

CARTER'S MIDDLE EASTERN POLICY AND THE EGYPT- ISRAEL PEACE AGREEMENT



Figure 1: Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, U.S. President Jimmy Carter, and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat at Camp David (September 7, 1978)

BY NOAH FLEISHMAN

Carter's Middle Eastern Policy and the Egypt-Israel Peace Agreement

Author: Noah Fleishman

Mentor: Professor Ofra Amihay

Seminar Instructor: Professor Adrienne Edgar

History Senior Honors Seminar

20 March 2019

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT:	3
CARTER'S UNIQUE NEGOTIATING SKILLS:.....	8
CARTER'S INITIAL ATTEMPTS AT PEACE:.....	12
CARTER'S SPEECH SETS THE STAGE:	14
SADAT'S HISTORIC SPEECH:	16
SADAT'S VISIT TO JERUSALEM:	19
BILATERAL EGYPT-ISRAEL TALKS STALL:	23
CARTER'S ATTEMPT TO INTENSIFY U.S. ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS:	24
CARTER MEETS WITH EGYPT AND ISRAEL TO GAUGE POSITIONS:	27
EXPECTATIONS TO THE PIVOTAL ISSUE AT CAMP DAVID:.....	33
PIVOTAL ISSUE AT CAMP DAVID:.....	38
THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAEL PEACE AGREEMENT:.....	46
THE SUCCESSES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF CARTER'S CAMP DAVID SUMMIT:.....	48
CARTER AT CAMP DAVID AND WHY IT MATTERS:	50
BIBLIOGRAPHY:	52

Amongst the tension of the Israel-Egypt peace negotiations, President Jimmy Carter traveled to Jerusalem to join Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin in prayer at the Wailing Wall. The prayer began with Carter saying, "Oh God, guide the Arabs and Israelis to a permanent peace." Begin responds "Amen." Carter goes on, "Oh God, guide the Egyptians and Israelis to real peace and coexistence, with open borders and trade." Begin again responds "Amen." Carter continues, "Oh God, guide the Israelis to relinquish to the Arabs all the territory seized since the 1967 Middle East War." Begin interjects, "Ahem, mind you Mr. President, you're only talking to a wall."¹

This witty joke that traveled around Cairo, Egypt during the 1978 Camp David summit pokes fun at one of the most significant geopolitical challenges of the Middle East. For better or worse, the Arab-Israeli conflict continually dominates the media's and the public's attention. For decades, foreign policy experts have contemplated and attempted various negotiating techniques to bring about a broad lasting peace in the Middle East with the help of American mediation. While a comprehensive peace deal has not been reached in the Middle East, this is not to say that the everyday lives of people in the region are consumed by war and conflict. On the contrary, much of the Middle East is safer and more peaceful currently than it was for the last 70 years. The current relative tranquility is in large part due to the work of one particularly courageous leader who tirelessly worked to guarantee the safety and wellbeing of the people in the Middle East who had their lives torn apart by war. United States President James "Jimmy" Carter injected himself into the turmoil of the Middle East with the objective of creating peace and advancing human rights. No American president before him, and arguably no American president after him, has made as meaningful or as lasting an impact on the peace and stability of the region.

This paper will analyze Carter's unique negotiating skills leading up to, during, and following the 1978 Camp David summit. Carter's contributions throughout the Camp David peace negotiation process have not been thoroughly studied and have been misinterpreted by

¹ Salim Yaquub. *Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, and U.S.-Middle East Relations in the 1970s* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2016), 239.

revisionists. This analysis will highlight how Carter's creative outlook, personality, and strategic prowess created an enduring peace agreement between Egypt and Israel.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT:

After the end of World War II, on November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a plan to partition the British Mandate of Palestine into a Jewish state, an Arab state, and the international city of Jerusalem.² The Jewish population accepted the partition plan, but the Arab states and inhabitants of the Mandate rejected the plan.³ Immediately following the partition plan, clashes began between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, then still under the British Mandate. On May 14, 1948, David Ben-Gurion declared Israel's independence, an event which led the Arab nations of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan to invade Israel. This began what Israelis call the War of Independence, or what the Arabs call the *Nakba* (catastrophe). At the beginning of 1949, the parties agreed to a ceasefire, and an armistice line was drawn known as the "green line." The war was considered a victory for Israel because it repelled Arab invasion, and in doing so captured more territory than initially allotted under the U.N. partition plan. The Israeli territory conquering entailed displacement of many Palestinians neighborhoods and towns, hence the reference to the war as a national trauma in Palestinian memory.

On 26 July 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company, a joint British-French enterprise.⁴ In what became the Suez Crisis, a joint British-French-Israeli force invaded the Egyptian Sinai at the end of October and beginning of November to retake the canal. Britain, France, and Israel were forced to withdraw due to significant pressure from the United States and the USSR.

In June 1967, the most significant Arab-Israeli conflict, known in Israel as "the Six Day War," began after mounting tension along the Egypt-Israel border caused Israel to

² "U.N. Resolution 181 (II) Future Governance of Palestine: Plan of Partition with Economic Union." United Nations. November 29, 1947.

³ "The Partition Plan-65 Years Later." Israel ministry of Foreign Affairs. November 29, 2012. https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Issues/Pages/Partition_Plan-64_years_later.aspx.

⁴ "The Suez Crisis, 1956." Department of State: Office of the Historian. Accessed January 2019. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/suez>.

launch what it claimed as a preemptive strike.⁵ The invasion of Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula prompted Syrian, Jordanian, and Iraqi forces to attack Israel. Israel's counterassault resulted in the capture of the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan. The war was considered a crippling defeat for the Arab world and cemented Israel's military supremacy. Significantly, the war resulted in Israel controlling territory unrecognized internationally, the displacement of thousands of Palestinians from the West Bank and Golan Heights, and the fleeing of Jewish minorities in Arab countries. An Israeli-Jordanian and an Israeli-Syrian ceasefire were signed, but a state of war remained between Egypt and Israel. On November 22, 1967, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 242 which sought two main goals:

- (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
- (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.⁶

In the context of the Camp David Accords, UNSC Resolution 242 (1967) is incredibly important because it formed the foundation on which President Carter would attempt to negotiate a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt.

Israel's control of the Sinai Peninsula led to hostilities along the Suez Canal in what Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser called the War of Attrition, believing that a sustained attack on Israel would force their withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula. The large-scale skirmishes along the Suez Canal ended in a ceasefire in August 1970 and with no significant territorial changes. One month later, President Nasser died of a heart attack and his Vice-President, Anwar Sadat succeeded him.

⁵ Efraim Karsh. "The Six-Day War: An Inevitable Conflict." *Middle East Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (2017): 1-12.

⁶ "U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 (1967)" United Nations. November 22, 1967.

On October 6, 1973, which on that year corresponded with the holiest Jewish day of Yom Kippur, an Arab coalition launched a surprise attack on Israel that caught the Israelis and Americans entirely by surprise. A force of primarily Egyptians and Syrians armed units coordinated an attack on the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. During the war, Israel received support from the United States and the Arab states received support from the USSR.⁷ The Egyptian Army made significant gains in the first week of the war, and many Israelis, including cabinet members, thought that this might be the end of Israel. In the context of the Camp David Accords, this is significant because the fear instilled in the Israeli public by the '73 October War, known in Israel as "the Yom Kippur War," resulted in political shifts in the country. On October 22, 1973, the UNSC passed Resolution 338, which called on all parties to cease military actions and fully implement UNSC Resolution 242.⁸

Despite a ceasefire achieved after the '73 October War, skirmishes between Israeli and Egyptian forces still broke out, violating the ceasefire agreement. In what became one of the many crowning achievements of his career, U.S. Secretary of State at the time, Henry Kissinger, began to fly back and forth between Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan to negotiate ceasefire agreements. His constant movement between parties with an emphasis on personal interactions became known as the "shuttle diplomacy."⁹ Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy was the first significant attempt by a U.S. administration official to negotiate the terms of an agreement between parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

On December 21, 1973, Kissinger helped convene the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference, co-chaired by the United States and the USSR. The conference included Egypt, Israel, and Jordan and aimed primarily to gather representatives of all the countries in the

⁷ Abraham Rabinovich. *The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East*. New York: Schocken Books, 2004.

⁸ "U.N. Security Council Resolution 338 (1973)" United Nations. October 22, 1973.

⁹ "Shuttle Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974-1975." Department of State-Office of the Historian. Accessed January 25, 2019. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/shuttle-diplomacy>.

same room to talk to each other.¹⁰ The Geneva Conference did more than that, however, in assisting Kissinger to broker the 1974 disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt and between Israel and Syria.¹¹ Additionally, Kissinger later managed to broker the more crucial normalization of the Sinai Peninsula with the 1975 Sinai Interim Agreement between Egypt and Israel which had five major results:

- (a) Israeli withdrawal in Sinai to the eastern ends of the Mitla and Gidi Passes;
- (b) Creation of a UN-monitored buffer zone in the evacuated area;
- (c) Turning the previous buffer zone into Egyptian territory;
- (d) Israeli withdrawal from the oil fields at Abu Rudeis and Ras Sudar;
- (e) Opening the Suez Canal to Israeli non-military cargo ships; and
- (f) Establishment of American early-warning stations in the area of the passes.¹²

Because the Watergate Scandal left American president at the time Richard Nixon preoccupied with domestic matters, Kissinger practically became the sole American foreign policy mastermind until the end of the Gerald Ford administration.

Kissinger remained Secretary of State under President Ford after Nixon resigned. However, in the Ford Administration, American-Israeli relations reached an impasse when Ford asked for a reassessment of foreign aid to Israel after Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin made a reversal on withdrawal policy.¹³ Rabin called the reassessment “an innocent-sounding term that heralded one of the worst periods in American-Israeli relations.”¹⁴

Despite his success, Kissinger was able to broker mere interim agreements that created an impasse, but nothing near a peace. While outright war was not occurring, it could

¹⁰ “Geneva Middle East Peace Conference Takes Place.” Center for Israel Education. December 21, 2018. Accessed January 25, 2019. <https://israeled.org/geneva-middle-east-peace-conference/>.

¹¹ “Israel-Egypt Disengagement Agreement (1974).” Economic Cooperation Foundation. Accessed January 25, 2019. <https://ecf.org.il/issues/issue/179>; “Israel-Syria Disengagement Agreement (1974).” Economic Cooperation Foundation. Accessed January 25, 2019. <https://ecf.org.il/issues/issue/178>.

¹² “Interim Agreement with Egypt: 1975.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed January 25, 2019. [https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/maps/pages/sinai interim agreement-1975.aspx](https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/maps/pages/sinai%20interim%20agreement-1975.aspx).

¹³ “Reassessment of Washington-Israel Relationship Begins.” 2018. CIE. March 18, 2018. <https://israeled.org/reassessment-of-washington-israel-relationship/>.

¹⁴ Yitzhak Rabin. *The Rabin Memoirs* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 261.

very well be on the horizon, and the need for a stronger lasting peace agreement was clear.

With American-Israeli relations at an all-time low and the trauma of the October War in the recent memory of Israelis and Egyptians, it was unclear if attempting to begin a peace process would be anything more than rhetoric. When Carter, was catapulted onto the national stage, despite his limited foreign policy experience, he was determined to make his mark on the Middle East peace process.

CARTER'S UNIQUE NEGOTIATING SKILLS:

On January 20, 1977, James "Jimmy" Carter was sworn in as the United States' 39th President. Having only previously served as a Georgia State senator from 1963-1967 and as Georgia's Governor from 1971-1975, Carter was seen as an outsider with limited foreign policy experience compared to his predecessors. Carter hinted at his inexperience on the campaign trail when he chose to stress general foreign policy goals rather than a more complex means of achieving them.¹⁵ However, through his single term in office, he expertly negotiated a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel that had eluded his predecessors for 30 years. With the necessary involvement of American mediation, the Egypt-Israel peace agreement would eventually become the standard to which all future Middle East negotiations would be conducted.

President Carter undoubtedly played a critical role in brokering the 1978 Camp David Accord and the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. According to Israel's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moshe Dayan, "If not for Carter, we [Israelis and Egyptians] would not have arrived at a final agreement."¹⁶ However, the process by which Carter orchestrated these watershed agreements has not been sufficiently analyzed.

