Frontiers of Reciprocity:

The Dynamics of Exchange, Diplomacy, and Power in the Dawnland

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Table of Contents

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Introduction

When describing the colonization of Maine through the late seventeenth century, historians often employ the terms "borderland" and "frontier." In turn, they connote a backwater on the outer bounds of empire, and a wilderness yet to be brought under the rule of law. In this period, the European and Indigenous inhabitants of Maine planted roots in a land defined by its liminality. It was a contested region straddling the French and British empires, destabilized by a series of the bloodiest Native American wars in New England's history, which were described by a contemporary account as the "*decennium luctuosum"* and "*duodecennium luctuosum"*: a decade of sorrow, twelve years of mourning.[1] Here, in the Northeastern region that Indigenous inhabitants referred to as the Dawnland, residents were isolated from colonial centers of power, in Boston and in Quebec, and the politics of empire remained in flux well into the eighteenth century. Long after English colonists established their hegemony over their Indigenous neighbors in Southern New England, the Wabanaki in the Dawnland were able to assert their sovereignty, dealing with settlers on an equal footing that reflected the balance of power in the region.[2] An era characterized by violence erupted, however, when English settlers spurned the reciprocal relationships the Wabanaki attempted to build with them, inaugurating a perpetual struggle over sovereignty and power in a remote corner of empire. Through this conflict, Anglo-Wabanaki relationships were continuously subjected to re-negotiations that responded to contextual shifts wrought by political, economic, and demographic transformations. As settlement and subsistence

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[1] Cotton Mather, *Decennium Luctuosum: An History of Remarkable Occurrences, in the Long War, Which New-England hath had with the Indian Savages, From the Year, 1688, To the Year 1698.* Boston, 1699, Early English Books Online; Cotton Mather, *Duodecennium Luctuosum: The History of a Long War with the Indian Savages, and their Directors and Abettors; From the Year, 1702, to the Year, 1714*, Boston, 1714, Eighteenth Century Collections Online.

[2] Jenny Hale Pulsipher, "Dark Cloud Rising from the East: Indian Sovereignty and the Coming of King William's War in New England," *The New England Quarterly* 80, no. 4 (2007): 588-613 at 589-590.

practices forcefully clashed, and trade and gift exchange took on a new resonance at the close of the seventeenth century, Native assertions of sovereignty and power in the Dawnland articulated a narrative of resilience and resistance.

Before Europeans settled trading posts and towns in the Northeast, Native peoples had inhabited the Dawnland for thousands of years, carefully cultivating and manipulating the landscape to sustain themselves physically and spiritually. The Algonquian-speaking Wabanaki engaged in a dynamic culture and continuously developed new technologies and cultural practices, which is evidenced in the archeological record by transformations in agricultural and hunting habits, innovations in ceramics, and a proliferation of shared spiritual imagery.[3] These transformations did not happen in a vacuum, as shared artifact styles and evidence of material exchange point to large spheres of exchange within which the Wabanaki operated as a crossroads, connecting them with other Indigenous peoples to the south and the west. Population grew as horticulture became an ingrained practice by the turn of the seventeenth century, and most Wabanaki groups consolidated into semi-nomadic tribes, preserving ancient traditions of seasonal movement, and moving village sites to replenish their soil, woods, and streams.[4] As pictured in Figure 1, the Wabanaki were politically organized in semi-autonomous bands whose complexity is rarely reflected in European sources. The people broadly identified by the English as "Eastern Indians" included Native peoples who resided between the Hudson River and the Atlantic coast, encompassing most of the Maritime Peninsula.[5] As these Native groups, which

[3] Bruce Bourque, *Twelve Thousand Years: American Indians in Maine* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), 100.
[4] Evan Haefeli and Kevin Sweeney, *Captors and Captives: The 1704 French and Indian Raid on Deerfield,* (Amherst and Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 12.
[5] Haefeli and Sweeney, *Captors and Captives*, 78.

included the Pennacooks, Kennebecs, and Penobscots, often intermingled and acted collaboratively in war parties, strict divisions can be ambiguous.[6]

Figure 1. Lisa Brooks, "Kwinitekew Environs," in The Common Pot.
https://lbrooks.people.amherst.edu/thecommonpot/map4.html.

In the early seventeenth century, the Indigenous people of the Dawnland established regular contact with the French and the English, two groups of Europeans who were often at odds with each other. In the eyes of these European colonists with imperial ambitions, this region often represented the outer reach of their potential sphere of influence, their frontier and borderland. Beginning in the late sixteenth century, the French had a foothold in the St. Lawrence River Valley, directly North and East of present-day New Hampshire and Maine. This region of New France largely consisted of a network of trading posts, which was sustained by a

[6] Bourque, *Twelve Thousand Years*, 107.

lucrative trade in furs, the success of which depended on strong relationships between French traders and Indigenous hunters. Exploratory probes southward into Maine resulted from this vibrant commercial activity, and the French soon established more permanent trading posts in Acadia by the early seventeenth century.[7] The English were also active in the fur trade, but they were mainly confined to summer voyages until the founding of Plymouth in 1620, which resulted in an influx of small fishing and trading outposts on Maine's southwest and central coastline.[8] These gradually grew into more permanent settlements throughout the next several decades.

In the early years of European settlement, the Wabanaki and these newcomers maintained generally peaceful relations, mutually benefitting from an amicability that increased access to trade goods and to a potential ally in an increasingly destabilized borderland. Beginning in 1600, however, the Indigenous residents of the Dawnland bore witness to waves of demographic and political upheavals, as successive epidemics resulted in a catastrophic collapse of the Indigenous population and a reconfiguration of kinship networks, and new access to a world economy drew the Wabanaki into conflicts with their Indigenous neighbors.[9] The Wabanaki tried to incorporate the English settlers into their network of reciprocal relationships that governed the Dawnland, a web of exchange wherein gifts and mutual obligation served as an essential backbone of diplomacy by maintaining ties between communities.[10] This period of relative peace abruptly ended in 1675, when colonial paranoia regarding an Indigenous uprising in Massachusetts spread north, rupturing these relationships and inaugurating a new era of violence and warfare. In

[7] Bourque, *Twelve Thousand Years*, 120.
[8] Bourque, *Twelve Thousand Years*, 120-121.
[9] Ian Saxine, *Properties of Empire: Indians, Colonists, and Land Speculators on the New England Frontier* (New York: New York University Press, 2019), 28; Bourque, *Twelve Thousand Years*, 145.
[10] Saxine, *Properties of Empire*, 32.

refusing to uphold or respect the understanding of mutual obligation that underpinned their relationship to the Wabanaki, English settlers forced the hand of the Wabanaki to protect their sovereignty through bloodshed rather than their preferred tactic of diplomacy.

Maine being removed from colonial centers of power and largely governed by dynamic and localized relationships did not lead to much popularity among contemporary colonists. However, these very circumstances have caused a renewed surge of interest in Maine among historians of early America. The rise of the "New Indian History" in the 1980s and 1990s represented a significant turning point in the practice of early Americanists. This initial movement strove to deconstruct the American master narrative by centering Native peoples as principal actors in colonial projects, and many subsequent waves of scholarship have emanated from this central ethos. Richard White's seminal 1991 definition of the Great Lakes region in the mid-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a "Middle Ground" forever changed the landscape of Indigenous histories. White emphasized Native-colonial relationships that were founded on a mutual dependency, rather than the traditional narrative of conquest and cultural decline, centering the unique possibilities of mutual accommodation, cultural exchange, and great violence that arose from the specific circumstances of this region and period.[11] While it is likely that historians have been too liberal with the label of "Middle Ground," renewed interest in remote borderlands as realms of unique relationships and opportunities is undoubtedly informed by White's perspective, as academics continually work to expand methodologies to bring history closer to Native realities.[12] To realize this goal, scholars have urged early Americanists to work to institutionalize the practices of Native American and Indigenous studies, to expand the scope

[11] Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), IX-XI.
[12] For a more detailed discussion on historians' use of the concept of "Middle Ground," see Philip Deloria, "What is the Middle Ground, Anyway?" *The William and Mary Quarterly* 63, no. 1 (2006): 15-22.

of historical narratives by incorporating materials and methods that are not wholly beholden to the boundaries defined by Euro-American principles.[13]

Through this work, Maine has joined a host of other regions in colonial North America that has been transformed from a hazy, undefined frontier to a region regarded as exceptional for its ability to tell a story of Indigenous resistance, resilience, and power in the face of colonial expansion. The Wabanaki in the colonial era had been written about from early in the "New Indian History," with historians such as Kenneth Morrison writing during the 1980s about the complicated dynamics of Indigenous-colonial relationships in Maine.[14] This is in no small part due to its status as a borderland, which enables boundary-crossing research that challenges established national narratives by articulating the complex dynamics of contested power in a space inhabited by multiple cultures.[15] This is not simply because more than one European empire was vying for dominance over the Dawnland, but because this European contest was overwhelmingly shaped by Indigenous strategies.[16] Regardless of imperial claims, the geopolitical reality reflects that Europeans were newcomers in Wabanaki territory, and that Native people therefore were central to the development of the region.[17]

In the most recent wave of scholarship, historians have become particularly concerned with the persistence and character of Wabanaki power and sovereignty. Jenny Hale Pulsipher's *Subjects unto the Same King*, published in 2005, concludes with the notion that the Wabanaki

[13] Alyssa Mt. Pleasant, Caroline Wigginton, and Kelley Wisecup, "Materials and Methods in Native American and Indigenous Studies: Completing the Turn," *The William and Mary Quarterly,* 75, no. 2 (2018): 207-236.
[14] See Kenneth Morrison, *The Embattled Northeast: The Elusive Idea of Alliance in Abenaki-Euramerican Relations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Kenneth Morrison, "The Bias of Colonial Law: English Paranoia and the Abenaki Arena of King Philip's War, 1675-1678," *The New England Quarterly* 53, no. 3 (1980): 363-387.
[15] Eric Hinderaker and Rebecca Horn, "Territorial Crossings: Histories and Historiographies of the Early Americas," *The William and Mary Quarterly,* 67, no. 3 (2010), 395-432 at 408.
[16] Hinderaker and Horn, "Territorial Crossings," 409.
[17] Hinderaker and Horn, "Territorial Crossings," 409.

were exceptional in their success in asserting their power when dealing with New England.[18] Ian Saxine's 2019 *Properties of Empire* outlines the rise and fall of a system of landownership that relied on the acknowledged validity and importance of Indian land deeds within elite colonial society on the Maine frontier.[19] Saxine's unique perspective of Native power is essentially a work of legal history, emphasizing how colonial structures accommodated and employed Wabanaki ideas of property to illustrate how Native sovereignty persisted, and how Wabanaki values influenced the practices of landownership on the Maine frontier. Published only one year prior, Thomas Wickman's *Snowshoe Country* investigates Native power through the lens of an environmental history, arguing that the Wabanaki's cultural heritage of wintertime knowledge gave Indigenous peoples a significant advantage over English settlers, one they pressed in times of war to preserve their independence.[20] Overall, while there are some differences regarding the chronologies of these works, they stem from the different strategies these historians explore to exemplify and typify Native power in this period. The works of Pulsipher, Saxine, and Wickman reflect a consensus that the Dawnland in the early colonial period was characterized by uniquely fluid power dynamics, wherein the Wabanaki repeatedly and successfully asserted their sovereignty in a multitude of contexts.

