiled it and was knighted in 1571 by Elizabeth for his actions.

In 1573 Hawkins replaced his father-in-law as Controller of the Navy. He was very successful in this role and remained a popular national figure. His greatest contribution in this period were the improvements he made to English vessels. In terms of trading, his role shifted to being a financer of voyages rather than the captain himself. He largely financed the voyages of Drake and continued to influence the slave trade in a less hands on way. In this way he continued to combat the Spanish as the English further branched out in the west in terms of trade and the capture of slaves. Hawkins continued in this capacity until 1588.

When the Spanish Armada attempted to sail up the English Channel Hawkins was the captain in charge of the English fleet that stopped them. He demonstrated his masterful skills as a seaman and leader, all the while continuing his now personal feud with Spain. This was a culmination of the tensions that he himself had helped set in motion two decades before. It seems

only fitting then that he was so involved in the Spanish defeat in one battle, rewriting his and Drake's previous humiliation at San Juan de Ulúa.

In 1591 Hawkins's son, Robert, was kidnapped by the Spanish. The elder Hawkins and Drake set off on an expedition to rescue him but faced numerous defeats. His attempts to recover his son from Spanish captors lasted for four years. By 1595 Hawkins was sixty-three years old and had spent much of his adult life sailing in rough living conditions. This almost certainly contributed to his poor health and, defeated by his inability to reach his son, he died at sea. This was a poignant end to the arduous relationship of Hawkins and Spain. After his death he was glorified for his work privateering and his great heroism during the Spanish Armada. He remained a great figure in naval and national history for the next century, yet his fame faded over time.

The legacy of Hawkins and his slaving voyages is also relevant to the slave trade that emerged in the 17th century. He began a longstanding tradition of British abuse of Africans and the commodification of their bodies. Hawkins and Elizabeth may not have had any racial motivations for the slave trade in their lifetimes, but they certainly influenced later traders who did have racial reasons for their abuses of Africans. They gave legitimacy to a trade that would extend into the New World and shape an entire nation. The vast success of Hawkins and the acclaim that he garnered in British society contributed to the romanticization of slavery and slaving voyages. It made this practice a hallmark of British success and a depiction of how the Englishman was meant to dominate the "uncivilized." As Britain garnered an empire, these voyages were used to justify the conquering of other nations and people as well. Hawkins and his exploits laid the basis for later sinister imperial actions of Britain.

Epilogue



The Hawkins Crest

I really admire the conclusion of *Early Modern England 1485-1714: A Narrative History* by Robert Bucholz and Newton Key. This work was one of the first books I read when I began to take a real interest in British history and I was particularly taken with the way these authors chose to end their work. While it is a wonderful historical work on the great history of Britain, Bucholz and Key showed a reverence to those who suffered at the hands of the British throughout this time as well. They ended this work that told of the vast accomplishments of the British people, the luxuries of the monarchy and the beginnings of imperialism with condemnation of British action. They noted the vast amount of people who suffered due to the "great successes" of the crown and nations who still struggle to recover from these abuses. I was very moved by this sentiment and the responsibility that these authors took to fully educate their audience. It is for this reason that I have chosen to end my own, albeit short, work in this way.

When I began my thesis I had high hopes for the attention I could pay to the Africans that were captured by Hawkins. I expected that I could write a piece that demanded my audience to consider the fate of these people as more than just mere commodities. As I began my research, however, I realized the vast limitations I would face if I chose to pursue this goal. Due to the time of these voyages, not much attention was paid to the Africans abducted by Hawkins other than the number of them. There are no firsthand accounts of these victims and there are no firsthand accounts that depict them as anything other than slaves. This greatly hindered my original goals for this project. Despite this, I hope that my work has given some illumination to the British mindset in terms of slavery.

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