As in other matters, Carter was extremely detail oriented throughout the negotiations, meticulously reviewing documents until he could quote exact numbers during meetings. Much of the analysis of Carter's preparations, which is what made him so knowledgeable during the negotiations, is accredited to his career as an engineer. William Quandt, a National Security Council staff member from 1977-1979, wrote of Carter's basic approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict: "Trained as an engineer, Carter seemed to believe complex problems could best be tackled by careful study, detailed planning, and comprehensive designs...he was

¹⁵ Charles Mohr. "Carter, With a Long List of Campaign Promises, Now Faces the Problem of Making Good on Them." *New York Times*. November 15, 1976.

¹⁶ Kenneth W. Stein, *Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace* (New York: Routledge, 1999), 24.

a problem solver more than a grand strategist.”¹⁷ However, Carter’s lack of prior knowledge of Middle Eastern foreign policy and his relative unfamiliarity with American Jews or American Arabs allowed him to see the Arab-Israeli conflict with a fresh set of eyes. That allowed him to negotiate what no other American leader had previously done. He was able to do so not solely because of his problem-solving mindset as an engineer, but also because of his unique lack of national experience emboldened him to separate himself from the dilemma previous American presidents faced. Previous presidents were torn between interests of the American-Jewish community, oil-rich Arab nations, and competition with the Soviet sphere of influence.

Carter regularly shared with the White House Press Corps information from meetings that he had previously had with foreign leaders, which those very leaders believed was being said in confidence. Following a meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on March 9, 1977, Carter publicly outlined the geographic map that would need to be achieved before a settlement could be reached. However, that map radically differed from Israel’s previously stated position.¹⁸ Carter’s penchant for pushing the peace process faster than what Israel was comfortable with created substantial tension between the United States and Israel. Additionally, Carter distanced himself from, or even outright rejected, promises that previous U.S. presidents had made to Israel. While Carter’s frankness has historically been perceived to be a result of anger with Israeli “intransigence,” his open candor effectively revived a stagnant negotiating process and gauged public support for new positions.¹⁹ Carter and his administration utilized opinion polling in Israel to see how Israeli citizens felt about U.S. policies as a means of leveraging Israeli opinion against Israeli leaders through the media.

¹⁷ William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967*. 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Berkeley: Brookings Institution Press; University of California Press, 2005), 177.

¹⁸ Stein, *Heroic Diplomacy*, 193.

¹⁹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983), 97.

Additionally, when Carter made statements that angered the Israelis, they resulted from sporadic spontaneous comments, that even surprised his own advisors. While these comments seldom became official U.S. negotiating policy, they were used to show Sadat that the United States was willing to risk political ties with Israel to advance peace. By speaking frankly, Carter persuaded the Egyptians and Israelis simultaneously. Carter's strength with the Israelis and his soft touch with the Egyptians allowed him to pull them to an agreement.

A significant amount of scholarship has focused on why President Carter was disproportionately favorable in both public and private interactions with Sadat. Carter called Sadat "my wonderful friend" and said after their first meeting that "it was love at first sight and quite genuine."²⁰ Carter's apparent closeness to Sadat made Israelis incredibly uncomfortable and gave them the perception that they would not receive fair treatment. American and Israeli Jews alike became particularly furious with him after Carter published his 2006 book *Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid*, and many, like former Director of the Anti-Defamation League Abraham Foxman, used this to accuse Carter of being antisemitic.²¹ While Carter's comparison between the West Bank and South African apartheid in his book is controversial and arguable, his book should not diminish the fact that Carter had to show a certain level of favor to Sadat. Sadat entered peace negotiations not just as a representative of Egypt but attempting to speak on behalf of the Arab world. If at any point Carter pressured Sadat to make necessary concessions to Israel without simultaneously gratifying him publicly, Sadat would have left the negotiations. Carter also showed unwavering sympathy towards Israel, in part because it was the Holy Land, but also because he believed in Israel's

²⁰ Paul H. Elovitz and Mohammed Shaalan, "Presidents Carter and Sadat," in *Politics and Psychology: Contemporary Psychodynamic Perspectives*, ed. Joan Offerman-Zuckerberg (Boston, MA: Springer US, 1991), 143-173.

²¹ James D. Besser, "Jewish Criticism Of Carter Intensifies." *The Jewish Week*. December 15, 2006. Accessed January 25, 2019. <https://web.archive.org/web/20070613195955/http://www.thejewishweek.com/news/newscontent.php3?artid=13420>.

right to exist peacefully, which had evaded the country since the day of its creation. To commemorate the 25th anniversary of the Camp David Accords, the Carter Center held a panel at the Woodrow Wilson International Center where participants at Camp David recalled their own memory of events. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the U.S. National Security Advisor to the President, summarized what he learned from Camp David:

Overall I would say that what Camp David shows is that, first of all, if the United States is to play a constructive role in the Middle East, it has to have a balanced and fair approach and be perceived as such by the world community and not be partial, not to provide umbrella just for one side or protection for one side or favoritism to one side.¹¹

Carter somehow walked a negotiator's tightrope whereas he was able to curry favor for Sadat while not alienating Begin, because after all, Israel held all the cards.

¹¹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Camp David 25th Anniversary Forum," Carter Center, September 17, 2003. Accessed January 24, 2019. https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/Camp_David_Forum_03.pdf

CARTER'S INITIAL ATTEMPTS AT PEACE:

By the time Carter became president, all that existed in the Middle East was a handful of ceasefires that had stabilized parts of the region after the various wars. Carter sent Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on an 11-day Middle East trip in February 1977 to gauge the support for his proposal for a second, more substantive, Geneva Middle East Peace Conference. On his trip, Vance met with Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, Egyptian President Sadat, Lebanese President Élias Sarkis, Jordan's King Hussein bin Talal, Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, and Syrian President Hafez Assad.²³ On the last day of his exploratory trip to the Middle East, Vance said that the Arabs and Israelis remain "deeply divided" and that it will be "a very hard and difficult road ahead."²⁴

A month after Vance's trip, the same leaders that he saw visited the White House. After their visit, Carter made a planned address before the United Nations General Assembly in New York on March 17, 1977. In his speech, Carter said, "In the Middle East we are doing our best to clarify areas of disagreement, to surface underlying consensus, and to help to develop mutually acceptable principles that can form a flexible framework for a just and a permanent settlement."²⁵ The Carter Administration based its framework for peace in the Middle East on a 1975 Brookings Institute Report created by Brzezinski, Quandt, and Vance. The detailed 11-page report outlined U.S. interests in the Middle East, the need for a peace agreement (the first Sinai Disengagement Agreement was about to expire at the end of 1977), the process through which a settlement should be reached, its provisions, and the U.S.'s role in negotiating it.²⁶ Carter believed that he could achieve these objectives by convening

²³ "Secretaries Travel Abroad- Cyrus R. Vance." U.S. Department of State Archive. Accessed January 25, 2019. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/trvl/ls/13038.htm>.

²⁴ Bernard Gwertzman, "Vance, Ending Tour, Says Deep Divisions Persist in Mideast." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Feb 22, 1977.

²⁵ Jimmy Carter, *United Nation- Address Before the General Assembly*. The American Presidency Project. March 17, 1977. <https://www.presidency.ucsba.edu/node/243111>.

²⁶ "The Brookings Report on the Middle East." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 6, no. 2 (1977).

another Geneva Middle East Peace Conference in September or October 1977. A working group of Brzezinski, Vance, and their staffs formulated what a second Geneva conference would look like, and what had to happen beforehand. Carter believed that the first Geneva conference was unsuccessful because no preconditions were arranged and it did not last long enough.²⁷ Brzezinski thought the procedure and any preconditions to be discussed at Geneva needed to be adequately addressed before the conference. Israel's Prime Minister, Rabin, opposed going to a second Geneva conference without Brzezinski's suggested format.

While Rabin occasionally found Carter very difficult to work with and vice-versa, the two leaders respected one another. When Carter hosted Rabin at a State Dinner in the White House, Carter said that when he first met Rabin, "he was an instant friend."²⁸ Rabin spoke after Carter and ended his remarks with a toast to peace in the Middle East.

Then in May 1977, an Israeli election threatened to torpedo the progress made towards peace. Menachem Begin, the leader of the right-wing *Likud* party and former member of the Irgun (a Zionist terrorist organization that sought to remove British and Arab presence from Palestine), became the first right-wing leader of an Israeli coalition government in the country's thirty years of existence. In America, an article in the *Wall Street Journal* declared "forget peace."²⁹ In Israel, the results of the election were dubbed a "*Mahapakh*" (turnover).³⁰ The Yom Kippur War, which caught Israel by surprise, left a psychologically wounded country that turned to Begin for strength. Carter would now have to continue his negotiations with Israel's new leader.

²⁷ Stein, *Heroic Diplomacy*, 188.

²⁸ Jimmy Carter, *Visit of Prime Minister Rabin of Israel Toasts of the President and the Prime Minister at a Working Dinner for the Prime Minister*. The American Presidency Project. March 7, 1977. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/242920>.

²⁹ Felix Kessler, "Israeli Election Skews Peace Hopes." *Wall Street Journal* (1923 - Current File), May 26, 1977.

³⁰ Elon Gilad, "Word of the Day / Mahapakh." *Haaretz.com*. January 10, 2018. Accessed January 25, 2019. <https://www.haaretz.com/.premium-word-of-the-day-mahapakh-1.5312105>.

CARTER'S SPEECH SETS THE STAGE:

On November 2, 1977, the 60th anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, Carter delivered a speech before the Meeting of the General Council of the World Jewish Congress. In his speech, he discussed his support for Israel and the Jewish people but did not shy away from having an honest presentation of what he felt were the necessary steps to achieve peace. In his speech, Carter outlined the “three key issues” needed to be addressed in any negotiations:

First, the obligations of real peace, including the full normalization of political, economic, and cultural relations; second, the establishment of adequate security measures, coupled to Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories, and agreement on final, recognized, and secure borders; and third, the resolution of the Palestinian question.³¹

It is significant that Carter would have the political determination to outline these bold steps towards negotiations when addressing the World Jewish Conference. Furthermore, Carter undoubtedly had another audience in mind for this speech - namely, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. By outlining significant points for negotiation and asking for the full acceptance of United Nations Resolution 242, Carter was signaling to Sadat that he could stand before his domestic audience and place himself in an uncomfortable position to advance negotiations.

Sadat must have recognized this point, because the next day, on November 3, 1977, he sent Carter a telegram in which he suggested that it is necessary to “upgrade the level of the peace conference.”³² In the telegram, Sadat expressed his desire to move past procedural issues, which he saw as endless bickering that jeopardized peace, and instead convene a Middle East Conference in east Jerusalem with “the leaders of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the People’s Republic of China, France, the United Kingdom,

³¹ Jimmy Carter, *World Jewish Congress Remarks at the Meeting of the General Council*, The American Presidency Project. November 2, 1977. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/242474>.

³² *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute*, January 1977-August 1978, eds. Adam M. Howard and Stephen P. Randolph (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2013), Document 141, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v08/comp1>.

Israel, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Lebanon, Mr. Yassir Arafat and the United Nations Secretary General.”³³ Sadat’s tone in the telegram was that of irritation at the lack of urgency in negotiations. This was a radical utterly different approach than the one that Sadat and Carter had been working on. Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski had all been strong advocates of reconvening a second Geneva Middle East Conference. A second conference would have just been used to outline procedural matters for later negotiations. Sadat wanted something ready to be signed.

