University of California, Santa Barbara

The Causes of the First Anglo-Dutch War 1652-1654

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

[1]**Western Europe in 1648:**

[1]University of Texas, Austin. *Europe 1648.* London: Cambridge Modern History Atlas, 1912. http://www.emersonkent.com/map_archive/europe_1648.htm

[2] **Low Countries 1568-1648**

[2] University of Texas, Austin. The Netherlands Wars of Independence. London: Cambridge Press, 1912. https://cosmolearning.org/images/the-netherlands-wars-of-independence-1568-1648/

Introduction:

The first Anglo-Dutch War was fought from 1652-1654 pitting two Republican, Protestant powers against one another. These two peoples with a shared history of cooperation stretching back to the Hundred Years War (1337-1453), bonded by commercial and military treaties and mutual benefit, all of a sudden found themselves at war in 1652. The source of the breakdown in relations remains a complicated and debated issue among historians. After the conclusion of the first war in 1654, the enmity did not cease with the restoration of the Stuarts in England, but instead intensified with two more wars fought after the restoration of the Stuart monarchy stretching from 1665-1667 and 1672-1674. By 1700 however, the two countries had found themselves bound to one another once more, this time in a marital alliance making William III of Orange (1650-1702) King of England as well as Stadtholder (national leader) in the Dutch Republic. The centuries-long friendship which became hostile, ended with a joint monarchy between the Netherlands (literally low lying country, interchangeable with Low Countries) and England. The drastic change in their relationship solicits a study of what caused their breakdown in relations and if that breakdown led to war.

This work has two goals. First, it will identify the causes contributing to the deterioration of relations between these two countries that had for so long been allied and friendly. Secondly, it will analyze the reasons for the declaration of war by the English in 1652, even after relations had improved and it seemed that a revised treaty was imminent. Was the war an inevitable result of a growing rivalry between two emerging countries or an unfortunate culmination of events mishandled by those involved? Was the English declaration of war on 10 July 1652 the result of commercial competition and tension fueled by fear of money shortages in England? Or, was it

the result of festering anger in the English public following years of perceived slights by the Dutch against the English? These questions will be considered in determining the cause of worsening relations between the Commonwealth of England and the United Provinces, the seven Northern Protestant provinces of the Netherlands that secured their independence from Spain in 1648.[3]

I will argue that the outbreak of war was more complicated than many historians have thought. Scholars have emphasized either commercial or ideological reasons. Although both had a significant effect, other contributing factors, such as the long standing inadequacy of the English government's revenues and the unsteady nature of the Parliamentary government following centuries of monarchical rule, have not been given adequate attention about their effect on the deterioration of relations. The insufficiency of revenues and the instability at home and internationally, due to the ongoing civil wars in England, Scotland, and Ireland, were at the forefront of the Rump Parliament's dilemma. The Rump's Members of Parliament (MP's) were deeply concerned with ending the English Civil War (1642-1651) and returning their country to normalcy, something their lack of financial solvency prevented them from realizing.

Another point of emphasis will be the effect alliances had on the policies of the English government. From as far back as the Hundred Years War there was a tendency in English politics to ally with those who had similar interests. England in the Middle Ages (fifth century to the fifteenth century) tended to ally itself to enemies of France and to those who controlled the cloth ports of Northern Europe in Antwerp. By doing so, English monarchs insulated themselves alongside those that they could trust, because their interests were the same. English allies were selected based on their like minded needs, either for defence, trade partnerships, or as was the

[3] The structure of the government of England and Scotland operated as a republic with no king from 1649-1660, and was referred to as a Commonwealth along with Scotland and Ireland.

case in 1651, for ideological similarities. When an alliance lost its beneficial nature, as was the case in 1651 with the United Provinces, England had no trouble isolating itself from those previously called friends.

Historiography:

A great deal of study has been devoted to the study of the first Anglo-Dutch War as the first commercial war driven primarily by economic factors. Recent scholarship into the causes of the war have questioned the primacy of the financial explanations and emphasized the effects of ideological motives and political maneuverings on the course of events. Charles Wilson promoted the primacy of economic causes of the war. His views were considered the best explanation until the 1990s when others looked primarily at the failed ambassadorial mission of Walter Strickland (ambassador to the United Provinces from 1642) and Oliver St. John (Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in 1648) to the Netherlands began to develop different views on the war's causation. In *Profit and Power,* Wilson establishes several critical links between the English economy and the outbreak of war in 1652. He asserts that the First Anglo-Dutch War was "the inevitable outcome" of economic competition because of the depression of English trade "which sharpened men's demands for action," and coupled with the "new circumstances of naval strength," many were convinced that the time to strike had come.[4] While his reasoning played a role, it neglects important factors including public opinion, the impact of the English Civil War internationally, and the change in ideology in England during their civil war.

[4] Charles Wilson, *Profit and Power: A Study of England and the Dutch Wars* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), 56. Hereafter cited as: Wilson, *PP.*

Steven Pincus claims in *Protestantism and Patriotism* that the First Anglo-Dutch War was the result of "an unusual political alliance between apocalyptic Protestants (Fifth Monarchists) and classical republicans[5] . . . who dominated English political culture" after the execution of Charles I (1600-1649) in 1649.[6] After the failure of their dream of a political union with the United Provinces and their realization that the Dutch "were neither good Protestants nor committed republicans," they determined to deal with the Dutch "as they had dealt with the Scots." Pincus claims that the Navigation Ordinance (1651) was not "the first volley of a modern trade war, but rather a punitive move against a corrupt polity." He argues that the Rump's apocalyptic and republican leaders' conviction that the Dutch were "materialistic and Orangist" (monarchical and not republican) was ultimately the main contributor to the outbreak of war.[7] Although Pincus explains in depth the faults of Wilson's theories and the efficacy of his own, his lack of scrutiny about the effects of financial solvency weakens his analysis of the souring of Anglo-Dutch relations.

J.R. Jones presents a third perspective on the cause of the first Anglo-Dutch War. He contends that "those concerned with the launch and direction" of the war were influenced by the mercantilism of the day believed "that wealth was finite, and that one nation could become wealthier only by depriving its rivals of their share of international trade."[8] Jones explores the international factors acting on the decision making of both the United Provinces in their effort to

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[5] Apocalyptic Protestants were Fifth monarchists who rose to power during the English Civil War. They rose to prominent positions in the Rump government, and saw the end of monarchies as the beginning marker to the reign of the saints who would prepare the earth for Christ's thousand year reign written about in the book of Revelation. Classic Republicans were those who read the classic texts of ancient Greece and Rome and intended to implement that type of government.

[6] Steven Pincus, *Protestantism and Patriotism: Ideologies and the Making of the English Foreign Policy, 1650-1668* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 14.

[7] Pincus, *Protestantism and Patriotism,* 14.

[8] J. R. Jones, *The Anglo-Dutch Wars of the Seventeenth Century* (New York: Longman Group, 1996), *4.*

avoid a military alliance with the English who were widely ostracized and considered "regicides" after the execution of Charles I, and the Rump Parliament and their attempt at an alliance between two Protestant and Republican countries.[9] His views provide another factor to consider, and a counterweight to the arguments of Pincus and Wilson.

Methods and Format:

This investigation will begin with an introduction to the basic history of relations between England and the Low Countries from the fourteenth century up to 1652 when war was declared by England on the Dutch Republic. It will also provide a brief explanation of the English system of finance through the same period to show the inherent difficulties of their system, which had a substantial effect on the English Civil War. The Civil War led to Parliament taking power only to impose heavier taxes on England than ever before. The first section emphasizes the inadequate income of the English crown and the theme of friendship between England and the Netherlands based on their mutual interest in defense and trade. The second section focuses on the financial aspects pertaining to the cause of the war. It includes insight into why the traditional attribution to the war is not sufficient as an explanation for the war. It shows some of the causes of tension between the two nations, and how these new tensions were compounded by the pressure of income shortages found in England before 1652. The third section addresses the political, ideological, and social components which factor into the English hostility toward the Dutch. This part examines the force of ideas in England, and the effect they had on the outbreak of war. Also involved in the third section are the consequences of the Strickland/St. John mission's failure on the Rump Parliament's declaration of war on the Dutch.

[9] Jones, 83.

Section four analyzes Anglo-Dutch relations in the months leading up to the Battle of the Goodwin Sands on 19 May 1652, and its collapse into war. It includes an examination of the breakdown of relations resulting from their inability to secure a renewed alliance in 1651, which contributed to the passage of the Navigation Ordinances on 9 October 1651. Its passage, coupled with already escalated tensions, enabled a misunderstanding like the Battle of the Goodwin Sands, to mature into war between two former allies.

In this investigation I will use books as secondary sources. These works published on the causes of the Anglo-Dutch Wars supply the mainstream theories to the cause of the war. These, like the works of Steven Pincus and Charles Wilson, will provide the bulk of my study and enable me to build my case around. I have deduced that their explanations were not sufficient. Although thorough, they do not take into account the complexities of the English financial state and the influence of international politics, and therefore leave questions that this study answers.

