The Ties That Bind:

Political Patronage in the Late Roman Republic

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Abstract

Two schools of thought continue to debate the importance of patronage in the elections of the late Roman Republic. On one extreme is the orthodox school, which argues patronage was the key to elections, while on the other extreme the emerging revisionist interpretation contends that cultivating the popular support of the people through games, public reputation, and bribery was the key to elections, and that patronage was of subordinate-- or even negligible significance. Based on the works of Marcus Tullius Cicero and Quintus Cicero's *Commentariolum Petitionis*, this thesis represents a moderate view: a view which states that both mobilizing patronage and cultivating the people through popular methods were essential for electoral success, and that neither could be ignored. This thesis also introduces a new model of the Republican patronage system. Unlike the orthodox or Gelzerian interpretation where a few nobles controlled vast armies of personal clients, the conception of patronage which emerges from the evidence presents a completely different picture: a picture in which the organizational structure of patronage was not grouped in huge blocks of clients but rather fragmented among many "men of influence" (i.e. municipal aristocrats, patrons of colleges and guilds, powerful freedmen, and other types of friends or *amici*), who each controlled a finite amount of patronage within their sphere of influence. Through lateral relationship of mutual obligation with these men of influence, who were not themselves clients, a candidate was able to have these friends or *amici* mobilize their clients on his behalf at his election.

Introduction

The social institution of patronage is a universal phenomenon that has transcended virtually every era and society in history. Both in time past and in time present, patron-client relationships have exerted their most powerful influence on politics, especially in elections and legislation. For many people today the Tweed Ring in late 19th century New York City is probably the most famous modern example of the profound impact--both positive and negative--patronage relationships can exert upon the political process.[1] However, patronage is not exclusively a modern phenomenon. Virtually every country within the Mediterranean basin can trace its institution of patronage back throughout its history to ancient times.[2] Many of these modern European countries can document their patron-client relationships back to the Roman Republic, where this unique type of social relationship remained a ubiquitous force in Republican society for five hundred years. Like most important historical issues the debate among historians concerning the importance of patronage on elections during the late Roman Republic has both a traditional orthodox interpretation as well as a revisionist interpretation. The orthodox point of view was first put forth in 1912 with Mathias Gelzer's seminal work, *The Roman Nobility*, in which he argues:

> The entire Roman people, both the ruling circle and the mass of voters whom they ruled, was, as a society, permeated by multifarious relationships based on *fides* and personal connections, the principal forms of which were patrocinium in the courts and over communities, together with political friendship and financial obligation. These relationships determined the distribution of political power.[3]

Gelzer's work has influenced many historians writing on the late Republic, who have because of this influence taken it for granted that patronage was the dominant force in politics, that the ties of patronage between the plebs and their patrons controlled the voting in the two legislative and electoral assemblies, *comitia centuriata* and the *comitia tributa*, and that the voting was completely separate from the actual opinions and issues of the plebs themselves.[4] In other words, until recently the majority of historians have

argued that the Roman plebs had little or no control over their personal vote because it was controlled by their patron or patrons. Recently, some historians have begun to question the traditional interpretation, arguing the evidence does not support the assumption that patronage represents the key to understanding Republican politics.

The emerging revisionist interpretation contends that patronage was not the dominating or pervasive force controlling politics. Revisionist historians differ amongst themselves on the importance they believe clientelism had on Republican politics. Some maintain that patronal ties were an important part of politics, but deny that these ties of obligation dominated or controlled the voting for elections. Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, for instance, argues that the "picture that emerges from the late republic is dynamic: Rather than offering the key to Roman politics, patronage must be seen as one of several methods of generating power, a system actually in competition and conflict with other systems."[5] Cultivating the general populace through bribes, banquets, games, and other means of popular self-promotion are the other systems Wallace-Hadrill argues competed with the patron-client system for electoral power. Other revisionist historians contend that patronage was of little or no importance in late Republican elections, arguing that the structure of patronage which many historians envision "is itself a modern hypothesis, which has very little support in our evidence."[6] The revisionist historians emphasize the rarity of references to patronage in the primary sources, which they believe shows contemporary Romans did not consider it an important aspect of politics. Other revisionists contend that the pervasiveness of electoral corruption, known as *ambitus*, and the magnificent games and feasts put on by the rising politicians clearly demonstrates that Roman politicians considered popular and illegal methods of winning electoral support much more important than personal relationships of obligation. For example, Alexander Yakobson's article, "*Petitio et Largitio:* Popular Participation in the Centuriate Assembly of the Late Republic," argues that "the very fact that electoral corruption was so rampant in the late Republic can be seen as proving that the traditional patronage system

was in crisis and did not control large sections of the electorate."[7]

Whatever the merits of both interpretations, evidence suggests that neither interpretation provides a balanced examination explaining the significance of electoral patronage in Republican society. If one weighs the evidence from both sides, the possibility of a third interpretation emerges integrating both arguments into a sufficient explanation for the significance of patron-client relationships in elections. This thesis is an example of such a synthesis. In my estimation we should listen to the evidence, which does not support modern assumptions bestowing a preeminence to either patronage or popular appeals to the uncommitted voter; but rather the evidence clearly emphasizes that canvassing for public office required a candidate to take into account two mechanisms for winning support: the first is concerned with cultivating and mobilizing *amici* and their vertical patronage ties to their clients; the second with winning the people's favor through games, banquets, bribery, and a popular reputation. The evidence does not imply that one was more important than the other, as modern historians seem intent on arguing, but rather it suggests that both mobilizing patronage and winning popular support were indispensable for winning election.

The focus of this study ranges from the time of Sulla in 80 B.C. through to the civil war between Caesar and Pompey beginning in 49 B.C. The *Commentariolum Petitionis* or "The Handbook of Electioneering" by Quintus Cicero, who was the younger and less famous brother of Marcus Tullius Cicero, offers an illuminating perspective into the importance contemporary Republican politicians placed on clientelistic ties.[8] This treatise will be analyzed extensively later in the study; however, for now it is important to note that the main thrust of Q. Cicero's argument resides on the belief that winning an election required both the popular support of the people and the acquisition of a large network of patronal ties, including one's own and one's friends. In other words, he contends that patronage was an important aspect of politics along with other avenues of support, such as vying for popular support. What is especially interesting about this

manifesto is that Q. Cicero himself illustrates that the distinction between *patronage* and popular support was often ambiguous, even to contemporary Roman politicians. This ambiguity is one of the problems in studying this issue, because it is difficult to differentiate between what is considered patronage from other forms of political support. Modern scholars, in fact, recognize that "patronage as a system is characterized by ambiguity."[9]

Because there is a lively dispute over what exactly constitutes *patronage* in the evidence (i.e. scholars disagree on what relationships fall within the *parameters of* patronage), part of the first chapter identifies and defines important *signal words* in order to show that words besides *patrocinium* or *clientelae* indicate the process of patronage. Moreover, since there is a lack of some types of evidence, a comparative analysis is conducted between ancient Rome and Catania, Italy in the 1950s in order to argue that the social conditions in the late Republic did not weaken or destroy the patronage system, but merely transformed it. After the examination of the theoretical processes and interactions of patronage in the first chapter, which provide a necessary working definition and clearly defined parameters for studying this phenomenon in the evidence, the second chapter of this thesis concentrates on the synthesizing hypothesis previously proposed.