Underpinning this consensus is an emphasis on the Indigenous value of reciprocal relationships. This implicit system of governance was founded on an understanding of mutual obligation between groups, no matter how culturally distinct they were. Generally, recent scholarship is clear in its assertion that breeches in this social contract were perceived as threats to Native sovereignty and were often the impetus for violence in this region. However, the role

[18] Jenny Hale Pulsipher, *Subjects Unto the Same King: Indians, English and the Contest for Authority in Colonial New England* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005).
[19] Saxine, *Properties of Empire*, 2.
[20] Thomas Wickman, *Snowshoe Country* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 9.

of diplomacy in mediating these power dynamics and contests for sovereignty does not figure predominantly in the current state of the field. This lack stands in stark contrast to today's scholarship on the Haudenosaunee in the same period, which emphasizes a network of alliances solidified through ritualized gift giving as the foundation of their expansionist and militaristic power.[21] In fact, when historians of the Wabanaki do discuss the role of gifts in these reciprocal relationships, they usually rely on the robust historiographical tradition on the Iroquois to obliquely include gift giving in a supporting role to their central point.

This thesis therefore addresses how this form of diplomacy impacted the character and persistence of Wabanaki sovereignty and power. I ask: to what extent did these relationships of mutual obligation, with a particular eye to the obligations inherent in trade and gift exchange, mediate the power dynamics between residents of the Dawnland? When has this strategy worked to extend Native sovereignty, and when was it limiting? Through a close reading of primary sources that betray how power functioned on the Maine frontier, including archival land deeds, trade agreements, peace treaties, records of conferences, and narratives of warfare, I find that misaligned expectations regarding reciprocal obligations following land transactions, treaties, and exchanges often caused increased conflict, which alternately worked to extend or limit Native power.

The following pages are divided into two chapters. The first works to define the initial relationship between the Wabanaki and the English, which is characterized by Wabanaki pressure on the English to bend to Indigenous practices of governance. It characterizes the First Anglo-Wabanaki War (1676-1678) and the resulting peace treaty as illustrations of Native

[21] See Daniel Richter, "Native Power and European Trade," in *Trade, Land, Power: The Struggle for Eastern North America*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 13-113, for the role of gift giving in solidifying relationships.

sovereignty and power in the Dawnland and demonstrations of the consequences that faced settlers when they failed to respect these dynamics. The second chapter identifies shifts in circumstances that impacted this relationship, including a solidification of the Wabanaki's relationship with the French, which provided some leverage over the English, and the rising prominence of trade, in which the English had a distinct advantage. These factors, alongside continued English disrespect, definitively broke the initial relationship the Wabanaki had tried to forge in prior years and led to a second conflagration of war in the Dawnland. Like the former, this chapter concludes with the treaty that ended this conflict, which reflects Indigenous power in the region. So long as the Wabanaki retained this power, European settlers would be faced with the imperative to conform to Indigenous expectations of diplomacy.

Chapter 1

Forging and Testing Relationships on the Dawnland

In the spring of 1623, Wabanaki leaders near Casco Bay formally greeted Christopher Levett, who was an explorer, a colonial agent, and the first recorded Englishman to briefly settle in what would become the city of Portland, Maine.[22] Though Levett and the men he brought inland to scope out the arable land and navigable waterways between York and Sagadahock numbered only seven, he recorded that a party of fifty Wabanaki, including multiple Sagamores, their wives, and their children, "bid me welcome" through a ceremonial exchange.[23] As a collective, the Wabanaki "gave me such victuals as they had, and I gave them tobacco and acqua vitae," a diplomatic exchange that symbolically opened up the Dawnland community to Levett.[24] As Levett continued traversing the craggy north eastern shore, he continued to incur the good will of Sagamores, as his recognition of the Wabanaki's "natural right of inheritance" to the land and water enabled him to engage with Indigenous leaders in a proper fashion, "obtaining consent" and "avoiding treachery" in his quest to "settle" his very own plantation.[25] To Levett, building relationships with the region's leaders was key to surviving and thriving in the Dawnland.

When Levett set his sights on "Quack," which he renamed "York", a woman he recognized as the Queen of the region warmly received him. Levett reported that she said he was "welcome to her country, and so should all my friends be at any time."[26] In this instance, the

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[22] Lisa Brooks, "Prologue: Caskoak, the Place of Peace," in *Our Beloved Kin: A New History of King Philip's War*, (Yale University Press: 2018), 17-24 at 17, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1z27jbr.7.
[23] Christopher Levett, "A Voyage into New England, 1623," in *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, Third Series, Vol. VIII (Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1843), 159-191 at 169, https://archive.org/details/s3collections07massuoft/page/472/mode/2up.
[24] Levett, "A Voyage into New England," 169.
[25] Levett, "A Voyage into New England," 171.
[26] Levett, "A Voyage into New England," 171.

"Queen" spoke with the vested voice of her community to invite Levett to enter into the Wabanaki system of governance that was based in a social contract of reciprocity.[27] It was an initial move in establishing a diplomatic relationship, in cultivating a place of belonging for Levett within a land and culture that could only be navigated through an active maintenance of kinship ties and public demonstrations of this commitment.[28] It is clear that Levett was proud of his ability to engage with Indigenous diplomacy, eagerly recounting the aforementioned conference in which he became the "adopted cousin to so many great kings at one instant," an achievement that he cheekily remarked he "was not a little proud of."[29] Although he did "willingly accept of it," it is less obvious that Levett truly understood the expectations and obligations that came with this newfound kinship.[30]

Levett's recounted phrasing, that himself and all his friends were "welcome *to*" the Queen's country, betrays a key misunderstanding that would come to plague many Anglo-Wabanaki relationships. As Lisa Brooks, a leading interdisciplinary scholar of Native American studies, argues, the Queen's warm reception and others like it was not an invitation to take possession of Native land nor to exploit their carefully cultivated ecosystems, but an invitation to find their place within the pre-existing network of reciprocal relationships that was central to governance both within a particular tribe and with other polities.[31] As English settlers began to probe into the Dawnland in the mid-seventeenth century, trickling up from more established colonial centers in southern New England, they found themselves in active negotiations with the

[27] Brooks, "Prologue: Caskoak, the Place of Peace," 19.
[28] Brooks, "Prologue: Caskoak, the Place of Peace," 20.
[29] Levett, "A Voyage into New England," 170.
[30] Levett, "A Voyage into New England," 170.
[31] Brooks, "Prologue: Caskoak, the Place of Peace," 20.

region's Indigenous peoples, and forced to grapple with the contested notions of property and sovereignty that emerged from these encounters.

In her 2006 book, *The Native Ground,* Kathleen DuVal describes the Arkansas Valley as a region where the relationships that emerged from European colonialism were defined not by accommodation nor by resistance, but by "incorporation."[32] Although the demographics and political realities of the Arkansas Valley and the Maine frontier substantially differ, the seventeenth-century sources examined in this chapter speak to a similar impulse of the Wabanaki to draw "European empires into local patterns of land and resource allocation, sustenance, goods exchange, gender relations, diplomacy, and warfare."[33] And while historians have charted the Wabanaki's fierce struggles for sovereignty in the eighteenth-century, the balance of power in this earlier period often lay in the hands of the Wabanaki, which made Indigenous understandings and practices preeminent in the Dawnland. As Ian Saxine's work on property and sovereignty in colonial Maine demonstrates, this power dynamic forced English settlers to accommodate Indigenous values regarding diplomacy and property ownership into their own style of governance on the frontier.[34] When the English failed to meet Wabanaki expectations on these fronts, they were sharply rebuked.

This chapter explores different types of diplomatic agreements that defined the initial character of the Anglo-Wabanaki relationships that were forged on the Dawnland, mainly centering land deeds and treaties. These, alongside colonial narratives of settlement and warfare on the frontier that I use to illuminate settler ideology, are overwhelmingly created by English

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[32] Kathleen Duval, *The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 5.
[33] Duval, *The Native Ground*, 5.
[34] Ian Saxine, *Properties of Empire: Indians, Colonists, and Land Speculators on the New England Frontier*, (New York: New York University Press, 2019), 4.

hands, which poses an inherent challenge to an analysis that aims to consider the impactful role Indigenous ideology and practices played in intercultural negotiations and within English society itself. While written records of Indigenous thought are unavailable, I seek to highlight and analyze Wabanaki actions, including diplomatic measures and acts of war, and I utilize the practices and work of Native American studies scholars to produce a realistic picture of the Dawnland. Throughout, I aim to illustrate the inherent contingencies of colonial history, to avoid simplifications that stem from a framing that promotes an inevitable European conquest and a moralistic dichotomous struggle between good and evil. As English settlers and the Wabanaki constructed and negotiated relationships, atomized colonists on a hard-scrabble frontier were confronted, at times violently, with the imperative to accommodate and even incorporate themselves into Native systems of governance.

The Communal Contours of Native Land

The Indigenous valuation of interdependent cooperation as a governing principle in the North American northeast is most often illustrated through the "common pot" metaphor. The common pot references the relational networks of Indigenous life that feed and nourish kin, and it has an implicit relationship not only to human community, but to the anima of the land itself, animals and plants that are transformed into sustenance for Native communities.[35] As Lisa Brooks demonstrates in her book, *The Common Pot,* the connective tissue linking land, reciprocity, and communal nourishment can be explored through linguistic families. In the Wabanaki language, the common pot is described as a *wlôgan*, meaning dish. This in turn is

[35] Lisa Brooks, *The Common Pot: The Recovery of Native Space in the Northeast*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 4.

linguistically related to *wôlhanak,* the term used for the spaces carved out by networks of waterways, the land between rivers that sustained life in the Dawnland.[36] They are both vessels to nourish and provide but are far from empty; rather, their true meaning is derived from the relationships of which they consist. *Wôlhanak*, as ecological environments, are inextricably linked with the villages that depend upon them, and this philosophy calls upon humans to consciously engage with this reality, to consider how individual action reverberates through this interwoven tapestry, and to ritually acknowledge their dependence on all forms of natural life.

Mythologies emphasizing the importance of natural conservation and warning against selfish, individual aggrandizement at the expense of the community were centered in the material reality that Wabanaki subsistence and survival practices depended on sharing space and resources.[37] This ethic was not some abstracted altruism. Ceremonies and daily life both invoked the common pot, and Indigenous peoples of the northeast ritually enacted an equitable distribution of resources, emphasizing communal interdependency and the human role of restoring balance to their network. Generosity was a strategy utilized by leaders to publicly establish their status, and maintain the loyalty of their tribe, and gift giving played an essential role in diplomacy, solidifying relationships, establishing expectations of mutual obligation, and renewing relationships.[38] While couched in pre-colonial traditions, the concept of the common pot would become more forcefully articulated in Native spaces in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as settler-colonial expansion crystallized a definitive contrast and timely imperative for this trope's proliferation.[39]

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[36] Lisa Brooks, *The Common Pot*, 4.
[37] Ian Saxine, *Properties of Empire*,
[38] Jenny Hale Pulsipher, *Subjects unto the Same King: Indians, English, and the Contest for Authority in Colonial New England* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 12.
[39] Lisa Brooks, *The Common Pot*, 4.

