

Doomed to Failure.

Sino-American Relations 1941-1950.

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Provincial Names

Character	Pinyin	Pronunciation	Character	Pinyin	Pronunciation
北京	Beijing	bay-jing	内蒙古	Naimongol	ney-mong-gol
宁夏	Ningxia	ning-shia	宁夏	Ningxia	ning-shia
青海	Qinghai	ching-hai	山西	Shansi	shan-shi
陕西	Shensi	shan-shi	山东	Shandong	shan-dong
甘肃	Gansu	gan-su	上海	Shanghai	shang-hai
四川	Szechuan	seh-chuan	湖南	Hunan	hun-an
贵州	Guizhou	gui-zhou	湖北	Hubei	hu-bei
云南	Yunnan	yun-nan	福建	Fujian	fu-ji-an
广西	Guangxi	gwang-shi	广东	Guangdong	gwang-dong
海南	Hainan	hai-nan	香港	Hong Kong	hong-kong
台湾	Taiwan	tai-wan	澳门	Macao	mao

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China: Administration



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Province-Level Names

Characters	Pinyin	Pronunciation	Characters	Pinyin	Pronunciation
安徽	Anhui	ahn-way	辽宁	Liaoning	lee_ow-ning
北京	Beijing	bay-jing	内蒙古	Nei Mongol	nay-mung-goo
福建	Fujian	foo-jee_en	宁夏	Ningxia	ning-she_ah
甘肃	Gansu	gahn-soo	青海	Qinghai	ching-hi
广东	Guangdong	g_wong-doong	陕西	Shaanxi	shun-she
广西	Guangxi	g_wong-she	山东	Shandong	shahn-doong
贵州	Guizhou	g_way-joe	上海	Shanghai	shong-hi
海南	Hainan	hi-nan	山西	Shanxi	shahn-she
河北	Hebei	huh-bay	四川	Sichuan	ssu-ch_wan
黑龙江	Heilongjiang	hay-loong-jee_ong	天津	Tianjin	te_en-jin
河南	Henan	huh-nan	新疆	Xinjiang	shin-jee_ong
湖北	Hubei	hoo-bay	西藏	Xizang	she-dzong
湖南	Hunan	hoo-nan	云南	Yunnan	yu_oon-nan
江苏	Jiangsu	jee_ong-su	浙江	Zhejiang	juh-jee_ong
江西	Jiangxi	jee_ong-she			
吉林	Jilin	jee-lynn	台湾	Taiwan	tie-wan

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I. Introduction: Lost Chance in China?

Sino-American relations throughout the decade of the 1950s were characterized by mutual suspicion and hostility. This antagonism was the result of policies adopted by the United States and the Chinese Communist Party the preceding decade. The former World War Two allies found themselves on opposite sides of the emerging Cold War, and the rising tensions between the United States and the People's Republic of China exploded into armed conflict in Korea a year after the Chinese Communists gained control over the Chinese mainland. Were there missed opportunities for friendlier relations between the two nations? Or, rather, were the United States and China cast into their roles as enemies by larger forces which could not be reversed by any amount of diplomatic wisdom?

While the United States turned in on itself in the boisterous 1920s and attempted to isolate itself from the treacherous international political scene of the depression wracked 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party, after being founded in 1921 soon found itself engaged in a bloody civil war with the Guomindang, or the Chinese Nationalist Party. The United States recognized the Guomindang regime as the legitimate government of China and generally supported its attempts to suppress the Chinese Communists. Although the United States did not particularly care about China's domestic politics, America had long identified itself as anti-communist and had even participated in the Siberian campaign to smother the infant Russian Bolshevik revolution in its crib. American anti-communism applied to China as well.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor rudely roused the United States from its slumber. The United States was thrown into the war with Communist allies in the form of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party, but this cooperation did little to allay American fears of communism. Nevertheless, United States diplomats tried to unify the Chinese Communist Party with the reluctant Guomindang in order to strengthen the anti-Japanese alliance. American support never went to the Chinese

Communist Party; only the Guomindang got precious American Lend-Lease aid. By the end of the war, many American diplomats were calling for a fundamental change in United States China policy. These men were convinced that the Chinese Communist possessed the most effective military force in China, and that the future policy of China would be determined by the Communist Party. They advised Washington to extend Lend-Lease support to the Chinese Communists independently of the Guomindang.

High level American officials objected to the proposal, saying that it would be a betrayal of faith to the Guomindang. The United States continued this policy of exclusively supporting the Guomindang throughout the war with Japan. During the Chinese civil war which followed, the United States continued to send assistance to the rival of the Chinese Communist Party. This support would carry grave implications for United States relations with the Chinese Communists after the founding of the People's Republic of China.

Neither the United States nor the fledgling People's Republic of China was any more inclined towards conciliatory policies than they had been during the civil war. The United States refused to recognize the new government and considered it a puppet of the Soviet Union. The Chinese Communists mistreated American diplomats who had stayed behind to establish contact with the new Communist rulers and offended American sensibilities with abusive propaganda about Washington's aims and actions in China. The rift dividing the two governments only expanded, and in October 1950 distrust led to an undeclared war in Korea.

Until the late 1960s, American scholarship tended to place the origins of the Sino-American confrontation in what was considered to be an antagonistic policy adopted by the Chinese Communists after the establishment of the People's Republic of China. This theory is primarily based on Mao's "lean to one side" speech of June,

1949.¹ By allying itself with the Soviet Union in the emerging Cold War, the People's Republic of China was intentionally setting itself at odds with the United States.

In his book *China Crosses the Yalu*, Allen Whiting defines the framework with which the Chinese Communist Party approached foreign policy as consisting of three components. The first, which he refers to as the Chinese component, combines traditional Chinese tendencies towards expansionism with xenophobic attitudes. The second component is the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the People's Republic of China, which focused the aggressive elements of the Chinese component and led to an alliance with the Soviet Union. The third component, the experiences of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, reinforced the Chinese Communist assumptions of American hostility based on the first two components.² This assumption of American hostility led to a self-fulfilling prophecy of sorts in the 1950s, as Chinese fears of American hostility led them to intervene in the Korean War, after which the United States did become increasingly hostile to the People's Republic of China and determined to contain Communist expansion.

Harold C. Hinton was even more critical of the People's Republic of China in his book *Communist China in World Politics*. The hostility which arose during 1949 and the early 1950s was "more attributable to the Chinese than to American policy."³ Hinton claimed that any change in relations were contingent on a change of leadership in Beijing, for there was little possibility of any policy change so long as Mao or any of the other members of the "Long March" generation (that is, those leaders of the Chinese Communist Party who participated in the Long March of 1934-1935) remained in power.⁴

¹Mao Zedong, "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," *Selected Works of Mao Zedong* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1969), Vol. 4 p. 415.

²Allen Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), p. 9.

³Harold C. Hinton, *Communist China in World Politics* (Boston: The Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966), p.492.

⁴Ibid., p. 498.

History was to prove Hinton wrong, as Mao himself was the Chinese leader during the Sino-American rapprochement in 1972. In a later work, *China's Turbulent Quest*, Hinton backed off from his earlier assertions of Chinese hostility. In the preface, he stated that one of the difficulties in the study of Chinese foreign policy was:

the rather strange emotional climate, or rather climates, in which discussion of China and of policy toward China is often conducted, notably in the United States and in American academic circles. On the right, there is a surviving although probably diminishing tendency to see China as a malevolent threat. On the left, there is a growing tendency to see it as an awkward giant driven to misbehavior by uncomprehending American hostility.⁵

This is an excellent summation of the two primary schools which dominated the debate on Sino-American relations following the establishment of the People's Republic of China. Hinton's own earlier views were typical of the former. But in *China's Turbulent Quest*, Hinton was critical of both the United States and the People's Republic of China, blaming the Chinese Communist leadership for turning the United States into Japan's successor as the leading imperialist threat to China and the United States for reinforcing the adversarial relationship by inaugurating the famous "containment doctrine" during the Korean War.⁶

The paradigm attributed by Hinton to the right was clearly outlined by Frank Trager and William Henderson. "The tendency (of the People's Republic of China) to resort to the sword, in defiance of the settled consensus of the international community, is already disturbing and will continue to become progressively more so as Communist China inevitably waxes in strength and military power." They concluded that the foreign policy pursued by the People's Republic of China after 1949 presented a major threat to the interests of the United States in East Asia, which they defined as "the

⁵Harold C. Hinton, *China's Turbulent Quest*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), p. xi.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 264-265.

prevention of a hegemony in Asia under the leadership of a power or concert of powers hostile to the United States".⁷ This they considered to have been amply demonstrated by China's policies in the first decade of Communist rule.

The history of the Korean War was being revised almost before it was written. In 1952, I.F. Stone's book *The Hidden History of the Korean War* challenged the idea that China had acted as an aggressor in Korea. He asserted that America had provoked the People's Republic of China into intervention in order to protect its national defense interests.⁸ This argument gained in popularity among leftist scholars during the Vietnam War era. The wave of revisionism reversed the traditional model of Chinese aggression and replaced it with a model of American aggression. Rather than the anti-American rhetoric of the People's Republic of China and Mao's "lean to one side speech" provoking the United States, American hostility towards Communism was seen as provoking the Chinese Communists into an anti-American campaign.