1

Theoretical and Comparative Inquiries into Republican Patronage

Definition and Terminology

What is meant by patronage? Since patronage is a highly complex social interaction that most people only vaguely understand, it is important to illustrate and define what exactly patronage is. According to modern definitions, patronage is above all else a social institution based on personal relationships between individuals.[10] Patron-client relationships are usually not concentrated in only one sector of society, but rather dispersed over the entire population. The vertical relationships between patrons and clients are based on inequalities of wealth and power. Patrons are superior to their clients in wealth, prestige, and power. This superior position allows the patrons to monopolize resources and provide rewards, such as agrarian laws giving land to the landless, subsistence crisis insurance, state-subsidized food for the urban plebs, and knowledge of the law which their clients need. By fulfilling and guaranteeing these needs, patrons are able to ensure their clients' loyalty and support. In return, patrons receive from their clients electoral support in the form of votes, enhanced prestige, protection, and loyalty. Thus the mutual exchange of different types of resources between patrons and their clients is a fundamental part of these relationships.

There also exists a strong aspect of unconditionality and long-term obligation in patronal relationships. Patronage is not merely a political deal where there is a specific exchange of resources, rather these relationships exist over long periods with the exchange of resources often occurring at significantly different times. In order for these relationships to last over extended periods, strong elements of interpersonal loyalty and obligation are built into the system. In fact, fulfilling one's obligation is closely connected with one's honor. Not fulfilling an obligation diminishes one's honor and leads to shame in society, because the community is the ultimate authority for deciding

one's honor. Patron-client relationships are informal ties existing outside the legal structure and are therefore not contractual. Nevertheless, these relationships are tightly binding because of the important aspect of personal honor. Although these relationships are long-term and tightly binding, they are not entered into by means of coercion but rather they are formed voluntarily and can also be dissolved voluntarily.[11] Moreover, an important aspect of the patronage system is the competition between patrons for the support of clients, who can choose voluntarily whom they wish to be their patron. Andrew Wallace-Hadrill describes the Republican system as pluralist in nature where "a multiplicity of patrons acted in competition with each other, offering alternative routes of access to resources."[12] It is important to note that competition and fluidity are in fact vital aspects of any patronage system; without them the whole system will stagnate and eventually change into something wholly different.

This modern sociological definition provides us with a necessary basis for studying patronage in ancient Rome. However, as Fergus Millar criticizes, to apply only modern definitions of patronage to an ancient society is to "say that curiosity about exact nuances of ancient social and political relationships is superfluous."[13] Millar is of course correct: To declare that the ideology and language of Roman society is irrelevant is to overlook a vital dimension. However, to estimate the actual importance of Roman patronage solely on the basis of the frequency of words such as *patronus* and *cliens* is vastly to underestimate the value of patron-client relations in Roman society. Thus, it is not convincing when historians like Millar contend that clientelistic ties of obligation exhibited very little influence on Republican politics because key sociological terms such as *patrocinium*, *patronus,* and *cliens* rarely appear in the literature. A true understanding of Roman patronage requires the historian to navigate delicately between modern conceptions of patronage and Republican conceptions of patronage, which although similar in their essence differ in actual practice due to Roman social mores and customs.

It is certainly easy to understand, if one concentrates solely on the words *patronus*

and *cliens*, how one might view patronage as an unimportant factor in Roman society and politics. For example, Richard Saller notes that Marcus Tullius Cicero used the word *patronus* only twenty-three times in his extensive writings, and only twice in the meaning of a protector of a powerful supporter. He also notes that the word *cliens* was rarely used.[14] However, as Saller argues in his book *Personal Patronage Under the Early Empire*, the literature distorts the actual social reality, so "we should not jump to the conclusion that patronage existed only where the words *patronus* and *cliens* were used."[15] It seems logical to ask why in fact so few explicit references to patronage exist in the literature. Saller offers an explanation to this problem:

> [The] language of social subordination may have seemed arrogant when used by the patron, a tactless advertisement of his superiority and the relative weakness of his client. . . . The appearance or absence of the words *patronus* and *cliens* is not indicative of the presence or absence of the phenomenon of patronage, but it is a reflection of the circumstances in which it was described.[16]

In order to gain clearer insights into Roman social reality, it is therefore important to analyze patronage-related words in the literature other than *patronus* and *cliens* that do not carry negative connotations.

The Roman politician had within his sphere of influence a large and varied network of relationships including friends, clients, freedmen, and slaves.[17] Slaves, of course, should automatically be excluded from any discussion of patronage, because their ties to their master or *domini* were based on legal bonds of subservience, which goes against the very definition of patronage. The freedmen, who were manumitted slaves, became after the cessation of their bondage the clients of their former master, who as the granter of freedom was considered to be authorized to exercise some degree of coercion or power over his new clients.[18] Because the Roman concept of friendship was inherently ambiguous, it defies a simple analysis of whether it constitutes a patronage relationship or not. Certainly some friendships were in fact patron-client relationships. Yet identifying all friendships as patronage relationships is utterly absurd. Any study on the importance of

patronage in Roman society, then, must clearly distinguish those relationships that fall within the parameters of clientelism with those which do not. Friendships between men of roughly equal social standing are also vital to analyze for this study even though they were not in and of themselves patron-client relationships, because a significant dynamic of Republican patronage consisted of the mobilization of clientelistic bonds through friends. Through lateral relationships to friends, who were not clients but patrons themselves, a politician could vastly increase his vertical clientelistic network without actually increasing the number of his personal clients. Clients mobilized by a candidate's friends in his behalf do not then become the candidate's dependents, rather they are just performing their obligation to their original patron. Nevertheless, what is taking place here is certainly the mobilization of voters through patron-client relationships, and should thus be considered as an example of the workings of patronage within Republican politics. Thus, it is important to begin this study with an examination of patronage *related* words in the literature. This method which should enable us to distinguish between patron-client relationships and other types of social bonds, while at the same time allowing us the ability to discern the mobilization of clients within some of these other equal social relationships. These terms can be separated into two categories. The first category contains words such as *amicus, hospitium, patronus,* and *cliens*, which identify the individuals involved in patron-client relationships. The second category includes *officium, beneficium, meritum,* and *gratia*, which describe the resources that are exchanged between patrons and clients.

The term *amicus* is the most frequent substitute for *patronus* and *cliens* in the literature because of its inherent ambiguity, which allowed it to be applied to social unequals without any negative connotations of social subordination. Of course not all Roman friendships should be considered patron-client relationships. On the surface the distinction between *amicitia* and *clientela* is as follows: while *clientela* is a connection between men of differing social standing, which requires the lesser of the two men (i.e. the client) to support his patron in his endeavors, *amicitia* is a relationship between men of

equal or nearly equal standing, which is based on genuine goodwill, political expediency, or a combination of the two. In fact, both patrons and clients tended to avoid using words such as *patronus*, *cliens*, or *patrocinium* in describing their relationship, but rather they preferred to call each other *amici* and their relationship a friendship. Is it then impossible to distinguish between Roman friendships and patron-client relationships within the evidence? Making a precise distinction between a *patrocinium-clientela* relationship and *amicitia* is a futile endeavor, according to Erik Wistrand.[19] This amounts to total capitulation, however. The conundrum of needing to make this distinction in order to provide a valid interpretation of Roman patronage and yet apparently not being able to do so, is not nearly as untenable as it first appears. It does not follow that, because some Roman friendships were in reality clientelistic relationships, and because both clientelistic relationships and friendships were based on similar social and moral concepts, historians cannot distinguish between the two. How then, in the late twentieth century, are we to make a clear distinction which the Romans themselves often did not make or even seek to make? Richard Saller attacks such skeptical assumptions. According to him, it is possible to differentiate between a patron-client relationship and friendship among social equals "where the term *amicus* occurs with respect to a friendship between men known to be of unequal status."[20] In other words, if it can be shown that friends were of unequal social status, then one can assume a patronage relationship.