This is illustrated in the origin story of Ktsi Amiskew, the Great Beaver, animated stone standing guard above a section of the Kwinitekw river, which was the lifeblood of an essential crossroad of fertile valleys that sustained and connected the southern Wabanaki.[40] In the context of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century wars for land and sovereignty, this story took on a new significance. It had always been based in a warning against the danger of selfish over-extraction from the common pot, the popular Indigenous motif, as Ktsi Amiskew's greed turned the Great Beaver to stone after his dams disrupted and damaged the ecological relationships that sustained the Kwinitekw network.[41] As colonial expansion wore on, and as the fur trade became increasingly saturated within Native society, Ktsi Amiskew witnessed the corrupting influence of an insatiable desire for his descendants' pelts, and a world wholly out of balance.[42] While competition from the fur trade began to emphasize individual ambition in Native society on a greater scale, challenging the redistributive ideal underlying Wabanaki society and rupturing the networks that bound the common pot, legends took on a mortal imperative. They cast the English in the role of Ktsi Amiskw, and the Wabanaki as transformers, who would reverse the tide of English acquisition.[43]

Land and Life on the Frontier

English colonists in seventeenth-century Maine constituted the select few who chose to enter and stay in this Native space. While Europeans had utilized northeastern waters to fish and trade for years, even generations, these fishermen only stuck around for mild weather, and often

[40] Lisa Brooks, *The Common Pot*, 17.
[41] Lisa Brooks, *The Common Pot*, 23.
[42] Lisa Brooks, *The Common Pot*, 21.
[43] Kenneth M. Morrison, *The Embattled Northeast: The Elusive Ideal of Alliance in Abenaki-Euramerican Relations*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 30; Lisa Brooks, *The Common Pot*, 43.

left before the first snow.[44] Establishing a year-round presence in the region necessitated continual diplomatic negotiations with the Wabanaki, particularly in times of resource scarcity. In an imperial imagination, this frontier was a border to be protected and extended, dividing the cultivated from the wild, the civilized from the savage, and representing an empty wasteland to be reborn. This was particularly true to the Puritans in Massachusetts, who believed colonization to be a divine mission to civilize and evangelize the New World, and as an opportunity to create a godly society from the ground-up. However, it is unlikely that the earliest colonists of Maine, made up of rough-and-tumble fishermen who lived in scattered settlements bearing little resemblance to the tight knit, morally upright communities of Puritan Massachusetts, shared a similar religious fervor.[45]

In the seventeenth century, and indeed throughout most of the colonial period, Maine remained sparsely populated. Increasingly unpredictable seasons and harsh winters due to the environmental phenomenon now known as the "Little Ice Age" worsened what was already a troublesome agricultural environment, limiting the regions' ability to support a large population. Indigenous demographics would not recover from the blow dealt from a series of epidemics in the early 1600s until the turn of the eighteenth century, and Maine's largest English town, Falmouth, was small even by colonial standards yet often relied on outside resources from Boston to sustain its population.[46] Moreover, while settler ideology remained intimately tied to the English notion of "planting", a conscious justification of Native dispossession to promote agricultural improvement, the lives of early colonists in Maine were often defined by their

[44] Thomas M. Wickman, *Snowshoe Country: An Environmental and Cultural History of Winter in the Early American Northeast*, (Connecticut: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 58.
[45] Charles E. Clark, *The Eastern Frontier: The Settlement of Northern New England, 1610-1763*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), 13.
[46] Saxine, *Properties of Empire*, 12.

tenuous hold on the land itself. Successive cycles of war and food shortages often forced settlers to abandon their homes altogether, as Indigenous resistance and environmental dangers posed by the Dawnland inhibited the success of the settlers' colonial project for the better part of the century.[47]

As a colonial frontier contending with conflicting claims of jurisdiction, the governance of this region's European settlers frequently changed hands throughout the seventeenth century, which often contributed to an isolating ethos of insecurity and lawlessness.[48] Even when exclusively looking to the English, a pattern of competing political and proprietary claims to the region emerged early in its history as various English governments struggled for jurisdiction. King James I granted his claim to the territory by right of discovery to the Council of New England in 1620, which inaugurated a decades-long period in which the Province of Maine was passed from one English gentleman to another, beginning with Sir Ferdinando Gorges. The Massachusetts Bay Colony, founded by Puritans in 1628, continually tried to assert its own claim to the region, seizing the area in the 1650s and again in 1668, only to be thwarted by the English monarch both times. The Bay Colony went so far as to purchase Maine in 1680, only to be stopped once more when King James II revoked the Massachusetts charter to create the centralized Dominion of New England, which did not last a decade before it was overthrown by Bay Colonists in 1689, who received a new royal charter that included control over Maine in 1692.[49]

The reality this manifested on a contested frontier was one of local, typically ineffective governance, and conflicts were often defined by contests of individual interests. In the absence of

[47] Wickman, *Snowshoe Country*, 3.
[48] Morrison, *The Embattled Northeast*, 103.
[49] Saxine, *Properties of Empire*, 28-29.

a unifying authority, English settlers found themselves free to abuse their Native neighbors, cheating them in trades, illegally selling them liquor, and purchasing lands without government approval, which was lamented by colonial officials and the Wabanaki alike to little avail.[50] On the other hand, the Wabanaki saw these overlapping claims for jurisdiction by various English governments as emblematic of their leaders' lack of authority, making them less appealing allies.[51] Lacking an essential foundation of mutual trust, interactions between English settlers and the Wabanaki were often rife with misunderstandings that carried a potential for greater conflict.

Additionally, while comparatively unmarked by violence, the relationship between English settlers and the Wabanaki in the early seventeenth century cannot be described as a friendship– the later war years were preceded by foundational fractures in trust and a disregard for relational norms, intentional and unintentional, often on the part of the English. Even in times of relative peace, English apathy towards their Native neighbors was the best-case scenario. More often, their dealings were betrayed by a strong undercurrent of skepticism and distrust.

The English, particularly in Massachusetts, carried a general bias against the Native people of North America, an opinion informed by religious beliefs and the English colonists' experience in the earlier Pequot War (1636-38).[52] Indeed, colonial interpretations of King Philip's War were shaped by this perspective. As described by the Puritan minister Cotton Mather in 1699, "the Evident Hand of Heaven appearing on the Side of a people whose Hope and Help was alone in the Almighty Lord of Hosts, Extinguished whole Nations of the Salvages [sic]."[53] The English in this period understood their project of colonization in distinctly religious terms, and readily

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[50] Morrison, *The Embattled Northeast*, 74.
[51] Jenny Hale Pulsipher, "Dark Cloud Rising from the East: Indian Sovereignty and the Coming of King William's War in New England," *The New England Quarterly*, vol. 80, no. 4 (Dec 2007), 588-613 at 610.
[52] Kenneth M. Morrison, *The Embattled Northeast,* 103.
[53] Cotton Mather, *Decennium Luctuosum: An History of Remarkable Occurrences, in the Long War, Which New-England hath had with the Indian Savages, From the Year, 1688, To the Year 1698.* Boston, 1699; Early English Books Online 184.

perceived threats to their newly founded city of God from their Native neighbors. While imperial competition had not yet boiled over to war, the English were particularly wary of the Wabanaki's perceived ties to the Catholic French, which were exemplified by the Jesuit influence at missions like Sillery in nearby Canada. While it is difficult to ascertain the degree to which individual settlers on the Maine frontier bought into this particular brand of ideologically motivated colonialism, these beliefs undoubtedly trickled into Anglo-Wabanaki diplomacy, especially once Massachusetts sought to bring the colony of Maine under their own jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, English settlers saw the Dawnland as an opportunity for independence and autonomy. Idealizing freeholds and individual property owners' lack of dependency on others, colonists often came to the frontier in hopes of freeing themselves from the unequal entanglements and relationships that shaped life in old England.[54] In contrast, the Wabanaki did not separate land from the relationships that governed it, as their control of resources were unavoidably bound up in social networks. Their land use policies reflect a prioritization of reciprocal relationships between all inhabitants of the Dawnland, human and nonhuman, Indigenous and novel, in an effort to manage resources for their own gain.[55] The miscommunications that contributed to violence in the region were often rooted in this very dissonance, as English colonists' inability to meet the Wabanaki's expectations of mutual obligation that were bound up in the latter's conceptions of property reverberated through the making of war and peace in the region.

Regardless, to gain a foothold in the Dawnland, English colonists entered into a series of agreements regarding land use with the Wabanaki, engaging with them as the proprietors of the territory the colonists wished to obtain. Forged amid political turmoil and transformations within

[54] Saxine, *Properties of Empire*, 20.
[55] Saxine, *Properties of Empire*, 24

both communities, it is likely that both the newcomers and the Indigenous peoples hoped that the relationships that sprung from these mutually beneficial agreements would bring stability to the region. However, while these negotiations can bring to life the possibilities of coexistence, they also emphasize the inherent limitations that two vastly different cultures of ownership posed to these hopes.

The Origin of a System of Deeds and Obligations

The Wabanaki worked to incorporate settlers into the system of mutual obligation that had regulated relationships in the Dawnland prior to their arrival, which was most clearly articulated in this ad-hoc system of agreements regarding land use that benefitted both Indigenous and English inhabitants of the region. Traditionally, an exchange of land in the Algonquian context took place in a diplomatic conference and was the result of extensive negotiations regarding land use. Even as the European practices of private property and deed recording began to work their way into Native space, the Wabanaki would not have given the same weight to the written word as their European counterparts, prioritizing their continued tradition of oration and material exchange.[56] And while it is true that many of these land deeds did not result in substantive monetary gain for Indigenous residents, recent scholarship has forcefully argued that most early land exchanges in the Dawnland were wholly consensual, and that, with few exceptions, the Wabanaki understood the terms of the deeds they agreed to.[57]

Moreover, Wabanaki land deeds often carry the signatures of several sagamores, demonstrating that these decisions were often made by the consent of the involved community,

[56] Lisa Brooks, *The Common Pot*, 35
[57] Saxine, *Properties of Empire*, 29.

as pictured in Figure 2.[58] Conversely, despite powerful rhetoric asserting an unequivocal English right to claim and settle New England by erasing Indigenous systems of land use and ownership (as John Locke argued, "that which is common to all is proper to none,") Englishmen who sought property in the Dawnland nevertheless understood the need to compensate the Wabanaki for their land.[59] Likewise, they understood the imperative of obtaining land by Wabanaki community consent. Often, this Indigenous practice worked its way into the English practice of written contracts: one 1660 land deed stated that the exchange was made "with the consent of the rest of my Counrtymen who had any thing to do with the Land did bargain and sell."[60] Here, English settlers were forced to accommodate and formally recognize the Wabanaki practice of communal land ownership. As colonization in the region developed through the seventeenth century, these deeds formed an essential foundation for diplomacy in the region. While not quite exemplifying mutual understanding, deeds would serve as a vehicle to further Anglo-Wabanaki mutual interests so long as their validity held in the region.

[58] For land deeds carrying the signature of multiple Wabanaki leaders, see Warrabitta, "Deed from Warrabitta and Nanateonett to George Munjoy," June 4, 1666, Item 7348, Coll. 34, Box 1/1, Maine Historical Society, Portland, Maine, https://www.mainememory.net/record/7348; Robinhaud, "Robinhaud deed to land at Sheepscot River," December 25, 1662, Item 7354, Coll. S-910, Misc. box 34/14, Maine Historical Society, Portland, Maine, https://www.mainememory.net/record/7354; "Wabanaki deed to Richard Warton," July 7, 1684, Item 20270, Coll. S-1280 (O.S. Box 20), Maine Historical Society, Portland, Maine, https://www.mainememory.net/record/20270.
[59] Saxine, *Properties of Empire*, 29
[60] "Deed of Flewellen (an Indian) to John Sanders Fathers, of a tract of land between Wells and Cape Porpise," February 19, 1660, Massachusetts Archive Collection, vol. 30, 84, https://www.familysearch.org/ark:/61903/3:1:3Q9M-C9Y5-9XP7?i=26&cat=1055547.



Figure 2, "Deed of Flewellen to John Sanders Fathers," February 19, 1660, Massachusetts Archive Collection, https://www.familysearch.org/ark:/61903/3:1:3Q9M-C9Y5-9XP7?i=26&cat=1055547.