Carter responded to president Sadat’s telegram two days later with his own telegram which politely and frankly outlined the complications that convening a Middle East Conference in east Jerusalem would entail.³⁴ Carter stressed to Sadat the importance of nuance and patience needed in talks of this nature. Sadat was rushing into negotiations with no preparation, no clear plan, and with the intent of only being satisfied when a deal was made. It was a recipe for disaster that would have meant the end to Carter’s systematic approach to a second Geneva Conference. In his telegram, Carter expressed his gratitude that Sadat would seek his input but advised that a public announcement of a Middle East Conference would complicate the peace process rather than facilitate it.³⁵ In the days after Carter’s telegram, Sadat did not make any further references to this plan and did not make any public announcements regarding a Middle East Conference. Carter had successfully dissuaded Sadat from an announcement that would have been more for show than for peace. However, Sadat, who enjoyed the international attention, would make a speech before the *Egyptian People’s Assembly* days later that would surprise Americans and Israelis alike.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977-August 1978, Document 142.*

³⁵ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977-August 1978, Document 143.*

SADAT'S HISTORIC SPEECH

On November 9, 1977, Sadat gave a speech before the *Egyptian People's Assembly*, where he seemed to publically retract from the notion of a Middle East Conference in east Jerusalem and expressed his willingness to negotiate in Geneva.³⁶ It appeared that Carter's telegram had convinced Sadat to continue towards Geneva. However, Sadat wanted to prove that it was he, and not the Israelis, who was more prepared and eager to negotiate. Sadat went so far as to say that he would "go to the *Knesset* (Israeli parliament) itself" to negotiate with Israelis to withdraw from occupied territories and recognize Palestinian rights.³⁷ Even though Sadat was speaking before the *Egyptian People's Assembly*, the American ambassador to Egypt Hermann Eilts was in attendance. It was clear that Sadat's message was intended for a global audience. Similar to Sadat's recognition of the political courage that Carter expressed in his speech before the World Jewish Council, Carter commended Sadat for taking meaningful steps towards peace:

Your forceful reiteration of Egypt's commitment to peace and of your determination not to be deterred or delayed by petty differences over procedure are acts of extraordinary statesmanship. You have my admiration and my pledge to work hand in hand together for the peace that we both seek. The coming days will be crucial to our effort to bring about an early reconvening of the Geneva Conference.³⁸

American and Israeli news outlets were filled with speculation as to what this may mean for negotiations. Additionally, Sadat's speech took the American and Israeli governments by surprise, so they were left to try and figure out what Sadat's goal was.

In Washington, Brzezinski began to compile memorandums for Carter that included excerpts and assessments of the Israeli media's reaction to Sadat's speech. In a November 14th memorandum for the President from Brzezinski, he summarizes the overall positive

³⁶ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977-August 1978, Document 144.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977-August 1978, Document 146.*

reaction that the Israeli media gave to Sadat's speech.³⁹ Brzezinski references explicitly an article from *Maariv*, a hawkish mass circulated Israeli newspaper, stating that Sadat's public speech to his own people gave his words more weight and was an essential first step towards public recognition of Israel.⁴⁰ Brzezinski's inclusion of such excerpts in the memorandums reflects the understanding that national media outlets serve not only to report on the national mood but also to set it. Newspapers like Israel's *Maariv* reflect facts and events that have occurred while simultaneously offering opinions on what those facts and events mean. When shaping foreign policy or negotiating agreements between countries, it is just as significant, if not more significant, to know what a country's people think instead of just what its leaders think.

Carter made it very clear that he wanted another Geneva conference to occur. These memorandums on Israeli media's reaction to events are evidence that the U.S. was paying very close attention to the national mood within Israel after Sadat's speech. This is because the national mood in Israel could be used for the dual purpose of pushing the Egyptian and Israeli leaders closer together. If the national mood in Israel, detailed through domestic media coverage, revealed that the people were willing to make dramatic steps towards peace, then it could be used by Carter to convince Begin to be more forceful in his efforts to work towards peace. Similarly, domestic media coverage of Sadat's visit could be shown to Sadat himself by Carter as a way of demonstrating that his courage to go to Jerusalem had been awarded approval by the Israeli people.

³⁹ *National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski provides President Jimmy Carter with information on the following world events: Portuguese political situation; Somali-Soviet relations; Israeli media response to a speech by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat; the human rights situation in Iran; Indonesian military requests for U.S.-made aircraft.* United States: White House, 14 Nov. 1977. *U.S. Declassified Documents Online* (accessed November 21, 2018). <http://tinyurl.galegroup.com.proxy.library.ucsb.edu:2048/tinyurl/8APvM6>.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

Sadat's announcement that he would visit the *Knesset* came as a surprise, and potentially one that could destabilize the situation of current progress towards Geneva due to uncertainty. The Carter administration began to discuss if it was feasible to dissuade Sadat from visiting Jerusalem, and instead refocus on a track towards Geneva.⁴¹ However, Sadat was determined to go to Jerusalem. Sadat believed that visiting Jerusalem would revive substantive negotiations, give him more prominence amongst Arab nations, and would shift the responsibility for the next move towards Israel. Despite the legitimate symbolic significance of the first Arab leader visiting Israel, it was more for symbolism than diplomacy. In discussion with Dan Pattir, a media advisor for Begin, Pattir asked Sadat if he had any procedural, substantive, or agenda question prior to the visit, to which Sadat responded, "My only agenda is coming to Jerusalem."⁴² Despite Sadat's outward eagerness to begin negotiations without preconditions, it would have been unreasonable to assume that should he be invited to Israel, that the visit would have any substantive results. Sadat had placed himself too far in front of Arab precedent, and the Israelis still did not trust the Egyptians after the 1973 October War. This theoretical trip to Jerusalem was still just Sadat's rhetoric, and it would take an Israeli invitation to initiate a formal visit as an attempt to ease tensions.

⁴¹ Stein, *Heroic Diplomacy*, 117.

⁴² Ibid, 225.

SADAT'S VISIT TO JERUSALEM:

On November 15, 1977, a satellite hookup linked Cairo and Tel Aviv with the *CBS* newsroom in New York. It was here that Walter Cronkite, a prominent *CBS* news anchor, interviewed Sadat and later Begin.⁴³ Only four years earlier, the countries of these two leaders had declared a cease-fire with one another after the 1973 October War, however, they were still in a state of war. Now, Sadat told Cronkite that he was willing and able to travel to Jerusalem at the "earliest time possible" to engage in substantive dialogue with no preconditions.⁴⁴ Later in the interview, Begin promised Cronkite that he would postpone his visit to London to meet with British Prime Minister James Callaghan, and extend an invitation to Sadat to visit Jerusalem during that time instead. In an interview with the *Washington Post* the next day, Cronkite remarked that no interview or combination of interviews previously in his career would "[have] the prospect of immediate impact like this."⁴⁵ John Marks, who served as a Foreign Service Office in the State Department, argued that the media has an important role to play in peacebuilding by not glamorizing conflict and journalists asking questions that promote understanding.⁴⁶ Cronkite did this by allowing Sadat to reiterate his interest in visiting Jerusalem, and giving Begin the opportunity to respond. Egypt and Israel still did not have diplomatic relations, so the United States acted as the intermediary between the counties. Hermann Eilts, ambassador to Egypt at the time, told Sadat that Begin had issued an oral invitation to him, but he would not respond until Israel

⁴³ Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat, interviewed by Walter Cronkite, *New York Times* (1923-Current File), Nov 15, 1977.
<https://www.nytimes.com/1977/11/15/archives/transcript-of-the-interviews-with-sadat-and-begin.html>.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Robert G. Kaiser, "Cronkite: Matchmaking in Mideast." *The Washington Post* (1974-Current File), Nov 16, 1977.
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/11/16/walter-cronkite-and-matchmaking-in-mideast/92167d36-9b50-48f1-ac69-85f83ad1d4f6/>.

⁴⁶ John Marks, "Peacebuilding and the Media." *Women's World*, no. 41 (2007): 31-32.

sent a more formal invitation; this was proof that Sadat was taking any visit to Jerusalem very seriously and that it was not merely rhetoric.⁴⁷

The coverage surrounding the historic first Arab leader's visit to Israel, especially only three years after the October War, was full of hope. Even before Begin's formal invitation, Israeli news was discussing how unprecedented this could be. Brzezinski began to receive regular memorandums from the White House Situation Room with important quotations extracted from mass circulated Israeli newspapers.⁴⁸ Similarly to the memorandum on Israeli media coverage immediately after Sadat's speech before the Egyptian People's Assembly, Brzezinski was collecting intelligence on what the situation on the ground in Israel was looking like. The analysis from the Situation Room for Brzezinski said:

The embassy comments that whether or not anything comes of this latest exchange and whether Sadat ever in fact appears in the *Knesset* is seen by most observers as immaterial. The fact that he has declared his willingness to do so and that Begin has extended the invitation is in itself significant. Abba Eban [Israeli Parliament Member] emphasized this in an interview on Sunday when he said that it was important to note that Israel has now been accepted by Egypt as a country with "a government and a parliament and with whom conversations can be carried out."⁴⁹

On November 16, 1977, Begin formally invited Sadat to visit Israel and speak to the *Knesset*. American news agencies began to assess that the Carter administration, realizing the momentous progress being made among Egypt's and Israel's leaders, decided to partially abandon the Geneva road. The *Washington Post* wrote, "the Carter administration, which until today had played no role in helping arrange what had been an almost unthinkable

⁴⁷ Stein, *Heroic Diplomacy*, 224.

⁴⁸ National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski is provided with information on the following world events: Israeli press reaction to dialogue between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin; Moroccan King Hassan II's plan to facilitate contact between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and U.S. Jewish groups during his Washington, D.C. visit. United States: White House, 15 Nov. 1977. U.S. Declassified Documents Online (accessed November 21, 2018). <http://tinyurl.galegroup.com.proxy.library.ucsb.edu:2048/tinyurl/8ARCy7>.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

meeting, appeared to be dramatically revising upward its opinion of the event's importance."⁵⁰

The next day, Begin called Carter to discuss his formal invitation to Sadat.⁵¹ The two leaders agreed that Sadat was taking a bold step by visiting Israel, one that might place him too far away from the rest of the Arab world, so it would be critical to guarantee that Sadat left with something that he could take back to his people. The American ambassadors to Israel and Egypt began to devise a plan so that upon his return to Egypt, Sadat would have a tangible achievement to present to his people.

The red carpet had literally been rolled out for Sadat, but there was a tense sense of uncertainty in the air at Ben Gurion Airport in Tel Aviv. There were members of Sadat's own cabinet who had resigned over his visit to Israel, and others who believed this would be an assassination attempt.⁵² There were members of Begin's cabinet who believe this was just a disguise for another planned invasion like that of 1973. However, both radical factions of either cabinet were proven wrong as Sadat got off of the plane and was met with smiles and a handshake from Begin.

The plan was that when Sadat landed in Israel he would pray at the *Al-Aqsa* Mosque, visit the *Yad Vashem* Holocaust memorial, and visit the Church of the Holy Sepulcher. As the motorcade traveled through the streets of Jerusalem, children lined the streets waving Egyptian and Israeli flags. Peace finally felt tangible.

⁵⁰ H.D.S. Greenway, "Begin Formally Invites Sadat to Visit Israel." *The Washington Post*. November 16, 1977. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/11/16/begin-formally-invites-sadat-to-visit-israel/8ed427f6-47ae-4e3b-a5d8-97875ef75ba2/?utm_term=.1aa16789b6ac.

⁵¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute*, January 1977-August 1978, Document 147.

⁵² H.D.S Greenway. "Sadat Trip Set Saturday." *The Washington Post (1974-Current File)*. Nov 18, 1977. <https://search-proquest-com.proxy.library.ucsb.edu:9443/docview/146717504?accountid=14522>.

Almost entirely absent from this momentous occasion were any Americans. While it was Carter's conversations with Sadat that encouraged him to perform a grand gesture for peace, Sadat had not informed Carter of his plan to go to Jerusalem before he announced it at the *Egyptian People's Assembly*. Sadat's trip to Jerusalem represented the first time that Israel and Egypt would attempt to engage in bilateral negotiations without American involvement. While bilateral negotiations very well could have resulted in progress in the peace negotiations, Sadat's trip was largely symbolic, and neither leader made concessions or trusted one another.

For the first time, the United States was placed in a support role. While Carter was willing to help provide assistance and advice, he was more inclined to be the mediator in the room negotiating between Egypt and Israel. In an interview Samuel Lewis, the U.S. Ambassador to Israel, he said

Israelis had a very heady feeling because they had finally achieved this breakthrough, and they didn't need the United States... They needed our support, obviously, but they really hoped and many of them thought that they could translate Sadat's trip into a quick bilateral agreement.⁵³

Sadat's visit to Jerusalem infused a new sense of purpose into the peace negotiations, but it also humbled Carter by showing him how fragile the closeness of his involvement really was. Vance also recognized that should bilateral negotiations move forward that "in the immediate future [the United States'] intermediary role, while still important, is less central than in the past."⁵⁴ The role that the United States would potentially play in future negotiations was fading away, and with it, Carter's closeness with Sadat.

⁵³ Stein, *Heroic Diplomacy*, 228.