A more important topic for our study, however, is the patronage relationships which underlay many Roman friendships. Friendships among men of truly equal standing, it is important to note, might also indicate the dynamic process of patronage in the evidence, because the compact between these individuals and their willingness to harmonize their interests for a specific goal might include the mobilization of their vertical clientelistic networks. So although the relationship between friends of equal standing is horizontal in nature, one can often see or infer vertical relationships underlying and often even supporting Roman friendships. Since *amicitia* was so closely intertwined with the

mobilization patronage, it is important to examine their similarities.

Both Roman friendships and patron-client relationships were based on the same underlying precepts. Ideally, *amicitia*, like *patrocinium*, was supposed to be based on reliance, faith, and trustworthiness, not on the mutual exchange of services. However, the belief in a social ideal existing undistorted or unchanged in a society is an absurd fallacy. If anything, the evidence stresses the reciprocal obligations between *amici*. As P. A. Brunt states,

> it is beyond question that *amicitia*, for whatever reasons the relationship was formed, was not a relationship either of mere affection or of mere reciprocal interest; if it was more than an empty name, it bound the friends together in bonds of obligation and honor.[21]

If a man received a service from an *amici*, he was expected to repay that service through any means at his disposal. As Marcus Tullius Cicero, who wrote extensively on the concepts of friendship and obligation, contends in *De Officiis*: "if there shall be obligations already incurred, so that kindness is not to begin with us, but to be required, still greater diligence, it seems, is called for; for no *officium* is more imperative than that of proving one's gratitude."[22] Indeed, in Roman society, in consequence of the moral duties inherent in friendships, not fulfilling an obligation would be tantamount to social suicide, and would result in a man being plagued with the negative title of *ingratus amicus*, or ungrateful friend. Friendships with men of both equal and inferior social standing provided the ambitious politician with many valuable services, which neither personal wealth nor power alone could possibly achieve. In the bonds of fellowship, according to Cicero, "there is but little difference between the greatest and the ordinary man; and friendship is to be cultivated almost equally by both."[23] It was, therefore, a necessary imperative for ambitious men seeking election to cultivate continuously new friendships while at the same time perpetuating old ones, specifically for the services these friends would be able to provide at his election. The most important service an *amici* could provide was, of course, the mobilization of his clients in behalf of his friend's

candidacy. Yet, as Marcus Cicero wrote, friendships were supposed to form on the basis of genuine goodwill, not on utility. This in fact illustrates one of the dilemmas that friendships based on underlying patronage bonds as well as other types of *amicitia* presented to Roman ways of thinking and behaving: "a man was not supposed to form a friendship or distribute a favor with a view to the return, and yet he knew that his *amicus*/recipient was in fact obliged to make a return."[24]

In the overall perspective, then, Roman friendships were marked by ambiguity and contradictions, which even troubled contemporaries. Cicero's treatise *De Amicitia*, for example, concentrates on the apparent contradiction between the philosophy of friendship based on moral goodness and the utilitarian or businesslike attitude toward friendship which seemed to pervade Republican society. "Friendship springs rather from nature than from need," writes Cicero, "and from an inclination of the soul joined with a feeling of love rather than from calculation of how much profit the friendship is likely to afford."[25] Cicero, arguing from a moral perspective, criticized those who maintain "that friendships must be sought for the sake of the defence and aid they give and not out of goodwill and affection."[26] Despite his moralizing, Cicero was not immune to the fact that utility served a necessary function in bonds of *amicitia*. "Mutual interchange," he conceded, "is really inseparable from friendship."[27] It is important, of course, to recognize the implications these bonds exerted on politics: all the various types of *amicitia* affected the outcome of elections. These ranged from intimate friends who simply shared a similar outlook on politics, which Quintus Cicero calls "friends on more genuine grounds," to the purely electoral friendships which Quintus argues have "a wider application in a canvass than in the rest of life."[28] Even if political friendships of all types played an important role in politics (a subject scrutinized in the second chapter), one should still not presuppose that all friendships were merely political alliances.[29]

Since both *patrocinium* and all types of *amicitia* were based on the reciprocal exchange of goods and services and since much of what is written on them in the primary

sources is concerned with these exchanges, the words that call attention to this flow of resources are a good indicator of clientelistic relationships and thus need to be examined and defined. Richard Saller notes four Latin words which indicate a mutual exchange of services between patrons and clients or among friends: *beneficium, officium, meritum,* and *gratia.* Although it was not written in law, a *beneficium* was usually the initial favor or service given in a patronal relationship or friendship, with the receiver then being obligated to return the service with worthwhile favors of his own, which were known as *officia*. *Officium* was a word of wide connotations, involving political, social, and economic obligations, which entailed reciprocal services or favors between patrons and clients. Mathias Gelzer states that the best equivalent for *officium* in the English language would be as a "reciprocal personal relationship . . . especially in the sense of the performance of an action arising from such a relationship."[30] Cicero used the term in the sense of a social and moral obligation to repay a service with an equal or greater service when he justifies his defense of Murena to Servius Sulpicius. He writes: " I agree, Sulpicius, that in the election the claims of friendship demanded all the support that I could give you and I think that I discharged my *officia*."[31]

There were, of course, relative values placed on the services exchanged, and benefits could be reaped by bestowing a great many services. For example, Cicero, who lamented the proliferation of businesslike relationships--as opposed to genuine personal bonds--in Roman society, did not consistently uphold the high moral principles he advocated in *De Amicitia*. In a very calculating and businesslike manner, Cicero wrote in *De Officiis* that "in order to become good calculators of *officia*," one must add and subtract obligations owing and owed in order "to strike a balance correctly and find out just how much is due to each individual."[32] The advantages of bestowing services to a vast array of friends and clients were as follows: providing favors was essentially an investment which could yield valuable returns in the future, because a favor incurred would have to be returned with an equal or greater service. For example, if a man

mobilized his personal clients in behalf of a friend's candidacy, he would then expect a like service in his own canvass for election. So despite pretensions stressing the moral foundation of patron-client relationships and friendships, in Roman social reality these bonds were often based as much on a calculating appraisal of services as they were on genuine goodwill. Although Romans did place values on these services, it is important to recognize that these values were highly ambiguous, because these relationships involved not merely the simultaneous exchange of equal services, but rather long-term credit of services often built up over long periods of time. As Saller states, this is why "it was difficult for an exchange partner to opt out of a relationship on the grounds that his debts were paid up, when he could not be sure whether the repayment was commensurate with the initial favor."[33] Thus the essential component of these bonds was not whether men felt true gratitude and obligation in their hearts, but rather that they recognized that a benefactor of a service, whether a friend or client, was entitled to services in return. We may infer from this that the ambiguity of debts in patron-client relationships and in friendships actually helped to transform these ties of obligation into long-term relationships.