These sources are supplemented by state papers and documents produced in the seventeenth century that provide validity to my investigation. The writings of Thomas Mun, a notable economist in the seventeenth century, Calendar of State Papers, and the Letters Pertaining to the First Dutch War collected by Samuel Gardiner, provide the bulk of primary source analysis.

A Brief History of Anglo-Netherlandish Relations before 1652:

The First Anglo-Dutch War can not be understood in seclusion. The centuries-long relationship between the English and those in the Low Countries provide context for later events happening immediately prior to the outbreak of war in 1652. Two recurring themes present

themselves in the study of Anglo-Dutch relations, that of a mutually beneficial and necessary trading and military partnership, and the often connected, repetitive lack of tax revenue. These diminished the ability of the English monarchy to assert itself domestically and on the continent as one of the major powers in Western European affairs. These factors required those who held power in England to join themselves commercially to the Netherlands. These themes will emerge throughout the shared history of the Netherlands and England and will present themselves again during the first Anglo-Dutch War.

Because of the importance of England's long history of crown income shortages compared to its contemporaries, it is necessary to first address the basics of how the English system operated, the root of the issue, and finally its role in English policy leading up to the Anglo-Dutch War in July 1652. The English crown had two principal ways of muster funds, ordinary and extraordinary revenues. The first was a constitutionally guaranteed method of providing the crown the funds with which they could run their households. This came from rents paid by tenants on royal lands. The tenants would work the land and twice a year they would pay, in goods, an apportioned amount of their harvest.[10] Ordinary revenue also came through by means of customs duties on all trade. At the start of each new reign Parliament would be called by the monarch and agree on the level of customs duties the crown could collect during their reign. In England, the majority of the customs duties came through the wool/cloth trade. In the high Middle Ages, England exported its wool, undyed and raw, to Antwerp where the cloth industries would dye and finish the product before selling it off to the rest of Northern Europe at a large profit. By the late fifteenth century, English wool was increasingly woven into cloth before export to the Netherlands. The last portion of ordinary crown revenues came through the

[10] Robert Bucholz and; Newton Key, *Early Modern England 1485-1714* (Oxford, Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), 53.

collection of feudal dues and profits of justice. Wardship, the crown's ability to take in the heir of a noble and collect that heirs rents until the child reached maturity, and relief, the fee owed to the crown when an heir inherited their land, were the largest contributors of feudal dues to the treasury.[11]

Extraordinary revenue was another way the crown could levy finances. These were taxes raised through Parliament on landed income. The crown would call a Parliament which would vote on a tax based on need. These would be used to fight wars, the defense of the realm, and for the maintenance of the royal household in times of financial difficulty.[12] English monarchs tended to avoid calling Parliaments for extraordinary revenue because the money often came with requests for "redress of grievances" attached to it.[13]

England's ability to collect its lawful income provided one further barrier to obtaining sufficient revenue. England did not possess a national bureaucracy in the modern understanding. It relied on regional nobles and gentry to enforce crown law and collect its taxes. These same local landowners were also responsible for the assessment of their lands when taxes were voted and would often under appraise their lands.[14] If a situation arose which the landowners detested the sovereign's order, they would not enforce it in their area. This created problems during the religious transformations in England, and in the reigns of the Stuarts. If the monarchs wished to enforce their policies, they would either have to go to Parliament for the funds to raise an army or do so from their ordinary revenue.

The genesis of the relationship between the Low Countries and England can be traced as far back as the Middle Ages. During the Hundred Years War (1337-1453), which was fought

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[11] Bucholz, 53.
[12] Bucholz, 53.
[13] A redress of grievances was the right, given in 1215 in the Magna Carta, which ensured that nobles could petition the king to resolve their complaints without fear of reproach by the king.
[14] Bucholz, 51.

principally between the kingdoms of France and England over their rival claims to the French throne, England allied itself to the duchy of Burgundy. The duchy of Burgundy was nominally a vassal of the French king but controlled a vast swath of land from the Alps to the Low Countries (modern day Holland and Belgium). The Burgundian strength and reluctance to acknowledge French hegemony during the Hundred Years War made them a natural ally for the English both commercially and militarily against the French. Militarily, the alliance at times encircled French borders (English holdings in Aquitaine and Normandy and Burgundian holdings along the Rhine river) and presented a tool for alliance for both sides. Their commercial relationship was centered on the English wool that was shipped from England and processed and dyed in the cloth district of Antwerp and was then sold throughout continental Europe. England and the Low Countries were both dependent on the wool trade from the late fifteenth century through to the mid-seventeenth century. Wool was the primary export from England and a staple of the cloth trade in Northern Europe. The customs duties collected from its trade provided a reliable revenue source for the English crown. Customs duties became increasingly important to English kings because they were easy to estimate and collect, making them a dependable source of income. While war continued with the French, an alliance with Burgundy enabled the English and Burgundian rulers a steady revenue through the trade of England's raw wool and wool cloth. The alliance between England and the Low Countries (Burgundy at this point), remained strong for three hundred years before the first Anglo-Dutch War. The bond between the two countries was based on the need for one another both in terms of trade and military assistance against a stronger power. The English holdings in France were contingent upon the support of Burgundy, without which, France would have been able to reclaim its lost lands piecemeal. Their close relationship was built upon necessity, as neither country individually was able to resist France.[15]

[15] Robin Neillands, *The Hundred Years War* (Routledge, 1990), Chapter 13.

In the fifteenth century England became engulfed in the thirty-year Wars of the Roses (1455-1485), a sporadic period of infighting between the royal houses of York and Lancaster over which should hold the throne of England. The war finally ended when Henry Tudor (Henry VII) defeated Richard III at the Battle of Bosworth Field on 22 August 1485. Following the conclusion of the Wars of the Roses in 1485, the alliance between Burgundy and England would be tested. A rival claimant to the English throne appeared in Cork in November 1491 as Richard of Shrewsbury, the son of Edward IV. He was not the son of Edward IV, but a pretender by the name of Perkin Warbeck who challenged Henry VII's claim to the throne. In 1493, Warbeck won the support of Edward IV's sister Margaret, duchess of Burgundy, who supplied Warbeck with troops in his attempt to win the throne of England. Margaret's support of Warbeck's claim and her protection of Warbeck at court was seen as an attack against the legitimacy of Henry VII and therefore taken as a threat against England. Instead of going to war, Henry VII issued an embargo against Burgundy to disrupt the cloth trade which Burgundy relied on. While this tactic was costly for England as well as Burgundy, because the English cloth trade still ran through Antwerp, it remained the cheaper option to war, which was the primary concern of Henry VII in his effort to stabilize England after the tumult of the Wars of the Roses. Duke Philip IV of Burgundy and Henry VII ended the conflict in February 1496 by signing the Intercursus Magnus, a commercial treaty that fixed trade duties and promised that neither country would harbor fugitives of the other country.[16] Warbeck's false claim to the throne put a strain on the alliance, and almost caused war. However, because of the need to ensure the continuance of trade and the persistent threat posed by France, the alliance endured.

Two themes appear in the conflict with Margaret and Burgundy that would continue into the seventeenth century. The first was the shortage of money available to the English crown that

[16] Sean Cunningham, *Henry VII* (New York: Routledge, 2007), Chapter 4.

certainly influenced Henry VII's decision to embargo Burgundy instead of initiating war. Henry VII won a crown at Bosworth with little prestige still attached. As a result, he spent his entire reign stabilizing the country and securing financial independence for the crown. Independence would be achieved by increasing the king's ordinary revenue. Ordinary revenue was money owed to the king through rents on his private lands, customs on exports and imports, profits of justice (legal fines), and feudal dues (inheritance taxes, wardship, relief). In his effort to stabilize the crown, Henry sought to increase his collection of customs duties as a way of increasing his ordinary revenue. Although the embargo on Burgundy inevitably hurt the customs duties collected by England, it remained the more frugal choice compared to war.[17] The most obvious impediment to Henry's goals was war and the massive expense it carried with it. Henry's avoidance of war in the conflict with Margaret and Burgundy was directly connected to England's financial paucity. The accompanying lack of allies to support an attack and deficiency of funds to raise an army following years of civil strife added to his decision to refrain from warfare, but pecuniary inadequacy remained the principal factor.

The second theme is the use of mutually beneficial and necessary trade partnerships and alliances. For this reason the dukes of Burgundy remained the best option to counter the power of France. The deficiency of the English military compared to that of its French counterpart required an ally to prevent Calais, England's last continental possession, from falling to France. Burgundy, therefore, remained the primary option in opposition to France because of its proximity to Calais and the Burgundian rivalry with France. The prominence of the port of Antwerp and its bustling cloth industry, coupled with the economic need of England to maintain its wool and cloth exports continued to make theirs a partnership of necessity. This principle would continue to influence English foreign policy extending into the seventeenth century.

[17] Cunningham, Chapter 6.