⁵⁴ Cyrus Vance, *Analysis of Sadat-Begin Talks*. November 24, 1977. Jimmy Carter Library, Plans Files, Container 1, Egypt, 11/77-11/81.

BILATERAL EGYPT-ISRAEL TALKS STALL:

Sadat's spontaneous visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 did not result in groundbreaking changes in either Egypt's or Israel's negotiating positions. However, Sadat's visit to Jerusalem did mark a change in the relationship between Sadat and Begin, while also humbling Carter because of the almost total lack of U.S. involvement. The visit to Jerusalem awakened Carter to the fact that the U.S. may no longer be playing an instrumental role in Middle East peace negotiations. Carter's realization moved him to focus more on what an Egypt-Israel deal mediated by the U.S. would look like as opposed to a broader Arab-Israeli deal at Geneva.

Soon after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, Begin visited Ismailia, Egypt on Christmas Day to continue the talks that had begun in Jerusalem. However, despite the goodwill, both leaders demonstrated, the same vast divide remained between the Israeli and Egyptian camps.⁵⁵ The working relationships between Begin and Sadat can best be described as complicated; at times they would be seen laughing with one another, but both Sadat and Begin were "men of beliefs" who were divided personally and by their opposing negotiating styles.⁵⁶ Sadat was someone who made grand gestures and often expected the same in return, and Begin was a gradual and meticulous negotiator who dedicated close attention to each and every article, sentence, and even word.⁵⁷ This is where Carter's distinctive unstudied negotiating style was necessary. Carter's closeness to Sadat gave Sadat someone with whom he could negotiate general principles, and Carter's detail orientation gave Begin someone with whom he could dive into details and debate particulars.

⁵⁵ Henry Tanner, "In Egypt, an Editor Describes the Sadat-Begin Meeting as the 'Last Bus to Peace'." *The New York Times*. December 25, 1977. Accessed February 12, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/1977/12/25/archives/in-egypt-an-editor-describes-the-sadat-begin-meeting-as-the-last-bus.html>.

⁵⁶ J24NEWS. "What Was the Relationship between Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat?" YouTube. November 19, 2017. Accessed February 12, 2019. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P9DbGeYPzv4>.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

CARTER'S ATTEMPT TO INTENSIFY U.S. ROLE IN NEGOTIATIONS

On January 4, 1978, Carter visited Sadat at Aswan, Egypt. In their statements following their meeting, Carter did what no other U.S. President had publically done. He declared that the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories were illegal and that

there must be a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The problem must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and enable the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future.⁵⁸

In typical style, Carter broke with U.S. foreign policy precedent when he felt it was necessary to regain Sadat's trust. Carter's Aswan Declaration was not a mistake, but an intentional maneuver to pull Begin closer towards Sadat and Carter's view that settlements in the Sinai Peninsula were only an obstacle to peace that could be halted if Begin wished to do so. On the same day, Israel announced that it would expand the construction of settlements in the Sinai Peninsula.⁵⁹ Begin had been planning the expansion of six military settlements in the West Bank territories even before Carter's remarks at the Aswan conference, but Carter's remarks, which were designed to place pressure on Begin, triggered Begin's immediate response.

Carter manipulated the tension between Israel and the United States that he himself created at Aswan by turning the words of Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan against Begin. In one letter in a series of correspondences between Carter and Begin regarding the expansion of settlements after January 4th, Carter quoted to Begin the minutes of a meeting he previously had with Dayan on September 19, 1977. Dayan had said, "Settlements will not decide boundaries, and if a settlement is beyond our final borders, it will either be removed or

⁵⁸ Jimmy Carter and Anwar Sadat. "Statements by Presidents Sadat and Carter, Aswan, 4 January 1978." Mfa.gov.il. January 4, 1978. Accessed February 12, 2019. <https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook3/Pages/107%20Statements%20by%20Presidents%20Sadat%20and%20Carter-%20Asw.aspx>.

⁵⁹ Donald Neff, "Middle East History: It Happened in November; Sadat's Jerusalem Trip Begins Difficult Path of Egyptian - Israel Peace." *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, (Nov 30, 1998), 83-85.

we will get agreement with our neighbors.”⁶⁰ Carter’s speech at Aswan alongside Sadat, which came only weeks before Begin, Carter, and Sadat were supposed to meet in Jerusalem and Cairo, was purposefully designed to pressure Begin on a position (“the Palestinian problem”) which was in fact not the crux of the negotiations. Carter was aware that Sadat’s primary loyalty was to his own people and that his primary negotiating goal was to get back Egypt’s land which was lost in 1967. In an interview with U.S. ambassador Dennis Ross, he stated that what made the negotiations leading up to and at Camp David interesting was

that the negotiations involved not just Egypt and Israel, but they involved Egypt trying to represent the Palestinians at the same time they were trying to get their own land back...Egypt was there trying to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians at a time when the Palestinians weren’t accepting Egypt as their representative.⁶¹

Carter genuinely supported a Palestinian state, but was also pragmatic and realized that this was out of the question for Begin and a negotiating point regarding which Sadat was willing to compromise. Knowing this, Carter did not hesitate to apply pressure regarding a negotiating point that could later be compromised on for the greater issue of the Sinai Peninsula.

What may have appeared as a public blunder or Sadat manipulating Carter was actually Carter’s intentional attempt to simultaneously satisfy Sadat with an impressive gesture while also applying pressure to Begin at a negotiating point that would eventually become less substantial without proper Palestinian representation. American historian and journalist Donald Neff described Carter’s visit to Egypt and the Aswan Declaration as an event that was meant “to help Sadat, and goad Begin to be more forthcoming.”⁶² This single example of Carter’s prepared remarks at Aswan demonstrated that his candor and closeness

⁶⁰ *Message from President Carter to Prime Minister Begin*. January 19, 1978. Jimmy Carter Library, Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor, NSA 3, Container 9, Israel - Prime Minister Menachem Begin, 11/77-6/78.

⁶¹ Dennis Ross, personal telephone interview by author. January 17, 2019.

⁶² Neff, “Middle East History”.

to Sadat were successful negotiating strategies that pulled and pushed Egypt and Israel towards an agreeable deal.

From February 4 to February 8, Sadat visited Carter at Camp David. Before their five-day-long peace negotiating strategy conference, Brezinski sent Carter an outline of the United States' Middle East strategy for the next two months. Included in the memo is an illustrative calendar that details five events that had to take place before Carter could give a substantial speech on the Middle East peace process. Brezinski noted that Carter should send an official letter to Begin in mid-February demanding that he be more flexible and reaffirm U.N. Resolution 242 in all its parts, and follow with a letter to Sadat in late-February reaffirming U.N. Resolution 242 in all its parts. It was strategic for Carter to send these letters because the basic outline of U.N. Resolution 242 promised peace and security for Israel in return for withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula. Brezinski's memo also outlined the intense negotiating battle that would occur between the Egyptian and Israeli delegations concerning the embrace of all parts of U.N. Resolution 242. The Egyptians wanted the text of 242 included in the body of an agreement so that it would be legally binding, but the Israelis wanted the text of 242 included in the preamble of an agreement so that it would be a procedural recommendation, but not legally binding. Brezinski's memo ends with "Get ready for big debate!"⁶³

⁶³ *Memo from National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezinski to President Jimmy Carter. "Outline of a Middle East Strategy for the Next Two Months."* January 25, 1978. Jimmy Carter Library, Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor, NSA 25, Container 1, Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations 1978, Volume 1 [11].

CARTER MEETS WITH EGYPT AND ISRAEL TO GAUGE POSITIONS:

On February 4, 1978, Carter and members of his national security team met with Sadat and members of his government at Camp David. During the nearly hour and a half meeting, Carter made clear to Sadat his strategy in regard to the important issue of settlements in Sinai and to a certain degree those in the West Bank. Carter said that

Israel is most vulnerable to pressure from American Jews, from Congress, from the people, and from you and from me, on this issue. I have a feeling, a political feeling, that in a showdown, Begin would lose in Israel if settlements were viewed as an obstacle to permanent peace.⁶⁴

Carter was once again using the settlements in Sinai as a two-pronged approach. He showed sympathy towards Sadat while reinforcing the necessity to formally recognize Israel, and walked Sadat through how Israel could be pressured to relinquish the territory in Sinai that was captured in 1967. Additionally, Brezinski told Sadat that if after the meetings concluded he announced a "negative decision on the political and military talks," that it would appear as though the Carter-Sadat talks had failed. He went on to say that only "those in Israel who do not want a compromise will benefit."⁶⁵ Carter, Brezinski, and Vice President Walter Mondale, who during the meeting continually praised Sadat, all worked to make sure that Sadat knew that they, the American people, and the Egyptian people were grateful for the steps that he had made. They did so to ensure that he would not leave the negotiating table, as he had previously expressed frustration over Israeli inflexibility.

Carter was set to meet with Begin at the end of March. Carter would have the opportunity to express to Begin Sadat's genuine misgivings about the rate at which the peace process was proceeding. Sadat and Carter wanted Begin to leave the March meeting with a clear idea of what needed to be sacrificed for peace, and to avoid losing U.S. public support.

⁶⁴ *Memorandum of Conversation*. "President's Meeting with President Anwar Sadat." February 4, 1978. Jimmy Carter Library, Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor, NSA 25, Container 1, Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations 1978, Volume I [I].

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 9.

Before Begin's visit, Carter was given an outline of the objectives, substance, and tactics that should be used in his meeting.⁶⁶ The substance of the meetings was to include an affirmation of U.N. Resolution 242, as well as a discussion of settlements in Sinai, the West Bank, and Gaza. The outline advised Carter that the tone that he would need to take with Begin would have to be one of strength. However, on March 11, 1978, 39 Israelis were killed and another 71 injured by *Fatah*, a faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), in what became infamously known as "the Coastal Road Massacre." Brezinski used a backchannel to send Begin a note that said: "Every morally concerned person shares your sense of outrage and partakes of your sorrow at this vile act. It is a revolting reminder of the worst in human history."⁶⁷ Begin was still going to meet with Carter in Washington, now that the need for peace was more apparent, but the Coastal Road Massacre only hardened the positions of Begin and the Israeli public, making any deal with the PLO, let alone one that may benefit them, out of the question. In his memoir, Vance wrote that

the terrorist raid and the Israeli military response changed the political atmosphere for our talks with Prime Minister Begin. Before March 14, Begin had been on the defensive on both settlements and withdrawal [but after the massacre] the possibility of getting Begin to alter his positions on the West Bank and Palestinian questions was virtually eliminated.⁶⁸

On March 21, 1978, the U.S. and Israeli governments met at the White House to negotiate. A dozen representatives of each side met in the Cabinet Room for just over two hours to make each other's positions clear. During the meeting, Begin clarified the Israeli position in regards to the settlements in Sinai, revealing that there could be consensus down the line between him and Sadat. However, Begin's views for the future of Gaza and the West

⁶⁶ *Memorandum to President Carter*. "Outline of Strategy Paper for Begin Visit." March 1, 1978. Jimmy Carter Library, Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor, NSA 25, Container 1, Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations 1978, Volume I [I].

⁶⁷ *Personal Note from National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezinski to Prime Minister Begin*. March 13, 1978. Jimmy Carter Library, Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor, NSA 7, Container 8, Backchannel messages - Middle East, 2/78-11/80.

⁶⁸ Yaqub, *Imperfect Strangers*, 264.

Bank for "Judea and Samaria" as Begin preferred to call the land by its Biblical name) represented a change from the position of previous Israeli governments. Carter wanted a future agreement to include withdrawal "on all fronts," but Begin said that "The phrase 'on all fronts' is not in Resolution 242. We have a right not to add words to that Resolution."⁶⁹ When Carter pressed Begin on the purpose of U.N. Resolution 242, Begin said "The state of Israel has never been branded as an aggressor in the 1967 war. The Security Council never made such a determination. So changes in border are permissible and should be agreed upon."⁷⁰ Carter stuck to the strategy paper that was given to him three weeks earlier and chose to press Begin to consider only allowing military encampments to remain in the West Bank and gradually withdraw over a five-year interim period.