Through a seventeenth-century perspective, the rationale behind these deeds is clear. Survivors of seventeenth-century wars and epidemics, the depopulated Wabanaki attracted new neighbors, potential allies and trading partners, by simply permitting them to settle on land that was plentiful.[61] Native grantors continued to reside in their ancestral lands, and while anxieties surrounding their continued access to traditional resources were not necessarily evident, they did become more common as the century wore on.[62] In one exceptional deed from 1643, a Sagamore identified as Mr. Roles does feel the need to clarify the region he planned to reside in, that he "doth except a Parcel of Ground called by the Name Comphegan wch he doth keep for

[61] Saxine, *Properties of Empire*, 31.
[62] Bourque, *Twelve Thousand Years*, 141.

himself."[63] It was more common for Sagamores to include some formulaic language to explicitly reserve their right to hunt and fish on deeded lands, and Mr. Roles himself preserved the "Right & Interest in that Ware only I the sd Roles do except for my self my Heirs & Ex … shall have Occasion to make Use of for Planting for Time to Time & likeways Fish for eat."[64] Another 1684 contract explicitly disclaims: "Provided Nevertheless [that] nothing in this Deed be Construed to deprive us ye Saggamores Successors or People from Improving our Ancient Planting grounds nor from Hunting in any of s'd Lands."[65] With these expectations of land use established, these exchanges would reasonably have been viewed to the benefit of the Wabanaki, particularly in the context of the mid-seventeenth century, when European demand for furs were particularly high.[66]

This preservation of customary land use rights is particularly resonant when these deeds are interpreted as an initial, intercultural tie that aimed to inaugurate a reciprocal relationship. Facing the increasingly militaristic and expansionist Haudenosaunee, or Iroquois, to their west, the Wabanaki were looking for allies to create a more formidable resistance against a mutual foe.[67] While the initial payment that these deeds detail is often fairly minimal, one listing "two large Indian Blankets two gallons of Rum two pound of Powder four Pounds of muscet Balls and twenty strings of Indian Beads" in exchange for twenty square miles, accounts from English settlers commonly refer to a "quit rent", a European practice wherein tenant farmers paid an annual sum to their overarching landholder, either a large landowner or proprietor with

[63] "Roles to Chadborn, 1649," In *York Deeds*, vol. 1, ed. John T. Hull (Portland, ME: B. Thurston & Co, 1887). https://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044032315715?urlappend=%3Bseq=95%3Bownerid=27021597765291182-99
[64] "Roles to Chadborn, 1649."
[65] "Wabanaki deed to Richard Warton," July 7, 1684, Item 20270, Coll. S-1280 (O.S. Box 20), Maine Historical Society, Portland, Maine.
[66] Bourque, *Twelve Thousand Years*, 142.
[67] Saxine, *Properties of Empire*, 31.

ownerships rights that often derived from royal authority.[68] However, the value that the Wabanaki believed they were deriving from such payments went beyond this understanding of a purely monetary exchange. In the same 1643 document from Mr. Roles, the statement that "Half ye great Ale-wifes that shall be taken at that Ware from Time to Time for ever" would have likely been thought of as rent for settlers, whereas the Wabanaki would have interpreted this obligation as a tribute, a diplomatic function of ongoing relationships.[69] In the Dawnland, gifts in a multitude of forms, including an annual tribute, represented pathways towards opening, maintaining, and re-negotiating relationships.[70] The opening sentence of a 1662 deed describes itself as "the condicon of this obligacon," essentially asserting an expectation of settlers' participation this network of reciprocal relationships.[71]

Challenging Relationships

In June of 1675, an abrupt conflagration of violence broke out in southern New England between expansionist colonists and their Native neighbors. Called King Philip's War by the English, after a misnomer of the leader of the Wampanoag forces, Metacom, this conflict was an explicit Indigenous resistance to the erosion of Native sovereignty, as English colonial presence, and their resulting hunger for land and hegemony, had only become more solidified as the century wore on. In the fall of that same year, Wabanaki forces began a campaign against English settlements in the Dawnland, resulting in a type of hysteria amongst the settlers. One

[68] Wesumbe, "Wesumbe deed," November 28, 1668, Item 7287, Coll. S-1262, Maine Historical Society, Portland, Maine, https://www.mainememory.net/record/7287; for a discussion on Wabanaki displeasure at English failure to pay quit rent, see Morrison, *The Embattled Northeast*, 112-115.
[69] York Deeds, v. 1, pt. 1, fol. 6.
[70] Saxine, *Properties of Empire*, 32.
[71] Robinhaud, "Robinhaud deed to land at Sheepscot River," December 25, 1662, Item 7354, Coll. S-910 Misc. box 34/14, Maine Historical Society, Portland, Maine, https://www.mainememory.net/record/7354.

account of the war asserted that the violence "plainly shews that there was a designe of a general Rising of the Indians against the English, all over the Country, (possibly as farr as *Virginia*)."[72] While there is no strong evidence for an explicit coordination between Indigenous peoples from the Northeast and from Southern New England, these two conflicts were undoubtedly connected, as both Native groups were driven to arms in response to English settler behavior, and many south New England Native peoples sought refuge from King Philip's War among the Wabanaki.[73]

It is important to note that the actions of the Wabanaki were not wholly unified, and that significant numbers abstained from fighting in the Dawnland.[74] When settlers did not explicitly violate the terms of the diplomatic relationship that Indigenous residents expected, efforts to treat with their neighbors to stave off conflict were often successful. In a 1676 history of King Philip's War, Cotton Mather's father, the Puritan minister and official Increase Mather writes that Maine colonists who "brought Presents with great Protestations of Amity and Fidelity" were "happily successful" in keeping their neighbors from participating in the violence. [75] This confirms that the Wabanaki were less likely to take up arms in instances where English settlers were willing participants in this type of diplomacy, where gifts were symbolic of mutual peace and obligation.

The Wabanaki who did fight were driven to war after Englishmen, paranoid about Indigenous-Anglo violence spreading north towards colonial settlements in Maine, clumsily

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[72] William Hubbard *A narrative of the troubles with the Indians in New-England, from the first planting thereof in the year 1607, to this present year 1677. But chiefly of the late troubles in the two last years, 1675 and 1676: To which is added a discourse about the warre with the Pequod's in the year 1637*, (Boston: John Foster, 1677; Evans Early American Imprint Collection), 12 http://name.umdl.umich.edu/N00171.0001.001.
[73] Bourque, *Twelve Thousand Years*, 151.
[74] Bourque, *Twelve Thousand Years*, 151.
[75] Increase Mather, *A Brief History of the War with the Indians in New-England, from June 24, 1675 (when the first Englishman was murdered by the Indians) to August 12, 1676, when Philip, alias Metacomet, the principal author and beginner of the war, was slain wherein the grounds, beginning, and progress of the war is summarily expressed: together with a serious-exhortation to the Inhabitants of that Land*, (Boston: John Foster, 1676; Early English Books Online), 13, https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo2/A50189.0001.001/1:5?rgn=div1;view=fulltext.

demanded that the Wabanaki surrender all of their guns and ammunition, on which the Wabanaki had come to depend after nearly a century of regular trade with Europeans.[76] This unfounded move was akin to a demand to surrender their sovereignty, their right to self-defense as well as to their then well-established subsistence practices, which had come to include hunting with firearms. It was a culmination of the underlying skepticism that the English had harbored in their dealings with the Wabanaki, a crescendo sufficient to destroy the relationships the Wabanaki had been trying to foster. The warfare of the First Anglo-Wabanaki War largely consisted of Native raids that targeted specific families and homes, suggesting an overarching aim of individualized retribution against settlers who had made a habit of cheating the Wabanaki in trades, violating the terms of their deeded lands, or otherwise breaking with their social contract. While William Hubbard's 1677 account of the fighting in Maine is particularly biased, even he acknowledges that the Indigenous community utilized this reasoning for taking up arms, explaining that:

> notwithstanding many of the Inhabitants in the Eastern, as well as in the Western parts of the Country, that were wont to Trade with the Indians… were ready to think, some of the Ruder sort of the English, by their imprudent & irregular acting, had driven them into this Rebellion. [77]

Hubbard is quick to negate this assertion, commenting "yet is it too evident, that the said Indians… naturally delight in bloody & deceitful actions."[78] This public justification glossed over repeated English provocations against the Wabanaki, instead perpetuating the unsubstantiated notion that Native people were naturally violent and lawless.[79]

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[76] Saxine, *Properties of Empire*, 34.
[77] Hubbard, *A narrative of the troubles with the Indians in New-England*, 12.
[78] Hubbard, *A narrative of the troubles with the Indians in New-England*, 12.
[79] Morrison, *The Embattled Northeast*, 108.

Within a matter of months, these raiding parties had wreaked havoc on the Maine frontier, effectively depopulating colonial settlements and driving the English out of the Dawnland.[80] Unlike the catastrophic outcome of the war for their southern brethren, which effectively marked the beginning of British hegemony in southern New England, there was no Wabanaki defeat in the Northeast.[81] As the conflict wore on, casualties mounted on both sides, and brought the Wabanaki and the English to the bargaining table.

Rebuilding a Tenuous Peace

A powerful assertion of Native power is found in the conclusion of this first Anglo-Wabanaki war. While the document detailing the articles of peace itself is now lost, its reverberations were unavoidably felt and mentioned. Writing twenty-three years after the wars beginning in New England, the Puritan minister Cotton Mather explained that the terms of the conflict's end in the colony of Maine were unique to the rest of New England, that while, "in little more than one years Time, the United Colonies of Plymouth, Massachusetts, and Connecticut, with their United Endeavours, bravely Conquered the Salvages… the Fate of our Northern and Eastern Regions in that War was very different from that of the rest."[82] The conflict with the Wabanaki dragged on for two years after the capture and killing of the Wampanoag leader Metacom, and the conclusion of hostilities in southern New England. Finally, after "all hands were weary of the War," Mather writes that "a sort of a Peace was patched up… with circumstances which the English might think not very Honourable."[83] Though

[80] Saxine, *Properties of Empire*, 34.
[81] Saxine, *Properties of Empire,* 35.
[82] Cotton Mather, "*Decennium Luctuosum*, 1699," in *Narratives of the Indian Wars, 1675-1699,* ed. Charles H. Lincoln (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1913), 179-300 at 184.
[83] Mather, *Decennium Luctuosum,* 184.

his rhetoric lacks force, Mather unmistakably nods to a genuine shock to the English worldview, and the expectations that were built upon it.