The next section in the story of amicable relations between England and the Low Countries appears during the reign of Elizabeth I (1558-1603). The two nations feared the attempt of King Philip II of Spain and his plan to enforce Catholicism upon all of his subjects, including those in the distant Netherlands, and in northern Europe more generally.[18] The first in a series of revolts by those in the Low Countries began in 1566 when the provinces of the Low Countries rebelled against King Philip II of Spain. The first and second revolts centered around the "defence of local privilege against the encroachments of the new central power" followed by resistance to a government attempt to impose a ten percent Value Added Tax on all sales to fund war efforts in other areas of their empire.[19] Additionally, Philip's brief stint as king of England by marriage to Queen Mary I revealed to Protestants in England how zealous Philip was to return England to the Catholic church. Tensions escalated when Philip II began persecuting Protestants in concert with the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis that promised both France and Spain would persecute all heretics that fled across their borders.[20] These developments combined with the Philip's rigid attitude against any compromise with Protestants led Elizabeth to provide tentative assistance to the Dutch rebels in 1570 on grounds of national security and the defense of Protestantism.[21] For her, England could remain secure against Spanish power only if there was a buffer zone from Spanish power and international Catholicism. The necessity of an ally against a stronger foe and the protection of English trade brought England and those in the Netherlands together once more.

The method of fighting adopted by the English was directly linked to the disparity of crown revenue between Spain and England. Elizabeth and those in her government understood

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[18] See map one above for the European land holdings of Philip II.
[19] Geoffrey Parker, *The Dutch Revolt* (London:Penguin Books, 1977), 14-15.
[20] Parker, *The Dutch Revolt,* 61.
[21] Geoffrey Parker, *Spain and the Netherlands, 1559-1659* (London: William Collins Sons, 1979), 53.

that the loss of the Low Countries to the Spanish would put England into an untenable position and grant Philip a staging area for invasion. They had to balance their ambition to combat Spain and international Catholicism with their desire to protect their Protestant comrades against their financial weakness. Although Eliabeth tried to avoid open warfare with Spain, it became a reality in 1585 with the signing of the Treaty of Nonsuch.[22] Once the English entered the war, they conducted it with two aims in mind, to prevent the defeat of the Dutch and to extricate themselves from the fighting as quickly as possible and at the lowest cost possible. As a result, Elizabeth generally ordered a more reserved role in the fighting, always trying to protect her investments and loans to the Dutch government.[23] While her officers in the Low Countries detested this hesitant war policy, it was not the first time an English monarch went to war and tried to conserve funds. English involvement in the defense of the Low Countries was necessary because of their strategic value to the English, but recurring financial paucity in England dictated Elizabeth's war strategy.

The policy of cooperation between the Netherlands and England began to splinter during the reigns of the early Stuart monarchs, James I of England (1603-1625) and Charles I (1625-1649). The continuation of the Dutch Revolt meant that the entente remained unbroken, but the differences in the two nations were becoming more apparent. The cooperation between Charles I's Stuart family of England and William II's Orange/Nassau family of the Netherlands continued to affect their countries, through intermarriage, even after their deaths. Charles I's daughter Mary was betrothed to William II in 1641. This marriage continued to shape Stuart/Orange relations after the execution of Charles I in January 1649. While the Dutch Revolt drew toward an eventual end in 1648, the English Civil War continued after Charles I's execution

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[22] Parker, *Spain and the Netherlands,* 51.
[23] Paul Hammer, *Elizabeth's Wars* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 121-124.

in 1649, and proceeded to further complicated relations. The deaths of Charles I in 1649, and William II in 1650 did not end their cooperation however. While their deaths were a blow to both families, their familial ties remained strong through Mary and her newborn son William III, and their supporters (Royalists in England and in exile and Orangists in the United Provinces) continued to complicate relations between the States General (legislative body in the United Provinces) and the Rump Parliament.

Between 1648 and 1651 there was a great deal of change in England and the United Provinces. The replacement of the king in England by a representative government in 1649 after its civil war over what it saw as a breach of its ancient constitution, and the almost simultaneous failed coup by William II, then Stadtholder, against the States General in Amsterdam were seen as parallel to many in both countries. While the trade relationship remained largely intact, the dominance of Dutch shipping and the resistance of the Dutch to commit to support the new Parliamentary government became a significant hindrance to continued entente. The cessation of pressure on England's government by the civil war and the declining threat of Spain toward the Netherlands brought new difficulties to the Anglo-Dutch relationship. As external threats abated, tensions old and new began to rise to the surface.

In England, ordinary and extraordinary revenue were the foundations of royal finances. By the seventeenth century this system had become outdated, and the great European inflation of the sixteenth century brought by the influx of New World gold and silver further exacerbated the problem. England's contemporaries had shifted toward a new type of taxation that enabled them to levy more taxes and consequently raise larger armies and navies. James I attempted to work with Parliament toward an annual subsidy with the Great Contract in 1610. In exchange for the subsidy, James promised to sign away feudal rights like wardship. The contract failed in large

part due to the mistrust of Parliament toward James and Parliament's demands for the surrender of more royal prerogatives (monarchical rights).[24] The increased inflation and the recurring shortage of revenue weakened the power of the Stuart kings. The weakness was never more apparent than under Charles I, who because of the crown's financial frailty resorted to methods of securing ordinary revenue that his critics believed was illegal. During a period referred to as the personal rule, an eleven year period where no Parliament was called, Charles solved his money problems by extending an old tax called Ship Money, which was traditionally paid by coastal towns to the whole of the country.[25] By 1639, landowners and others in the country largely stopped paying the ship money. This, coupled with the outbreak of the First Bishops War in 1638-1639 Charles was forced to call Parliament.[26]

The crown's financial difficulties directly led to the English Civil War in 1642. Charles's "diminished majesty" and the demands made by Parliament in 1641-2 were "the sort of pressure . . . to which only a king esteemed weak could have been subjected."[27] The stipulations Parliament made of Charles would never have been made toward his predecessors Elizabeth or Henry VIII. Stuart poverty was due in part to their lavish lifestyle, but owed much more to the inflation crisis felt throughout Europe in the seventeenth century. Although his administration did all it could to cut expenditure and lived "on the tightest budgets," it was not enough, and any increase in expenditure would cause an ensuing debt spiral.[28] The historian Russell states that even if they had managed their finances well, "the Stuarts inherited a financial system which was already close to the point of breakdown." The "taxation by consent" structure, Russel continues,

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[24] Bucholz, 224-225.
[25] Bucholz, 240-241.
[26] Bucholz, 242-243.
[27] Conrad Russell, *The Causes of the English Civil War* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990), 162, 164.
[28] Bucholz, 240-241.

was already proving to be incapable of successfully financing a war.[29] These struggles were brushed aside by those in Parliament as household mismanagement. Ironically, Rump MP's would have to adopt extreme and novel tax measures, which they previously rejected under the early Stuart kings, in order to win the English Civil War.[30]

The procedure of obtaining the funds necessary for war had to come through Parliamentary taxes and subsidies, and the civil war quickly made Parliament aware of the exceptional taxation required to fight a modern war. Parliament reacted by passing compulsory monthly assessments (monthly taxes based on value of land) and a new excise tax, which was a sales tax on popular items like ale, beer, and tobacco, to fund the war effort.[31] Before the civil war, England was behind in effective taxation compared to the other great powers, France and Spain. During and after the conclusion of the civil war Parliament continued its effective tax system and looked for other ways to increase its income. It began serious inquiries into trade and shipping to increase its profit from customs duties. These inquiries brought them into conflict with the Dutch, who by this point were the preeminent commercial power of Northern Europe. The newfound strength of England, with its new taxation system and powerful armed forces, were ready and able to press any claims.

The Commercial Component of the First Anglo-Dutch War:

The cause of the first Anglo-Dutch War has often been largely attributed to economic factors acting on England that drove them to declare war on the Dutch in July 1652. Chief among these was the trade deficit created by the imbalanced state of the cloth trade, fisheries, and the

[29] Russell, 166.
[30] Bucholz, 254.
[31] Bucholz, 254.

competition over shipping which reached its climax with the passage of the Navigation Ordinance by the Rump Parliament on 9 October 1651. Although war broke out in 1652, the struggle between the United Provinces and the Commonwealth began long before the Netherlands were independent and while England and Scotland were still ruled by the Stuart monarchs. Indeed, as early as 1623 the massacre at Amboyna ignited English hatred against the Dutch. As a consequence of the shortage of revenue and the resulting weakness of the crown, James I and Charles I found no solution to their trade deficit, nor could they pursue sanctions against the Dutch. The deficiency would continue to linger into the Interregnum (period with no monarch 1649-1660) when the Rump Parliament would decide upon a policy of mercantilism. Ultimately, the financial struggles of England at the hands of the Dutch, so the English believed, and the fragile position of Dutch trade, coupled with the recent strength of the English position following the English Civil War, positioned them to exploit Dutch weaknesses. While commercial difficulties contributed to tensions between the two countries, it did not lead to war.