As discussed earlier, Carter's surprising launch onto the national stage in the mid-70s and his lack of personal experience in historical foreign policy decisions gave him a unique perspective unburdened by the weight of history. Carter's talk with Begin and members of the Israeli cabinet reveal that he was less concerned with historical precedent, and more concerned with the present situation. Even as the meeting was taking place, when Begin made it clear that the Israeli position was changed, Carter did not become unsettled by the new circumstances, he simply adopted them as a new fact and incorporated that into his calculus. Begin and Dayan justified their position with historical context; however, Carter always pivoted back to the present and how the situation on the ground appeared. Carter was deeply sympathetic towards Israel, but his unique ability to use the past for context and not as a crutch to rest on is what positioned him to do what no other American leader had done before.

⁶⁹ *Memorandum of Conversation*. "President's Meeting with Prime Minister Begin." March 21, 1978. Jimmy Carter Library, Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor, NSA 25, Container 1, Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations 1978, Volume I [I].

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 8.

Quandt, who was present in the March 1978 meeting between Carter and Begin, said that Carter was unique among American presidents for the "depth of his concern to find a peaceful resolution." Quandt further emphasized this was true despite how at the "beginning of [Carter's] administration, he knew little about the intricacies of the problem."⁷¹

On March 22, 1978, Carter and Begin reconvened after having dinner and a private discussion with one another the night before. Carter began the meeting by saying that he was "now discouraged about the prospects for future progress." After going into meticulous detail with Vance, Begin, and Dayan over settlements in Sinai and Palestinian self-determination which led nowhere, Carter left the meeting saying "I am sure you can reach some resolution of these differences. Thank you."⁷²

By that summer, the Carter administration's negotiating strategy was no longer working, and Sadat had still not presented the Americans with a sufficiently detailed proposal that the administration could modify and present Begin.⁷³ As members of Congress in the U.S. were gearing up for elections, the talks between Israel and Egypt came to a troublesome stall.

Between May and July of 1978, Begin visited the United States over Passover, Carter gave a speech commemorating the 30th anniversary of Israel's independence, Vance visited Egypt and Israel, and numerous letters were exchanged between Carter and Begin and between Carter and Sadat. However, still no progress was made to bridge the gap between Israel and Egypt in regard to the settlements in Sinai or Palestinian self-determination.

Both Sadat and Begin desperately wanted to achieve peace for their people, but negotiations were stagnant. Every proposal Sadat presented to the Americans lacked adequate

⁷¹ William B. Quandt, *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics*. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986), 331.

⁷² *Memorandum of Conversation*. "President's Meeting with Prime Minister Begin." March 22, 1978. Jimmy Carter Library, Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor, NSA 25, Container 1, Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations 1978, Volume 1 [I].

⁷³ Yaqub, *Imperfect Strangers*, 264.

negotiable depth and Begin was not flexible enough to move his government's position on U.N. Resolution 242 closer towards the American stance. Neither Sadat nor Begin were in the mood or position to break the negotiating stalemate. For Carter to infuse new life into the negotiations, he would have to make a grand gesture. However, Carter was advised by a small group of Democratic consultants to "stay as aloof as possible from direct involvement in the Middle East negotiations; this is a losing proposition."⁷⁴ The situation in the Middle East between Egypt and Israel was deteriorating quickly, and at a time when the civil war in neighboring Lebanon was intensifying, it looked as if the prospect of war was more imminent than the possibility of peace. At the time, doing nothing would have meant avoiding failure and blame, but if Carter continued he would have the opportunity to do what no other U.S. president had done before him.

On August 3rd, Carter sent one letter to Begin and another almost identical letter to Sadat. Carter solicited from both leaders a "renewed effort at the highest levels and with the greatest determination."⁷⁵ More specifically, he asked to have all three leaders meet together to "search for additional avenues towards peace."⁷⁶ At the same time that these letters of such historical significance were being delivered, Vance was in the Middle East to personally convey to the two leaders Carter's sincere desire to meet together to achieve a lasting peace. Sadat and Begin immediately accepted Carter's invitation.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*. (Fayetteville: Univ. of Arkansas Press, 2002), 315.

⁷⁵ *Letter from President Carter to President Sadat*. August 3, 1978. Jimmy Carter Library, Plains Files, Container 1, Egypt, 11/77-11/81.

⁷⁶ *Letter from President Carter to Prime Minister Begin*. August 3, 1978. Jimmy Carter Library, Plains Files, Container 17, Begin (Menachem) Communications, 11/77-8/78.

⁷⁷ William Quandt, "Middle East Developments, Memorandum for the President from Bill Quandt." *Central Intelligence Agency*. August 13, 1978. Accessed February 15, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/527b88eb993294098d517732>.

On August 8, 1978, Carter's press secretary Jody Powell announced that Begin and Sadat had accepted Carter's invitation. Powell's talking notes, which were prepared by Brzezinski, said

There are those who will say that the President should not be personally involved in a meeting at this level and that the chances for success are not very high. The President decided to issue an invitation not because the prospects are so good but because the risks are too high.⁷⁸

Carter, Begin, and Sadat were set to meet at Camp David a month later. Their meeting would include cabinet members and a dozen of high ranking staffers. The stage was set, and if major developments could be made in September at Camp David, then significant change could occur in the Middle East to pacify the region.

⁷⁸ *Announcement of Camp David Accords*. August 8, 1978. Jimmy Carter Library, Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor, NSA 7, Container 8, Backchannel Messages – Middle East, 2/78-11/80.

EXPECTATIONS TO THE PIVOTAL ISSUE AT CAMP DAVID:

Carter's invitation to Sadat and Begin was the revitalization that the stagnant negotiation process desperately needed. Sadat and Begin's acceptance of the invitation to convene negotiations at Camp David initiated a month-long preparation process by Carter and his cabinet. Carter's defining negotiating style which brought fresh eyes, frankness, and friendship were all on display in the lead up to Camp David.

The news of Carter's Camp David initiative echoed across the globe. The *Chicago Tribune* called Carter's initiative "the most dramatic move made for peace since Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem," and the *New York Times* said, "Mr. Carter has decided on this bold stroke in spite of the chilly negotiating atmosphere and the relative absence of diplomatic preparation."⁷⁹ It was apparent to everyone around the world, but particularly among the leaders of Egypt, Israel, and the U.S., that failure would not be an option. If Camp David failed, another war was almost guaranteed.

Carter was given a briefing book composed of analysis by Vance, Quandt, Harold Saunders, and Alfred Atherton.⁸⁰ The briefing was entitled "The Pivotal Issue: The Sinai/West Bank Relationship" and explored the critical issue of negotiations, background, and each party's respective view.⁸¹ The document discussed the important link that existed in Begin and Sadat's minds between what was required to resume Sinai territorial negotiations and "the West Bank/Gaza/Palestinian complex of questions."⁸² Essentially, the "pivotal

⁷⁹ Raymond Coffey, "Begin and Sadat Agree to Meet with Carter on Mideast Issues." *Chicago Tribune (1963-Current File)*, Aug 09, 1978; Hendrick Smith, "A New Gamble on Mideast." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Aug 09, 1978.

⁸⁰ Nahla Yassine-Hamdan and Frederic S. Pearson, *Arab Approaches to Conflict Resolution: Mediation, Negotiation and Settlement of Political Disputes*. (London: Routledge, 2014), 157.

⁸¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978-December 1980*, eds. Alexander R. Wieland and Adam M. Howard (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2013), Document 7, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v09Ed2>.

⁸² *Ibid.*

issue” referred to Begin and Sadat’s opposing view on linking any agreement over Sinai to that of the West Bank. Begin sought to ensure that no part of any Egyptian-Israeli agreement would pertain to resolving the question of Palestinians statelessness in Gaza and the West Bank, but Sadat sought to ensure that no Egyptian-Israeli agreement could be met without first linking Palestinian statelessness to the negotiations.⁸³ If a conclusion could not be made on this issue, then certainly a peace could not be achieved.

Carter’s ingenious approach to the negotiations was reflected in how he aimed to use his power and friendships. Paraphrasing how Carter entered Camp David, Brzezinski recalled the president saying, “that instead of working against Begin, we should try to work through him.”⁸⁴ What Carter was later able to do at Camp David was readjust the approach to negotiating with the Israelis. Instead of trying to bend Begin towards Sadat’s position in regard to the West Bank and Gaza, Carter attempted to reorient the question into how best he could make Sadat feel like he was getting a win to show the Arab world while simultaneously guaranteeing Begin’s security concerns (Later, nearly the entire Arab world rejected Sadat for this very reason.) This new strategy in regard to the pivotal issue was only made possible by Carter’s unique negotiating decisions that created a genuine bond of trust between him and Sadat while also maintaining an authentic line of communication.

Before the negotiations began at Camp David, Carter and his administration were working to adjust the narrative surrounding the pivotal issue of linkage between a compromise in Sinai and a compromise on Palestinian self-determination. This is what would determine the success or failure of the overall dialogue. At a news conference a week after announcing the restarting of negotiations at Camp David, Carter was asked about what led him to take the risk and what would happen should the effort fail. Carter in response described the framework for peace as difficult to achieve, noting that

⁸³ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 198.

⁸⁴ Yaqub, *Imperfect Strangers*, 264.

it may result only in a redetermination or recommitment to continue subsequent negotiations. We might make more progress than that. But we will go there as a full partner in the discussions, depending primarily, however, on the two national leaders themselves to work out the differences between them.⁸⁵

While Carter's ultimate goal was to achieve some form of an agreement between Sadat and Begin, he was also pragmatic enough to make sense of the complexities of each parties' positions to know that a straightforward agreement was unlikely to happen. Carter used this news conference, other public appearances, and discussions with high ranking foreign officials to create room for a grey area where compromises could be made.

Carter genuinely believed that the expectations for the Camp David negotiations were somber. Yet by being so frank about his expectations he was able to place the onus of "compromise or risk of failing" on the Egyptians and Israelis, while also rendering any agreement, despite any final vagueness, palatable. Before taking off on a helicopter for Camp David, Carter remarked that "the political consequences of failure might be very severe and...the prospects of complete success are very remote."⁸⁶ He took off to Camp David fully prepared to meet or exceed the expectation he set. With him, he had dozens of briefing papers, numerous advisors, and CIA analyses of Begin and Sadat's psychological profiles.⁸⁷

Likely in the numerous banker boxes of briefings that Carter was bringing with him was one from the CIA titled "Egypt-Israel: Expectations." The document, dating August 10, 1978, said that

the reaction of Egyptian officials, military men, and intellectuals to the announcement of the tripartite meeting at Camp David next month has been overwhelmingly positive. The danger may be that expectations have been raised unrealistically high

⁸⁵ Jimmy Carter, "The President's News Conference." *The American Presidency Project*. August 17, 1978. Accessed February 27, 2019.

⁸⁶ Jimmy Carter, "Camp David Meeting on the Middle East Remarks on Departure from the White House." *The American Presidency Project*. September 04, 1978. Accessed February 27, 2019. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/camp-david-meeting-the-middle-east-remarks-departure-from-the-white-house>.

⁸⁷ Jim Hoagland, "President Leaves for Camp David Mideast Summit." *The Washington Post* (1974-Current File), Sep 05, 1978.

and that there could be a reaction against Egyptian President Sadat's policies if the talks do not produce measurable progress.⁸⁸

The CIA's analysis, which was included in the President's National Intelligence Daily Cable, offered a further validation that Carter was using his strategic candor to bring public expectations closer, or even bellow, expected negotiation goals.

The grey area that Carter created around the pivotal issue of linkage between territorial negotiations in Sinai and negotiations regarding Palestinian self-determination would in fact later come back to harm Sadat. Later, during negotiations at Camp David, Israel's Attorney General, Aharon Barak prophetically said, "that if agreement had to be reached that day, all they could hope to do was to paper over some very major problems that would come back to haunt them."⁸⁹ Barak's prediction about the complications of linkage, or lack thereof, as will be discussed later, stems from Carter's calculus to minimize collateral damage of the peace agreement.

Carter himself later admitted this, when after Camp David concluded he said, "We must also not forget the magnitude of the obstacles that still remain. The summit exceeded our highest expectations, but we know that it left many difficult issues which are still to be resolved."⁹⁰ While the ramifications of the pivotal issue and linkage continue to be discussed today, it is clear that had Carter not created a grey area, negotiations would have surely fallen apart.

As will be discussed later, the Arab world and the Palestinian people eventually rejected the Camp David agreement and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty on account of a lack of adequate linkage between territorial exchanges in Sinai and Palestinian self-determination.