A more refined version of Stone's argument can be found in Bruce Cumings' *The Origins of the Korean War*. While Cumings was primarily concerned with Korea's colonial past and the developments on the Korean peninsula following V-J Day, he suggested that the Chinese decision to enter the conflict was based on concerns over the safety of Manchuria and jointly operated Chinese-North Korean hydroelectric plants on the Yalu, and the prevention of a United States-Japanese "Co-Prosperity sphere" in northeast Asia.⁹ Cumings likened the American action to that of the sixteenth-century Japanese ruler Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who after unifying Japan launched two unsuccessful attempts to conquer Korea and the mainland.

⁷William Henderson and Frank N. Trager, ed., *Communist China, 1949-1969: A Twenty Year Appraisal* (New York: New York University Press, 1970), p. 317.

⁸I.F. Stone, *The Hidden History of the Korean War, 1950-1951* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1952), p. 184.

⁹Bruce Cummings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 733-734.

Critical studies of Chinese foreign policy gave way to sympathetic ones. Joseph Camilleri was particularly critical of the United States in his work *Chinese Foreign Policy*. Camilleri observed that China had acted as a "dissatisfied power" for most of the twentieth century, intent on changing the existing world order.¹⁰ This led it into conflict with both the United States and the Soviet Union, the two dominant world powers.¹¹ Camilleri subscribed completely to the model of American hostility provoking Chinese defensive policies:

Chinese fears, it should be noted, were aroused not only by American actions but also by the inflammatory statements of several American leaders.... American diplomacy had become so obsessed with the alleged expansionary and subversive tendencies in Chinese foreign policy as to lose sight of its own imperialist thrust into Asia. America's misconceptions of the true nature and consequences of its actions and was thus subtly but unmistakably projected on to the Chinese perceptions and behavior.¹²

Camilleri took a position diametrically opposed to Trager and Henderson, who place the blame for hostility on China, by accusing the United States of arousing Chinese hostility.

As Hinton suggested, there are significant flaws in both approaches to the question of the Sino-American confrontation of the 1950s. The first, which for the sake of convenience will be referred to as the "traditional school," reads like an indictment of the Chinese Communist foreign policy during this period, and suggests that the United States was unable to alter China's innate hostility in any manner after the Communist Party came to power. The second school, which will be referred to as the "revisionist school," reverses the indictment, and blames the United States for consistently antagonizing the generally passive People's Republic of China.

Neither of these schools offers a satisfactory explanation for the Sino-American

¹⁰Joseph Camilleri, *Chinese Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Martin Robertson and Company, 1980), p. 3.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 46.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 28-29.

confrontation in the 1950s, however. This is not to impugn the quality of some of the authors; it is testament to Whiting's work that *China Crosses the Yalu* remains the authoritative work on the Chinese decision to enter the Korean War in spite of the dramatic changes which have overtaken scholarship in this field since 1960. Cumings treatment of Korea's colonial heritage is of similar merit. However, Whiting's book is an analysis of the Korean War, not Chinese foreign policy throughout the fifties and does not deal with the Taiwan Straits Crisis later in the decade. Cummings, on the other hand, deals with the tension between Washington and Beijing only tangentially, being primarily concerned with events on the Korean peninsula.

Both schools indicate that, had either government adopted different policies, relations between Washington and Beijing could have been warmer. Yet the policies adopted appeared to be the best available to the leaders who decided upon them. What was behind this series of flawed decisions?

II. Sibling Rivalry.

The Chinese Communist Party was established in July of 1921 with the assistance of the Comintern (Communist International), the international Communist organization founded by Lenin and others in 1919 to encourage communist revolutions throughout the world. Chen Duxiu was elected as the first secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party, despite the fact that he was unable to attend its first session. Comintern influence remained strong within the Chinese Communist Party, however, and in 1923 the Comintern advisers strongly advised members to join the Guomindang and support its attempts to reunify the country,

Chen was unenthusiastic about the proposed alliance. He distrusted the Guomindang's influence upon members of the Chinese Communist Party.¹³ Nevertheless, the Chinese Communists joined the Guomindang in what became known as the United Front. In 1926, this coalition of Nationalist and Communist forces launched the Northern Expedition to recover the north-eastern provinces of China proper which had fallen into the hands of local warlords.

Tensions began to rise between the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang. So long as Sun Yat-sen, the "father" of the 1911 revolution which had overthrown the Qing Dynasty, remained alive, both sides were constrained to deal with each other on relatively peaceful terms. His death in 1925 removed that limitation, and despite the success of the Northern Expedition, relations deteriorated. On April 12, 1927 Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) began an extermination campaign to wipe out the Communists. The purge began in Shanghai, and soon spread to Guangzhou, Nanjing, and elsewhere.¹⁴

¹³Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 520-521.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 528.

failure. The split devastated Communist strength in China's urban centers. Chen Duxiu was forced to take responsibility for the disaster, despite his original opposition to the alliance; the leaders of the Comintern were not about to accept responsibility themselves.¹⁵ The Guomindang itself split over the issue of the Communist purge; the left wing in Wuhan maintained its ties to the Communists and condemned Jiang, while Jiang set up his own government in Nanjing with supporters from the Guomindang right wing.

Even as the Communists in the cities were being destroyed, the seeds of a new power base were being planted. Following in the wake of the Northern Expedition, a young Chinese Communist named Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) returned to his home province of Hunan to write a report on peasant unrest in the area. He soon became impressed with the peasants and recognized their potential as a source of support for a revolution, noting in his "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan" in March 1927:

All the wrong measures taken by the revolutionary authorities against the peasant movement must be speedily changed. Only thus can the future of the revolution be benefited. For the present upsurge of the peasant movement is a colossal event. In a very short time, in China's central, southern, and northern provinces, several hundred million peasants will rise like a mighty storm, like a hurricane, a force so swift and violent that no power, however great, will be able to hold it back.¹⁶

This criticism of Party policy was not well received. Nevertheless, Mao later organized a small army of peasants and in September of the same year he launched an attack on the provincial capital of Changsha. This became known as the "Autumn Harvest Uprising." It was quickly crushed by local security forces, and Mao was forced to retreat to the Jiangxi-Hunan border region to lick his wounds. For this

¹⁵Jonathan Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1990), p. 359.

¹⁶Mao Zedong, *Selected Works of Mao Zedong* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1967), Vol. 1 p. 23.

failure, Mao was rewarded by censure and expulsion from his post on the Central Committee.

Mao was ridiculed by the Communist Party for attempting a peasant revolution without the leadership of the working class.¹⁷ The Chinese Communist Party, placed under the leadership of a Stalin protege named Qu Qiubai in 1928, continued in its attempts to promote armed uprisings in the cities.¹⁸ Every effort was crushed by the Guomindang. The post of secretary-general became a revolving door; whoever happened to occupy it at the time was blamed for the failures of the urban strikes. Stalin and the Comintern were above reproach, despite the fact that they were the ones dictating the policy.

Meanwhile, Mao began to organize rural soviets in and around the provinces of Hunan, Jiangxi, and Fujian, a strategy that had earlier been rejected in favor of Stalin's urgings for urban strikes. These soviets were collectives under which a central authority controlled the production and distribution of agricultural and industrial products. Under the military leadership of Zhu De, the soviets began to develop the strongest Communist military forces in China. The cutting edge of the Communist movement in China was shifting from the Party leadership in the cities to Mao in the countryside.

In late 1931 the Soviet trained Communist Party leadership, which had been driven underground in Shanghai, joined Mao in his capital of Ruijin, Jiangxi. This group had studied in Moscow and was known as the "Returned Student clique." The Party leadership was extremely critical of Mao's unorthodox, peasant-based approach to Communist revolution and his reliance on guerrilla warfare. At the same time, the Guomindang attacks on Mao's Jiangxi Soviet were gaining in intensity. This dual threat combined to unseat Mao in 1934, when the "Returned Student" clique assumed

¹⁷Hsu, p. 554.

¹⁸Ibid.

control of the Soviet. They abandoned Mao's strategy of guerrilla warfare for one of positional warfare.

The consequences of this change of strategy were catastrophic. By fall of 1934, the Red Army had been thoroughly beaten, and the top leadership was forced to take what remained of their military and attempt to flee the Guomindang attacks. This flight was the beginning of what was to become known as "The Long March," which lasted from October 1934 to October 1935. During this trek, Mao managed to regain his position at the top of the Communist command structure and have the blame for the disasters of the Jiangxi Soviet placed on the "Returned Students" clique.¹⁹ The Long March ended in Yan'an, which became the main Communist base in China for the next decade.

Seeking respite from the Guomindang assaults, Mao began to call for a Second United Front, this time to liberate those areas of China under Japanese occupation. At the end of World War I, most of the Western powers had withdrawn from China. They were replaced by an increasingly aggressive Japan, determined to carve out its own empire in Asia. In 1931, young officers of the Japanese Guandong Army staged an explosion in a Manchurian railroad station which they used as a pretext for occupying the entire region. The Guandong Army then set up its own puppet government in the region, which they called Manzhouguo (Manchukuo), returning the deposed emperor of the fallen Qing Dynasty to the throne.