Evidence of these routed expectations can be found in the records of a 1676 peace treaty between the English and the Wabanaki, when the former were riding high from their more decisive victory over the southern Wampanoags and Narragansetts. The Saco sagamore, identified as Mugg or Mogg, was reportedly vested with the power of the Penobscot sagamores Madockawando and Chebartina, and acted as the lone representative for Wabanaki interests, isolated among enemies in Boston. The terms he agreed to betray no hint of English recognition of Native power, nor of any related English dishonor. The English did not appear to permit a single concession to Wabanaki demands: Mugg was to henceforth stop all hostilities, take up arms against those who continued, return English captives and stolen goods without ransom or compensation, agree to obtain arms and ammunition exclusively from the English, and even "procure pay, wherewith to make full Satisfaction unto the English for all such Injuries, Losses, and Damages, as they have been sustained by them," through annual payments of Beaver Skins, an offer uncomfortably akin to an extraction of tribute.[84] Needless to say, the terms held only insofar as the Sagamore remained in English custody: the Wabanaki continued their raids on the English without pause, depopulating their villages and scorning this pretension of English authority in the Dawnland.[85]

Some of the peace negotiations that took place after this continuation of hostilities were recorded by Joshua Scottow, an English merchant who was the principal proprietor and garrison

[84] William Hubbard, "Narrative of the Troubles, II, 1676," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties and Laws, 1607-1789 Volume XX New England Treaties, North and West, 1650-1776*, ed. Daniel R. Mandell (Maryland: University Publications of America, 2003), 27-30 at 28.
[85] Jenny Hale Pulsipher, "'Dark Cloud Rising from the East': Indian Sovereignty and the Coming of King William's War in New England," *The New England Quarterly* 80, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 588-613 at 593-594.

commander at Black Point, in Scarborough, one of the besieged Maine villages. In this 1677 conference, which gathered Sagamores from the Kennebec River and representatives of Massachusetts and New York in Pemaquid (now Bristol, Maine), participants agreed to several provisions that significantly diverged from the prior proposal. Firstly, attendees affirmed that "there should be a peace between him & all ye English, they being Subjects to ye same King."[86] Though at first glance, this phrasing appears to signal a diminution of Native power, it has been forcefully argued by Jenny Hale Pulsipher as, functionally, an assertion that the Wabanaki and the English were dealing on equal footing, both under the equal protection and beholden to the ultimate authority of a distant, paramount ruler.[87] Scottow's record also includes a provision for reciprocal justice, explaining "that upon any Injury done by them to ye English Complaints should be made to their Sagamores, for Reparation … If any Injury were done by ye English to them, they were to Complaine to those Gentlemens," an unprecedented recognition of Native judicial practices and of direct reciprocity.[88] However, the final version of the treaty included an even more stunning provision: in return for allowing inhabitants to return to their homes, every English family must pay a peck of corn to the Wabanaki annually.[89] This form of tribute was, seemingly, a reversal of the 1676 treaty provision stipulating that the Wabanaki pay an annual sum of beaver skins to the English. It is a forceful recognition of Wabanaki sovereignty and power, and the primary source of the English dishonor Cotton Mather lamented a generation later.

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[86] "Narrative of Voyage to Pemaquid," August 28, 1677, Item 15560, Coll. 420, vol. 8/57, Maine Historical Society, Portland, Maine, https://www.mainememory.net/record/15560.
[87] Jenny Hale Pulsipher, "Dark Cloud Rising," 594.
[88] "Narrative of Voyage to Pemaquid"
[89] William Williamson, *The History of the State of Maine, from its first discovery, A.D. 1602, to the separation, A.D. 1820,* (Maine: The Cumberland Press, 1832), 552-553.

The balance of power that was established in the Dawnland in 1678 was far from inevitable– in fact, it has been read as a shocking reversal of an established narrative by contemporaries and modern viewers alike. The negotiations that mediated these diplomatic relationships and exchanges were contested, a confluence of two distinct worldviews that often, but not always, found themselves facing the other on opposing sides of a battlefield. Appeased by English concessions to Wabanaki sovereignty, Indigenous people began to solicit the re-population of the frontier. Evidence of this can be seen in a "loyalty oath" from 1684, six years after hostilities ended. In this document, the Kennebec, Androscoggin, and Casco Bay Sagamores swore that they did not wish to engage in warfare against the colonists, writing that only "Jealousyes and hostilityes on one hand and Treachery and fores on ye other… Constreyned us to use means of Preservation & Defense."[90] While this document was transcribed by English hands, it nonetheless includes a claim that preserves Wabanaki authority.[91] Having been victorious in the previous conflict, this was not a promise of subservience, and it even includes an implicit threat, disclaiming: "Since our Authority over owne people & Execise of our hereditary Rights to Ancient Traditions & Customs, are ye onely means to Keepe them in obedience."[92] Explaining that their tribes were "praying" to receive the "Gratious protection" of the powerful English monarch, it is clear that, from a Wabanaki perspective, this was an attempt to secure a potential ally, and to re-incorporate the English into a network of mutual obligation.[93]

Molded by English hands, this document also includes obvious contradictions, promising "entire subjection & obedience to your Glorious Crowne," in the same breath as the above

[90] "Indian Loyalty Oath," c. 1684, Item 9305, Coll. S-1280 (O.S. Box 20), Maine Historical Society, Portland, Maine, https://www.mainememory.net/record/9305.
[91] Pulsipher, "Dark Cloud Rising," 597.
[92] "Indian Loyalty Oath."
[93] "Indian Loyalty Oath."

disclaimer of Native authority, and providing "full & absolute resignation & confirmation to Mr Wharton & his heires for ever" while simultaneously asserting their "hereditary rights & ancient traditions & customs" for the same tract of land.[94] In the interest of peace, and with the memory of violence close at hand, both parties seemed willing to overlook these contradictions. However, the actions of English settlers soon made it clear that they believed the Wabanaki to be beholden to their own authority, and that they did not plan to adhere to the promises of Native sovereignty in either the 1678 or 1684 documents. Without recompense, the Wabanaki came to believe that war was their best and only path to assert their rights over the Dawnland.

[94] "Indian Loyalty Oath."

Chapter 2

Exchange and the Redefinition of Anglo-Wabanaki Relations

In 1684, the governor of New Hampshire, Edward Cranfield, wrote of his "great fear of another Indian war."[95] It was the same year in which several Wabanaki sagamores in Maine affirmed their loyalty to the English crown while disclaiming that their "obedience" was contingent on the perpetuation of their sovereignty.[96] Yet Cranfield explained that the "Indians to eastward in Maine" had been "very disorderly," threatening to "kill the English and burn their houses."[97] Cranfield, a man of high ambition who palpably resented his assignment in such a remote locale, expressed confidence in his ability to diplomatically navigate this precarious situation.[98] He directed fellow colonial governors to "send to the principal Chiefs… to know the reason of these threats, and to tell them that if any wrong had been done them the English would give satisfaction and use all methods to preserve peace and amity."[99] He explained that he was mainly concerned with the actions of other colonial leaders, for he believed that he had "a good understanding with the Indians that inhabit among us."[100] However, Cranfield would not prove to be the shrewd negotiator he believed himself to be. Despite this apparent show of confidence, Cranfield also noted that he had personally travelled to New York to meet with Governor Dongan, whose help he entreated in enlisting "some of the Southern Indians… in case of a war."[101] The resulting indiscriminate attacks by Mohawks would greatly inflame Anglo-Wabanaki tensions. Moreover, while Cranfield's advice to the other governors hear out the

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[95] J. W. Fortescue, ed., *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 1681-1685*, (London: Kraus Reprint, 1964), 633.
[96] "Indian Loyalty Oath."
[97] Fortescue, *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series*, 633.
[98] Pulsipher, "Dark Cloud Rising from the East," 602.
[994] Fortescue, *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series*, 633.
[100] Fortescue, *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series*, 633.
[101] Fortescue, *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series*, 633.

complaints of sagamores was sound, he himself would ironically prove unwilling to meet with Wabanaki leaders, and unable to acknowledge, much less address, the root causes of these inflamed tensions.[102]

The peace found in the wake of the First Anglo-Wabanaki War (1676-1678) was far from settled, and misaligned expectations for how power dynamics would play out in the Dawnland permeated most diplomatic measures and limited effective negotiation. While the Wabanaki permitted the English to re-settle the frontier, they did so with the implied contingency that the English would adhere to the concessions they made in the interest of forging this tenuous peace. Moreover, the terms outlined in the 1678 treaty worked to preserve Native sovereignty and the ideal of the Common Pot, forcibly asserting Wabanaki power not only as a sovereign actor in the region, but also, to an extent, over English settlers. By demanding a tribute, the Wabanaki incorporated settlers into their system of demonstrated mutual obligation through resource re-allocation. However, as rumors swirled soon after this initial peace was forged that yet another conflagration of violence would descend over the Dawnland, it is clear that many aspects of this agreement did not come to fruition.

The Wabanaki were driven to war from English actions. As the English re-populated the towns and homes they had abandoned, their behavior soon made it clear to the Wabanaki that they did not feel beholden to the agreements their government had made on their behalf. In contradiction to the concessions made on paper, the settlers expanded their towns into unceded Wabanaki territory, made Native subsistence practices near impossible, and often failed to pay their tribute. This behavior signaled to their Indigenous neighbors that they were neither able to

[102] Samuel G. Drake, *History of the early discovery of America and landing of the Pilgrims, with a biography of the North American Indians*, (Higgins and Bradley, 1854), 297.

effectively contribute to nor to coexist with their standard of reciprocal relationships.[103] The English not only demonstrated a simple disrespect, but embodied genuine threats to Native sovereignty, to their ability to effectively govern and provide for their people and their land. Native discontent with these actions was palpable, and heightened tensions soon devolved into violence. In the Second Anglo-Wabanaki War (1688-1699), referred to as King William's War by English colonists, Indigenous inhabitants of the Dawnland acted to preserve their sovereignty and reject English pretensions to authority over Native space. For their part, the English inflamed tensions by repeatedly failing to heed Indigenous complaints. This practice of disregarding Native voices was exacerbated by a budding alliance between the Wabanaki and their French foes, which the English took as proof of a Catholic conspiracy bent on the destruction of New England. To the English, this thus lessened the impact of their own actions in the lead up to war.

Scholars of Indigenous North America tend to overlook the conflicts that consumed the Dawnland at the close of the seventeenth century. The Second Anglo-Wabanaki War is often only briefly touched on by historians, who prefer to highlight King Philip's War and the French and Indian War (1754-1763) of the proceeding century to cleanly bracket an era of Indigenous-colonial conflict. As the historian Jenny Hale Pulsipher argues, the periods of sustained conflict that sprang up in between these two better-known wars need closer study, if for no other reason than to illuminate the connective tissue between them.[104] Pulsipher also asserts that King William's War warrants study "in its own right, for it clearly illustrated the consequences of English failure to respect Indian sovereignty."[105] While the conclusion of King Philip's War in 1676 largely marked the end of the viability of Native sovereignty in southern New England, the

[103] Saxine, *Properties of Empire*, 35.
[104] Pulsipher, "Dark Cloud Rising from the East," 589.
[105] Pulsipher, "Dark Cloud Rising from the East," 589.

Wabanaki were able to practically assert their independence from English authority throughout the remainder of the seventeenth century and even into the eighteenth.[106]

In the Dawnland, the English were not the hegemonic political power, and the Wabanaki exploited numerous pathways to curb English incursions and reclaim much of the Dawnland for themselves, including their alliance with the French. However, as the Wabanaki alliance with the French obfuscated the causes of the war for some English settlers, viewing the Second Anglo-Wabanaki War as a mere extension of imperial conflicts can distort its inherently localized nature. While King William's War is commonly seen as the North American theater to the contemporaneous Nine Years' War in Europe, the historians Evan Haefeli and Kevin Sweeney work to reconcile the imperial and local readings of these conflicts more effectively. They argue that French imperial interests "overlapped" with or "paralleled" the Wabanaki's ongoing struggle against English incursion into their lands.[107] In granting Indigenous actions autonomy from total imperial influence, historians can more accurately discern Wabanaki motivations in forging a relationship with the French, and how they utilized the flux of imperial power dynamics to their advantage to successfully extend their sovereignty.

As demonstrated by the preceding chapter, "consequences" arose when English settlers were unable to properly meet Indigenous expectations of diplomacy and governance, including acceding to Wabanaki practices of land use and diplomatic mediation. While King Philip's War seemed to have dissuaded the Wabanaki from pursuing a policy of genuine incorporation, laying bare some irreconcilable differences in governance and ecological relationships, they continued to sharply sanction the English when their practices were incompatible with Indigenous sovereignty, a pattern that persisted through the remainder of the seventeenth century. As the

[106] Pulsipher, "Dark Cloud Rising from the East," 591.
[107] Haefeli and Sweeney, "Captors and Captives," 2.