⁸⁸ "Egypt-Israel: Expectations." President Carter and the Role of Intelligence in the Camp David Accords, *Central Intelligence Agency*. August 10, 1978. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1978-08-10.pdf>.

⁸⁹ Quandt. *Peace Process*, 201.

⁹⁰ Jason Schwartz, "Begin and Sadat Sign Camp David Accords." *POLITICO*. September 17, 2018. Accessed February 27, 2019. <https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/17/began-and-sadat-sign-camp-david-accords-sept-17-1978-816159>.

Nevertheless, the lack of clear linkage was necessary to make any sort of a deal at all. Later, it will be shown that scholars like Seth Anziska are answering the wrong questions in regard to unforeseen outcomes of the final Camp David agreement.⁹¹ While Dr. Anziska argued that American negotiations at Camp David “circumscribed Palestinian self-determination,” it will be argued that Carter was aware of the implications of a vague agreement. Similarly, Carter also knew that should he fail to mediate an agreement between Egypt and Israel, greater immediate provocations like war or economic crises could occur.

⁹¹ Seth Anziska *Preventing Palestine: A Political History from Camp David to Oslo*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), 124.

PIVOTAL ISSUE AT CAMP DAVID:

The United States-mediated negotiations that took place at Camp David between Egypt and Israel from September 5 to September 17 and encompassed a vast number of concerns. The final agreement signed on the White House lawn on September 17 had three components: The West Bank and Gaza, Egypt-Israel, and Associated Principles. Within each of those components are numerous elements whose exact wording was debated and decided after hours of negotiations, described in detail in Lawrence Wright's book titled *Thirteen Days in September*. The following analysis of Carter's unique negotiating skills will focus on the previously mentioned pivotal issue of linkage between an agreement on territory exchange in Sinai the question of Palestinian self-determination. Linkage, or lack thereof, within the resulting document from Camp David, *The Framework for Peace in the Middle East*, has led many critics to regard it as the failure of Camp David that could have resulted in a far greater peace. Others assert that it was a necessary concession that allowed the summit to accomplish anything at all.⁹² The following analysis concerning the negotiations around the issue of linkage will be limited to Carter's success at achieving an eventual agreement.⁹³ The success or shortcomings of the deal that Carter brokered should be further explored.

While at Camp David, what Carter uniquely brought to the American delegation, as well as to the individual leaders of Egypt and Israel, was a fresh set of eyes more interested in looking towards the future than the past. It was understood that negotiations would most likely collapse if too much emphasis was placed on historical precedent. Given Carter's lack of foreign policy experience before becoming president, he was uniquely prepared for the task. Right before the summit started, Brzezinski gave Carter a strategic paper advising him

⁹² Lawrence Wright, *Thirteen Days in September: Carter, Begin, and Sadat at Camp David*. Vol. 3.1. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014. Apple Book), 264.

⁹³ Laura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan. *Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: Patterns, Problems, Possibilities*. 2nd ed. Indiana Series in Middle East Studies. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2010.

that while “both leaders will constantly be trying to get you to side with them” it would be vital to “concentrate on the future choices, on the strategic consequences of success or failure, and on the need for each side to transcend past positions.”⁹⁴ Carter’s ability to emphasize potential instead of the past mixed perfectly with his role as mediator between two leaders who felt the burden of history on their shoulders. Carter’s style was a lesson for future negotiations that it “was much better for [the United States] to be putting something on the table...Once [Egypt or Israel] put something on the table, they would have to be wedded to it and it could not really be modified.”⁹⁵ Carter’s relative lack of experience concerning Middle Eastern politics enabled him to be a creative and unbiased broker. These traits meshed perfectly with the strategic need to emphasize the current negotiations at hand instead of being beholden to past positions.

Going into the Camp David summit, Carter and the American delegation were focused on reconciling the two fundamental differences between Sadat and Begin. Sadat would not agree to a final settlement that did not relate Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza to the reacquisition of pre-1967 land in Sinai. Begin would not agree to relinquish the territory captured in Sinai if it meant fashioning a Palestinian self-determining body. For Israel, this was a matter of national security that could not be oversimplified, but for Egypt, it was a matter of Arab unity.

It is to this unique challenge that Carter dedicated much of his time and mental ingenuity at Camp David trying to solve. His expectation setting game that began before going to Camp David started to pay off after the second day of meetings. At the end of day two (September 6, 1978) at Camp David, Brzezinski brought Carter two different memos.

⁹⁴ *Strategy paper for President Jimmy Carter’s Camp David peace negotiation efforts with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin*. White House, 1 Sept. 1978. *U.S. Declassified Documents Online*, <http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/9HzmFX>. Accessed 28 Feb. 2019.

⁹⁵ Dennis Ross, interview by author. January 17, 2019.

One was a synopsis of Israeli news reaction, and the other was of Egyptian news reaction. An editorial in Israel's *Maariv* regretted that Carter "joined the race of pessimistic evaluations."⁹⁶ In Egypt, *Cairo Radio* said that "there is no room for optimism or pessimism."⁹⁷ Carter's early attempts at repositioning the media's, and even Begin and Sadat's, understanding of success was proving itself worthwhile. Carter created a negotiable opening where he could discuss the terms of the pivotal issue in a less consequential setting which made the other leaders more receptive to compromise.

As discussed earlier, it was crucial that during the summit the U.S. acted not just as an intermediary between the two parties, but also produced the drafts to be shown to each party. Carter was able to capitalize on his creative and unbiased negotiating style by convincing Sadat and Begin to allow him to create the initial wording based on what each leader offered. Carter was so dedicated to working out the details of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty at Camp David that the first draft was written by him personally.⁹⁸ Various drafts were presented to both the Egyptians and Israelis who made their own revisions, and it was up to the Americans to produce reconciled amended versions.

As the American delegation created each successive new draft, they took notes of what the Egyptian and Israeli delegations agreed and disagreed on. The notes were a tool to help reconcile different drafts. At the top of the typed document was a key that said "Blue= Not seen by Israel," "Green= Not seen by Egypt," and "Black= Neutral comment."⁹⁹ This

⁹⁶ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Israeli Media Comments concerning President Jimmy Carter's Warning against 'excessive Optimism' over the 9/5-9/17/1978 Camp David Summit Meetings" *U.S. Declassified Documents Online*, September 6, 1978. <http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/9Hz6G6>.

⁹⁷ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Egyptian Media Pessimism over Success at the Upcoming Camp David Summit Meetings." *U.S. Declassified Documents Online*, September 6, 1978. <http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/9HzHH3>.

⁹⁸ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 199.

⁹⁹ *Draft Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David*. September 12, 1978. Jimmy Carter Library, Plains Files, Container 28, Mid-East - Camp David Summit, President's Working Papers, 10/22/73-9/12/78.

annotated draft gives much insight into how the Egyptian and Israeli delegations felt about the issue of linkage between Sinai and the West Bank/Gaza. In the section of the draft framework concerning enabling “the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future...” two notes are made on either side of the text. Outlined in green it says, “Egyptians insist” but outlined in blue it says, “Begin objects.” Additionally, the documented conversations that took place between the American delegation and Egyptians and Israelis after seeing the first draft gives insight into how flexible they were willing to be.

In regard to the “Palestinian problem,” Carter’s first draft of a framework for peace included the phrase “Negotiations related to the West Bank and Gaza should provide for links between these areas and Jordan and should proceed in three stages.”¹⁰⁰ The Israeli delegation objected the phrase “provide for links between these areas and Jordan” and suggested to delete it. The primary Israeli objective at Camp David was to achieve recognition and a substantive peace from the regions strongest Arab country, Egypt. The Israelis, and particularly Begin and Barak who were intentionally particular about the language used in the draft, did not want Israel to be legally tied to a multi-year withdrawal agreement from the West Bank and Gaza. While the Egyptian delegation sought to tie Palestinian self-determination with the Sinai Peninsula, for the Israelis, self-determination and withdrawal created security concerns.¹⁰¹

Later, after the first American draft was released, Vance recalled having a conversation with Israel’s Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, where Dayan suggested to “find a way to separate out the agreement on the West Bank and Gaza so as at least to leave Camp David with that as an achievement.”¹⁰² The Americans and Israelis understood that to link the

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 7.

¹⁰¹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978-December 1980, Document 41.*

¹⁰² *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978-December 1980, Document 43.*

withdrawal of settlements in Sinai to the withdrawal of settlements in the West Bank/Gaza would mean to not have a deal at all because it was so disagreeable to the Israelis. While Israel's lack of flexibility could have affected the scope of a peace agreement, the facts of the matter were that this was an issue that Israel would under no circumstances compromise. It was, however, a negotiation point that had to be worded in such a way that would guarantee that Israel would stay at the negotiating table and ensured that Sadat would not appear to have abandoned the Palestinian question.

In a later meeting on September 12th, after the first draft was created, members of the American and Egyptian delegations met. Throughout the two-hour meeting, the issue of linkage between two separate agreements was never discussed.¹⁰³ While the members of the Egyptian delegation were interested in going over the general concept of what withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza would look like over a five-year interim period, they did not ask how it would be enforced. The Egyptian delegation was similar to Sadat in the sense that during their meeting with the Americans, their main concern was getting back the territory in Sinai.

Contrastingly, the Israeli delegation looked over the preliminary framework paragraph-by-paragraph. They discussed the draft in Hebrew in front of Vance, who decided that it was best to let the Israelis look over the document at their unhurried pace and reconvene the next morning.¹⁰⁴

On the issue of linking an agreement in Sinai to an agreement concerning the Palestinians, the Egyptians and Israelis were in agreement on the fact that the Jordanians should be involved. The Egyptians knew that they could work with their more moderate Arab ally, Jordan, and the Israelis understood that any deal to prescribe Palestinian self-

¹⁰³ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978-December 1980, Document 44.*

¹⁰⁴ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978-December 1980, Document 46.*

determination would have to include Jordan because the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) did not have any of the structure required to establish a functioning government. This was the grey area that Carter would use as an opening to insert into the final agreement language that would be acceptable to both parties.

While Sadat and the Egyptian delegation were less interested in being involved in detailed negotiations, the Americans and Israelis worked out deliberately vague language that essentially exempted the Palestinian territories from being considered territories acquired by war. This meant that a true connection between an agreement regarding Sinai and an agreement regarding the Palestinian territories could not be established.¹⁰⁵

While Carter entered the negotiations hoping for the best possible outcome, he was also a pragmatist who understood expectation setting would be necessary. In reworking the draft to accommodate the Israeli position, Carter understood that the Israelis were plainly in a stronger negotiating position than the Egyptians. It took a creative lawyer, one like Aharon Barak, to do legalese hairsplitting to protect the notion that U.N. Resolution 242 did not apply to the negotiations over the future of the West Bank. Recalling his time at the negotiations, Quandt said that “the Americans accepted the ambiguity, and Sadat may have well wondered what all the verbal gymnastics were about. In any case, Begin won this round as well.”¹⁰⁶

Analysts of international political mediation like Montague Kern have argued that Carter’s willingness to bend too much under Israeli intransigence was his greatest failure at Camp David.¹⁰⁷ Yet this simply means that the Israeli delegation was far less flexible than Carter had initially anticipated, and he was unable to alter their long-held objection to the linkage of two separate agreements. In the last days at Camp David, the Israeli delegation was able to prevail and lead the American delegation to perform careful legalese gymnastics.

¹⁰⁵ Yaqub, *Imperfect Strangers*, 265.

¹⁰⁶ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 202.

¹⁰⁷ Daniel Strieff, *Jimmy Carter and the Middle East: The Politics of Presidential Diplomacy*. Middle East Today. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 60.

However, this previously held conception ignored how Carter tactfully carried out his plan to work with Begin and not against him.

As Lawrence Wright describes on the fifth day of the summit, when Carter deleted the provision linking,

the implementation of a treaty between Egypt and Israel to the creation of a self-governing authority on the West Bank and in Gaza. Inevitably, he began thinking of two separate agreements. This would lead to what many critics consider to be the failure of Camp David to achieve a comprehensive peace, while others believe that it allowed the summit to achieve anything at all.¹⁰⁸

Put differently, Carter already knew prior to dropping the issue of linkage that it would be an immovable barrier for the Israelis that would prevent them from signing any peace agreement. For the Egyptians, it was an issue that could be looked over as parliamentary level details.