The establishment of Manzhouguo enraged the Chinese people, who considered Manchuria an integral part of China. The League of Nations condemned the Japanese action. Japan responded by withdrawing from that body, which had no capability to take effective action enforcing its decrees. Anti-Japanese sentiment in China rose dramatically. One of the most disaffected was the "Young Marshal," Zhang Xueliang, the son of a Manchurian warlord. His father, the "Old Marshal" Zhang Zuolin, had

¹⁹Hsu, p. 561.

been assassinated in 1928 by the Japanese in the process of consolidating their hold on Manchuria. The Young Marshal joined the Guomindang in 1934, and was sent to Xi'an to suppress Communists in that region. He was particularly receptive to Communist calls for a Second United Front, as he and most of his troops were more interested in regaining Manchuria than eliminating the Communists.

Despite popular sentiment against the Japanese and the growing demand for action, Jiang remained dedicated to wiping out the Communist threat. In December 1936 he travelled to Xi'an meet with Zhang and test his loyalty.²⁰ When Jiang refused to change his position *vis-a-vis* the Communists, a group of soldiers under Zhang's command killed Jiang's bodyguards and held the Generalissimo hostage, demanding he shift the focus of attack from the Communists to the Japanese. This left Jiang with little choice, and the Second United Front was inaugurated.

Although the alliance had been cemented under duress, Jiang did his part and called off the attacks on the Communist base areas. In July of 1937 Japanese troops in northern China demanded entry into a city near Beijing, in order to search for a missing soldier. The Chinese garrison refused, and the Japanese unit responded with a bombardment and occupied the city early the next morning.²¹ These events precipitated a rise in tensions which led to the outbreak of full-scale war later that year. Japanese troops won several quick, decisive victories, capturing Jiang's capital city of Nanjing in December. What followed was the worst massacre of the Sino-Japanese War, the infamous "Rape of Nanjing."

The Nationalists retreated, eventually halting the Japanese advance in central China. Jiang set up a wartime capital in Chongqing (Chungking). The lines began to solidify, as the armies became bogged down. Political lines within the Guomindang also began to harden. Much of the political infrastructure had been destroyed, and

²⁰Spence, p. 422.

²¹Hsu, p. 583.

Jiang could not carry out much in the way of land reforms for fear of alienating the landlords, who were one of his primary bases of support. In addition, it was primarily against the Guomindang that the Japanese forces were arrayed.

In contrast, the Chinese Communists were fairly isolated from the conflict, especially during the first years of the war. Mao seized this opportunity to secure his position both within the Chinese Communist Party and within China as a whole. Although he had called for the Second United Front, Mao was much less enthusiastic in his support given the reality of it than he had been in his propaganda; his formula for success was to devote 70 percent of his resources toward expansion, 20 percent toward undermining the Guomindang, and 10 percent towards resisting the Japanese.²²

The political agenda of the Chinese Communist Party was forced to compromise in the interests of the United Front. Idealistic programs to eliminate the landlord class were temporarily abandoned; such dispossessions as had been frequent in the Jiangxi Soviet were not politically feasible in Yan'an. Propaganda attacks on the Guomindang, while never ceasing, became much more subtle in their criticism.

Party membership rose dramatically during this period. By 1940, there were approximately 800,000 members, up from 40,000 in 1937.²³ The Red Army recovered the strength it had lost during the Long March and expanded beyond that previous level. They returned to the guerrilla tactics of Mao and Zhu, making life miserable for the Japanese garrison forces unfortunate enough to be located in areas near centers of Communist strength. Close contact with Chinese inside Japanese-controlled areas also fostered the growth of popular recognition of the Chinese Communists, as the Red Army spread Communist propaganda and developed an extensive civilian intelligence network.²⁴

²²Ibid., p. 589.

²³Spence, p. 461.

²⁴John King Fairbank, *The United States and China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 2nd ed. p. 236.

At the same time, the rest of the world was becoming aware of the Chinese Communist movement. Foreign observers in Yan'an had a tendency to portray the Chinese Communists as agrarian reformers, and independent of Moscow's influence.²⁵ This perception became extremely influential among members of the American State Department stationed in Yan'an during the Second World War. Jiang took strong objection to these reports and the implication that his regime was corrupt and stagnant. The most famous of these journalists, Edgar Snow, arrived in Yan'an 1936. His subsequent book *Red Star Over China* was extremely favorable to the Chinese Communists, praising their treatment of the peasants.²⁶

The popularity of the Chinese Communists with American journalists was a strange phenomenon. The normally unpalatable label "Communist" was tolerable because of the image of the Chinese Communists as being agrarian reformers rather than true Communists. The standard by which the two Chinese regimes, the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang, was relative; as important as what the Chinese Communist Party did to improve its own image was what the Guomindang did to destroy its own. Peasants in the Communist-held areas were genuinely treated better than their counterparts in regions controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. Foreign observers were horrified by Nationalist treatment of the peasants, where there were reports of officials enforcing taxes when the countryside was struck with famine.²⁷ These same conditions would influence American diplomats and military officers when they entered China in WWII.

By 1941, the Chinese Communist Party possessed a strong territorial base, an powerful military force, and an effective propaganda network. Red Army soldiers were widely recognized by Chinese in Japanese held areas, as the tactics they employed allowed them much more interaction with the populaces than their Nationalist

²⁵Hsu, p. 595.

²⁶Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China*(New York: Grove Weidenfield, 1968), p. 85.

²⁷Spence, p. 477.

counterparts. The Communists were also viewed favorably by foreign journalists, who admired the Spartan lifestyle of their leaders and the fair treatment of the peasants relative to the Guomindang areas. The Chinese Communist Party had transformed from the ragged remnants of the Long March survivors into a force to be reckoned with.

The Communist Party received little help from its ally, as the Soviet Union was at the height of the great purges and had little concern for the fate of the Chinese revolution. Alone, the unlikely alliance of Nationalist and Communist Chinese struggled against the Japanese war machine.

In the first months of the war, Nationalist troops precipitated a major battle near Shanghai, the center of foreign commercial interests in China. Some historians accuse Jiang of seeking to create an international incident, which he hoped would bring about foreign intervention.²⁸ Jiang certainly sought Western intervention, as China could not hope to defeat Japan by itself. The West was taking advantage of privileges acquired in the 19th century through a series of unequal treaties which had been forced upon China. If the Western powers claimed that they had rights to concessions in Shanghai and elsewhere in China, it was their obligation to defend those concessions in the event of war.

Partly in response to the fighting near Shanghai, a conference was held in Brussels, Belgium in November of 1937. Nine nations, including the United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, China, and Italy sent delegates. The United States representative, Norman Hekzekiah Davis, called upon the conference to urge Japan and China to open negotiations and cease hostilities. The conference failed to agree upon a mediator, and achieved no results. The Italian representative even objected to the message sent to Tokyo, which read in part "no dispute in history has ever been satisfactorily settled through the use of armed force." He cited the Italian use of force

²⁸ Nathan W. Tushman, *Silvestri and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945* (New York: Bantam, 1970), p. 213.

III. A Coalition of Enemies.

Jiang appealed to the West for assistance early in the Sino-Japanese War, but to no avail. Britain and France were too preoccupied with events in Europe to risk war in Asia, while the United States was restrained by isolationist fervor. The Chinese Communist Party received little help from its ally, as the Soviet Union was at the height of the great purges and had little concern for the fate of the Chinese revolution. Alone, the unlikely alliance of Nationalist and Communist Chinese struggled against the Japanese war machine.

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²⁸Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945* (New York: Bantam, 1970), p. 213.

to settle the dispute between Italy and Ethiopia as a satisfactory resolution through force. Japan, which along with Germany refused to attend the conference, rejected its proposals.²⁹

After the failure of the Brussels Conference, the United States began a series of informal discussions with Japan. These discussions were concerned with the status of American treaty rights in China. The United States saw the Japanese invasion as threatening to its economic interests in China and an infringement on the Open Door Policy, a series of informal agreements between the United States and other imperialist powers near the turn of the twentieth century which guaranteed access to Chinese markets. Consequently, Japanese-American relations began to decline. By 1940, the diplomatic situation had so deteriorated that the United States began to apply increasingly severe economic sanctions against Japan. Events reached a crisis point in mid-1941. American Lend-Lease aid had already begun to flow into China, and the establishment of the American Volunteer Group, better known as the "Flying Tigers," had cast American and Japanese pilots against each other in combat. In July, President Roosevelt signed an order freezing Chinese and Japanese assets in the United States. Chinese assets were frozen at the request of the Nationalist government, while Japanese assets were frozen over Tokyo's strong objections.

Japanese planes attacked the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7 1941, bringing the United States into the war. America expanded Lend-Lease programs to the Allies and mobilized its own military. Simultaneous Japanese attacks on British bases in Singapore and elsewhere had brought Great Britain into the Asian war. After four and one-half long, lonely years, China had allies in the war against Japan.

The structure of the anti-Japanese alliance was an extremely complicated mix of friends and enemies against a common foe. Within China, the Second United Front

²⁹Time Magazine, Nov. 15, 1937, p. 19.

supposedly pooled the Nationalist and Communist forces against Japan. This marriage was purely one of convenience, however, and had begun to breakdown as early as 1939. By the time the United States entered the war, sporadic fire-fights between Guomindang and Chinese Communist Party units were breaking out.