Meritum, similar to *beneficium* and *officium*, was a word which the Romans used to express something deserved or merited. Common to all three, however, was the concept of reciprocity as both a social and moral duty. Although different authors might have given different variations in meaning to these three terms, there is no clear-cut difference between them in the primary sources. *Gratia*, literally gratitude, which meant in Roman society a favor or returning a favor, is often used in the sources as a repayment for a favor already received. If a man received a *beneficium*, then he was *gratia obligatus* or obligated to return the favor. Bestowing many *beneficia* gave a man a tremendous amount of influence and gratitude which he could manipulate in order to mobilize voters at his own election or for his friends if he so desired. Romans viewed *gratia* not only as a personal duty to one's patron or friend, but also it was regarded as a basic social duty.

Thus, the Romans believed that *gratia* was an indispensable moral force that kept a diverse and highly stratified society tightly bound together.

It seems clear that *patronus* and *cliens* mark patron-client relationships in the sources. It should also seem equally clear that *amicus, officium, beneficium, meritum,* and *gratia* might also signal patronage in the literature. Certainly some *amici* were in fact clients and not socially equal friends. More importantly, however, for this study is the fact that many lateral Roman friendships were based on each man's ability to mobilize his personal clientelistic network in his friends' behalf at their elections and for them return a like service. The words that signal the exchange of resources in relationships of reciprocal obligation are also essential to understand in this study of electoral patronage. Within a patron-client relationship these words could indicate a client voting for his patron at his election. Within an *amicitia* relationship these words might signal an *amici* mobilizing his personal clients for another friend's election. Thus all of these words should be used as indicators of the mobilization of patronage for electoral purposes when their context supports such an interpretation.

Comparative Analysis

The last two centuries of the Roman Republic witnessed a radical transformation in Italian agriculture, a change in which elite type farming based on large slave plantations, known as *latifundia*, replaced many of the traditionally profuse small farms. The effects this transformation had on Roman society are certainly open to interpretation, as is all history. Thus it might prove fruitful to conduct a comparative analysis between ancient Rome and Catania, Italy during the 1950s, because it might shed light on whether the conditions in Italy during the last two centuries of the Republic were in fact perfect for the permeation of new types of patron-client relations, or whether the social conditions weakened and destroyed the existing bonds. Although due to vast temporal differences a comparison between these two societies might at first seem strange, in fact both exhibited

highly similar social changes during the respective periods being examined, which makes them ideal for such a comparison.

The comparative method, usually used to provide evidence either to undermine an existing historical hypothesis or to support a new one, is used in this study to do both. First, the comparison shows the common hypothesis, stating that the change in Italian agriculture led to a fundamental weakening or even the destruction of the patronage system, is false. "Conditions of extreme uprootedness and rapid impoverishment," writes Lemarchand, "are just as instrumental in forcing urban and rural clienteles into the fold of a clientelistic apparatus" as are the traditional conditions of patronage, where patron-client relationships are formed because the patrons control the flow of necessary resources.[34] This observation by Lemarchand has led me to the formulation of a new hypothesis: The change in Italian agriculture merely transformed segments of the existing traditional patronage system, creating fertile ground for both new types of clients and new types of patrons.

In their study "The 'New' Clientelism in Southern Italy: The Christian Democratic Party in Catania," Mario Caciagli and Frank P. Belloni illustrate how periods of significant upheaval and change, such as rapid urbanization due to the migration of masses of peasant farmers from the countryside into the city, does not inevitably lead to the destruction of a patronage system, but rather it can lead to a transformation and subsequent formation of new types of clientelistic bonds. Caciagli and Belloni illustrate with their study of Catania how "in such periods of transition, the old forms of clientelism, which relied on important 'notables' and traditional patronage, are displaced by a clientelism deriving support from a patron organization of a mass clientele."[35] This type of transformation occurred in the Catania Christian Democracy from approximately 1954 to 1960. A new leadership in Catania based largely on 'new' forms of clientelism formed during these seven years.

The 'old' form of clientelism which existed in Catania prior to this period was what one might call the traditional type of patronage: relationships based on marked

inequalities of wealth in which the patron controlled highly personalized and permanent resources apart from any public power resulting from a governmental position. "Their status as notables -- together with the deference they received -- was taken for granted by them, and accepted by their followers, as an established and more or less permanent fact, unrelated to any political position that they might choose to accept."[36] In agricultural settings like the one in Catania these resources might include access to land, provisions for seed, equipment, advice, or subsistence crisis insurance in case a client needed a loan to get through an unprofitable season of farming. In return the patron would expect to receive from his clients, basic labor services, supplementary labor and goods, expressions of deference, promotion of his interests and reputation, and a client would also be expected to campaign and vote for his patron if he should stand for office.[37]

The rapid urbanization which took place during the middle and late 1950s resulted in a "new" clientelism characterized by the exchange of political support by the client in return for tangible benefits received from a government office holder or a political party, such as the Christian Democratic Party in modern Italy. Personal ties still existed between patrons and clients in this new system, but now this was done through middlemen called *apparatchi*, who were the new patrons. The *apparatchi*'s role was to mobilize their personal clients to vote or campaign for any party laws or candidates. This middleman type of patron is ubiquitous in modern patronage. For example, the political parties in New York during the 19th and 20th centuries, such as the Tweed Ring, were based to a large extent on the patronage power that ward leaders and precinct captains (middlemen patrons) obtained from their districts.[38]

Another distinguishing characteristic of this transformation in Catania was the considerable increase in electoral competition, especially in the number of candidates competing for public office. Now any person with enough initiative willing to undertake all of the competitive processes involved in a political career could realistically achieve a certain amount of support through patron-client relationships.[39] One result of this

increased electoral competition was the intense competitive bidding for client support. In order to gain a client's support, one needed to offer more tangible benefits than competing patrons. Gone were the "days of the inextinguishable debt--eternal gratitude--on the part of the client."[40] One of the problems for the new patrons is that they have a finite amount of resources to work with, and often their funds cannot keep up with the growing needs of the clients. The end result is that many candidates accumulated huge debts trying to satisfy the mass of clients virtually insatiable need for benefits.[41]

An agricultural transformation similar to that of Catania occurred in ancient Rome during the second and third centuries B.C. A transformation of this magnitude obviously created far reaching consequences for the rest of Roman society. That is to say, it is possible this transformation destroyed the traditional bonds of patronage between peasant farmers and their patrons, or at least, as Alexander Yakobson argues, caused a weakening in these bonds which by the time of the late Republic resulted in a full-fledged crisis within the whole patronage system.[42] What we understand of this transformation, on the other hand, could lead to another conclusion: the change in Italian agriculture might not have destroyed or even weakened patron-client bonds, rather it might have merely facilitated the emergence to the forefront of new types of patrons and clients.

Most Roman citizens during the early and middle Republic were small farmers living just above the subsistence level. Making a living on a small farm was often a precarious endeavor because a farmer could have a bad year or be burdened with unexpected taxes or any number of other problems which could ruin him. According to Keith Hopkins, peasant farmers' need for subsistence crisis insurance or other types of assistance from the more prosperous "reinforced a pattern of borrowing and dependence," which was often "expressed in the institution of clientship."[43] According to Roman tradition, peasants' need for a protective patron dates back to the time of the founding of the city itself. Romulus, the mythical founder of Rome, set up a system

> allowing each of the common people to have a protector of his own choice. . . .