The cloth trade was the greatest of England's industries, and had been for centuries before 1600. However, the monolithic nature of the English economy was a problem for English merchants, especially in times of depression and competition.[32] The main source of competition came from the Dutch. As stated earlier, English wool had been exported from London as either raw or woven, but not dyed. Once in the Netherlands it would be dyed and processed and sold throughout the continent at a much higher price. By 1600, English merchants became aware of the large profits the Dutch were reaping compared to their menial profits exporting raw wool. A report in 1614 estimated that if the whole cloth process of dyeing and manufacturing was carried out in England instead of the Netherlands, profits could rise from 50 to 100 percent.[33] Led by

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[32] Wilson. *PP.* 8.
[33] Charles Wilson, *England's Apprenticeship 1603-1763* (London: Longman, 1984), 39.

Alderman Cockayne, a merchant from the Eastlands (East Anglia), James I approved the Cockayne project that intended to increase employment by manufacturing and dyeing closer to home before exporting a finished product.

Although Cockayne's endeavor contained a rationale, it also neglected some aspects and were affected by some unforeseen events. Firstly, England did not possess the technology or manufacturing capability to dye and finish the amount of cloth they were producing. This meant that either production would have to slow, or the surplus would still have to be finished outside of England. Secondly, European markets were decimated by war and the debasement of currencies, from the inflation crisis. In an undifferentiated economy like England, this meant that a massive trade depression was imminent, which bode awfully for the Cockayne project. Thirdly, and most importantly, the Cockayne project was in direct competition with the Dutch cloth markets. The Dutch responded with reprisals against the import, sale, or wearing of cloth dressed or dyed in England, crippling the English cloth trade.[34] Without the ports and in the Low Countries, England had no way to effectively export its wool to the rest of the continent. The negative effects of the Cockayne project, primarily the Dutch reprisals, which were not withdrawn for two decades, had a lasting impact on the English wool trade. The ruthlessness of the Dutch and their mercantilist embargo on English wool would not be easily forgotten. It would prove to be a grievance that, for the English, would have to be rectified.

The second problem creating tension in the economic relationship between the English and Dutch were over the rights to the fisheries off the coast of the British Isles. By the seventeenth century, "the principal fishing grounds lay off the British coasts" and were "minutely supervised by the College of the Great Fishery" in Holland. The close monitoring of the industry was to ensure the "efficiency of the industry," because its importance to the wellbeing of the

[34] Wilson. *PP*. 29

Dutch economy. It was responsible for just short of one million pounds annually, which was half the value of England's yearly exports.[35] The profit from the Dutch fishing industry at the expense of English waters increasingly drew the criticism of the more mercantilist minds in England like Thomas Mun. Mun, who was the director of the East India Company, and advisor to Privy Council committees in the 1620s and 1630s, denounced English trade practices based on his belief in England's wealth of resources. Naturally, he saw the exploitation of the "British" fisheries as something England, not a foreign power, should be benefitting from.

> The fishing in his majesty's seas of England, Scotland, and Ireland is our natural wealth, and would cost nothing but labor, which the Dutch bestow willingly, and thereby draw yearly a very great profit to themselves by serving many places of Christendom with our fish, for which they return and supply their wants both of foreign wares and money, besides the multitude of mariners and shipping, which hereby are maintain'd [maintained], whereof a long discourse might be made to shew [show] the particular manage[ment] of this important business. . . [36]

The question of the fisheries was not just a matter of political and economic importance or national interest, it escalated into a matter of legal right. James's 1609 proclamation announced that a license would be required to fish on "British coasts."[37] This came as a shock to the Dutch at a time when they were penetrating further into colonial areas claimed by other powers. They naturally sought an interpretation of *Mare Liberum,* or free seas; open waters that could not be claimed by any one nation. Grotius, a Dutch jurist, claimed that no one nation can claim "the vast, boundless sea . . ." nor could the seas "be the appanage of one country alone."[38] The Dutch staved off English attempts in 1610, 1618, and 1622 to implement licensing, with the

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[35] Wilson. *PP*. 33.
[36] Thomas Mun, *England's Treasure by Foreign Trade* (Glasgow: 1664), 12.
[37] Wilson. *PP.* 35
[38] Quoted in Wilson. *PP.* 36.

latter two by means of armed escorts of their fishing ships.[39] Here again, the Dutch aggression would be noted and brought up in the Rump Parliament. To English merchants, the Dutch did not seem to reciprocate the friendship shown by the English. The English, who might have liked to enforce licensing off "British coasts" were unable to do so because of their financial weakness.

By the first half of the seventeenth century, the Dutch had become a leading commercial power in Northern Europe and the preeminent shipbuilders in Europe. The keys to their maritime success were threefold. First, the invention of the *fluit,* a cheaply built freighter, gave the Dutch supremacy in the bulk cargo trade displaying an efficiency that would not be matched until the eighteenth century.[40] Their ability to ship cargo at a lower price, and in greater quantity enabled the Dutch to monopolize the shipping industry. Secondly, the low cost of production resulted because of their use of a new wind-powered lumber sawing mill invented in 1596. The wind-powered saw enabled the Dutch to construct ships faster than the hand shaped vessels of England, and with greater precision. At its peak, the Dutch system was able to produce some 500 new vessels per year.[41] Thirdly, by the seventeenth century the Dutch had shifted their scattered production areas into a few focused centers. There they stockpiled pre-cut timber enabling them to further cut their costs far below any other nation.[42]

The Dutch efficiency in building their *fluits,* and their effectiveness in moving cargo, granted the Dutch primacy in the shipping trade.

The extent of success enjoyed by the Dutch in the seventeenth century was eye opening. By their industriousness the Dutch garnered nearly three quarters of the grain and timber trade in

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[39] Wilson. *PP.* 36
[40] Charles Wilson, *The Dutch Republic and the Civilisation of the Seventeenth Century* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968), 23
[41] Jan De Vries, *Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis: 1600-1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 92-3.
[42] De Vries, *Economy*. 93.

the Baltic, which at this time was the breadbasket of Europe. Nowhere more so than in the Baltic did the Dutch enjoy such a clear advantage against English shipping where they outnumbered English ships by thirteen to one.[43] This advantage was leveraged into an increasingly larger gap by the lower price of timber and shipbuilding materials available to the Dutch secured by the lower costs of transport and trade.

The East Indies became the most aggressively contested region between the Dutch and English in the first two decades of the seventeenth century. The pursuit for spices from Asia and the wealth that it brought with it drove the competition to a new level between the English and Dutch. The contest boiled over into violence in when ten Englishmen were accused of conspiracy to overthrow the Dutch fortress at Amboyna in 1623. The Dutch East India Company tortured Gabriel Towerson, the leader of the alleged plot to overthrow the Dutch garrison, and many of those suspected of involvement in the plot to secure confessions and executed ten. This violence caught the ear of those in England and sparked outrage due to the lack of evidence. Karen Chancey noted that such a plot was unlikely. The Dutch Fort Victoria, was "an impressive fortification garrisoned by 200 soldiers." In addition to the large garrison, there was no large English contingent in the area due to a prior treaty. If Towerson and his twenty had somehow managed to take the fort, it would have been impossible to hold the fort with such a small force, especially with a large Dutch presence in the area.[44] As details trickled into England, the indignation grew. The growth of animosity is reflected in the letters of Simonds D'Ewes (who would later be an MP during the Long Parliament 1640-8) to his friend Albert Joachimi the Dutch ambassador to England when he pleaded for news from the Netherlands that those accused of "barbarism at Amboyna" were adequately punished so that the tempers in England could be

[43] Wilson. *PP.* 41-42.
[44] Karen Chancey, *The Amboyna Massacre in English Politics, 1624-1632,* 585.

calmed.[45] The ruthlessness succeeded in securing for the Dutch a near monopoly of the East Indian Seas.[46] However, it carried with it lasting feelings of animosity evident in D'Ewes's letters even fifteen years after Amboyna in 1638. D'Ewes wrote that in the " deepest of mind " for "the entire society of merchants . . . as well as innumerous amongst us" can hardly hold back "jeers and hostile hands from your people."[47] Daniel Defoe's classic description of Dutch shipping in 1728 provides another contemporary English opinion from someone who, as a trader, resented the success of Dutch trade. Defoe claimed: "The Dutch must be understood as they really are the Middle Persons in Trade, the Factors and Brokers of Europe . . . they buy to sell again, take in to send out, and the greatest Part of their vast Commerce consists in being supply'd from All Parts of the World, that they may supply All the World again . . ."[48]

The belief at the time was that the volume of international trade was static and the only way to increase it was at the expense of another.[49] This helps explain why many countries, like England, resented the triumph of the Dutch trade. The assumption was, if the Dutch were successful, then it was because they had taken it from someone else. Nowhere was this felt more than in England, whose close proximity and longstanding link with the Netherlands through trade indicated that Dutch success happened to the detriment of English commerce. The feeling of being slighted by the English in their dealings with the Dutch over the fisheries and the cloth trade were compounded by their belief that the Dutch were profiting from English struggles. For the English, these were not the actions of a reliable ally.