Great Britain was one of the "Big Four," the four major Allies including the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, and heavily involved in the war in Europe. It played only a minor role in Asia, however, mostly in Burma and Southeast Asia. There were a couple of reasons for this limited role. Most importantly, Britain had its hands full with Germany and could not afford to divide its resources between the two theaters. Another factor was the distrust with which both Chinese regimes regarded the British. Prior to Japan, Britain had been the most aggressive imperialist power in China, and had precipitated the Opium Wars in the 1840s and 1850s which had ultimately led to China's partition. More immediately, British relations with Japan prior to December 1941 gave the Chinese cause for concern. Faced with the German threat in Europe, Britain had been bending over backward to avoid war with Japan, and backed down in several confrontations. At a time when China was looking for friends, these actions by Great Britain did not foster warm feelings.

Another member of the European Allies was most conspicuous by its total absence. The Soviet Union, anxious to avoid a two-front war, had signed a neutrality pact with Japan in 1941. Despite urgings from the other Allies, Stalin refused to declare war on Japan while Germany was still active.

The United States had long recognized the Nationalist regime as the legitimate government of China, and when the Lend-Lease Program was inaugurated all aid went to Chongqing. Nonetheless, differences between the United States and the Chinese Nationalist leadership emerged. The United States had entered the war against Japan, and expected all allies to cooperate in defeating Japan before engaging in other activities. For Jiang, the matter was not so simple. As soon as Japan was defeated he

would face the Chinese Communists in a power struggle for control of China. These divisions led to a crisis during the war against Japan, and deeply influenced United States policy in the post-war era.

Soon after the United States entered the war, General Joseph Stilwell was sent to China. His mission had four parts:

- To supervise and control all United States defense aid affairs [Lend Lease aid] for China.

- Under the Generalissimo [Jiang] to command all United States forces in China and such Chinese forces as may be assigned to him.

- To represent the United States Government on any International War Council in China and act as the Generalissimo's Chief of Staff.

- To improve, maintain and control the Burma Road [the main artery of United States materiel assistance into China] in China.³⁰

"Vinegar Joe," as Stilwell was known, had spent many years in China during his military career, most recently as military attache to the Nationalist government (at that time still in Nanjing). During the early stages of the Sino-Japanese War, Stilwell had been critical of Jiang's cries for help.³¹ It was only the beginning of what would develop into a major personality conflict between the two which caused a rift in Sino-American relations.

The crux of the Jiang-Stilwell controversy was the Nationalist blockade of Communist base areas. Stilwell wanted to remove the blockade; this action would release Jiang's best troops for action against the Japanese and allow the Communists to engage in operations against Japanese forces in northern China. Jiang was adamantly opposed to this proposal. He felt that it would allow the Communists to expand their influence in both Japanese- and Nationalist Chinese-held territories, subverting

³⁰China White Paper, p. 469.

³¹Tuchman, p. 219.

Nationalist authority. Neither would budge, and to resolve the dispute President Roosevelt sent General Patrick Hurley to negotiate.

Concurrently, American diplomats and military officers were for the first time entering the Communist headquarters at Yan'an. In July 1944 a United States military observer mission arrived with Jiang's reluctant approval, as he had only allowed it after being heavily pressured by Roosevelt. Included in this mission was a foreign service officer, John S. Service, who had referred to the Chinese Communist Party as "the most dynamic force in China."³² Like the journalists who proceeded him, Service was generally favorably impressed with what he saw.

Service recognized the rising power of the Chinese Communist Party and warned that future Chinese policies would be subject to Communist influence:

We can limit ourselves to these two possibilities of (a) Communist control of the country, or (b) important Communist political participation, because it is now apparent that the present Guomindang cannot unaidedly exterminate the Communists and because it can be taken for granted that we will not willingly, or knowingly, give this aid. The Communist Party, therefore, under any circumstances, must be counted a continuing and important influence on China.³³

Conviction of the future importance of the Chinese Communist Party led Service to advise Washington to send military aid directly to the Communists.

This advice was ignored by the United States government, and no aid to the Chinese Communist Party ever materialized despite repeated urgings from Service and other foreign service officers disillusioned with Jiang. The major reason was the opposition of Jiang and Hurley. Jiang, concerned over the Communist challenge for control of China, was determined to restrict the flow of American arms to Yan'an. Hurley recognized the rivalry but was convinced that the correct policy for the United States was exclusive support of the Guomindang.

³²Hsu, p. 597.

³³John S. Service, *Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of John S. Service*, e. Joseph Esherick (New York: Random House, 1974), p. 320.

party. In Chongqing, the differences between Stilwell and Jiang proved intractable. Hurley advised Roosevelt to drop Stilwell, as the alternative was to risk losing Jiang and the Nationalists.³⁴ Stilwell was recalled in October 1944, and replaced by General Albert C. Wedemeyer. Wedemeyer adopted a more conciliatory approach than Stilwell, and Jiang found him much more acceptable.

Although Hurley had failed to ease tensions between Jiang and Stilwell, he remained in China to attempt to unify all Chinese forces, Nationalist and Communist alike, against Japan. On November 7 he travelled to Yan'an meet with Mao. The result of this conference was a "Five Point Draft Agreement." The first point called for the unification of all Chinese forces in the war against Japan and in the reconstruction of China. The second point was the establishment of a coalition government of all anti-Japanese parties (excluding the collaborationist regime of Wang Jingwei). The Republican Revolution in 1911 had established a one-party dictatorship by the Guomindang for a unspecified period of time which would provide for "political tutelage," allowing the Chinese people time to learn about democratic processes and their rights under the new regime. By 1944 this was no more than an excuse for the leadership of the Guomindang to maintain its own position. The third point claimed that such a coalition government must uphold the principles of Sun Yat-sen. The fourth point provided for the equal distribution of foreign aid, which until then had gone through Chongqing and never made it to Communist base areas. The fifth and final point in the agreement was that the new national government recognize the legality of the Guomindang, the Chinese Communist Party, and all other anti-Japanese parties.³⁵

The Nationalist government responded by issuing a three-point plan which required the Communists to hand over all their troops before recognition as a legal

³⁴Ibid., p. 605.

³⁵China White Paper, p. 74.

party. Although the Communists would be given some high positions in the command structure, they would not be allowed to retain any independent military forces. The Communists would also be required to uphold the principles of Sun Yat-sen. No provision was made for a coalition government, as the Nationalists refused to recognize the Communists as a legal party so long as they possessed independent military forces.

The Communists were furious at this unexpected response. The Communist representative, Zhou Enlai, informed Hurley that so long as the Nationalists were unwilling to accept the idea of a coalition government there was no point in continuing negotiations. Hurley responded by saying that he was attempting to liberalize the three point counter-proposal, and pleaded with Zhou to return to Chongqing. He received a reply indicating that in addition to the original five points in the Five Point Agreement the Communists demanded four new concessions, including the removal of the Nationalist blockade around Yan'an and the release of all political prisoners held by the Nationalists. Hurley informed the Communist leadership that these demands were a departure from the original agreement, and he could not make any promises on Nationalist cooperation.

Hurley, who had been appointed Ambassador to China in late November, finally got Jiang to agree to discuss certain changes in the national government. On the basis of this promise, Zhou returned to Chongqing in late January, 1945. He left for Yan'an on February 16, after having worked out details for a Political Consultative Conference which would determine the role of parties outside the Guomindang within the national government.³⁶ Three days later, Hurley left for Washington to consult with Roosevelt.

Earlier that month, Roosevelt had met with Winston Churchill and Stalin at Yalta to establish the terms under which the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan. The results of the conference were not made known to Hurley or Jiang. What

³⁶China White Paper, p. 82

they were not told was that the Soviet Union was given rights to the Manchurian ports of Dairen and Port Arthur, and that Outer Mongolia would remain independent of China. It was primarily to discuss the decisions at Yalta that Hurley returned to the United States.

While Hurley was out of China, Jiang declared that a National Affairs Conference would be held in November to work out a new constitution. The announcement was made without prior notification of the Chinese Communists, who were not invited to attend; the delegates had been selected in 1936 under Nationalist sponsorship.³⁷ The Communists were outraged by this trick, and negotiations collapsed as a result.

In Washington, Hurley was receiving a shock of his own. Several foreign service officers, including John Service, had bypassed Hurley and sent a telegram to Washington without his knowledge on February 28. They advised the President to apply heavy diplomatic pressure on Jiang to form a coalition government and to send assistance directly to the Communists. Hurley was furious when he learned of this telegram and insisted that his policy of sole support for the Guomindang was correct. Every one of the foreign service officers who signed the note was transferred out of China shortly afterward.