English continued to fail to meet Wabanaki expectations of mutual obligation, the favor of Indigenous diplomatic relations began to turn towards the French, whose imperial success in North America was largely due to their ability to accommodate Indigenous norms, customs, and demands. This also opened up a new strategy to extend Wabanaki power, as they leveraged the strengths and weaknesses of each empire against the other: utilizing English strength in trade to force the French to provide them goods at a cheaper rate, and French accommodation to persuade the English to utilize Indigenous pathways of negotiation.

A Case Study of the Consequences of English Disrespect

While historians mainly utilize blatant infractions of treaty agreements when enumerating the causes of King William's War, the Wabanaki also complained of a more general sense of not getting the respect they sensed they were owed, of the English beginning to violate the spirit of earlier agreements in order to reframe the terms of their relationship.[108] In May 1685, the sagamore Kancamagus led a group of fourteen Pennacooks to Portsmouth to gain an audience with the governor of New Hampshire, Edward Cranfield. Utilizing his Anglicized name, John Hawkins / Hogkins, Kancamagus took Cranfield up on his earlier offer to hear and resolve Wabanaki complaints regarding Englishmen's recent flagrant breeches of their pact of mutual defense. Invoking the expectations that came of a long-standing alliance that spanned generations, harkening back to an "old time when live my grant father and grant mother then Englishmen com this country, then my grant father and Englishmen they make a good government, they friend always," Kancamagus asserted that the English had failed to uphold

[108] Pulsipher, "Dark Cloud Rising from the East," 601.

their promise to protect the Pennacooks from the Mohawks of present-day New York.[109] He then asked Cranfield for a supply of powder, ammunition, and guns, and entreated the English to not "let Mohogs kill me at my place."[110] Under a veneer of diplomatic niceties, Kancamagus was likely operating under the suspicion that the English were not only negligent in their duties of protection, but had also played a more active role in "letting" the Mohawks attack the Dawnland than they cared to admit.[111]

This suspicion was well-founded, as Governor Cranfield was indeed directly responsible for the Mohawk attacks that made Kancamagus "afraid allways Mohogs he will kill me every day and night."[112] Historically, the Pennacooks' close proximity to the English and the constant threat of conflicts with the expansionist Iroquois had made them particularly amenable to an alliance with the English, which led most Pennacooks to stay neutral in King Philip's War and even led a sagamore, Wanalancet, to ostensibly embrace Protestantism.[113] Despite these public displays of fraternity, the English distrusted the Pennacooks because they maintained their alliances with the Indigenous nations who had supported King Philip, and took in hundreds of the war's refugees from the south.[114] This foundational skepticism became so great that they were unable to treat with the Pennacooks as genuine allies, endangering the possibilities for peace between the two groups.

The subsequent breakdown of this relationship manifested itself not only in the encouragement the English gave to the Mohawks, but also in other forms of English disrespect. According to Kancamagus, they flouted the expectation of reciprocal justice due to a respected

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[109] Samuel G. Drake, *History of the early discovery of America and landing of the Pilgrims, with a biography of the North American Indians*, (Higgins and Bradley, 1854), 297.
[110] Drake, *History of the early discovery of America*, 297.
[111] Sainsbury, *Calendar of State Papers*, 688.
[112] Drake, *History of the early discovery of America*, 297.
[113] Haefeli and Sweeney, *Captors and Captives* 79.
[114] Haefeli and Sweeny, *Captors and Captives*, 80.

ally, as he entreated Governor Cranfield that "if my Indian he do you wrong pray you no put your law… pray you must let me know what he done because I will ponis him," reminding to the Governor that it was not proper for him to hold his men subject to English authority and punishment.[115] He hinted that, if this practice continued, it would contribute to a breakdown of their relationship, and asked Cranfield to instead send for him to "help," in such situations "if you desire my business."[116] To Kancamagus, repeated instances of English disrespect led him to believe that they no longer valued nor desired their friendship, and his statement to Cranfield carried an implicit warning that the circumstances of their relationship would quickly change if this behavior was not corrected.

The worst offense to the relational norms of this alliance came from Governor Cranfield's refusal to meet with Kancamagus in person whatsoever that spring. The Pennacook sagamore journeyed to Portsmouth as a diplomatic partner, and even showed Governor Cranfield the proper respect due to a "friend" by bringing a traditional gift of beaver skins.[117] He wrote to the Governor three separate times on the same day to request a meeting, attempting to appeal to Cranfield's sense of duty by communicating, in turn, the extreme danger the Mohawks posed, the reciprocal obligations tied to their long-standing alliance, and his mounting frustration with other instances of English disrespect. Cranfield was unmoved, for on the following day Kancamagus wrote to a "Mr. Mason," whom the Governor had apparently tapped to field the sagamore's concerns. As Kancamagus' later actions would demonstrate, Mr. Mason was unable to resolve the differences between the parties. Not only had Cranfield failed to reciprocate Kancamagus' gift, much less provide the guns and ammunition for which he pleaded, but he also

[115] Drake, *History of the early discovery of America*, 297.
[116] Drake, *History of the early discovery of America, 297.*
[117] Drake, *History of the early discovery of America*, 297.

did not deign to see Kancamagus at all, a snub offensive enough to effectively sever their ties of friendship, alliance, and mutual obligation.[118]

This episode exemplifies the Wabanaki's and English's divergent understandings of their relationship at the close of the First Anglo-Wabanaki war. As argued by Jenny Hale Pulsipher, Kancamagus's description of the agreement made between his grandfather and the English, his consistent use of the term "friend" when addressing Cranfield, and even the use of the title "Mr." by several of his companions when signing these letters all point to an assertion of an equal partnership with the English.[119] The Wabanaki may well have seen this willing alliance as an act of generosity on their part, for, as a nineteenth-century historian later put it, "their remarkable successes through the late war, might very properly embolden them to dictate… hard conditions of peace."[120] Despite the demonstrated power of the Wabanaki, and the written word of the 1678 treaty, English officials increasingly viewed Indigenous peoples as subjects beholden to their authority, a misalignment that would prove to be an insurmountable rift in their relationship.

English paranoia regarding the Pennacook and other Wabanaki tribes swelled as Native discontent became palpable to settlers on the frontier, and Kancamagus began to build a reputation for promoting militant resistance to English incursions. As the historians Evan Haefeli and Kevin Sweeney characterized him, "Kancamagus commanded respect, but he also heightened English fears."[121] Settlers' concerns soon pushed English officials to sign a new treaty with several Wabanaki sagamores of "lasting peace, friendship, and kindness," in September 1685.[122] The treaty addressed many of Kancamagus's original complaints, confirming

[118] Pulsipher, "Dark Cloud Rising from the East," 604.
[119] Pulsipher, "Dark Cloud Rising from the East," 602.
[120] Williamson, *The History of the State of Maine*, 553.
[121] Haefeli and Sweeney, *Captors and Captives*, 81.
[122] "Treaty, English and Wabanakis (1685)" in *New England Treaties, North and West, 1650-1776*, 42.

the practice of reciprocal justice and assuring protection against the Mohawks. But, like the terms of the 1678 treaty, this agreement appeared to do little to change English behavior. The conference was saturated with a mutual suspicion that seeped its way into the document, which closed with the stipulation guarding against Wabanaki movement, for fear they would be leaving to meet the French or otherwise preparing for war:

> the Indians shall not at any time hereafter remove from any of the English plantations… before they have given fair and timely notice thereof, unto the English… without such fair and timely notice given to the English, that then it shall be taken pro confesso that the Indians do intend and design war with the English, and do thereby declare that the peace is broken.[123]

While Kancamagus, likely still offended by Cranfield's disrespect, did not attend the treaty conference, he signed on to the terms several weeks later, adding his name amongst ten other sagamores.[124] However, this peace treaty would only hold for three years. With the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Wabanaki War, beginning a year before the overlapping war in Europe, Kancamagus and the Pennacooks would hold a central position among the Indigenous warriors who were bent on revenge for past wrongs, and resistance to further incursions.[125]

The Failure of Incorporation

The mutual distrust that the 1685 treaty betrays would prove to be a self-fulfilling prophecy, as unresolved issues from King Philip's War persisted in the Dawnland. While marked

[123] "Treaty, English and Wabanakis (1685) in *New England Treaties, North and West, 1650-1776*, 43.
[124] Pulsipher, "Dark Cloud Rising from the East," 605.
[125] Haefeli and Sweeney, *Captors and Captives*, 82.

disrespect by English officials was undoubtedly impactful, the Wabanaki's most significant grievances pertained to the behavior of English settlers. In 1699, the Reverend John Pike explained that the Wabanaki cited English actions in justifying the beginning of the Second Anglo-Wabanaki War. They complained of the English failure to pay tribute, and of their use of nets to halt fish from swimming upriver, which the Wabanaki were "greatly Affronted at" because "the Fishery of the Rivers had been a privilege Reserved Entire unto themselves."[126] The English turned out cattle to destroy Native crops, and habitually cheated the Wabanaki in trades, which Reverend Pike flippantly admitted were "Common Abuses… which such as Trade much with them are seldom Innocent of."[127] These instances not only demonstrated a simple disrespect, but genuine threats to Native sovereignty, to their ability to effectively govern and provide for their people and their land. Moreover, the English were explicitly obliged to preserve these customary land use rights, having agreed to do so in official treaties and in individual land deeds.

However, the most blatant instances of English disrespect and the Wabanaki's "Main provocation" to violence was the deeding of lands they considered their own to English settlers.[128] The English expanded settlement onto land that Indigenous inhabitants asserted was wrongfully ceded, most commonly by sagamores who participated in "deceitful" land sales that lacked communal approval.[129] After the Massachusetts Charter was revoked in 1684, the Catholic King James II appointed Sir Edmund Andros to head the newly formed conglomeration of New English colonies, the Dominion of New England.[130] After Andros sparked widespread

[126] Mather, *Decennium Luctuosum*, 186.
[127] Mather, *Decennium Luctuosum*, 186.
[128] Mather, *Decennium Luctuosum*, 186-187.
[129] Pulsipher, "Dark Cloud Rising from the East," 599.
[130] Saxine, *Properties of Empire,* 40.

discontent by rendering any land deed that did not stem from the King's patent invalid, conversation surrounding Indian deeds entered the mainstream.[131] In one pamphlet published late in 1689, an anonymous commentator connected the disregard for Indian land deeds to the outbreak of war, questioning:

> whether to advance this principle, that the Indians, because Pagans, have no Title to any Lands at all in this country, be not the way to continue the friendship of the Indians to us? and whether after all the hard censures we have undergone, the World will not judge us the juster and more righteous of the two, who own they have though Pagans, a just Right to all their Lands but those which they by fair Contract or just Conquest parted with?[132]

The most egregious instance of a deceitful land acquisition came in 1694, amidst the Second Anglo-Wabanaki War. After several sagamores signed a ceasefire with the new royal governor of Massachusetts, William Phips, the sagamore Madockawando signed a deed for a large tract of land on the St. Georges River.[133] Negating the norm of soliciting communal consent before large purchases, the deed paints Madockawando as the sole owner of this tract of land and does not include the common provisions protecting Native subsistence practices that appeared in earlier deeds.[134] As the seventeenth century progressed, and English settler population grew exponentially, the English no longer felt beholden to their accommodation of the Indigenous practice of communal ownership. However, their attempted imposition of individualized land transactions and failure to preserve necessary traditional use rights was interpreted by the

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[131] Saxine, *Properties of Empire*, 40.
[132] "An Appeal to the Men of New England, 1689" in *The Andros Tracts*, vol. 3, ed. W. H. Whitmore (New York: Burk Franklin, 1967), 201.
[133] Saxine, *Properties of Empire*, 37.
[134] Saxine, Properties of Empire, 37.