Before 1649, the English were in no position to challenge the Dutch over the fisheries, cloth trade, or address the trade imbalance. The early Stuart kings inability to provide for their

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[45] British Library, Harley MS 377, fo. 248.
[46] Wilson. *PP*, 44.
[47] British Library, Harley MS 377, fo. 248.
[48] Quoted in Wilson. *Dutch Republic.* 22.
[49] Wilson. *PP.* 40.

household expenses meant that they were also unable to supply the necessary funds to enforce their claims. After Charles I's execution, the Rump Parliament had the means, through unpopular but potent taxation, and this meant they could support their enlarged navy.[50] The excise tax and monthly assessments yielded Parliament the revenue necessary to defeat the Royalist forces of Charles I, the Scottish Presbyterian army, and Irish rebels all within a decade. When contrasted with Charles's inability to defeat the Scottish Presbyterian army in the 1639 Bishop's War, Parliament's effectiveness against its enemies reflected a miraculous reversal in England's ability to finance its military endeavors. The monthly assessments in December 1649 were bringing in £90,000 per month to supply the army and navy in England and Ireland.[51] This huge number is even more impressive because it alone, without supplement from foreign trade or the excise tax income, outweighed Charles I's total annual income of one million pounds at its height in 1638.[52] While highly effective, the Rump's taxes were despised, and as a Republican government empowered by its people, its MP's knew they had to lessen the burden of taxes and enhance additional sources of revenue. Here the contention surrounding the fisheries, the cloth trade, and the trade deficit returned to the preeminence.

The need to secure new avenues of revenue was not a new idea in the late 1640's. Thomas Mun, who was famous for his ideas written in *Treasure by Foreign Trade* in the 1620s and 1630s, was not the first to advocate increasing English trade. He contended that in order for England to raise its income, without oppressing its subjects, they must reduce their imports, and export more than they imported.[53] To this end, following the failure of the Strickland/St. John mission to the Netherlands to secure a closer union (which will be explained more in the next

[50] Jones. 41;
[51] C.H. Firth and R.S. Rait, *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum 1642-1660* (London: Wyman and Sons, 1911, Volume II), 287. Hereafter cited as *Acts and Ordinances.*
[52] Bucholz, 241.
[53] Mun, 85.

chapter), the Navigation Ordinance was passed on 9 October 1651. The Navigation Ordinance was passed largely due to the efforts of St. John upon his return to England. The Ordinance stipulated that no goods were to be imported to England on foreign ships, no salted fish or fish oil were to be imported except those caught by English ships and prepared by English fishermen, and no fish were to be exported unless they were carried by English ships. The Ordinance forbade any coasting trade (fishery activity and imports off the British coast) not carried on an English vessel.[54] Its emphasis centered on control of imports while also maintaining provisions directed at Dutch commerce. The significance of the fisheries to the Dutch economy remained at one million pounds annually and provided the Dutch with the currency necessary for business in the Baltic Sea. For the Dutch, the attempt by England to curtail their activity along the British coasts was untenable. However, this was no longer the weakened England that the Dutch had forced to back down under the Stuarts. The Commonwealth now had a steady, effective taxation system, and a superior navy to the Dutch. This time, the Dutch were not able to coerce the English, so they resorted to negotiation.

The negotiations with the Dutch concerning a repeal of the Navigation Ordinance bogged down as neither side was willing to give up their new advantages. The Dutch sought not only the repeal of the Navigation Ordinance but also the repeal of letters of marque for English privateers who captured Dutch ships in the informal war between France and England that lasted until 1655.[55] Dutch ships were being captured and robbed by English privateers because they were carrying both French goods, and Royalist victuals to Scotland. The Dutch commercial system relied in large part on their ability to transport, across the seas, the goods of other states, unmolested, throughout Europe. To the English, the Dutch conveyance of victuals to England's

[54] Wilson, *PP,* 53.

[55] A Letter of marque was a government license to a private person authorizing them to attack and capture vessels in conflict with the issuer, in this case being the Commonwealth of England.

enemies was unacceptable. To the English, it was the same as attacking an enemy ship and taking its spoils of war. English persistence in this course caused France to abandon the use of Dutch ships because they could not guarantee the safety of French merchandise.[56] In early 1652 the Dutch responded to English reluctance to reign in its privateers with a proclamation by the States General "to fit out and equip as speedily and with as little delay as possible one hundred and fifty ships of war in addition to those already in commision."[57] While the Dutch instructions to their lead admiral Maarten Tromp were strictly defensive, the giant increase in naval armament by the Dutch was alarming to those in England, who immediately saw the act as preparation for war by the Dutch. The States General intended to protect their shipping, and their fishing interests off the British coast which they deemed "of great importance to the State."[58] The inability by both sides to reach an agreement on the repeal of either the Navigation Ordinance or the letters of marque to English privateers, contributed to a state of increased tension between the English and Dutch. While the Navigation Ordinance did increase the likeliness of war, given the stress it enabled, it was not a cause of the First Anglo-Dutch War.

England's Ideological Change:

There can be no doubt that some degree of the tensions felt between 1651-1652 were due to economic disagreements between the Commonwealth of England and the United Provinces. However, they were not the sole causes of friction between the two nations. As intricate as the two interwoven economies were, their politics were just as complicated. By the middle of the

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[56] Samuel Rawson Gardiner, *Letters and Papers Pertaining to the First Dutch War, 1652-1654* (London: Navy Records Society, 1899-1930, volume 1), 50. Hereafter cited as: *FDW*.
[57] *FDW,* 88.
[58] *FDW,* 155-7.

seventeenth century their shared history of alliance would come to an end. The eighty-year struggle between Spain and the northern seven provinces of the Netherlands had finally come to its conclusion with the signing of the Treaty of Münster in 1648. Having solidified peace with Spain, the Dutch sought to maintain their peace by shunning military alliances and devoting themselves to the running of their state and the increase of their trade networks. So it seemed the best course of action by the States General to avoid entanglement was to delay the efforts of Parliamentarian diplomats and their calls for a closer union between the two Protestant republics. Tensions mounted between the two republics over Dutch assistance of Royalist forces in Scotland during the English Civil War, and the failed negotiation of a union between the two nations. While the Dutch were not openly supporting the Scots in their fight with Parliament, they continued to ship supplies to Scotland, paid for in some cases by Royalist exiles in the Netherlands, under a neutral flag. The latter contributed to the English conclusion that the Dutch were no longer good Protestants because in their pursuit of material wealth they abandoned their spiritual brethren. Nor were they genuinely republican as indicated by their continued tolerance of Royalist refugees who used their safe haven in the Netherlands to plot against the Commonwealth. Old wounds festered, renewed outrage over the massacre at Amboyna flared up, all contributing to the passing of the Navigation Ordinance and provided the final evidence that the Dutch were no friends of the English.

The strain on the Anglo-Dutch relationship began to intensify during the English Civil War, especially after the execution of Charles I in 1649. From 1642-1649 a civil war raged throughout England. In that war, Parliamentary forces gained the upper hand with their victories over Royalist forces at the battles of Marston Moor in 1645 and Naseby in the following year. With these two victories Royalist forces were beaten and Charles was tried in 1649 for high

treason after he tried again to raise forces against Parliament in 1648 through secret treaties with Scotland. He was convicted and sentenced to death in January 1649. After Charles I's death, his Dutch son-in-law William II began to assist Charles II, his brother-in-law, to regain his throne.[59] William began by putting pressure on the province of Holland, who were notoriously pro-Parliament because of their disposition toward trade, to support his policies against England. The pro-Stuart neutrality in the English war with Scotland (1649-1651) threatened to escalate into armed assistance under William. England, it seemed, was to be saved by divine intervention. During William's coup in Amsterdam in his attempt to "make himself absolute monarch of all the United Netherlands," William contracted smallpox and died in November 1650.[60]

With the attack stopped, and the pro-Stuart Orangist party leaderless, a closer union between England and the Netherlands seemed more possible than ever. By January 1651, the States General had recognized the Commonwealth of England as a sovereign nation and allowed political interaction. This seemed like a step toward unity, but by June of the same year the English had become aware that the "Dutch pipeline to the Royalists in Scotland had not been severed" with William's death. Dutch ports were being used to funnel support into Scotland against the Commonwealth. The Dutch role in "aiding of rebels, and fugitives with arms, [and] victuals" by Dutch shipping, under the neutral Dutch flag, was in direct contradiction to the *Intercursus Magnus* treaty of 1495, and according to St. John the Dutch operations "had done little less hurt to the Commonwealth of England" than if the Dutch had declared themselves enemies and gone to war with England.[61] With the Commonwealth being recognized as the legitimate power in the British Isles, the Dutch assistance to Royalists in Scotland was an

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[59] Samuel Rawson Gardiner, *History of the Commonwealth and Protectorate, 1649-1656* (New York: AMS Press Inc, 1965, volume I), 319. Hereafter cited as Gardiner, *Commonwealth*.
[60] Pincus, 15.
[61] Ambassador's Journal 18 April, 1651 Quoted in Pincus, 34.

obvious breach in treaty. There was no denying the articles, and the Dutch ambassadors knew it, but they also knew they were powerless to stop Royalist sympathies in the frontier Orangist provinces. The English response was clear. There were "two elements of the *Intercursus,"* which both parties were required to uphold, "one granted freedom of commerce and navigation, the other which guaranteed aid against each other's rebels."[62] To the English ambassadors, Walter Strickland and Oliver St. John, the Dutch were reaping the trade benefits of the *Intercursus Magnus* without upholding the second portion of the treaty. They argued if one was not met, the other was not guaranteed either, a point which the English ambassadors made apparent before their departure.[63]

The noncommitment of the States General followed the policy advice of Pieter de la Court, a Dutch merchant and economist, to "make no alliance with the English . . . but avoid war; and 'in all our differences give them good words and gain time.'"[64] While de la Court was a merchant and republican, his advice became the policy of the Orangist party in the States General. They stalled, but their stalling threatened to break the entire alliance apart. Instead of England falling "into a foreign or intestine war" or ruining themselves through corruption or luxury, England decisively defeated the Royalist armies in Scotland and turned their attention toward the Netherlands. The Orangists wanted to be sure that Charles II's forces in Scotland had lost before they abandoned the Stuarts. While they waited for a change in events, animosity grew in England.