> Romulus not only selected a genial term to enhance the relationship by calling the protection of the poor and humble 'patronage,' but he also assigned each party obligations that were beneficial, organizing the ties between them on a humane basis and one appropriate to citizens of the same community.[44]

Although this tale is mythical, it does indicate that the Romans ascribed a long history to their patronage system, and also shows how they wanted their society to be perceived by themselves and other societies. Patronage in Rome may have never been this ideal, but there probably is some basis of truth within this legend.

The last two centuries of the Republic were marked by almost constant warfare along the Mediterranean coast involving Rome against other peoples, such as the Carthaginians. Although most if this territory had been conquered by the time of the late Republic, these conquests created serious negative social consequences for the Romans at home. Men were forced to remain in the Roman armies for extended lengths of time, sometimes six or more years. In *Conquerors and Slaves*, Keith Hopkins accords much of the peasant farmers loss of land and impoverishment to this extended military service.[45] Yet to overemphasize this phenomenon would present a misleading picture: although many small farmers did lose their land, there were also many who managed to maintain their property despite the difficulties of the times. In fact, the rural population was comprised of a majority of small farmers, even when slavery was at its peak.[46] So for practical purposes, it should suffice to say this transformation was far-reaching and not merely the result of a few isolated events, but it had never been so all-embracing as to alter totally the general structure of Roman society. The rich landholders or the state often removed indebted peasant farmers from their land, which was in turn purchased by these aristocratic farmers and assimilated into their large slave-run plantations. This process had many far-reaching consequences for Roman society: more to the point of this thesis though, it illustrates the breakdown in traditional patron-client relationships for at least some of the rural population, because no longer were patrons fulfilling their obligation to protect their clients' interests with subsistence crisis insurance or other safeguards which

might enable them to maintain their property Many displaced farmers migrated to the city of Rome, which by the last century of the Republic had a population of one million people

The massive urbanization of Rome is quite similar to what happened in Catania during the 1950s, and it is probable that the political and social repercussions were also comparable as well Economic anxiety, widespread impoverishment, uprootedness, and massive migration are important forces which assimilate both urban and rural clients into the clientelistic system, especially in areas characterized by the spread of large capitalistic agriculture accompanied by notable declines in peasant farming and employment.[47] Thus it is likely that the economic and social upheaval did not destroy the patronage system in Italy, but merely transformed segments of it from the old traditional type of patronage to a new type featuring clients from the urban population of Rome. Late Republican Rome, similarly to Catania, also witnessed the pervasive emergence of *amici*, who like *apparatichi* were patrons of finite groups of clients, into Republican politics. Unlike than the *apparatichi* in Catania, however, the Roman *amici* (i.e. middlemen) were **laterally not vertically** connected to the candidates, and their patronage networks were not bound to one political party or candidate; rather they could mobilize their clients for any number of friends, political allies, or merely for the highest bidder. No longer were these power brokers only the municipal aristocracy or the Roman nobles, rather we see the emergence of other types of middlemen: patrons of colleges, workers guilds, and influential freedmen. Quintus Cicero writes in the *Commentariolum Petitionis*: "for in these days, electioneering experts have worked out, with all their eager will and resources, how to get what they want from their fellow-tribesmen."[48] The political importance of these lateral middlemen, who were equal in social standing to the candidates, is discussed more fully in the second chapter. For now, then, it is enough to illustrate for the reader that these middlemen-patrons did in fact exist, emerging dominant precisely because of the larger social upheavals. In this transformed society, these patrons served as an important link in

the patronage chain during the late Republic.

More marginal in supporting this hypothesis, yet still important, are the similarities in the resulting political systems from both of these societies. In Catania there was a marked increase in electoral competitiveness. Similarly, Rome also experienced a rise in electoral competition. T.P. Wiseman writes that the "competitive instinct, that urge to be first and greatest, is all too easily recognizable in the last generation of the Roman Republic."[49] For practical purposes, two examples will be used to illustrate the increase in electoral competition in the late Republic, resulting in part from the larger social transformations. The first is the notable rise in spending among potential candidates on games and banquets. Candidates were willing to spend enormous sums of money on games, often more than they could afford, in order to win office. For example, in a letter written to his brother Quintus in 54 B.C., Marcus Cicero wrote about Milo's campaign for the consulship:

> [Milo] is preparing to give the most magnificent games, at a cost, I assure you, that has never been exceeded by anyone. Considering that they are not demanded of him, he is acting like a fool for these two or three reasons at least--because he has already given a magnificent gladiatorial show, or because he has not the means."[50]

Because the competition was so fierce and the rewards so great, candidates were willing to risk enormous debts in order to reach higher and higher offices. Also marking the increase in electoral competition during this period was rampant electoral corruption. Two candidates vying for the consulship of 53 were willing to pay 10 million sesterces to the *centuria praerogativa*, the first and most influential century to vote in the centuriate assembly. Cicero's remarks on this outrageous case: "there is a horrible recrudescence of bribery and corruption. Never has there been anything equal to it."[51] Thus in Rome, as in Catania, similar political characteristics emerged from this transformation in the patronage system.

In the overall perspective, this comparison assists in bringing to light important

aspects of Republican patronage which have previously been given only marginal treatment in the secondary literature. First and foremost, it illustrates the fundamental role a candidate's lateral ties to middlemen-patrons or *amici* had on the mobilization of clientelistic votes. To ignore this aspect, when analyzing the import of Republican patronage, is to risk the emergence of an inadequate conception of Roman politics, perhaps even of an antiquated perspective Roman historical writing. Yet the significance of *amici* and their patronage networks is deeper than merely providing candidates with an opportunity to mobilize patronage ties outside of his own limited sphere of influence. The type of patronage system, based to a very large extent on *amici*, which emerges in the second chapter is fundamentally more fluid and unreliable than the highly structured system envisioned by the orthodox historians.

Conclusion

Since relationships of reciprocal obligation--whether *patrocinium* or *amicitia*--were formed, conducted, judged, and even restrained by Roman society, this study began with an examination of the social attitudes out of which patron-client relationships originated. This investigation into Roman ways of thinking about personal relationships, though like all history is only an interpretation based on disputable facts, brings to light certain important insights. First, the underlying moral and social concepts that form the foundation of patron-client relationships pervaded Roman society, and thus also underlie broader social relationships, such as *amicitia*. The second point is that we can draw distinctions between these differing social relationships, and achieve a clear representation of Roman patronage, only if we combine modern concepts of patronage with the subtle nuances at work in the patronage structure of Republican society. The implications in this method arise from our ability to avoid using a definition of *patrocinium* which far exceeded what the Romans would have considered patron-client relationships, while at the same time understanding that clientelism was in many ways connected with *amicitia*.

Through comparison this study has been able to suggest an alternative explanation for what impact social changes in the second and third centuries had on the whole patronage structure. The patronage structure described by this new conception takes on a fundamentally different coloring: a conception of patronage which has the virtue of emphasizing the important emergence of middleman patron as a ubiquitous force within late Republican elections. Additionally this reorientation of our view on late Republican patronage supports the argument put forth in the second chapter on the importance of patron-client relationships in deciding elections. Moreover, it also supports the argument in the second chapter that the patronage system in ancient Rome was a great deal more fluid and unstable than the system envisioned by the orthodox camp.