Wabanaki as fraudulent and deceitful. In the case of the 1694 land deed, it would prove to have disastrous consequences for the hope for peace in the region, causing an overwhelming majority of Penobscots to denounce the land cession as illegitimate, and to reject the associated 1693 peace treaty.[135]

This policy of land acquisition without regard for Wabanaki rights, alongside the habitual destruction of Wabanaki crops by unpenned cattle, inconsistent policies surrounding trade in firearms, and interference with the function of communal food sources like fisheries, represented genuine threats to Indigenous subsistence practices. These were violations of Indigenous rights over their land, symptoms of a culturally ingrained disrespect which directly threatened their sovereignty as people independent of direct English authority.[136] Failing to uphold traditional diplomatic norms, the English ignored the complaints that the Wabanaki lodged, disregarding the procedures for reconciliation that the 1685 treaty outlined.[137] As a result, infractions turned into cycles of retribution.

When the English again failed to keep wandering livestock from destroying Indigenous crops, and when formal appeals were ignored, the Wabanaki killed several of the settlers' cows, an early warning that kicked off the violence of the Second Anglo-Wabanaki War.[138] The English escalated this confrontation in 1688, exploiting orders from Boston to seize Native Americans suspected of contributing to the hostilities in southern New England to release pent-up frustration and instead imprison twenty Saco Wabanaki men, women, and children in Boston to serve as hostages.[139] In order to negotiate their release, the Wabanaki took several English

[135] Saxine, *Properties of Empire,* 38.
[136] Pulsipher, "Dark Cloud Rising from the East," 606.
[137] Pulsipher, "Dark Cloud Rising from the East," 606.
[138] Morrison, *Embattled Northeast,* 113.
[139] Morrison, *Embattled Northeast,* 113.

prisoners in turn.[140] While the Wabanaki released some captives in an effort to demonstrate their willingness to negotiate, Colonel Jonathan Tyng became convinced that "By their discourse and by their actions they Shew that they Intend a Warr with us."[141] Boston officials belatedly released their Saco prisoners to temper the situation, but English settlers proved unwilling to negotiate with the Wabanaki. The exchange quickly devolved into violence, thus repeating a pattern wherein local instances of violence and distrust could lead to full-scale war.[142]

A Budding French Alliance

In the same letter from 1688 in which Colonel Tyng warns of an imminent outbreak of war, he states that "we Question not but that there is a Strong Combination with them and the ffrench against us," in the same breath.[143] English worries of a coming war were only heightened by these rumors of an alliance between the Wabanaki and the French, which had long been suspected. While English anxieties were often overblown, the product of distinctly Puritan worldview that feared the denigrating influence of French papists, there was enough evidence of a budding Franco-Wabanaki relationship to fuel whispers of clandestine French aid, even before the official outbreak of imperial war.[144] In the mid-seventeenth century, the Catholic missionary Druillettes found that his theology resonated with the Kennebecs', leading to a syncretic religiosity that enabled greater possibilities for accommodation between Jesuits and the

[140] Haefeli and Sweeney, *Captors and Captives*, 81.
[141] Baxter, ed., *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, vol. 6, 429-430.
[142] Morrison, *Embattled Northeast*, 114.
[143] Baxter, *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, vol. 6, 430.
[144] Jenny Hale Pulsipher, "Gaining the Diplomatic Edge: Kinship, Trade, Ritual, and Religion in Amerindian Alliances in Early North America," in *Empires and Indigenes: Intercultural Alliance, Imperial Expansion, and Warfare in the Early Modern World*, ed. Wayne E. Lee (New York and London: New York University Press, 2011), 19-47 at 32.

Wabanaki.[145] Thirty years later, the Wabanaki who were displaced by King Philip's War sought refuge in New France, inaugurating a steady community at the Sillery mission.[146] In the same period, Catholic priests began to have a notable presence in Wabanaki towns, and began to successfully win over converts, particularly among those populations who were refugees from King Philip's War.[147]

The French were contemporaneously working to construct a political relationship between their own fur traders and Algonquians inhabiting the Great Lakes region. Called the *pays d'en haut* by the French, this region was also threatened by the Iroquois, which provided a further imperative for both groups to forge a strong alliance. This was eventually characterized as "the Middle Ground" by the historian Richard White.[148] The French, hovering close to northern Maine, soon became concerned by the political threat posed by English settlers, whose colonial population far outpaced their own. To the French, whose population in Acadia fell short of a thousand settlers as late as 1685, the Wabanaki functioned as an important buffer to protect their colonial holdings against the expansionist English, whose population in southern New England exceeded ten thousand in the same period.[149]

[145] Morrison, *Embattled Northeast,* 86, 88.
[146] Morrision, *Embattled Northeast*, 90.
[147] Pulsipher, "Gaining the Diplomatic Edge," 32.
[148] Bourque, *Twelve Thousand Years*, 158.
[149] Pulsipher, "Gaining the Diplomatic Edge," 31-32.



Figure 3, Justus Danckerts, "Novi Belgii Novaeque Angliae nec non Pennsylvaniae et partis Virginiae tabula multis in locis amendata," c. 1703, Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/2017585937/.

In courting this alliance, the French used similar strategies that won them essential relationships in the *pays d'en haut*. The paltry population of French settlers made them far less threatening than the ever-encroaching English and far less likely to greatly hinder the subsistence practices of their Native neighbors through dispossession. The French also seemed to understand the political strength of kinship ties, as Catholic priests often forged relationships with the Wabanaki that reflected obligations inherent in kinship, and some French traders and noblemen married Native women. Notably, the daughter of the Penobscot sagamore Madockawando

married the French trader St. Castine.[150] Similar types of relationships were largely unheard of in English society, as settlers kept a greater personal distance between themselves and Indigenous communities. When disagreements did arise between the French and the Wabanaki, Native customs for reconciliation prevailed, and this recognition of tribal law formed an essential backbone for effective communication.[151] Regarding this comparatively greater cultural compatibility, set in high relief by habitual disrespect by English settlers, the French became appealing allies to the Wabanaki.

Trade, Gift Exchange, and the Limitations of French Diplomacy

Aside from seeking partners who fundamentally respected Indigenous rights, trade was also an essential component in forging diplomatic relationships in the Dawnland and was often the deciding factor in the alliances the Wabanaki forged. Pre-dating permanent European settlement in Maine, European trade became an important feature in Wabanaki diplomacy in the late sixteenth century, which contributed to substantial cultural adaptations in Indigenous communities. One example of this is evident in the increased reliance on European firearms for subsistence practices, and why the English demand for the Wabanaki to turn over their guns discussed in the previous chapter was a substantial enough affront to contribute to the outbreak of the First Anglo-Wabanaki War. In terms of the Indigenous worldview, trade and gift exchange were intimately tied to diplomatic relationships, often serving as the physical manifestation of a friendship based in mutual obligation. These practices pre-dated the introduction of European trade in Wabanaki society, serving to maintain and extend relational networks, and often relating

[150] Pulsipher, "Gaining the Diplomatic Edge," 32.
[151] Morrison, *Embattled Northeast*, 118.

to Indigenous understandings of spiritual power.[152] The introduction of European trade goods, while innovative, was ultimately understood in the context of this tradition.[153]

Issues of trade with the English became a contributing factor to King William's War, particularly when the English withheld expected goods. This breach of their reciprocal relationship often caused the Wabanaki to strengthen their ties with the French, both for material goods they needed to survive, and because they could potentially fulfill the expectations that came with an alliance in a more satisfactory way than their English counterparts. In the discourse that consumed English towns before King William's War, the Captain of the fort at Casco attested to a rumor that an "attack by the Indians" had been "instigated by one Casteen a Frenchman, by whom they have been promised a shipload of goods;" and Anthony Bracket relayed that "There are ten Indians gone to Canada for ammunition it is supposed."[154] These rumors and the culture of anxiety they produced communicated an effective warning to the English, that the Wabanaki would not hesitate to turn to the French if English trade goods fell through.[155] While these rhetorical threats were extrapolated by the English to denote an expansive political alliance between the French and the Wabanaki, painting an image of Indigenous peoples as French puppets, Wabanaki actions, particularly in the first year of the war, were largely autonomous from the French Empire. Rather than imperial puppets, the Indigenous people of the Dawnland were strategically exploiting their positioning between competing empires to increase their access to necessary resources.

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[152] Neal Salisbury, "The Indians' Old World: Native Americans and the Coming of Europeans," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, Vol. 53, No. 3 (Jul 1996), 435-458 at 452.
[153] Salisbury, "The Indians' Old World," 453.
[154] Fortescue, *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies, 1681-1685*, 634-635.
[155] Pulsipher, "Gaining the Diplomatic Edge," 34.

While French relationships with the Wabanaki were based on a type of mutual respect, especially when compared to that of the English, this centrality of trade to Indigenous diplomacy and subsistence would come to limit the efficacy of their political alliance. Fundamentally, the French seemed to have understood the importance of gift exchange and trade to maintain these diplomatic relationships, as the symbolic power of gifts functioned in French society as well. The French King Louis XIV inaugurated a project to create an *histoire métallique* in the late seventeenth century, creating silver and gold medals imprinted with his likeness to bestow upon people from non-European nations as diplomatic gifts.[156] These objects carried an overt symbolic message to supplement the purely monetary value of their raw materials, aiming to promote the prestige of the French crown by disseminating the image of the monarch.[157] In 1693, two Wabanaki chiefs who likely distinguished themselves in raids against the English were gifted two gold medals, which were among the earliest examples of what became a standard practice of Europeans presenting medals to Native Americans as a representation of their alliance.[158]

As King William's War wore on, the French felt the pressure to gift generously to maintain their alliance, without which their military efforts would falter. In one 1692 conference between the French and the Kennebecs, a French official explained that "the King is satisfied with the way you have carried on the war against our common enemy," and presented the group with "gifts… as he considers you as those who expose themselves most readily and are continually on the warpath."[159] However, while the French often spoke of their willingness to trade with the Wabanaki to shore up their alliance, their efforts to make good on their promises were inconsistent. Although, in the same conference referenced above, the French promised that

[156] Wellington, "Medals in Motion: The cross-cultural reception of Louis XIV's medals," 1.
[157] Wellington, "Medals in Motion," 2.
[158] Wellington, "Medals in Motion," 18, 19.
[159] "Conference, Villebon and Kennebecs (1692)" in *New England Treaties, North and West*, 61-62 at 61.

they "expect, before long, ships from France with all things necessary, so that we shall lack nothing," the ongoing war in Europe limited the ability of the French monarch to get supplies to North America.[160] Further, when supplies did arrive, they often first went to their allies in the *pays d'en haut.*[161] French failure to deliver proper gifts and give access to reasonably priced trade goods made the Wabanaki more willing to make peace with the English, whose trade was comparatively more accessible and less expensive.[162]

In 1693, this lack of access to affordable trade goods constituted a significant challenge to Wabanaki subsistence practices, so much so that Madockawando and other sagamores proposed a peace treaty with the English. As reported by the English captives who were exchanged to demonstrate the sagamore's sincerity, "they have been meditating for more than twelve Months past to seek to the English to be in good terms with them, expressing their weariness of the War."[163] Importantly, they state that those sagamores represented in the treaty "lately resolved to cast off their Fryar who has laboured to push them forward in making further attempts against the English giving them Expectation of receiving assistance from the French wherein they have found themselves deceived."[164] While this treaty ultimately lacked the consensus needed to halt hostilities on the Dawnland, it speaks to the important role material exchange played in diplomacy and the maintenance of relationships. Indeed, as the Wabanaki explained to the French at a 1695 conference, "We know that thou hast been troubled by the parleys which we have held with the English… it was our need for many things and our distress

[160] "Conference, Villebon and Kennebecs (1692)" in *New England Treaties, North and West*, 61-62 at 61
[161] Pulsipher, "Gaining the Diplomatic Edge," 34
[162] Pulsipher, "Gaining the Diplomatic Edge," 35.
[163] "Massachusetts Governor's Report on Pemaquid Truce and Treaty," in *New England Treaties, North and West,* 65-66 at 66.
[164] "Massachusetts Governor's Report on Pemaquid Truce and Treaty," in *New England Treaties, North and West,* 65-66 at 66.

at seeing our families destitute, which drove us to make overtures to the English."[165] Explicitly leveraging the advantage of English trade against the French, the Wabanaki stated that the continuation of their talks with the English:

> depends on thee that we do not in the future, have the same cause. Therefore, tell us what merchandise will be for sale on this river; when thou hast agreed with us on the price we promise to cease all negotiations with the English and to prevent our youths from trading with them.[166]

To continue their imperial war against the English in the Northeast, the French had no other choice than to agree to fixed prices until hostilities ceased.[167] However, as French supplies remained scarce, the French would ultimately have to incur heavy economic losses or renege on their promise.[168]

The French failure to substantiate their kinship relationships through proper gifts and reasonably priced trade goods limited the advantage they had over the English in adapting to Native diplomatic practices. As Jenny Hale Pulsipher argues, this repeated failure to adhere to kinship expectations and to fulfill their part of mutual obligation soon transformed the relationship between the Wabanaki and the French, de-ritualizing any future exchanges between the two parties to make them decidedly "commercial."[169] This inaugurated a new diplomatic system wherein the French had little advantage over the English, and paved the way for a new period of tense peace between the English and the Wabanaki.