To the Fifth Monarchists in England, who believed the end days were near and the abolition of the monarchy paved the way for the return of Jesus, it seemed that Providence had created parallel situations in the Netherlands and in England and provided the perfect

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[62] Pincus, 35.
[63] Ambassador's Journal 14 June, 1651 Quoted in Pincus, 35.
[64] Quoted in Wilson, *PP,* 18.

opportunity to secure an ally in religion and ideology. They sincerely believed that they were preparing the earth for the thousand-year reign of Jesus before the Day of Judgement, and the signs only acted to confirm their beliefs. In both countries a tyrant had tried to ignore constitutional constraints and overpower their legislative bodies to secure for themselves more power than they should have. The signs to act were too bold to ignore. Firstly, the two "tyrants" had been overcome by the hands of Providence, William by fatal sickness just before he seized power, and Charles by the strength of Parliament's righteous armies.[65] The second was the immediate adoption of "a sound religious policy" in the Netherlands which the *Weekly Intelligencer* reported "unanimously agreed for the extirpation of Popery" and to revert back to the settlement of the Synod of Dordrecht in 1618" measuring up to English standards.[66] Their policy would extricate the country from popery and secure it as a haven for sound Protestant doctrine. Lastly, even those provinces of Orangist sentiment had accepted the resolution to acknowledge the Parliament of England as a free state.[67] With William out of the way, his followers reduced in influence, and the States General making strides toward unity with England, Parliament quickly dispatched its ambassadors, Oliver St. John and Walter Strickland. Many influential Rumpers (MP in the Rump Parliament) believed the timely death of William II, the States General division of Stadtholder powers among themselves, and their support of the Reformed Christianity signaled a divine appointment. The English were determined not to waste the opportunity God had provided. No longer satisfied with the amicable relationship between the two; instead their aim was to "seek a more strict and intimate alliance and union . . . for the good of both."[68] The purpose of the *Magnus Intercursus* was "the defense and aid against foreign

[65] Ian Gentles, *Oliver Cromwell: God's Warrior and the English Revolution,* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 103; Pincus, 17.
[66] Quoted in Pincus, 17.
[67] Pincus, 18.
[68] Instructions to the Ambassadors Quoted in Pincus, 25-6.

enemies, and the free intercourse of trade." The new union's attention would be directed at "the profession of the true reformed religion, and of the just liberties, and freedoms of the people of both republics."[69] The English sought an alliance that emphasized the religious unity among equally Reformed nations against their persistent fear of popery, both internationally and domestically. Despite the promise of their endeavor, after three months the ambassadors returned home having achieved nothing.

The States General had also proposed a treaty, but theirs was centered around trade, with no mention of a defensive alliance. The States General was split. The Orangists, who were the weaker party after the death of William II, could only hope to stall. The republican side led by the merchants of Amsterdam and Leiden, the economic centers of the country, were enthusiastic for a closer union. The proposed alliance would "afford proportionable advantages" giving merchants from Holland free access to all British ports and colonies enabling them, who already had a drastic advantage over English merchants, even more advantages.[70] The trade off was that the Dutch and English would become closer politically and come to the aid of the other if attacked, making the two countries a northern bulwark for reformed Christianity. With the Dutch proposal of a strict commercial treaty rejected by the English and the English treaty delayed by Orangist provinces, Strickland and St. John decided to leave the Netherlands and return home. Upon seeing that the English were leaving, the Dutch made one last attempt at a union offering a treaty of "mutual defense and conservation of liberty and franchise of the two Commonwealths and of the commerce and navigation reciprocal, and of the common interests, against all that should endeavor the disturbance of either of them."[71] This was the treaty the English wanted. They immediately drew up papers, but when the motion was presented to the States General, the

[69] Quoted in Pincus, 26-27.
[70] Quoted in Pincus, 32.
[71] Ambassador's Journal 16, June 1651 Quoted in Pincus, 33.

delegates from the Orangist provinces insisted that the articles be sent to the provinces for approval.

This, it seems, was the last straw for the English diplomats. The manner in which the mission failed created intense resentment in St. John, who then returned to Parliament with "extreme indignation."[72] Upon his return, St. John entered into discussion on how "they might discountenance and control the trade of Holland and increase their own."[73] Following the failure of union negotiations in the Netherlands by May1651, the Navigation Ordinance was born 9 October 1651[74]. St. John was "a principle engineer" in the composition of the Navigation Ordinance.[75] Given that St. John was the first to propose and among the primary authors of the bill, and that his nomination for the mission came because of standing in the Rump and his ability to "submerge minor differences for the greater good of the Protestant cause;" the timing suggests that the cause of the Navigation Ordinance was due to frustrated ideological concerns, and not primarily to increase English oversea trade.[76]

For the Dutch, one major obstacle hindering their acceptance of the new treaty was the clause concerning the harboring of rebels and fugitives. The 1495 treaty required that neither country harbor, nor aid one another's rebels. The clause was written concerning the usurper Perkin Warbeck in 1495, and no one could have imagined the complexity of royal marriages to come. It was too much for the Orange party to consider approving a treaty that would endanger the Princess of Orange and her infant son.[77] In short, the princess was a Stuart. The rebels waging war against the Commonwealth were royalists loyal to the Stuart monarchy. Therefore, for the

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[72] Edward Earl of Clarendon, *A History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England* (Oxford, 1843), 784.
[73] Clarendon, 784.
[74] *Acts and Ordinances,* 559.
[75] Quoted in Pincus, 45.
[76] Quoted in Pincus, 25; Clarendon, 784.
[77] Gardiner, *Commonwealth,* 328.

Orangists to accept the new terms, they would have to abandon the Stuart family. The Orangists could not agree, so they stalled and hoped for a change of heart in England.

Another impediment to Dutch acceptance of the treaty was their mistrust in a union with England. Their reasons centered on the recent English domination of Scotland which had come into a union with England in 1603, and since become a second rate partner. They feared that the disparity in size, population, and natural resources would make English domination difficult to avoid.[78] The Dutch feared that if they unified themselves with the English, it would only be a matter of time until they too became a second rate partner. The Dutch, who had finally concluded an eighty-year struggle for independence were unlikely to accept any terms that could lead to their subservience again.

As rational as Dutch reasoning may have been, news of the treatment of the Strickland/St. John mission revived old grievances in England, the most heinous of which, the massacre at Amboyna, ushered in calls for action. In Sir Simonds D'Ewes's letters to Albert Joachimi in 1629, D'Ewes reassured Joachimi that he was doing all he could to "soften their fervours," with inquiries as to the punishment of those Dutch colonial officials who perpetrated the massacre.[79] However, nine years later there was still no word of any just penalty, and D'Ewes warned of the stored feelings of animosity and "hostile hands" that might follow.[80] The "daylie iealousies" and differences between the English and Dutch over fishing rights "and the bitter legacy of Amboyna" were making "the dutchman hated worse than then [the] Spaniard."[81] The growing feeling in English newpapers was that the Dutch, who professed friendship, were not friends, and

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[78] Jones, 84.
[79] British Library, Harley MS377, fo. 248,
[80] British Library, Harley, MS377, fo. 248.
[81] Quoted in J. Sears McGee, *An Industrious Mind: The Worlds of Sir Simonds D'Ewes* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 249.

that something had to be done. Many in England were moved by the words printed by James Moxon:

> The most villainous and barbarous cruelties used on the English merchants residing at Amboyna in the East-Indies, by the Netherland governor and conncel [sic] there. Wherein is shewed what tortures were used to make them confess a conspiracy they were never guilty of; by putting them on the rack, and by a water torture, to suffocate them; and by burning them under their arm pits, and soals of their feet, till their fat by dropping extinguished the candles.[82]

Coupled with the aggressive tactics by the Dutch in the fisheries, and cloth trade and their encroachment in the Levant region, an area with well established English trade, Amboyna was presented as damning proof of the ingratitude of the Dutch. The English felt that their assistance against Spain in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries merited more loyalty, and the Dutch appeared unwilling to reciprocate such loyalty against England's enemies. The English wanted a firm defensive alliance against rebels, Catholics and monarchists. They wanted an enhanced *Intercursus Magnus,* but the Dutch were not going to give it to them.