2

Patrocinium Petitioque

Introduction

In the late Republic, men of aristocratic rank fiercely competed against one another in order to achieve *gloria* and *honor*. These men competed in order to live up to or even surpass the achievements of their family predecessors. When Lucius Licinius Murena was elected consul in the election of 63 he was the "first man to bring the consulship into an old family;" his father's bust was wreathed in laurels for the occasion that brought so much honor to Murena's family.[52] The subsequent prosecution against Murena for illegal electioneering and the distinct possibility of conviction were said by Cicero to have saddened, disfigured, and brought disgrace to his father's bust and to his family.[53] These men not only had to live up to their family expectations, but they also had to compete and try to surpass the achievements of their contemporary rivals. Quintus Cicero warned his brother that his canvass for the consulship in 63 would make many men envious of him, because of the prestige which he would bring to himself and to his family if he won. Men of consular families who had not risen to this position themselves would be envious that Cicero had surpassed them, while "new men" who had only reached the praetorship would also be jealous that Cicero exceeded them in rank.[54] In his speech in behalf of Murena, Cicero states that one reason for the *ambitus* prosecution against Murena was his attempt to rise in rank beyond his previous family members, which made nobles like Servius Sulpicius Rufus jealous that a man of lower birth would surpass him in rank. "In trying to rise a single step in office beyond the rank attained repeatedly by his family and his ancestors," Cicero laments, "[Murena] is risking both what he has inherited and what he has won himself."[55] Thus the whole electoral structure right down to its foundations takes on a coloring which is ultimately competitive: winning elections to office, climbing the *cursus honorum* to the consulship, and surpassing their peers in *honor* and *gloria* were

fundamental aspects of the aristocratic ethos in the late Republic.

No structured and stable political parties existed in ancient Rome. Men who sought electoral office did so on an individual basis, without any type of party platform or particular policy. These men did not have the luxury of a built-in party following. Nor did they win election through political platforms or issues. In fact, the *Commentariolum* advised Cicero that "during his canvass, you must not deal with politics either in the Senate, or in political meetings of the People."[56] They had to create their own following from friends, clients, and the support of the 'floating voter' (i.e. the voter who was not obligated to vote for a patron) through intense canvassing of all the people whether they were rich or poor, urban or rural.[57] Cicero describes the tremendous effort required of a politician in ancient Rome. "I took care that I should be seen personally every day. I lived in the public eye, I frequented the forum; neither my door-keeper nor sleep prevented anyone from having audience with me."[58] The *Commentariolum* advises Cicero that he must continuously canvass, "soliciting the same people many times, and, so far as possible, not letting anybody be in a position to say that he has not been canvassed by you-- and thoroughly and diligently canvassed too."[59] In the late Republic, regardless of inherited advantages that members of the nobility had, both men from noble descent and new men had to work hard in order to acquire enough support to win an election.[60] The crux of this chapter is an examination of how important ties of patronage were in securing election to office. Were bonds of patronage the **only** form of support a candidate needed to cultivate to win election, or were popular appeals to the citizenry the only real key to understanding late Republican elections? Was it in fact the case that a candidate had to mobilize both bonds of patronage and use popular methods to appeal to the people in order to win election to office?

There exists an ongoing debate between two camps of historians who are trying to answer these questions. At first one might think it is obvious--almost tautological--that a candidate for public office had to mobilize votes both through bonds of patronage and

public campaigning. However, many Roman historians argue the true answer to these questions resides in one of the two extreme positions: either patronage was the key to elections and everything else was negligible or popular appeals to the people were the decisive factor in elections and patronage had little electoral impact. The traditional interpretation first put forth by Mathias Gelzer, and then later more forcefully expounded upon by Lily Ross Taylor, contends that ties of patronage were the key to understanding Republican elections.[61] According to this interpretation, other factors that affected voting behavior--including cultivating the popular support of the people through games, banquets, bribery, and a strong public reputation--were not important for deciding the outcome of elections. Central to the Gelzerian interpretation is the belief that it was the nobles who personally controlled the masses of *clientelae*, which in turn served as an explanation for their predominance in elections, especially consular elections.[62] What else could possibly explain the fact that during the last hundred and fifty years of the Republic only ten "new men" were elected to the consulship; and from 93 to 48 B.C. Cicero was the only "new man" to achieve this office.[63] The emerging revisionist interpretation questions the orthodox view, arguing that the evidence does not support assumptions bestowing patronage with a preeminent position in deciding the outcome of Republican elections. Although revisionist historians concede that patronage was one of many systems for mobilizing voters, they argue that it was of subordinate importance--or even of negligible significance--compared to popular self-promotion and illegal electioneering methods.[64]

The evidence suggests that neither interpretation provides a balanced analysis explaining the importance of patronage in late Republican elections. In my estimation, we should listen to the one primary source that explicitly offers a detailed account of canvassing for election in Republican Rome: Quintus Cicero's *Commentariolum Petitionis* or the "Handbook of Electioneering." This treatise by Q. Cicero, the less famous brother of Marcus Tullius Cicero, is replete with promises of mutual obligation and performance

of favors in order to win electoral office, along with advice to appeal to the interests of the *popularis voluntas* or 'floating voter.' Q. Cicero states exactly what was needed in order to win election:

> Canvassing for magistracies is classified as attentiveness to two objects, the one concerned with securing the support of *amici*, the other with securing the *popularis voluntas* (the people's favor). The endeavors of friends should be enlisted by *beneficiis* and *officiis* (the definition and significance of these two words is discussed in the first chapter) and old acquaintance and affability and natural charm.[65]

The first object--cultivating and mobilizing the support of *amici*--is concerned with patronage ties and their electoral importance. For practical purposes and to make it easier for the reader to understand, patronage ties may be reduced to two distinct types: (1) a candidate's own personal patronage, which were the close interpersonal bonds between him and his clients; and (2) the ties of clientelism a candidate gained through lateral friendships with *amici* (i.e. middleman-patrons), who were on his own level of society, in order to mobilize their patronage networks at his election. The second object Q. Cicero states is concerned with winning the people's favor through popular reputation, games, banquets, and *largitio* (bribery). The contentions that one object was more important than the other--which these two camps of historians seem intent on arguing--are modern hypotheses which are not supported in the evidence; rather Q. Cicero states that mobilizing patronage and winning the people's support were **both** indispensable for winning election. It is time we started listening to the evidence.

Let us briefly look at one example from the curile aedile election of 55 B.C. which illustrates Q. Cicero's electoral thesis and this chapter's main thesis. M. Juventius Laterensis, a *nobilis*, lost this election to a first generation senator, Cn. Plancius, because, according to Cicero, he failed to achieve the two objects put forth in the *Commentariolum Petitionis*. Cicero first explains one of the reasons why Laterensis lost by viewing the defeat through the people's perspective and arguing through their mouth rather than his own: "I chose to bestow my favors upon the man who importuned me for them, rather

than upon the man who would not demean himself to the homage of a supple knee."[66] Although this is the appeal of a advocate defending his client against charges of electoral malpractice, Cicero would certainly not have argued a point in a law court filled with Roman senators and equestrians which would not have seemed at least plausible to contemporary Romans. Cicero proceeded to state to Laterensis that one should not "cease to wonder that by your refusal to cultivate the friendship of popular persons (*amicitiis*) you should have failed to win that distinction which your merits demanded as their due."[67] Laterensis' failure to extend his network of *amici*, *hospites*, and patronage beyond what he inherited from his ancestral ties was viewed by Cicero as the second reason why Laterensis lost the election. Laterensis failed to do the two things which Quintus Cicero states are required of a candidate in order to win a office; thus he lost. Cicero gives numerous other examples of candidates who also lost their election because they failed like Laterensis to take into both methods of mobilizing voters in Roman society.[68]