What prevented the lack of linkage from hurting Sadat's pride was Carter's incredibly close relationship with him. This is just another instance where Carter's closeness with Sadat served a strategic benefit. Carter knew that when it came time to call on Sadat to compromise for peace, he would be more willing to be flexible if the call came not only from the leader of the United States, but also from a friend.

Because of Carter's ability to make Sadat feel more at ease while making uncomfortable concessions, Carter guided Sadat to look the other way on the issue of linkage between the territory in Sinai and the future of Palestinian self-determination. Only a President like Carter, who was not only a friend of Sadat but also held his admiration, could have coaxed him into accepting such a plan.

Later at Camp David, Carter told Ezer Weizman, Israel's Minister of Defense at the time, that he would break the comprehensive peace into two agreements. One was to be "the grand bargain he hoped would resolve the Middle East conflict;" the other would

¹⁰⁸ Wright, *Thirteen Days in September*, 263.

"specifically deal with the Sinai settlements in order to achieve a separate peace treaty between Israel and Egypt."¹⁰⁹

In the final agreement signed on September 17, 1978, on the White House lawn, the Israelis conceded that the Palestinians had "legitimate rights" and should be given "full autonomy," but never used the phrase "self-determination."¹¹⁰ The final *Framework for Peace in the Middle East* that would eventually lead to the signing of the *Egypt-Israel Peace Agreement* three months later was intentionally vague wherever Carter sensed that it needed to be so.¹¹¹

When referring to the steps necessary to facilitate a withdrawal and a transition of autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza to either a future Palestinian entity, the Egyptians, or the Jordanians, the word "should" was intentionally used instead of "will." The word "should" left open a grey area that could be reinterpreted in the future. It eventually meant that the future self-determination negotiations would occur in vain because there was not enough legal clarity to force further negotiations.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 319.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 473.

¹¹¹ "Camp David Accords: The Framework for Peace in the Middle East - Research - The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum." Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum. September 17, 1978.
https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/research/framework_for_peace_in_the_middle_east.

THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAEL PEACE AGREEMENT:

Six months after the signing of *The Framework for Peace in the Middle East* at Camp David, Sadat, Carter, and Begin met again, this time on the White House lawn to sign the comprehensive *Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty*.¹¹² Carter had to make a separate agreement with Begin concerning negotiations with Egypt and Jordan to help facilitate Palestinian self-determination. These separate agreements made outside of the peace treaty framework were conducted in the form of a series of letters that included personal promises. While these personal letters may have been made between two world leaders, they did not carry any legal weight.

Carter's willingness to allow non-legally binding personal agreements to be a part of a broader legally binding peace treaty has attracted significant criticism of his negotiating style.¹¹³ However, Carter knew that the Israeli negotiating position was much stronger than the Egyptian negotiating position, which meant a choice between a deal with ambiguity, or no deal at all. Carter worked to clarify that even though clear linkage had not been made in the signed agreement, it could still be achieved. Though not legally binding, the correspondence between Carter and Begin was still significantly powerful. Should Begin not fully deliver on the promises he made in his letter, Carter could easily reveal the letters and expose that Begin was not willing to follow through with their promises, thus damaging Begin's image on the world stage.

What made the final peace agreement so successful was the military force withdrawal from Sinai and the implementation of normalized relationships between Israel and Egypt. Various zones were created to allow for a particular troop density over time, that would shift over a period of five years while Israeli troops withdrew from Sinai and Egyptian troops

¹¹² "Treaty of Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel." n.d. MFA.gov. [https://www.mfa.gov.eg/Lists/Treaties/Attachments/2278/Peace Treaty_en.pdf](https://www.mfa.gov.eg/Lists/Treaties/Attachments/2278/Peace%20Treaty_en.pdf).

¹¹³ Anziska, *Preventing Palestine*, 134-135.

reentered. This was a safety precaution to guarantee that there was appropriate geographic separation between the parties.

Following the signing of the accords at Camp David and the *Egypt-Israel Peace Agreement*, Sadat faced a significant amount of criticism. Egypt was banned from the Arab League and Sadat received condemnation from hardline Arab leaders in the Middle East and America.¹¹⁴

The peace agreement that Carter, Sadat, and Begin signed is still intact today to a certain extent. However, only two and a half years after Sadat signed the peace agreement, he was assassinated at a military parade by one of his own soldiers. While Sadat's assassination sparked fear that another Middle East conflict could be on the horizon, the peace between Egypt and Israel lasted.¹¹⁵ Hosni Mubarak, Sadat's Vice President, became President and under Mubarak from 1981 till 2011, a "cold peace" existed between Egypt and Israel. While the countries were not openly hostile to one another, they also were not friendly towards one another either.

¹¹⁴ Lippman, Thomas W. 1979. "Economic Boycott Of Egypt Imposed By Arab Countries, Arab States Unite in Boycott of Egypt." *The Washington Post*. WP Company. April 1, 1979.

¹¹⁵ "Egyptian Anguish." 1981. *Wall Street Journal (1923 - Current File)*, Oct 07, 1981.

THE SUCCESSES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF CARTER'S CAMP DAVID SUMMIT

In *Preventing Palestine* Seth Anziska claims that the current debilitating fate of the Palestinian people has its origins at Camp David. Anziska posits that “through deliberately ambiguous language in crafting this text, Carter and his advisors were able to secure Sadat’s and Begin’s support in the waning hours of the summit.”¹¹⁶ Anziska’s book attempts to provide an unbroken link between Begin’s, Carter’s, and Sadat’s inability to produce a solution to the Palestinian problem and the current plight of the Palestinians. Recently, Craig Daigle of the *Washington Post* similarly suggested that the Palestinian people were the losers of Camp David and that the current issue of Palestinian statelessness has seeds that were originally planted at Camp David.¹¹⁷ Both arguments are rightly based on the reality of Palestinian statelessness. However, any attempt to draw a direct link or commencement of the current Palestinian issue with the policies of Camp David is oversimplifying the complexities and hurdles that Carter had to overcome at Camp David, and ignoring intervening realities.

Dennis Ross, former U.S. Ambassador and special envoy to the Middle East during the Clinton Administration, disagrees with Anziska. Ross argues that the Camp David Accords are “a preeminent example of U.S. diplomacy at its best—a landmark agreement that produced the framework for the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.”¹¹⁸ Anziska scrutinized Carter’s policies at Camp David, arguing that Carter was distracted by the looming 1980 presidential election, the Iran hostage crisis, the Iranian revolution, and the Iraq-Iran War. Despite the fact that the Iranian Revolution is the only event Anziska states that was actually occurring during the Egypt-Israel negotiations, Ross argues that the ensuing intransigence of the PLO was the real cause of Palestinian statelessness after Camp David, not Camp David

¹¹⁶ Anziska, *Preventing Palestine*, 125.

¹¹⁷ Daigle, Craig. 2018. “The Loser of the Camp David Accords.” *The Washington Post*. WP Company. September 19, 2018.

¹¹⁸ Ross, Dennis. 2018. “Did Camp David Doom the Palestinians?” *Foreign Policy*. Foreign Policy. October 19, 2018.

itself.¹¹⁹ A significant portion of Anziska's argument overlooks the genuine good faith efforts with which Carter attempted to advocate for Palestinian self-determination. While the concept of self-determination was watered down to self-rule in the final agreement, this should not minimize the reality that Carter was only a broker, and even by trying to feverously advocate for the Palestinians, he risked pushing Israel away from the negotiations.

To commemorate the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Camp David Accords, the Wilson Center hosted a panel that included Carter, Barak, Brzezinski, Osama el-Baz, Walter Mondale, Quandt, Eilts, Samuel Lewis, and many others. As the panel proceedings note, throughout the panel discussion "every panelist attributed the ultimate success of Camp David to the personal attention and perseverance of President Carter who was unrelenting in his quest for peace."¹²⁰ Another panelist, Egypt's former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Boutros Boutros-Ghali said, "The proof that Camp David was a success is that peace prevails today between Egypt and Israel in spite of the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East [and] in the occupied territories," and that "Camp David contributed to the peace treaty [later] concluded between Jordan and Israel and helped Egypt play a role of mediator between the Palestinians and Israelis."¹²¹ It is difficult to say what would have happened in the Middle East had the Camp David summit not occurred. However, most foreign policy experts agree that the Middle East would have seen more wars and certainly fewer peace agreements had Carter not courageously inserted himself into negotiations to forge the first peace that the Middle East had ever seen.¹²²

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ "An Enduring Peace: 25 Years after the Camp David Accords." 2011. Wilson Center. July 7, 2011. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/enduring-peace-25-years-after-the-camp-david-accords>.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Bernard Gwetzman, "Egypt and Israel Sign Formal Treaty, Ending a State of War After 30 Years; Sadat and Begin Praise Carter's Role." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*, Mar 27, 1979.

CARTER AT CAMP DAVID AND WHY IT MATTERS.

In an interview with Ambassador Dennis Ross, when asked about the lessons and key conclusions that he and other American diplomats learned from Camp David he replied: "I would say that both the process and the substance basically was important, and I think they provided lessons for the future."¹²³ The process that Carter created at the Camp David Accords revolved around Egypt and Israel presenting the American delegation with their negotiating positions, and the Americans, in turn, drafting what they believed would be acceptable to both parties. In this way, the United States helped guarantee that neither party in the discussion felt beholden to any idea that they had introduced previously. Carter's approach to Camp David also helped shape the substance of future Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in regard to talks surrounding the concept of autonomy. Talks concerning autonomy at future negotiations in Madrid and Oslo originated at Camp David.¹²⁴

Carter's negotiating style at the Camp David Accords positively redefined the way that the United States engaged in diplomatic peacekeeping in the Middle East. In future negotiations, like the Madrid Conference and the Oslo Accords in the 1990s, the United States would attempt to occupy the role of rational unbiased mediator. While common understanding would assume that great foreign policy decisions require significant prior foreign policy experience, Carter's role at Camp David proved otherwise. Despite his relatively limited foreign policy background, it was because of Carter that the discussions at Camp David did not fail. His meticulous research and dedication to engineering a lasting peace proved to be the flagship foreign policy achievement of his presidency.

Carter was able to forge this agreement because he worked to develop trust between Egypt and Israel; future negotiations had to be based on similar humanistic principles. If the

¹²³ Personal telephone interview with Ambassador Dennis Ross on the 1978 Camp David Accords. January 17, 2019.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

parties involved in the negotiations did not trust that the United States sincerely wanted a resolution to the conflict, and not for selfish reasons alone, then the negotiations would not be able to start, or worse, would eventually fall apart. By developing trust, Carter was able to leverage both physical support and personal support to leaders who were willing to sacrifice and even face criticism for the greater good.

By doing all of this Carter stepped out of the tired cycle of history that continued to plague the Middle East with war, and approached the negotiations with creativity on the one hand and pragmatism on the other. Carter's approach to Camp David is significant because it set the benchmark by which future negotiators would define success.

The fact that peace has existed between Egypt and Israel for 40 years, as well as the dramatic decrease in hostility and state-sponsored violence, are proofs of Carter's skills. While many parts of the Middle East are still riddled with conflict, Carter's approach and execution at the Camp David summit has proven to be the model for future American involvement in peace negotiations in the Middle East.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Primary Sources:

- Announcement of Camp David Accords*. August 8, 1978. Jimmy Carter Library. Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor. NSA 7. Container 8. Backchannel Messages – Middle East. 2/78-11/80.
- “The Brookings Report on the Middle East.” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 6, no. 2 (1977): 195-205.
- Begin, Menachem and Anwar Sadat. interviewed by Walter Cronkite. *New York Times (1923-Current File)*. Nov 15, 1977.
<https://www.nytimes.com/1977/11/15/archives/transcript-of-the-interviews-with-sadat-and-begin.html>.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. “Egyptian Media Pessimism over Success at the Upcoming Camp David Summit Meetings.” *U.S. Declassified Documents Online*. September 6, 1978.
<http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/9HzHH3>.
- . “Camp David 25th Anniversary Forum.” Carter Center. September 17, 2003. Accessed January 24, 2019.
https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/conflict_resolution/Camp_David_Forum_03.pdf.
- . “Israeli Media Comments concerning President Jimmy Carter’s Warning against “excessive Optimism” over the 9/5-9/17/1978 Camp David Summit Meetings” *U.S. Declassified Documents Online*. September 6, 1978.
<http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/9Hz6G6>.
- “Camp David Accords: The Framework for Peace in the Middle East.” Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum. September 17, 1978. Accessed February 28, 2019.
https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/research/framework_for_peace_in_the_middle_east.
- Carter, Jimmy and Anwar Sadat. “Statements by Presidents Sadat and Carter” Mfa.gov.il. January 4, 1978. Accessed February 12, 2019.
<https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook3/Pages/107%20Statements%20by%20Presidents%20Sadat%20and%20Carter-%20Asw.aspx>.
- . “Camp David Meeting on the Middle East Remarks on Departure from the White House.” *The American Presidency Project*. September 04, 1978. Accessed February 27, 2019. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/camp-david-meeting-the-middle-east-remarks-departure-from-the-white-house>.
- . *Letter to President Sadat*. August 3, 1978. Jimmy Carter Library. Plains Files. Container 1. Egypt. 11/77-11/81.
- . *Letter to Prime Minister Begin*. August 3, 1978. Jimmy Carter Library. Plains Files. Container 17. Begin (Menachem) Communications. 11/77-8/78.