The delaying tactics and renegotiating of formally agreed upon principles by the States General could readily be seen by some in England as mirroring the actions of the king they had recently rid themselves of. The actions of the Dutch begot mistrust in the minds of the English. Oliver St. John came to see the Dutch as serving Mammon rather than God and supporting monarchies and their inherent deficiencies over a union between two special nations set apart by God.[83] The Dutch were ruining the opportunity for a Protestant republican alliance which "divine Providence" had created.[84] English newspapers were filled with threats that "the Dutch may be too late [to] repent [of] what they have done," echoing the warning of St. John that the

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[82] Anonymous, *A Memento for Holland,* (London: James Moxon, 1652) Thomason E1475[1].
[83] Pincus, 38-9; Pincus, 21.
[84] Quoted in Pincus, 39.

Dutch would "repent of having rejected our [English] offers."[85] While it is difficult to measure the effect of printed work on public opinion, it does suggest that English enmity was increasing and St. John's supporters in Parliament were openly hostile toward any Dutch overtures after the failure of the St. John mission. The hostility of the English could be felt across the Channel by Dutch merchants in the ferocity of the English sailors carrying out the Navigation Ordinances.

1652:

A few months after the passage of the Navigation Ordinance the United Provinces sent a delegation to England. By February 1652, English privateering was on the rise with Dutch shipping as the primary casualty, and while English trade with the Netherlands slowed due to the Navigation Ordinance, its repeal remained a secondary concern of Dutch lawmakers. The Navigation Ordinance and letters of marque issued by the English Parliament showed how hostile the English had become toward the Dutch. The States General accurately understood that relations had severely deteriorated and that something had to be done. The Dutch sent Lord Cats, a former Pensionary of Holland in December 1651 (leading functionary and legal advisor to the state of Holland's governing body) to lead the effort to soothe English indignation and prevent armed conflict. For the Dutch, fighting England was the worst possible outcome and something they fervently sought to avoid. However, in an attempt to shield themselves, should fighting ensue, the Dutch initiated a program of rearmament of their navy at the same time they sent their delegation. The rearmament combined with raised tensions, English privateering, and fear between the two nations led to the unintentional battle of Goodwin Sands 19 May 1652, and the beginning of the First Anglo-Dutch War.

[85] Quoted in Pincus, 59; Quoted in Pincus, 45.

The failure of the Strickland/ St. John's mission to the Netherlands fueled indignation in St. John and among the English public also. According to Edward Hyde, later to be made Earl of Clarendon, St. John and his allies in Parliament felt that they were "undervalued (that is, not valued above all the world besides)."[86] Their sense of importance surely resulted from the now widespread religious beliefs that the English were God's special people, a chosen people who knew that "god is casting down princes" to " declare against Popery . . . and kings whom they call tyrants, and for liberty."[87] Their evidence arose from their recent successes against their own tyrant Charles I in 1649. Given their experiences and beliefs, the Dutch denial of a union was taken as more than just a political insult, given all that England had done for the Dutch during their rebellion with Spain. It was an affront to God, who was using England to do his will, and by refusing England and their heavenly mission, the Dutch were turning their back on God as well, and for that they needed to be punished. Unlike the early seventeenth century under James I and Charles I, the English in the 1650s were now able to enforce any claims they had against the Dutch, and it seemed they were going to.

The need to punish the Dutch matured into the Navigation Ordinance. St. John and his associates endeavored to control the trade of Holland and increase their own trade at the expense of the Dutch.[88] The Ordinance, passed in October 1651 inhibited "all foreign ships from bringing in any merchandise . . . into England, but such as were the proceed or growth of their own country, upon the penalty of forfeiture of all such ships."[89] The Ordinance also contained measures against the export of British fish and oil except upon English vessels.[90] These measures

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[86] Clarendon, 784.
[87] Josselin's Diary Quoted in Pincus, 20. Josselin was a prominent preacher in England from the 1640s until his death in 1683.
[88] Clarendon, 784.
[89] Clarendon, 784; *Acts and Ordinances*, 559-562.
[90] *Acts and Ordinances*, 560.

were certainly aimed at the Dutch whose economy was reliant upon the British fisheries, salt trade, and shipping of foreign supplies. The most dangerous of the clauses to the Dutch concerned the fisheries. If the English, who had the larger navy and were now able to, decided to enforce this clause, which they seemed intent on doing, it could prove disastrous to the Dutch economy which needed the fisheries to support their Baltic trade network, which was by far their most profitable and important.[91] Steven Pincus claims that by passing the Navigation Ordinance, the English were punishing "the Dutch for apostazing, for abandoning the Protestant and republican cause, and consequently violating the *Intercursus Magnus*."[92]

To penalize the Dutch the Navigation Ordinance intended to seize the cargo and ship carrying illegal imports and exports. From October 1651 onward, if an English ship caught a Dutch ship importing materials from another country into England or exporting British commodities, that ship could be confiscated. Thus, the Navigation Ordinance incentivised privateering which led to heavy losses for Dutch merchants and their calls for action by the States General. Those in Holland who were originally in support of the Anglo-Dutch union were now the ones most affected by the delaying tactics of the Orangist provinces. The Dutch understood that all their maritime commerce must "pass in sight of England . . . or fetch a circumnavigation round Scotland and Ireland in the summer" which took double the time and posed greater dangers.[93] Therefore, the States General decided to send a delegation to England to repair the broken relationship.

The Dutch delegation led by Lord Cats arrived in England greeted by a very hostile host. The public remained irate over the Dutch denial, provoked by reminders of the Amboyna massacre. The Rump received the delegation "convinced that there had been no reformation

[91] Wilson, *PP,* 40-2.
[92] Pincus, 50.
[93] *FDW,* 37.

since the death of William II."[94] The task of Lord Cats and his entourage was to secure a repeal of the Navigation Ordinance and "return with an olive branch in their mouths."[95] Although they were instructed to obtain a repeal of the Ordinance, they were not willing to go to war over the measure.[96] In Cats's speech, he immediately emphasized the Dutch desire to create a "firm league of amity and union" including assistance "both in the offensive and defensive war."[97] This revelation delighted the English and negotiations flourished. By February 1652, the tone toward the Dutch had completely changed. They were once again esteemed as a "Christian republic" and no longer apostates.[98] Now free of Orangist bondage, *Mercurius Politicus* (the Rump Parliament's newspaper) once more acclaimed that the Dutch were a people "magnanimous and gallant" in their rediscovery of their liberty.[99] The two countries had agreed upon a yearly stipend the Dutch would pay to the English to fish off the British coasts, and conceded reparations of £700,000 for the injuries done at Amboyna.[100] It seemed by May 1652 that the two countries would again be allies with stronger ties than ever. Widespread belief in the impending treaty led many English merchants to deliver petitions to the Council of State to include their particular grievances in the general settlement.[101] More than any other evidence provided, the activity of the merchants manifests how close the two sides were to an agreement. If the resolution was not nearing a conclusion, as was the case with the Strickland mission, it is highly unlikely the merchants would have so hastily sought their inclusion to a settlement of grievances.

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[94] Pincus, 51.
[95] *Mercurius Politicus,* 27 November- December 4 1651 Quoted in Pincus, 50.
[96] Pincus, 51.
[97] Cat's Speech Quoted in Pincus, 54.
[98] Pincus, 54.
[99] Quoted in Pincus, 54.
[100] Pincus, 55-6.
[101] *Calendar of State Papers Domestic Series, 1651-1652* (London: Public Record Office, Volume 4, 1877), 232; Pincus, 57.

While it seemed that the two sides were edging closer to the approval of a Protestant republican union, both were engaged in a series of actions that increased tensions among their people, and more importantly among their navies. At the same time that the Dutch were sending their diplomatic mission to England, they were also dramatically increasing the size of their navy to defend their trade fleets and fishing ships against English privateering. The English, with the passage of the Navigation Ordinance began issuing letters of marque against Dutch fishing ships and trading vessels acting in conflict with the Ordinance. Letters of marque were issued after October 1651. Their issuance adversely affected Dutch shipping profits. If the Dutch could not guarantee the cargo their ships carried, then those paying them might seek other ways of transport. In addition, the threat of damage to the Dutch fishing industry proved too much for the Dutch to allow. The States General commissioned "with as little delay as possible one hundred and fifty ships of war in addition to those already in commission," on February 1652.[102] These new ships were commissioned "for the better guard of the sea and the preservation of the navigation and commerce of these United Netherlands."[103] At the same time as naval preparations were taking place, the States General ordered troops to begin garrisoning in the states of Holland and Zeeland.[104] Orders to garrison soldiers in coastal states were followed by orders issued to Admiral Tromp (the Dutch naval commander) to employ "at sea beyond the ordinary number" for the "security of the State and the protection of commerce."[105] These orders from the States General in late April/early May 1652 are a telling sign of potential conflict between the two republics, even while negotiations continued. The commission of Dutch ships to the Channel and fisheries from privateers were intended to be strictly defensive. However, their

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[102] Proclamation by the States General, Feb 25 1652 quoted in FDW, 88.
[103] *FDW,* 89.
[104] *FDW,* 98.
[105] *FDW,* 155-9.

orders to “free the ships of this country from all search . . . to defend them against all who try to do them injury, and to release them to the uttermost of their power from every one who may have captured them,” was clearly directed at English privateers.[106] The tone of the command denotes a sternness not reflective of allies but of rivals. Although the Dutch showed no inclination to go to war, because their economy required peace to flourish, they could not afford for English privateers to undermine their international commerce.