We simply cannot extract from the sources how many votes a candidate could expect to gain through ties of patronage, nor can we find out how much support could be acquired through appeals to the general populace. Although what we understand of Republican politics from the surviving evidence limits the possibility of concluding which of the two objects was more important for electoral success, it is nevertheless within the bounds of possibility to argue that both were essential aspects of electioneering and thus neither could be ignored, which is contrary to what many modern historians in both the traditional and revisionist camp envision. This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section acquaints the reader with the often confusing workings of the two electoral assemblies. Yet this background information is necessary for an understanding of Republican elections. The second section concentrates on the role of patron-client relationships in mobilizing voters for elections. An important question that needs to be answered after the reevaluation of the importance of patronage in this section is whether

or not the Gelzerian conception, envisioning a system where the nobles were patrons to vast armies of clients whom they used to pass the consulship "from hand to hand over long periods," remains valid. The third section focuses on the importance of the popular aspects of canvassing: namely the role of games, banquets, *largitio*, and popular reputation in determining electoral outcomes.

The *Comitia*

Each year elections in the late Republic produced twenty-four military tribunes, ten tribunes of the plebs, two curile and two plebeian aediles, ten quaestors, eight praetors, two consuls, and several minor officials.[69] The voting for these elections took place in one of the two electoral assemblies: the *comitia centuriata* and the *comitia tributa*. The two consuls and eight praetors were elected annually in the *comitia centuriata*. The praetor and the consul both possessed *imperium*, which meant that they had the power to conduct military, administrative, and judicial functions, but the praetor's power was subordinate to that of the consul.[70] The elections of the lesser magistrates, such as the quaestors and the curile aediles, took place in the *comitia tributa*.[71]

The tribe constituted the essential voting unit for the *comitia tributa*. Every male Roman citizen was enrolled in a tribe, which was a geographical voting unit. The tribe they were enrolled in depended on the location of their property holdings, or if they extended past tribal boundaries by his actual place of residence, except for freedmen who were enrolled exclusively in the urban tribes. In the time of the late Republic thirty-five tribes existed: four urban and thirty-one rural tribes. The urban tribes were constituted mainly from the landless city population, while the rural tribes were composed of both the rich landed aristocracy and the small farmers. It is important to note that Roman citizenship had recently been extended through Italy south of the Po river as a result of the Social War (91 B.C.-87 B.C.). The resulting influx of new voters added new dimensions to the elections of the late Republic. New land divisions in the tribes had to be created,

with the result that only three of the thirty-one rural tribes had continuous boundaries, while the remaining rural tribes were composed of as many as five or six separate areas. Thus, mobilizing one's tribe through ties of patronage became more difficult because of the discontinuity within the tribal borders. The newly enfranchised Italians could all vote within the tribal assembly, but many of them could not exercise their vote within the centuriate assembly because they first had to be enrolled by a census, and there was only one census between 85 and 49, that of 70/69.[72] Political patronage as an activity grows out of social circumstances and mutually beneficial relationships, out of needs and motives not necessarily political. The mass of newly enfranchised Italians were not part of this organization of the Roman citizen body into relationships of mutual obligation. Hence, the introduction of these new citizens into the Roman voting body no doubt weakened the relative importance of patronage ties in determining elections, because these people's votes could not be cultivated and mobilized through the existing patronage structure; rather they had to be secured by popular methods.

The voting in the *comitia tributa* was done tribe by tribe, where in each tribe there existed men of varying degrees of wealth, especially in the rural tribes. Unlike the *comitia centuriata* where men were divided by census classes and age groups, each person voted within their own tribe and their vote was equal to the vote of any other person in their tribe regardless of wealth or rank. In the tribal assembly it was not one man one vote, since the majority of voters within a tribe decided the vote of the whole tribe. Once a candidate had achieved a majority of the thirty-five tribes he was declared elected and the voting for him ceased. Yet this method of voting did not prevent the tribal assembly from becoming disproportionately influenced by the wealthier citizens. The masses of poor, landless citizens in Rome were all enrolled in the four urban tribes. Thus the influence of their vote was limited to only four tribes, which was small in comparison to the thirty-one votes of the rural tribes. Some historians have argued that because the votes of the urban plebs constituted only four tribes, their vote was inconsequential.[73] Moreover, because of

the great distances most rural citizens had to travel in order to vote in the *comitia*, the votes of the wealthier rural citizens carried substantially more weight than those with little or no property because they could more readily afford to spend the time and money required to exercise their vote.[74] However, one should not overestimate the power of the elite citizens. Cicero states that it commonly happened that all were surprised "at the election of some and the non-election of others."[75] A candidate simply could not ignore the vote of the masses at the polls, because the "people promotes those who court it most assiduously."[76]

The praetors and the consuls were elected in the *comitia centuriata*, which was divided into five classes according to an individual's property qualifications. Voters were assigned to one of the five classes depending on their wealth: the wealthiest citizens comprised the first class and the enrollment proceeded down by wealth to the fifth class. Those with property qualifications valued at 40,000 sesterces or more were registered within the first class.[77] These five classes were then subdivided further into a total of 193 centuries. The order of the knights or *eques* also voted with the first class. The knights consisted or two groups: the first comprised the businessmen known as *publicani*, and the second were the aristocracy in the Italian municipalities.[78] The first class, formed by taking the qualified *seniores* and *iuniores* from each tribe, comprised 70 of the 193 centuries.

Once a majority of the 193 centuries had been achieved for a certain candidate, the voting for that candidate would cease. It is necessary to note at this point that the division of centuries was done in such a way as to give the wealthier citizens (i.e. those in the first class along with the equites) a disproportionate voting advantage over the citizens enrolled in the lower classes. For instance, the first class received seventy centuries while those citizens who qualified below the lowest census class were enrolled into only a single century, the *capite censi*. Moreover, if the first class and the knights were in complete consensus, they needed only 9 of the remaining 105 centuries to outvote all the rest of the

centuries and stop the voting process. Wolfgang Kunkel contends that as a result of the voting process in the centuriate assembly the "the less well-off citizens normally had no opportunity to make any real use of their right to vote."[79] Such assumptions of voting unity within the first class are false. This statement would only remain valid if the centuries in the first class along with the knights voted in concordance with one another; however, a split in the vote of the first class would nullify their electoral advantage and extend the voting process down to the lower classes. Alexander Yakobson notes that candidates for office invariably belonged to the upper class and that the "resources at the disposal of the rival candidates (family prestige and connections, great wealth and the readiness to use it, personal popularity and perhaps political support, personal and political *amicitiae*, patronage) must have been, in most cases, of the same order of magnitude."[80] In consequence, he further contends that "the vote of the upper strata of the assembly must usually have been split."[81] Thus the votes of the lower orders often did make a difference at elections.