Despite the popularity of the Chinese Communists with certain American journalists and diplomats, they were never an acceptable alternative for the United States government. As Communists, they were ideologically tied to the Soviet Union, which was viewed with suspicion by the United States government even during the Second World War, when relations between the two nations were closer than ever. Moreover, the key American representatives in China, especially after Stilwell's dismissal, were all dedicated anti-Communists. Wedemeyer, Claire Chennault (the leader of the Flying Tigers and later the United States air forces in China), and to a

³⁷Hsu, p. 607.

lesser extent Hurley were willing to tolerate Guomindang abuses in order to prevent a Communist takeover of China. Roosevelt, although he did pressure Jiang to agree to a coalition government, never considered sending aid to the Chinese Communist Party without Jiang's consent. Truman succeeded Roosevelt as President after the latter's death in April 1945. Having little knowledge of the situation in Asia Truman followed the advice of Ambassador Hurley, the anti-Communist military officers and the high officials in the State Department, most of whom were also anti-Communist.

After returning to Chongqing, Hurley gave a report on the situation in China. In it, he assessed Communist policy and strength:

The leadership of the (Chinese) Communist Party is intelligent. When the handwriting is on the wall, they will be able to read. No amount of argument will change their position. Their attitude will be changed only by the inexorable logic of events. The strength of the armed forces of the Chinese Communists has been exaggerated. The area of territory controlled by the Chinese Communists has been exaggerated. The number of Chinese people who adhere to the Chinese Communist Party has been exaggerated. State department officials, Army officers, newspaper and radio publicity have in large part accepted the Communist leaders statements in regard to the military and political strength of the Communist Party in China. Nevertheless, with the support of the Soviet (Union) the Chinese Communists could bring about a civil war in China. Without the support of the Soviet (Union) the Chinese Communist Party will eventually participate in the National government.³⁸

Although correct in his assertion that certain agencies had exaggerated the strength of the Chinese Communist Party, Hurley grossly underestimated the capacity of the Communists to wage a civil war without foreign assistance. This misperception was to cloud American China Policy throughout the attempted mediations of the Guomindang-Chinese Communist Party dispute.

Major events were occurring elsewhere in China. On April 23 the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China opened, and the next day Mao gave a report entitled "On Coalition Government." This report laid down the basic

³⁸China White Paper, p. 99-100.

demands of the Chinese Communist Party for such a government. The first section was a short summary of Chinese history since 1927, in very propagandized terms. Mao attempted to establish the Chinese Communist Party as the legitimate heir of Sun Yat-sen, and claim the bulk of the credit for the war against Japan. The second section detailed the Communist proposal for a coalition government, flatly rejecting Guomintang demands that the Party relinquish its military forces and demanding the immediate abolition of one party rule by the Guomintang. Claiming that a return to feudalism would be disastrous, while neither a Western-style "bourgeois state" nor a socialist state was feasible, Mao proposed a different form of government:

We propose the establishment, after the thorough defeat of the Japanese aggressors, of a state system which we call New Democracy, namely, a united-front democratic alliance based on the overwhelming majority of the people, under the leadership of the working class.³⁹

Service was in Yan'an during the Congress and had a chance to interview Mao afterward. "On Coalition Government" contained a stern warning to any nation which helped the Chinese "reactionaries" (Jiang and the Guomintang leadership) and opposed the Chinese people's desire for democracy.⁴⁰ Mao was more conciliatory to Service, however. Service noted that Mao had indicated to him that the Communists would seek to maintain friendly ties with the United States because American assistance would be needed for the reconstruction of China in the post-war period.

The Nationalist regime, concerned over the status of Manchuria should the Soviet Union intervene in the war against Japan, sent a representative to Moscow in July. Stalin insisted on the terms of the Yalta agreement, and in return pledged to acknowledge Jiang as the legitimate ruler of China. On August 14 the Treaty of Alliance and Friendship between the Chinese Nationalists and the Soviet Union was signed.⁴¹

³⁹Mao, Vol. III, p. 229.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 257.

⁴¹China White Paper, p. 117.

The war against Japan was drawing to a close. On August 6 the first atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima after Tokyo failed to comply with the Potsdam declaration. The Soviet Union declared war on August 8, and the Soviet Red Army swept into Manchuria. After the second atomic bomb exploded over Nagasaki the next day, Japan signalled its surrender.

Celebration over the end of the war was sobered by the dispute between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party. Eight years of foreign occupation had ended, but the threat of civil war loomed on the horizon. American diplomats moved quickly to avoid conflict, but had little comprehension of how deep the rifts dividing the two Chinese regimes were.

After Japan's surrender, Ambassador Hurley convinced Mao to travel to Chongqing and meet with Jiang personally. In September, Hurley reported that the negotiations were making progress:

- (1) The negotiators have agreed that they will collaborate for the establishment of a democratic government for the reconstruction of China and prevention of civil war.
- (2) Both have agreed to support the leadership of Jiang Jieshi as president of the republic.
- (3) They have further agreed that both parties will support the doctrines of Sun Yat-sen and will cooperate for the establishment of a strong, democratic government.
- (4) The Communists have agreed that they will recognize the Guomindang as the dominant party in control of the government and will cooperate with that party during the transition from the present form of government to a democratic regime.
- (5) Numerous other questions, including the release of political prisoners, freedom of speech, press, belief, assembly, and association were agreed upon.⁴³

Two issues which were not settled at Chongqing proved to be the undoing of the agreements. The first was the question of leadership in certain Communist-held areas. The Chinese Communist Party wanted governors, mayors, and other local officials to be elected by the areas they were to represent. This method would ensure that

⁴³China White Paper, p. 106.

IV. Blunders in the Dark.

During WWII the United States had attempted to mediate the Chinese Communist Party-Guomindang dispute in order to more effectively prosecute the war against Japan. Near the end of the war the motive behind American mediation changed. United States strategy for the post-war era foresaw a strong, united, and friendly China as the base for United States interests in Asia and the Pacific. Fearing Soviet involvement in the event of civil war, United States diplomats sought to resolve the differences between the rival Chinese regimes by peaceful means.

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⁴²China White Paper, p. 106.

Communists would assume such offices. The Guomindang objected to this proposal and insisted that these officials be appointed by the central government, inserting its authority onto the Communist "Liberated Areas".

The second issue dividing the two regimes was the number of troops to be retained by the Chinese Communists in the aftermath of Japan's defeat. This controversy dated back to the initial American attempts to mediate during WWII. The Nationalists wanted the Communist Party to turn over all its troops prior to the establishment of a coalition government, while the Communists refused to relinquish control until after the united government had been put in place. Since neither side was willing to comply with the other's demands, negotiations were held for the purpose of reducing the size of the military controlled by both parties. Although some progress toward establishing the exact ratio was made at Chongqing, the issue remained unsettled.

Mao returned to Yan'an announcing that although the Chongqing negotiations had "borne fruit" and Communist representatives remained in Chongqing to continue the discussions, Nationalist attacks on Liberated Areas were rendering the agreements meaningless.⁴³ The clashes were a result of Nationalist attempts to enter North China and accept the surrender of Japanese troops stationed there. The Chinese Communist Party was unwilling to allow Guomindang forces into what it considered to be their territory. Rising tensions were not eased by the discussions continuing in Chongqing. New Chinese Communist Party demands were deemed unacceptable by the Guomindang, and the Communist representatives returned home. A Political Consultative Conference, charged with the task of working out the details of establishing a new government, had been scheduled for November 10. Due to the deteriorating relations between China's two major parties, the conference was postponed.

⁴³Mao, Vol. IV, p. 53.

Hurley resigned the position of Ambassador to China on November 26, while he was in Washington for consultation. In his letter of resignation, he bitterly denounced John Service and other foreign service officers involved in the February 28 telegram for undermining United States policy in China:

The professional foreign service man (John Service) sided with the Chinese Communist Party and the imperialist bloc of nations whose policy it was to keep China divided against herself. Our professional diplomats continuously advised the Communists that my efforts in preventing the collapse of the National government did not represent the policy of the United States. These same professionals openly advised the Communist armed party to decline unification of the Chinese Communist Army with the National Army unless the Chinese Communists were given control.⁴⁴

After being relieved from positions in China, Service and several other of the foreign service officers signatory to the February 28 Telegram returned to Washington and assumed posts in the Chinese and Far Eastern Division of the United States Department of State. Hurley accused them of continuing to side with the Chinese Communist Party and work against the policy set by the President, the Secretary of State, and himself (as Ambassador to China).

Truman accepted Hurley's resignation and appointed General George C. Marshall to succeed him as the President's Special Representative to China. Marshall had gained considerable respect as the Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff in WWII. His instructions were to bring about the "unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods."⁴⁵ The post of Ambassador to China remained vacant until Dr. John Leighton Stuart was named in July 1946.

Despite the hostility of the two Chinese regimes, Marshall succeeded in bringing them to the negotiating table. On January 10, 1946 the Political Consultative Conference originally scheduled for the previous November finally convened. The

⁴⁴China White Paper, p. 583.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 132.

conference met throughout January in Nanjing, where the Nationalist leadership had relocated in the aftermath of WWII. In its final session it resolved that a National Assembly to write and adopt a new constitution should convene on May 5, 1946.

Legal recognition was granted to all parties, in exchange for which Jiang was acknowledged as the national leader. Significant steps to reduce and reorganize the military forces of both parties were finally agreed to upon. Jiang addressed the Conference at its final session by pledging to uphold the program it had established.