Even as talks between the Commonwealth and the Dutch Republic progressed, Pincus notes that “Anglo-Dutch maritime hostility was at its worst in the first half of 1652.”[107] A deeper investigation into the finals months preceding the declaration of war on 10 July reveals that the consistent harassment of Dutch merchant ships by English privateers, and the English malice toward Dutch sailors they had captured, created a situation that “hath much incensed the merchants of Amsterdam,” causing many to seek letters of reprisal against the English.[108] In such an antagonistic maritime setting, the clash between the fleets of Tromp and Blake occurred at the Battle of the Goodwin Sands on 19 May 1652. While the cause of the battle remains contested, an investigation by the Rump on 25 May found that “the imperiousness of the Hollander, " triggered the conflict.[109] This skirmish off the Dover coast set in motion the Rump’s preparations for war. Prior to the fighting at Goodwin Sands, the Rump had ordered “a large fleet to the Mediterranean to protect trade,” which according to Jones, “would have left a weakened fleet in home waters, signifying that the Rump had no intention of going to war.[110] It appears that in the months leading up to the 10 July declaration of war by England, there was still little indication that war was imminent.

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[106] *FDW,* 158.
[107] Pincus, 69.
[108] Pincus, 63; Quoted in Pincus, 65.
[109] Quoted in Pincus, 72.
[110] Jones, 114.

Ultimately, the success of negotiations was severely undermined by the States General's decision to build one hundred and fifty new warships. The decision to sell off many of the Dutch warships after peace with Spain was made in 1648 created the necessity of the States General to hastily assemble one hundred and fifty new ships in 1652. The shock of a building programme of that size was seen in England as a policy of intimidation. The Dutch protection of their ships from search and seizure was to the English a challenge to their right to protect themselves from outside aid to their enemies. If the Dutch were not willing to abide by the *Intercursus Magnus* and insisted on supplying the enemies of the Commonwealth, then the Commonwealth resolved to treat those ships carrying victuals to their enemies as enemy ships themselves.

There are many factors that contribute to any war and the First Anglo-Dutch War is no different. However, there is inevitably a cause more responsible than the others. The failure of the Strickland/St. John mission was the cause most responsible for the First Anglo-Dutch War. The inability to reach terms in 1651 revealed ill feelings of past misdeeds setting in motion the Navigation Ordinance and English privateering against the United Provinces. English feelings of betrayal boiled over because the English believed they were rejected by their allies when the Dutch refused to enforce the *Intercursus Magnus.* The Navigation Ordinance resulted from St. John's indignation after he returned home. While the Navigation Ordinance is often presented as the cause for the "first commercial war," the evidence suggests otherwise. The Dutch were not willing to go to war over the Ordinance, which was clear given Cats's instructions on his diplomatic mission. Whether the Ordinance itself was conjured up as a punishment for the supposed Dutch mistreatment, as Edward Hyde claimed or their apostasy, as Pincus asserts, in England too the Ordinance was never intended to lead to war.[111] The Rump Parliament was trying to do the opposite. After fighting a civil war for the last decade, the Parliament was trying

[111] Clarendon, 784; Pincus, 50.

to cut costs, not pay for a new war and have to raise new taxes.[112] The Dutch fleet was not in a state of readiness for battle in late 1651 when English privateering began. As a result, they were unable to adequately defend their fishing ships and trade vessels which had to pass by England.

Conclusion:

Research reveals that the cause of the First Anglo-Dutch War was the failure of the Strickland/St. John mission to the United Provinces in the spring of 1651. Their inability to secure an extension of the *Intercursus Magnus* with the Dutch is the genesis led to the deteriorated relations of both nations, and the war began on 10 July 1652. The attempt to unify the Anlgo-Dutch republics by Walter Strickland and Oliver St. John was frustrated by the stratagems of Orangists in the States General and provinces of the Dutch Republic. Their delaying tactics seriously affected the ability of those in Holland and Zeeland who desired a union with England to secure a union. Had they succeeded in negotiating a union, war could have been avoided, but because they failed, relations between the two nations deteriorated, the countries soured toward the other, and tensions grew exponentially. Old grievances over the massacre at Amboyna and disputes over the fisheries resurfaced. St. John's indignation toward the Dutch upon his return to England in the summer of 1651 ushered in the passage of the Navigation Ordinance on 9 October 1651. The Navigation Ordinance was not the cause of the war. The instructions given to the Cats delegation in December 1651 were to seek the repeal of the Navigation Ordinance, but they would not go to war if it was not repealed.[113] The Dutch did not seek to go to war with the English at any point, but especially not in 1651. Before February

[112] *Acts and Ordinances,* 287.
[113] Quoted in Pincus, 51.

1652, when the States General ordered one hundred new warships, they were in a poor state of military preparedness, and more importantly they did not wish war with England under any circumstance.

There was no evidence that the cause of war could be linked to the disputes over the fisheries or trade with the Netherlands. While the Navigation Ordinance did contain provisions to seize Dutch ships fishing in British waters and those that carried imports into England, these measures seem to be measures against what some in the Rump considered to be "a corrupt polity," which had abandoned God and republicanism.[114] Instead, my research suggests that the letters of marque issued as a result of the Navigation Ordinance triggered the deterioration of Anglo-Dutch relations in early 1652. In response to the vigor of English privateers, the States General began their massive ship building program. The size of the building program and the orders given to Tromp to stop the search and seizure of Dutch ships in British waters led to the Battle of the Goodwin Sands in May 1652 and the beginning of war preparations by both sides.

Epilogue: The War's Effect on Globalization

[114] Pincus, 14; Pincus; Pincus, 38-9.

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After fighting three wars with the Dutch, in 1689 Parliament offered the crown to William III (the Dutch Stadtholder and son of William II Orange and Mary Stuart, 1689-1702)

[115] Mural by James Thornhill on the ceiling of the Painted Hall in the Royal Naval College at Greenwich (designed by Sir Christopher Wren). It shows William (Mary is to his right) with his foot on a figure representing tyranny (Louis XIV).

and Mary (daughter of King James II). Ironically, the man Parliament offered the crown to was a Dutchman. By doing this, England fulfilled the desire of the Strickland/St. John mission, a union with the United Provinces, but had to accept a Dutch king. They had gained the type monarch they had longed for since the reign of James I. They were unified under the leadership of a true Protstant, and a king willing to compromise with Parliament because he desperately needed English resources to defend his nation (United Provinces) against Louis XIV (1643-1715).

On 30 June 1688, William was invited to invade England to replace King James II, who was openly Catholic. William landed at Torbay in Devon on 5 November 1688. By the middle of December 1688, James II's supporters abandoned him and James had fled England. Upon jointly accepting the crown with his wife, William signed the English Bill of Rights. It provided, among other things, that the monarch could not suspend laws passed by Parliament, levy taxes without parliamentary consent, or raise a standing army during peacetime without parliamentary permission. During his reign, and because of his ongoing and costly wars with Louis XIV of France, Parliament met yearly. Parliament shifted from an event that happened at the pleasure of the king to an institution in British government. The Bill of Rights was not the first of its kind in the English Constitution. Other such documents like the Magna Carta had been around for centuries, but were not always upheld. Under William and his successors, the Bill of Rights was maintained, forever changing the operation of the British government.

Significantly, because of the institutionalization of Parliament, the Bank of England was founded during William's reign by a group of private bankers in 1694. Its establishment was enabled by the security of William's compromises. With the king adhering to restrictions on his royal prerogatives, the wealthy of England could invest their money in the Bank of England without fear of their king seizing their money, as was the case in France, which did not establish

its national bank until 1800. The Bank of England, which was modeled after the Exchange Bank of Amsterdam (est. 1604) enabled the country to borrow, as long as the interest was paid on time. As a result, merchants could borrow for larger trade ventures, colonial charters could more readily be funded, and military forces raised. After fighting three maritime wars with the Dutch, the English possessed a formidable navy, and with the addition of the Bank of England to fund overseas ventures, England was poised to expand its overseas empire. Out of the relatively insignificant Anglo-Dutch Wars, the English who before the wars had never been a preeminent power in Europe, built the largest empire in history, ruling one quarter of the world's population.

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