- . "The President's News Conference." *The American Presidency Project*. August 17, 1978. Accessed February 27, 2019. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-988>.
- . *United Nation- Address Before the General Assembly*. The American Presidency Project. March 17, 1977. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/243111>.
- . *Visit of Prime Minister Rabin of Israel Toasts of the President and the Prime Minister at a Working Dinner for the Prime Minister*. The American Presidency Project. March 7, 1977. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/242920>.
- . *World Jewish Congress Remarks at the Meeting of the General Council*. The American Presidency Project. November 2, 1977. <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/242474>.
- Draft Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David*. September 12, 1978. Jimmy Carter Library. Plains Files. Container 28. Mid-East - Camp David Summit. President's Working Papers. 10/22/73-9/12/78.
- "Egypt-Israel: Expectations." President Carter and the Role of Intelligence in the Camp David Accords. *Central Intelligence Agency*. August 10, 1978. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1978-08-10.pdf>.
- Foreign Relations of the United States*. 1977-1980. Volume IX. Arab-Israeli Dispute. August 1978-December 1980. editors. Alexander R. Wieland and Adam M. Howard (Washington: Government Printing Office. 2013). <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v09Ed2>.
- Foreign Relations of the United States*. 1977-1980. Volume VIII. Arab-Israeli Dispute. January 1977-August 1978. editors. Adam M. Howard and Stephen P. Randolph. Washington: Government Printing Office. 2013. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v08/comp1>.
- "Israel-Egypt Disengagement Agreement (1974)." Economic Cooperation Foundation. Accessed January 25, 2019. <https://ecf.org.il/issues/issue/179>.
- "Israel-Syria Disengagement Agreement (1974)." Economic Cooperation Foundation. Accessed January 25, 2019. <https://ecf.org.il/issues/issue/178>.
- "Interim Agreement with Egypt: 1975." Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Accessed January 25, 2019. [https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/maps/pages/sinai interim agreement-1975.aspx](https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/maps/pages/sinai%20interim%20agreement-1975.aspx).
- 124NEWS. "What Was the Relationship between Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat?" YouTube. November 19, 2017. Accessed February 12, 2019. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P9DbGeYPzv4>.
- Memo from National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezinski to President Jimmy Carter*. "Outline of a Middle East Strategy for the Next Two Months." January 25, 1978.

Jimmy Carter Library. Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor. NSA 25. Container 1. Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations 1978. Volume 1 [11].

Memorandum of Conversation. "President's Meeting with President Anwar Sadat." February 4, 1978. Jimmy Carter Library. Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor. NSA 25. Container 1. Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations 1978. Volume 1 [1].

Memorandum of Conversation. "President's Meeting with Prime Minister Begin." March 21, 1978. Jimmy Carter Library. Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor. NSA 25. Container 1. Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations 1978. Volume 1 [1].

Memorandum of Conversation. "President's Meeting with Prime Minister Begin." March 22, 1978. Jimmy Carter Library. Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor. NSA 25. Container 1. Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations 1978. Volume 1 [1].

Memorandum to President Carter. "Outline of Strategy Paper for Begin Visit." March 1, 1978. Jimmy Carter Library. Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor. NSA 25. Container 1. Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations 1978. Volume 1 [1].

Message from President Carter to Prime Minister Begin. January 19, 1978. Jimmy Carter Library. Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor. NSA 3. Container 9. Israel - Prime Minister Menachem Begin. 11/77-6/78.

Personal Note from National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezinski to Prime Minister Begin. March 13, 1978. Jimmy Carter Library. Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor. NSA 7. Container 8. Backchannel messages - Middle East. 2/78-11/80.

Quandt, William. "Middle East Developments. Memorandum for the President from Bill Quandt." *Central Intelligence Agency*. August 13, 1978. Accessed February 15, 2019. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/527b88eb993294098d517732>.

"Reassessment of Washington-Israel Relationship Begins." 2018. CIE. March 18, 2018. <https://israeled.org/reassessment-of-washington-israel-relationship/>.

Ross, Dennis. interview by author. January 17, 2019.

"Secretaries Travel Abroad- Cyrus R. Vance." U.S. Department of State Archive. Accessed January 25, 2019. <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/trvl/l/13038.htm>.

Strategy paper for President Jimmy Carter's Camp David peace negotiation efforts with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. White House. September 1, 1978. *U.S. Declassified Documents Online*. Accessed February 28, 2019. <http://tinyurl.galegroup.com/tinyurl/9HzmFX>.

"Treaty of Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel." n.d. MFA.gov. [https://www.mfa.gov/Lists/Treaties/Attachments/2278/Peace Treaty_cn.pdf](https://www.mfa.gov/Lists/Treaties/Attachments/2278/Peace%20Treaty_cn.pdf).

"U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 (1967)" United Nations. November 22, 1967.

"U.N. Security Council Resolution 338 (1973)" United Nations. October 22, 1973.

Yarvis, Cyrus. *Meeting of Sadat Begin Talks*. November 24, 1977. Jimmy Carter Library. Public Files. Container 1. Egypt. 11-27-11781

Secondary Sources

Abizaid, Seth. *Peace by Politics: A Political History from Camp David to Oslo*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.

Beiser, James D. "Jewish Criticism Of Carter Intensifies." *The Jewish Week*. December 15, 2006. Accessed January 25, 2019. <https://web.archive.org/web/20070613195955/http://www.thejewishweek.com/news/leewscontent.php?artid=13420>

Brezinski, Zbigniew. *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981*. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1983.

Carter, Jimmy. *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*. (Fayetteville: Univ. of Arkansas Press, 2002).

Colley, Raymond. "Begin and Sadat Agree to Meet with Carter on Mideast Issues." *Chicago Tribune (1961-Current File)*. August 09, 1978;

Dangle, Craig. "The Loser of the Camp David Accords." *The Washington Post*. WP Company. September 19, 2018.

"Egyptian Anguish." *Wall Street Journal (1923 - Current File)*. Oct 07, 1981.

"An Enduring Peace: 25 Years after the Camp David Accords." 2011. Wilson Center. July 7, 2011. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/enduring-peace-25-years-after-the-camp-david-accords>

Elovitz, Paul H. and Mohammed Shaalan. "Presidents Carter and Sadat." in *Politics and Psychology: Contemporary Psychodynamic Perspectives*, editor, Joan Offerman-Zuckerberg. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1991.

"Geneva Middle East Peace Conference Takes Place." Center for Israel Education. December 21, 2018. Accessed January 25, 2019. <https://israeled.org/geneva-middle-east-peace-conference/>

Gilad, Elon. "Word of the Day / Mahapakh." *Haaretz.com*. January 10, 2018. Accessed January 25, 2019. <https://www.haaretz.com/premium-word-of-the-day-mahapakh-1.5312105>

Greenway, H D S. "Begin Formally Invites Sadat to Visit Israel." *The Washington Post*. November 16, 1977. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/11/16/begin-formally-invites-sadat-to-visit-israel/8ed42716-47ac-4c3b-a5d8-97875ef75ba2/?utm_term=.1aa16789b662

"Sadat Trip Set Saturday " *The Washington Post* (1974-Current File). Nov 14, 1977
<https://search.proquest.com/proxy.library.ucsb.edu/9443/docview/146717504?accountid=14522>

Gwertzman, Bernard "Vance Ending Tour Says Deep Divisions Persist in Mideast " *New York Times* (1973-Current File) February 22, 1977.

"Egypt and Israel Sign Formal Treaty Ending a State of War After 30 Years, Sadat and Begin Praise Carter's Role." *New York Times* (1973-Current File) March 27, 1979.

Hoagland, Jim "President Leaves for Camp David Mideast Summit." *The Washington Post* (1974-Current File) Sep 05, 1978.

Kaiser, Robert G. "Cronkite: Matchmaking in Mideast " *The Washington Post* (1974-Current File). Nov 16, 1977.
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/11/16/walter-cronkite-and-matchmaking-in-mideast/92167d36-9b50-48f1-ac69-85f83ad1d4f6/>.

Karsh, Efraim. "The Six-Day War: An Inevitable Conflict." *Middle East Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (2017): 1-12.

Kessler, Felix. "Israeli Election Skews Peace Hopes." *Wall Street Journal* (1923 - Current File). May 26, 1977.

Lippman, Thomas W. "Economic Boycott of Egypt Imposed By Arab Countries. Arab States Unite in Boycott of Egypt." *The Washington Post*. WP Company. April 1, 1979.

Marks, John. "Peacebuilding and the Media." *Women's World*. no. 41 (2007): 31-32.

Mohr, Charles. "Carter, With a Long List of Campaign Promises, Now Faces the Problem of Making Good on Them." *New York Times*. November 15, 1976.

Neff, Donald. "Middle East History: It Happened in November; Sadat's Jerusalem Trip Begins Difficult Path of Egyptian - Israel Peace." *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*. (Nov 30, 1998). 83-85.

Quandt, William B. *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution. 1986.

———. *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967*. 3rd ed. Washington, D.C.: Berkeley: Brookings Institution Press; University of California Press. 2005.

Rabin, Yitzhak. *The Rabin Memoirs*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1996.

Rabinovich, Abraham. *The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter That Transformed the Middle East*. New York: Schocken Books. 2004.

Ross, Dennis. "Did Camp David Doom the Palestinians?" *Foreign Policy*. October 19, 2018.

- "Shuttle Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974-1975." Department of State-Office of the Historian. Accessed January 25, 2019. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/shuttle-diplomacy>.
- "The Suez Crisis, 1956." Department of State: Office of the Historian. Accessed January 25, 2019. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/suez>.
- Schwartz, Jason. "Begin and Sadat Sign Camp David Accords." POLITICO. September 17, 2018. Accessed February 27, 2019. <https://www.politico.com/story/2018/09/17/began-and-sadat-sign-camp-david-accords-sept-17-1978-816159>.
- Smith, Hendrick. "A New Gamble on Mideast." *New York Times (1923-Current File)*. August 09, 1978.
- Stein, Kenneth W. *Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace*. New York: Routledge. 1999.
- Strieff, Daniel. *Jimmy Carter and the Middle East: The Politics of Presidential Diplomacy*. Middle East Today. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 2015.
- Tanner, Henry. "In Egypt, an Editor Describes the Sadat-Begin Meeting as the 'Last Bus to Peace'." *The New York Times*. December 25, 1977. Accessed February 12, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/1977/12/25/archives/in-egypt-an-editor-describes-the-sadatbegin-meeting-as-the-last-bus.html>.
- "U.N. Resolution 181 (II) Future Governance of Palestine: Plan of Partition with Economic Union." United Nations. November 29, 1947.
- Wright, Lawrence. *Thirteen Days in September: Carter, Begin, and Sadat at Camp David*. Vol. 3.1. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2014. Apple Book.
- Yaqub, Salim. *Imperfect Strangers: Americans, Arabs, and U.S.-Middle East Relations in the 1970s*. Ithaca. New York: Cornell University Press. 2016.
- Yassine-Hamdan, Nahla and Frederic S. Pearson. *Arab Approaches to Conflict Resolution: Mediation, Negotiation and Settlement of Political Disputes*. London: Routledge. 2014.
- Zittrain Eisenberg, Laura and Neil Caplan. *Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: Patterns, Problems, Possibilities*. 2nd ed. Indiana Series in Middle East Studies. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press. 2010.