Reactionary factions within the Guomindang moved to undermine the agreements. The most important of these cliques was the "CC Clique", named after its two leaders Chen Lifu and Chen Guofu.⁴⁶ Leery of any compromise with the Chinese Communist Party lest such it diminish their own influence, these groups sought to destroy the Chinese Communist Party militarily. Jiang lacked both the will and the ability to prevent these factions from effectively blocking any negotiated settlement.

Communist activities seemed to verify the warnings of the reactionary cliques in the Guomindang. Cease-fire violations in Manchuria led to localized fighting and threatened to expand into a major battle. Manchuria had been turned into the most industrialized region in China during the Japanese occupation, and also had the symbolic value of being the province China went to war against Japan to regain. When the Soviet Army swept into the region at the end of WWII, they often relied on local Communist leaders to assist in administration. Communist units were allowed to accept the surrender of Japanese troops which had been stationed in Manchuria, resulting in a vast increase in Chinese Communist Party weapon and ammunition stockpiles. The Soviet presence had the additional effect of delaying Nationalist entry into Manchuria, allowing the Chinese Communist Party to firmly entrench itself in the countryside; this was especially the case in northern Manchuria, where Soviet trade and assistance to Communist Liberated Areas gave the Communists strong bases from

⁴⁶Hsu, p. 627.

which to operate.⁴⁷ Thus by 1946 the Communists were firmly entrenched in Manchuria and, when the Nationalists attempted to move in, Chinese Communist Party forces attacked.

Feeling confident that he had secured at least a temporary cease-fire, Marshall returned to the United States in mid-March to arrange for loans to China and consult with Truman. In his absence the insincerity of the two Chinese parties became apparent. Flagrant violations of the cease-fire agreement occurred on both sides, and the increased fighting in Manchuria evolved into a major battle. The deployment of Nationalist troops aroused Chinese Communist Party suspicions of an impending Guomindang attack. Although they had previously agreed to allow Nationalist forces to move into Manchuria and relieve occupying Soviet troops, the Chinese Communist Party engaged and harassed these units with increasing tenacity. That the movement of Nationalist troops was made possible by United States transportation facilities implicated the United States in the Guomindang "plot," as the Chinese Communist Party viewed the situation.

Marshall returned to China in April and with great effort managed to effect another cease-fire in June. Neither side was any more sincere the second time than it had been the first time. Nationalist forces carried out preparations for another assault against Communist Liberated Areas. The Chinese Communist Party used the negotiations to buy time while it secretly continued to expand its military and penetrate new areas. Two weeks after the second cease-fire took effect the civil war was back in full swing.

With the breakdown of the second cease-fire Marshall and the United States came under heavy attack by Communist propaganda. The United States was accused of duplicity by trying to fill the role of impartial mediator while at the same time aiding

⁴⁷Stephen Levine, *Anvil of Victory: Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945-1948* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).

one of the contending parties. The United States decision to sell the Guomindang WWII surplus at discount prices in August of 1946 seemed to the Chinese Communist Party confirmation of some sort of collusion against the Communists. In an interview with an American correspondent in September, Mao replied to a question on United States China policy:

I doubt very much if the policy of the United States government is one of "mediation." Judging from the amount of aid the United States is giving Jiang Jieshi to enable him to wage a civil war on an unprecedented scale, the policy of the United States government is to use the so-called "mediation" as a smoke-screen for strengthening Jiang Jieshi in every way and suppressing the democratic forces in China [as the Communists referred to themselves throughout WWII and the civil war] through Jiang Jieshi's policy of slaughter so as to reduce China virtually to a United States colony.⁴⁸

Other political parties joined in the protest of the sale of military surplus, and as a result some portions of the program were suspended.

Communist hostility to the United States during this period was not confined to propaganda attacks. In mid-July, several United States Marines were kidnapped and detained by the Communists. The situation became more serious at the end of the month, when Communist guerrillas ambushed a United States supply convoy near Beijing. Three United States Marines were killed and another dozen wounded in the fire-fight. Marshall sent a strongly worded complaint to the Chinese Communist Party leadership, which was evasive in the subsequent investigation.

Marshall attempted to bring about another cease-fire but the sale of military surplus had irreparably damaged America's position as a mediator. Both regimes abandoned attempts to form a coalition government and determined to settle the dispute through military means. Marshall was no longer a tool in the battle for public opinion but an obstacle on the path to military victory; both the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang began to resent his continued calls for peace.

⁴⁸Mao, Vol. IV, p. 109.

In November 1946 the Guomindang unilaterally convened the National Assembly which the Political Consultative Conference had called upon to adopt a new constitution in the previous January. The Chinese Communist Party and most minor parties boycotted the assembly, and the Chinese Communist Party denounced it as divisive and in violation of the Political Consultative Conference resolutions. Zhou Enlai, the Communist representative in Nanjing, informed Marshall that the "door to further negotiations had been shut," and that he was returning to Yan'an.

Marshall left China in January 1947, having failed in his attempts to resolve the Chinese Communist Party-Guomindang dispute. The Chinese Communist Party denounced his mission as an attempt to reintroduce American imperialism to China. The Guomindang quietly breathed a sigh of relief as Marshall left, as they were now able to conduct military campaigns against the Chinese Communist Party without his constant interference. Summing up the Marshall mission, historian Immanuel Hsu stated:

While Marshall's early success was largely a result of his active persuasion and respected stature, it is also true that the two contending parties found it bad politics not to accommodate him. Secretly, extremist elements in both parties found him standing in their way to victory.... Only Marshall's presence kept the two parties from ripping apart the facade of cooperation. But once he was out of sight, they ignored the truce and scrambled to improve their positions on the battlefield so that they would be better situated should the final settlement fall short of realization.⁴⁹

Marshall's initial success was in large part based on the desire to appear cooperative in the eyes of Chinese public opinion, and to a lesser extent in world public opinion.

American attempts at mediating the Chinese Communist Party-Guomindang dispute following V-J Day resulted in the alienation of both Chinese parties. As an "imperialist" power, the United States was already suspect in the eyes of the Communists. American support for the Guomindang during and after WWII, the

⁴⁹Hsu, p. 627.

transportation of Nationalist troops to Manchuria and North China, and the sale of military surplus at low prices all seemed to confirm Communist suspicions that the United States harbored designs against the Chinese Communist Party.

The Guomindang resented Marshall's attempts to negotiate a cease-fire and a coalition government. A coalition government would have meant a decrease in the authority of powerful factions within the Guomindang, most notably the CC Clique. The Guomindang felt that it possessed a vast military superiority immediately following WWII, and that the Communists could be defeated in a single decisive campaign. Marshall was merely delaying certain victory.

Following Marshall's departure, Communist propaganda began to assume increasingly anti-American overtones. In February 1945 Mao wrote: "The circumstances in which this situation has arisen are that United States imperialism and its running dog Chiang Jieshi have replaced Wang Jingwei and Japanese imperialism and adopted the policies of turning China into a United States colony."⁵⁰ United States imperialism was now portrayed as the major enemy and Chiang Jieshi merely its representative in China. Previously, Chiang was the major villain aided occasionally by erroneous United States policies. The shift in emphasis allowed the Chinese Communist Party to reap the benefits of appearing to be fighting a war of national liberation. So long as Marshall's presence kept the possibility of a coalition government alive in the hopes of the Chinese populace, the Chinese Communist Party could not afford to adopt this tone. With his departure, there was no longer a need to cater to United States diplomatic efforts, and America could be condemned without the fear of alienating the Chinese public. It also brought Chinese propaganda into line with the official word from Moscow, that the United States was attempting to exert imperialist control over nations through puppet rulers.

⁵⁰Mao, Vol. IV, p. 120.

The Nationalist economy had been ravaged by years of war against Japan. Radically shifting exchange rates and rocketing inflation following victory led to economic chaos. Dr. John Leighton Stuart, who remained in Nanjing after Marshall departed for the United States, warned Jiang of looming disaster and pressed him repeatedly to initiate economic reforms, but the Guomindang was unable to stop the economic slide. As the economic situation deteriorated, the Chinese public became increasingly dissatisfied with the Nationalist regime.

A series of military victories in early 1947 proved meaningless, and by the middle of the year the military situation turned against the Nationalists. Manchuria fell to the Communists, leaving the Guomindang thoroughly demoralized. After so many years of American support, the Guomindang had become psychologically dependent on it.⁵¹ Effective action could not be taken on any front, be it economic, political, or military.

The impotence of the Nationalist government led President Truman to send General Wedemeyer back to China on a fact finding mission. Wedemeyer was instructed to make an appraisal on the situation in China and make policy recommendations for the United States government. He was to inform the Nationalist leadership that any future United States aid would hinge upon significant reforms and United States supervision.

The repercussions of the Wedemeyer mission were exactly the ones the United States government did not want:

The Chinese government [Guomindang] believed that General Wedemeyer's mission would result in immediate and substantial economic and military aid. For the same reason, liberal and opposition groups were skeptical of the mission, fearing that aid would only prolong the civil war. The Chinese Communist reaction was bitterly hostile.⁵²

⁵¹China White Paper, p. 255.

⁵²Ibid., p. 256.

The Guomindang leadership expected the United States to save the day. The liberals expected the United States to make a bigger mess of the situation. The Chinese Communist Party expected the United States to reenter the civil war.