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[165] "Conference, Villebon and Wabanakis (1695)," in *New England Treaties, North and West*, 83-84 at 83.
[166] "Conference, Villebon and Wabanakis (1695)," in *New England Treaties, North and West, 83-84 at 83.*
[167] "Conference, Villebon and Wabanakis (1695)," in *New England Treaties, North and West, 83-84 at 84.*
[168] Puslipher, "Gaining the Diplomatic Edge," 37.
[169] Pulsipher, "Gaining the Diplomatic Edge," 37.

Redefining Anglo-Wabanaki Diplomacy

Several years after the end of the Nine Year's War in Europe, a truce was settled between the English and the Wabanaki following a particularly harsh winter of 1699-1700. As Cotton Mather recorded, after the deaths of several prominent sagamores, "a grievous and unknown Disease is got among them, which consumed them wonderfully," so "they Resolved now, to Fight no more," in search of a "more amicable way to compose the Differences."[170] The language of the treaty appears to demean the persistence of Native sovereignty, categorizing the agreement as a "submission" of a "rebellion" that was significantly influenced by the French, rather than hostilities arising from English incursions against a sovereign nation.[171] However, the Wabanaki did extract important concessions from the English, guaranteeing the protection of English law and, importantly, securing fair and regular trade with the English government.[172] This would directly address a central complaint of the Wabanaki, of being habitually cheated in trades by settlers, demonstrating the significant bargaining power of the Wabanaki. So long as the Wabanakis retained their power, the English could not make their pretensions to total conquest a reality, and likely employed this rhetoric for the benefit of royal officials in England.[173]

Following this agreement, a group of messengers were appointed by a "general meeting" of all the Wabanaki to "speak in all their names" to further confirm the peace, legitimized by this expression of communal consent.[174] The rhetoric of the ensuing memorial betrays a more measured stance of the end of the war, describing both the Wabanaki's "submission and

[170] Mather, *Decennium Luctuosum*, 273-275.
[171] "Casco Bay Treaty (1699)," in *New England Treaties, North and West,* 90-92 at 91.
[172] "Casco Bay Treaty (1699)," in *New England Treaties, North and West,* 90-92 at 91.
[173] Saxine, *Properties of Empire,* 39.
[174] "Memorial of the Sagamores (1699),"in *Documentary History of the State of Maine,* 26-28.

proposals."[175] In it, they invited the English to re-settle the lands they had previously occupied, demanded they respect traditional Wabanaki subsistence practices, and asked to secure a "Free Trade… under due regulations as Governour shall order."[176] Regarding the trade, the messengers made sure to note that "We shall be willing to give a price proportionable" for the goods they requested, which mainly included textiles, "principally Broad Cloths Stamels, Pennistone Gingerlins holland Shirts, all good and Strong."[177] This not only communicated the practical importance of a fair and accessible trade in making peace, but also represented a continuity in confirming relationships through ritualized exchange. Cloth and clothing were utilized as gifts between Europeans and Native peoples for centuries build relationships of allyship, and to physically manifest the resulting cultural interaction.[178]

Indeed, the language from the English immediately following the cessation of hostilities speaks to an acute imperative to ensure peace in the Dawnland by acquiescing to Native wishes, and addressing Wabanaki complaints, particularly regarding trade goods. In February of 1700, Massachusetts issued a proclamation explaining that "the Government have resolved to keep intirely under their own immediate direction and management" the regulation of trade with the Wabanaki, to ensure "that no abuse or injustice may be done to the Indians therein" for the "future peace and tranquility of his Majesties Subjects."[179] This project of centrally controlling trade was partly informed by imperial rivalries, as an English committee proposed that "the whole of this trade be managed as such… as to be sure to undersell the french," underscoring

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[175] "Memorial of the Sagamores (1699)," in *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, 28.
[176] "Memorial of the Sagamores (1699)," in *Documentary History of the State of Maine*, 27.
[177] "Memorial of the Sagamores (1699)," 28.
[178] Laura E. Johnson, "Roundtable: of Records and Rituals: Native Americans and the Textile Trade," The Junto: A Group Blog on Early American History, 2018, https://earlyamericanists.com/2017/02/15/of-records-and-rituals-native-americans-and-the-textile-trade/#_ftnref6.
[179] "Proclamation of Peace with Wabanakis, No English to Settle East of Wells (1600)," in *New England Treaties, North and West*, 93.

how the Wabanaki benefitted from placing these two imperial powers in competition.[180] Moreover, a 1699 bill aimed at regulating trade with the Wabanaki provides for "Presents out of the publick Treasury as shall be by them thought suitable… for engaging… Indians more firmly to the English Interest and obliging them to abandon that of the French."[181] However, as much as English sources may emphasize the Wabanaki relationship with the French, this is also an instance of English officials directly addressing Wabanaki complaints, which demanded the assurance of a fair trade in exchange for peaceful relations in the Dawnland.

The peace of 1699-1700 demonstrates at once how easily Wabanaki interests became subsumed in imperial rivalry within the English imagination as well as the extent to which European goods had become an integral part of Indigenous life. While the rising importance of trade goods is often linked to an inevitable, historiographical arc towards economic dependence, an erosion of sovereignty, and cultural decline, this link between trade and diplomacy is also representative of a strategy that worked to perpetuate Native power in the Dawnland.[182] Indeed, during a 1701 conference in Casco Bay, one English official was so desperate to "renew and keep fresh in memory… the happy fruits of so well a settled peace amongst us," that he aimed to "shew you our hearts, both in settling the Trade to your advantage as that for the future you may never want anything and at cheap rates and prices, as also to bring unto you the presents which the King has been pleased to send you."[183] The Wabanaki were active, central figures in dictating the terms of this exchange, both in materials traded and in their political significance. However, these functions were as much rooted in Indigenous tradition as the realities of the contemporary

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[180] "Report of Committee with proposals for settling the trade with the Indians at the Eastward (1699)," Massachusetts Archive Collection, vol. 30, 444-444a.
[181] "Bill for giving necessary supplies to the Eastern Indians and for regulating trad with them (1699)," Massachusetts Archive Collection vol. 30 446.
[182] Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 54, 68.
[183] "Casco Bay Conference (1701)" in *New England Treaties, North and West*, 110.

Atlantic world.[184] As trade and power became increasingly conflated over the course of the eighteenth century, the Wabanaki's embrace of European trade goods would bear unforeseen consequences, as this centrality of trade came to fuel violent competition for market access throughout the Northeast, and the incorporation of new technologies did substantially transform Native life.[185] While these unforeseen consequences continued to spiral out of this narrative as history progressed, these developments were never predetermined, but rather the result of involved negotiations regarding sovereignty and power between Native and European peoples.

[184] Richter, *Trade, Land, Power*, 67.
[185] Richer, *Trade, Land, Power*, 68.

Conclusion

While the year 1699 marks the end of the Second Anglo-Wabanaki War, it did not conclude the relational negotiations that continued to dominate the Dawnland. The apprehensions of the seventeenth century persisted into the eighteenth, as the English continued to fear a conspiracy between the French and Wabanaki. The Wabanaki, for their part, were suspicious of a marked English disrespect of their sovereignty, demonstrated through both a consumption of their resources and an assumption of their loyalty. While the English attempted to keep the peace by improving trade agreements, the Wabanaki were ultimately unwilling to reject the French Jesuits and tradesmen, their friends and allies, so tensions continued to simmer.[186] Only four years later, in 1703, these fears would, once again, become manifest with the outbreak of the Third Anglo-Wabanaki War. Indeed, conflict between the Wabanaki, French, and English would continue to plague the Dawnland, through yet a Fourth Anglo-Wabanaki War, and finally the Seven Year's War.

However, while the 1699 treaty failed to make a lasting peace, it speaks to the unique nature of the power dynamic that mediated relationships in the Dawnland at that time. Tracing the avenues through which the Indigenous inhabitants of the Dawnland wielded their bargaining chips to force concessions from the English, and the extent to which European newcomers accommodated themselves into Indigenous practices, this study closes with a document wherein the Wabanaki still held substantial power relative to the English. However, as mentioned above, this relationship did not persist. Through the first half of the eighteenth century, an exponential increase of English settler population and the declining influence of the French in North America made this insistence on Indigenous practices of diplomacy and relational negotiation

[186] Morrison, *Embattled Northeast*, 150-152.

decreasingly feasible.[187] With the expulsion of France from the continent entirely in 1763 at the conclusion of the Seven Years' War, the Wabanaki and other Indigenous peoples who had exploited their positioning in borderlands to play imperial interests off one another lost a key bargaining chip, disrupting the balance of power that characterized the negotiations of the proceeding century. The English became free to disregard the relationships of mutual obligation and reciprocity, and the time for negotiation as equal players had largely passed.

However, the Wabanaki people continued to assert their sovereignty beyond this chronology. Historians of colonial Maine today, including the work of Ian Saxine and Thomas Wickman, narrate active power struggles that extend through the eighteenth century. Highlighting the strategies the Wabanaki used to bolster their positioning relative to the English, these historians convincingly narrate how the Wabanaki utilized political geographies, traditional environmental knowledge, and other strategies to continually assert their sovereignty. This continues up to the present day. Drawing on historic roots forged in the conflicts of the late seventeenth century, the Wabanaki Confederacy had a contemporary revival in the 1990s. In the twenty-first century, the leadership of the Wabanaki have re-asserted treaty rights with a particular emphasis for the conservation of natural resources, and they have successfully petitioned the Maine legislature to expand their rights of sovereignty by being placed on equal footing with other federally recognized tribes, gaining the autonomy to regulate their own affairs, in 2023.[188] The complexity of power dynamics and diplomatic negotiations regarding Indigenous autonomy and power in the Dawnland may have roots in the seventeenth century, but they undoubtedly carry on to the present day.

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[187] Pulsipher, "Gaining the Diplomatic Edge," 38.
[188] David Sharp, "Maine Legislature votes to expand sovereignty for Native American tribes," WBUR Local Coverage, June 23, 2023, https://www.wbur.org/news/2023/06/23/maine-legislature-vote-sovereignty-native-american-tribes.

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