Wedemeyer submitted his report in secret to President Truman. The most controversial point was a recommendation to place Manchuria under UN Trusteeship. As China had originally entered WWII to recover Manchuria, Marshall and Truman felt that his proposal would be absolutely unacceptable to both Chinese regimes. In addition, they feared that it would place too great a burden on the fledgling UN.⁵³ Other points in the report called for a five year program of United States economic and military aid to China.

Wedemeyer's suggestions were not acted upon, although a smaller assistance program was adopted late in 1947. Rather than the five year program outlined by Wedemeyer, the program was scheduled to last for one year. United States policy makers felt that the situation in China was not certain enough to extend the form of assistance granted to Europe by the Marshall Plan. This resumption of aid was at least partially inspired by the increase in the intensity of anti-American rhetoric coming from Communist propaganda organs following Marshall's departure from China.

The string of setbacks for the Nationalist government continued into 1948. By the end of the year it was no longer a question of if the Communists would defeat the Guomindang but when. The desperate Nationalists finally passed economic reforms in an attempt to turn the economy around, but it was too late. The Guomindang had lost the faith of the Chinese public. Events on the battlefield were closely tied to the economy, and it was difficult to reverse the consequences of mismanagement for which the Guomindang was famous by 1948.

⁵³Ibid., p. 260.

By the end of 1948 it was generally agreed that the only possibility of preventing Communist victory was direct intervention by United States troops. There were numerous reasons why this policy was never adopted. After the Japanese surrender, the United States had begun the process of demobilization at breakneck speed. By 1948, the United States military simply did not possess the manpower to undertake a major campaign in China. Beyond the lack of military might was the lack of resources. Even during WWII Asia placed second to Europe on the priority list of the United States government. This preoccupation with Europe increased in the late 1940s as the Cold War emerged. The Marshall Plan consumed a major portion of the United States budget, and there simply wasn't enough left for China. The loss of China to the Communists was made acceptable by a shift in United States strategy. During WWII, United States strategy for the post-war era had been based on a strong, friendly China as the focus of American interests in Asia. When the outbreak of civil war required more effort and resources than the United States leadership had foreseen, it began to consider Japan as an alternative. For this reason, the United States government insisted that the occupation of Japan be solely an American affair.

In early 1949 the Nationalist foreign minister requested the United States along with other nations to act as mediators in negotiations with the Chinese Communist Party. The United States refused the request, citing the reaction of both Chinese parties to its previous attempts at mediation as evidence that new attempts would not serve in useful purpose.⁵⁴ The Guomindang began to negotiate with the Chinese Communist Party independently. Jiang retired as President of the Republic of China on January 23 1949 in favor of the Vice President Li Zongren.

Li continued attempts to negotiate with the Communists. The terms demanded by the Chinese Communist Party were tantamount to unconditional surrender, and the Guomindang sought to negotiate in the hope of modifying them. Meanwhile, Chinese

⁵⁴China White Paper, p. 291.

Communist Party military units continued to rout Nationalist units throughout China. By mid-April the Communists had taken Nanjing. Communist troops roused Ambassador Stuart upon taking the city, an ominous sign of things in store for United States diplomats in Communist areas.

In June 1949, Mao made a speech which was to have profound implications for future Sino-American relations. The speech, entitled "On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," announced the Chinese Communist Party attitude towards foreign relations:

The forty years' experience of Sun Yat-sen and the twenty-eight years experience of the Communist Party have taught us to lean to one side, and we are firmly convinced that in order to win victory and consolidate it we must lean to one side...all Chinese, without exception, must lean either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road. We oppose the Jiang Jieshi reactionaries who lean on the side of imperialism, and we also oppose illusions about a third road.⁵⁵

Mao bluntly announced that the Chinese Communist Party supported the Soviet Union, the leader of world socialism and the rival of the United States in the Cold War. This statement, interpreted in the light of the similarity between Chinese Communist and Soviet propaganda and ideological ties between the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union contributed to the rise of the monolithic bloc theory of world communism in the United States.

On October 1, 1949 Mao proclaimed the founding of the People's Republic of China. Having been so successful at destroying the Nationalist regime, the Chinese Communist Party now faced the task of building their own government. The Guomindang leadership took what forces it could and fled to the island of Taiwan to lick its wounds and prepare for its final stand. Some Nationalist forces remained on the mainland and continued to fight well into the next year, but the last line of defense

⁵⁵Mao, Vol. IV, p. 415.

would be the island-province of Taiwan.

V. The Gathering Storm.

The United States was still digesting the news that the Soviet Union had developed the atomic bomb when it received word that the Chinese Communist Party had established the People's Republic of China. Soviet possession of the bomb heightened cold war tensions and increased American fear of communism in general. The founding of the People's Republic of China convinced the United States government that the whole of China would soon fall under Communist domination. Despite the rising tide of anti-communism, Truman felt that the Guomindang was doomed and was reluctant to reenter the Chinese civil war. Consequently, the China policy settled upon by the United States leadership was one of watching developments for the time being.

Furious debate over how to react to the Communist victory in China erupted in Washington. The State Department's Far Eastern Division favored extending diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China, to allow the resumption of trade between American business and the Chinese mainland and to possibly drive a wedge between Mao and Stalin. President Truman, Secretary of State Dean Acheson (who had succeeded Marshall in that post on January 14, 1949), and now congressman vocal on the issue opposed recognizing the Communist regime, on the grounds that it had abused several American diplomats who had remained on the mainland to establish contact with the Chinese Communists and that such recognition would restrict American flexibility on the Taiwan question. Truman was given added incentive to keep his options open by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who assured him that Taiwan could be defended against the Communists.

While Washington tried to decide what to do, the Guomindang entrenched itself on Taiwan. General Sun Liren, an able military commander who had studied at The Virginia Military Institute, was placed in charge of the Nationalist defenses.

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Incompetent officers were sacked, and training programs improved under Sun's command. After suffering a humiliating defeat on the mainland, the Guomindang military was determined to redeem itself.

Nationalist reforms were not limited to the military. The structure of the Guomindang government was streamlined and modernized. Substantial land reforms were finally implemented. Having learned through disaster the importance of economic and political reforms, the Guomindang leadership finally took action towards resolving these troubles. Although Jiang pledged to return to the mainland, he took steps to ensure that Taiwan could provide the Guomindang with a home for awhile.

These efforts by the Guomindang went unnoticed in Washington, where policy makers began to consider the fall of Taiwan to the Chinese Communists as only a question of time. On January 5, 1950 President Truman publicly announced that the United States would not intervene in the defense of Taiwan:

The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa [Taiwan] or any other Chinese territory. The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.

Similarly, the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa. In the view of the United States Government, the resources on Formosa are adequate to enable them to obtain the items which they might consider necessary for the defense of the Island. The United States Government proposes to continue under existing legislative authority the present ECA program of economic assistance.⁵⁶

One week later, Acheson gave a speech which was to have a profound impact on events to come. Speaking at the National Press Club, Acheson defined the American defensive perimeter in Asia:

⁵⁶Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1969), p. 459.

The nation's [United States] defense, said he [Acheson] rests on a North Pacific frontier running along the Aluetian Islands to Japan and down through the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) to the Philippines. In case of an attack on this line, the United States would defend all these positions. (For Korea, hanging perilously close to the most naked Russian ambitions, he offered only a vaguer acknowledgment of "responsibility."⁵⁷

Both Korea and Taiwan were excluded from the American defensive perimeter. This speech is consistently quoted by historians as one of the contributing factors to the North Korean invasion of South Korea later that year. It may also have increased Chinese Communist hopes that the United States had finally abandoned the Guomindang.

Mao Zedong had left China for Moscow in December 1949 and remained there until the middle of February 1950. Indications that the United States was moving towards a separate peace treaty opened the possibility of a resurgent, rearmed Japan allied with the United States, a proposition which alarmed both Mao and Stalin. As a result of their negotiations, the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China was signed. A paltry economic aid program was extended in China.

American suspicions that the Chinese Communist Party was Moscow's tools were raised by Mao's visit with Stalin. Even before Mao left on the return journey to China, a little known Senator from Wisconsin began to revive Hurley's charges that communist sympathizers in the State Department had sabotaged United States foreign policy in China. Joseph McCarthy expanded these charges, accusing members of the State Department of working in collusion with the Soviet Union to bring about the communist victory in China. Fear of communism in the United States reached hysteric levels and McCarthy's attack became a powerful, destructive military force.

⁵⁷Time Magazine, January 23 1950, p. 10.

An increasing number of border incidents between North and South Korea erupted into full scale war in late June 1950, presenting Truman with a Communist challenge he could not ignore. Already under attack from McCarthy for "losing China," he could ill afford to appear soft on communism in Korea. The day after news of the invasion of South Korea reached Washington, the United States introduced a resolution condemning the North Korean attack. Because at the time the Soviet Union was boycotting the United Nations over the issue of Chinese representation, the resolution was adopted and accordingly American combat units began to arrive in South Korea before the end of the month. At the same time, Truman reversed his earlier decision regarding Taiwan. Concern that North Korean actions were preliminary to the final Communist assault on the Guomindang prompted Truman to send the United States Seventh Fleet to "neutralize" the Taiwan Strait, preventing either Chinese regime from attacking the other. Domestic politics also factored into Truman's decision to intervene in Taiwan, as he sought to secure Republican support for actions taken to defend South Korea. If Jiang was the "darling" of the Republican Party, than South Korea's Syngman Rhee was the "darling" of the Democratic Party in 1950.

The Chinese Communist regime in Beijing had initially hailed the North Korean attack in optimistic tones, and issued vague warnings about any American attempts to oppose the liberation of Korea. The People's Republic of China reacted far more strongly to the American interdiction of the Taiwan Strait. Premier Zhou Enlai, who had many dealings with Hurley and Marshall during the ill-fated American attempts at mediation, denounced the move as armed aggression against Chinese territory and in violation of the United Nation's Charter.⁵⁸ The new situation placed the Chinese Communists in a difficult dilemma. American "neutralization" of the Taiwan Strait made the new Chinese Communist government appear weak and resulted in a tremendous loss of face for the People's Republic of China, which sought to assume a

⁵⁸Whiting, p. 63-64. Parallel. Truman now decided not only to repel the North Korean

leadership role in Asia. Renewed American support for the Guomindang would strengthen the regime, meaning that time would work against the Chinese Communists. The risks entailed by proceeding with the invasion were the possibility of American retaliation and disastrous political repercussions, both at home and abroad, should the invasion fail. Nor could the Soviet Union be relied upon for military assistance, as its attention was drawn more to events in Korea and Europe. Chinese Communist troops which had been busily training for the impending invasion of Taiwan were quietly redeployed throughout July to bases in Manchuria, nearer the Chinese border with North Korea.

By mid-August United Nation's forces in Korea were gaining the upper hand. As it became apparent that the North Korean attack was running out of steam, Beijing began to change its position. Previously, although the Chinese Communist press had supported the North Korean invasion it had made no reference to any possible involvement on the part of Chinese Communist troops. Now the Beijing press began to tie the security of the two nations together. Recognizing the possibility of an impending United Nations counterattack, the People's Republic of China feared that such an event could sweep past the 38th Parallel (the point of division of the Korean peninsula into Soviet and American occupation zones after WWII) into North Korea.

Still engaged in consolidating its victory on the mainland, the Chinese Communist Party could not tolerate a unified, hostile Korea on its Manchurian border. The main threat to the People's republic of China presented by such a Korea was that it could be used as a base to supply anti-communist guerrillas. This concern was reinforced by the reversal of American policy on Taiwan, which breathed new life into the Guomindang.

Following the Inchon landing on September 15, the North Korean People's army was routed from the South. By the end of the month, United Nations forces had arrived at the 38th Parallel. Truman now decided not only to repel the North Korean

invasion but to unify the entire Korean peninsula. The United Nations passed a vaguely worded document which was used as justification for the invasion of North Korea, and United States troops crossed into North Korea on October 7, 1950.

Beijing issued several warnings to the effect that it would not tolerate any United States troops in North Korea. On October 2, Zhou had formally notified the Indian Ambassador in Beijing that if the United States sent troops into North Korea, the People's Republic of China would intervene. The state of relations, or rather non-relations, between Washington and Beijing resulted in this message being discounted. Chinese Communist forces quietly began to enter North Korea on October 16. In late November, a massive Chinese Communist attack on United Nations forces in North Korea broke the United Nations advance. A new stage in the Korean War had developed, one of an undeclared war between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

The roots of the conflict extended to fundamental ideological differences between the two. United States relations with the Chinese Communist Party were nonexistent prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, but the seeds of conflict had already been planted. America had identified itself as anti-communist long before the Chinese Communist Party had been founded and regarded communism a threat to United States interests. American leadership considered communism to be an tool of Soviet imperialism and viewed all Communist Parties as subject to Moscow's control.

Similarly, the Chinese Communist Party was predisposed towards a hostile relationship with the United States. The United States was the largest, most powerful capitalist nation in the world and a natural enemy for communism. Nationalism

¹Richard Wilson, *Drawing the Line* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), p. 373.

²Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: Doubleday, 1987), p. 975.

VI. Conclusion: No Chance in China.

Americans refer to the Korean War of 1950-1953 as the "forgotten war," but for the Chinese it is not so easy to forget. Chinese Communist forces suffered approximately 900,000 casualties in two and one-half years of fighting on the Korean peninsula.⁵⁹ United States casualties in the conflict numbered over 157,000.⁶⁰ Blood spilled in Korea helped fuel twenty years of hatred between the Chinese mainland and the United States.

Need the Sino-American conflict have occurred, or might relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States have followed a more amiable path? In examining this question one must look beyond the explosive confrontation on the Korean peninsula and consider the broader history of American involvement in China. Throughout the course of United States interaction with the Chinese Communist Party there were numerous opportunities on both sides to reduce tensions. That neither side pursued such a course is indicative of a greater force dividing the United States and the Chinese Communist Party.

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⁶⁰Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: Doubleday, 1987), p. 975.

inherent in Chinese Communism also fostered cold feelings with regard to the United States. Along with many other Western powers and Japan, the United States had exploited and humiliated China during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The Chinese Communists did not forget this history of foreign domination or the role played by the United States.

Under certain political conditions these ideological differences could be overlooked. During WWII, the United States found itself allied with communists both in Europe and Asia. American diplomats and military officers were frustrated by what they considered petty domestic squabbling between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party. In order to strengthen the anti-Japanese alliance, the United States attempted to unify the two Chinese regimes. These attempts demonstrated a clear lack of understanding on the part of the United States about the nature of the dispute between the Chinese parties. The Second United Front was not an alliance but a temporary truce, and an uneasy one at that. The war with Japan was merely an intermission in the Chinese civil war which had raged before the invasion and would continue after V-J Day.

Of an equally transient nature as the Second United Front was American cooperation with communism. The alliance could only hold so long as it was waging war on Germany and Japan. In no small sense, this alliance was working to destroy the basis of its cooperation. When Japan's collapse came into sight, it was apparent that the post-war era would be dominated by a Soviet-American rivalry.

American attempts to negotiate a coalition government in China after WWII were ill-advised, ill-informed, and poorly executed. Fear of Soviet intervention if civil war broke out prompted American efforts to at mediation, but concurrent support for the Guomindang made it impossible for the United States to act as an impartial mediator. The United States faced a dilemma it could not resolve: in order to prevent a civil war which would likely result in Soviet intervention and possibly lead to Soviet

domination of China it had to attempt to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the dispute between China's warring parties, but in order to get the Guomintang to cooperate with these efforts the United States had to provide Jiang's regime with support and forfeit its neutral status and ability to act as an impartial observer. The goal of American mediation was to prevent China from becoming a Soviet satellite; the United States attempted to unify the rival Chinese regimes not despite American fear of communism, but because of it.

Only after Marshall's ultimate failure did the United States realize that the breach between the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomintang could not be sealed. Civil war broke out soon afterward and the tide swung against the Guomintang. As much as the United States could not bear to see the Communists victorious in China, it felt that the defeat of the Guomintang was inevitable. As a result, Washington failed to develop an effective policy towards China. It sent enough financial aid to the Guomintang to further alienate the Chinese Communist Party, but not enough to influence the outcome of the civil war.

Domestic politics resulted in the United States' indecisive reaction to the founding of the People's Republic of China. Enormous political pressure from certain political arenas to recognize the new Communist regime was matched by equally powerful demands that Truman finally take a stand against the Chinese Communists. The deadlock was broken only by the North Korean invasion of South Korea. Fears of joint action by a monolithic bloc of Communist nations and a reappraisal of Taiwan's strategic value resulted in the decision to save the Guomintang.

Americans like to believe that a special friendship exists between themselves and the Chinese. The "Open Door" Policy is naively thought to be an example of the United States standing up for China against the "real imperialist" nations like France, Great Britain, Japan, and Russia to name a few. Sadly, there is no evidence of "friendship" in the United States approach to either Chinese regime during the 1940s

and 1950s. China was first a gun to be pointed at Japan and then a card to be played against the Soviet Union.

Chinese refer to China as *Zhonggou*. Literally translated, this means Middle Kingdom. For centuries before the arrival of Western gunboats the Chinese had regarded themselves as the civilized residents of the center of the world, surrounded on all sides by barbarians. Since the Opium Wars of the 1840s and 1850s had toppled the ivory tower from which they had looked out at the world, the Chinese had been struggling to regain what they felt to be China's rightful place under the sun. This was not only the goal of the Chinese Communist Party but of the Guomindang and all other Chinese political parties as well. The United States, as the dominant power in the Pacific, was a wall which China would either have to climb or work around, no matter who ended up in control of China.

It is tempting to speculate on what the results would have been if Service's suggestions had been acted upon or had the Communists been more sincere in negotiations. To say that relations would have been different had an alternative policy been adopted or an individual replaced is merely to state the obvious. But the enormous impetus of the forces pushing the United States and the Chinese Communist Party into conflict were beyond the control of any policy regardless of its effectiveness and individual regardless of his influence. Attempts to establish friendlier relations between the two were doomed to failure, as both ideological commitments and political reality cast them into conflict.

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