A Roman seeking electoral success could not afford to ignore canvassing the voters within the lower classes, because he could never be quite sure whether he would need those votes or not. Cicero, for instance, did not need the votes of the lower classes in his election to the consulship for 63, because he was elected by a unanimity of the first class, the equites, and the first centuries of the second class.[82] Yet Cicero could not have known that he would be elected by the unanimity of the upper class, especially since he was a new man. Before the election it is probable that he believed the votes of the lower classes might play a decisive role in his candidacy. The *Commentariolum* states that Cicero had previous to his canvass won the support of the urban masses, and that this was deemed an important voting block to have for his campaign.[83] In the very same election that Cicero was elected unanimously, there was a deep voting fracture in deciding between the other two candidates, Catiline and Antonius, which resulted in all or nearly all of the centuries having to be called to vote.[84] Yakobson further argues that a split within the

upper class must have occurred with even more frequency in the praetorian elections.[85] So although the wealthy in the first class could dominate the centuriate assembly, those in the lower classes could play an important role in an election if there existed a fracture within the voting of the elite. Since it was difficult, if not impossible, for a candidate to know before the election whether he would need the votes of the lower classes, it was in his best interest to canvass these voters and try to win their support through *largitio*, games and banquets, and other forms of ingratiating oneself with the general populace. On the other hand, because those in the centuries of the first class were also far fewer in number than the poor, " the number of voters in those units would have been comparatively small -- a few hundred in the centuries of the first 'class,' compared with many thousands in the bottom century."[86] Thus, the number of voters in the first class was not unmanageably large, which made it an ideal situation for cultivating *amici* for their votes in the first class, and their clients' votes in the lower classes if the voting should go down that far.

It is also important to note that the voting decision of the *centuria praerogativa*, which was the first century to vote and was chosen by lot probably from the *iuniores* of the first class, heavily influenced the voting of the following centuries and was seen as an indication on the outcome of the elections.[87] According to Cicero, the *centuriata praerogativa* "carries of itself such weight that no candidate for the consulship has ever secured its vote without being ultimately declared consul either at that very election of at any rate for the following year."[88] We may infer from this that *amici* and debts of obligation among the members of this century were critical for electoral success, not only because of its individual importance but also because of its broader influence and prestige. Since this century was chosen by lot at the time of the election, it was impossible for a candidate to know before the election which of the *iuniores* would be chosen, and thus it was difficult to cultivate *amici* specifically for the purpose of winning this important century. Obviously having as many *amici* as possible among the *iuniores* gave a candidate

the best possible chance of swaying the vote of this important century through ties of friendship and clientship. Securing the *centuriata praerogativa* through illegal electioneering techniques was probably a more effective way of gaining the support of this century. In 54, for example, two candidates for the consulship thought it was important enough to illegally pay 10,000,000 sesterces for its vote.[89]

Manipulating the Vote Through Patronage Ties

Understanding the importance of electoral patronage in late Republican Rome requires an explanation of how patron-client relationships affected the outcome of elections when compared to other methods of winning electoral support. This might sound simple, but properly expressed it includes a lot more than merely the delineation of events and facts, one after the other. This subject requires that historians utilize a great deal of exposition and analysis in order to support a thesis. Let me begin this section by restating that there existed **two** distinct kinds of patronage bonds a candidate utilized in his election. The first was a candidate's own personal patronage, which were the face-to-face bonds between him and his clients. These bonds served two distinct purposes for elections: they provided a candidate with their own specific votes at the polls; and they also served the equally valuable purpose, which was not in itself the process of patronage, of providing a candidate with a strong public reputation which in turn influenced the votes of the general populace not put under an obligation to a patron. Ironically, although the first purpose of personal patronage gives weight to the argument stressing its electoral importance, the second actually diminishes the electoral significance of patronage because in this case it was being used not for the specific votes it provides, but rather for its manipulation of the general populace's votes. The second type of electoral patronage was formed through lateral ties with *amici*, who were not in and of themselves clients, but they could mobilize their personal clients in their friend's behalf. However, unlike his personal clients, the clients of *amici*, though mobilized in his behalf, did not then become part of a

candidate's personal patronage; rather these clients were merely performing their obligation to their original patron.

A candidate's **personal** patronage, though limited, was an important factor in determining his electoral success. The tribe he was enrolled in formed the basis of a candidate's personal patronage, especially for the elections in the tribal assembly. A man's personal tribe had to be won through diligence and much *beneficia*. Achieving this type of zealous support from his tribe required a candidate to protect its members in the law courts, watch over their business interests in Rome and in the provinces, give them seats at games, festivals and banquets when they came to Rome, and even secure official posts for some of them.[90] According to Cicero, providing such services for one's own tribe was a traditional and necessary practice of patronage.[91] In return for such services, a candidate for office would expect his own tribe to give him their vote at his election. Cicero's defense of Plancius illustrates the tremendous support a candidate could derive from his local connections. Plancius' fellow townsfolk from Atina brought him not only

> the Teretine tribe (people from Atina vote in this tribe) . . ., but they made him a figure of importance, the cynosure of all eyes, and enlisted for him a compact, vigorous, and indefatigable body of adherents. For neighborly sympathy often provokes great displays of feeling in our municipal towns. . . . There was no one at Arpinum, at Sora, at Casium, at Aquinum, but was Plancius' adherent. Thickly-populated districts of Venafrum and Allifae, and in a word, all our rugged countryside, which holds . . . true to the bond of kinship, counted my client's distinction an honor, his promotion a compliment to itself.[92]

The support Plancius received from his town of Atina was essential in ensuring his electoral success for many different reasons. First of all, the people from his own town of Atina helped him win the Teretine tribe. Moreover, a candidate's neighboring towns were also subject to ties of patronage and could in some instances be considered, as in the case of Plancius, among his friends and dependants. This kind of neighborly support was common in elections, deriving from the concept of *vicinitas*, "an important concept in Roman social and political history, which created ties as strong as those of *amicitia*, *clientela*, or *hospitium*, and usually guaranteed support at elections."[93] Cicero himself

along with Gaius Marius both rose to the consulship in part because of the zealous support of their hometown, Arpinum.[94]

It was not always the case, however, that a candidate could count on such strong support from his hometown. Laterensis, the prosecutor against Plancius and a *nobilis*, suffered greatly in his consular candidacy because his hometown of Tusculum was so replete with consular families that his canvass went largely unnoticed.[95] Nevertheless, for the most part a man could count on securing the votes of his hometown and tribe during his election. Of course, if there were two men from the same tribe vying for the same office, only one of the two could receive such support. This brings up a very important point on the dynamics of Republican patronage. Because the whole structure of Roman elections was based on competition between men from the same class and often with roughly the same resources and connections, it must have been the case that at times men from the same tribes competed against one another and thus their tribe was under conflicting obligations to two opposing patrons. Because of the inherent conflicting obligations within the Republican patronage system, which are discussed in more detail with respect to *amici* later, the conception of personal patronage ties which emerges is more unreliable and unstable than the traditional interpretation has proposed. Thus patronage as an electoral force in our interpretation is weaker than the Gelzerian model.

The zealous support of a candidate's personal *clientelae* also served an important function apart from the specific votes these ties of patronage supplied. Unquestionably, the significance of these ties rested as much on the public image they provided a candidate as on the limited electoral support they could furnish. They gave his canvass credibility and *pompa* (show), as in the case of Plancius, which in turn helped mobilize the support of neighboring towns and the general populace not officially under obligation to one of the candidates. Cicero, for instance, was advised to "see to it that you show off both the number and the variety of your friends," because they gave one *dignitas* (i.e. merit, prestige, dignity). A candidate's *clientelae* often actively spread the word about their

patron's reputation, for the "talk which make's one's public reputation generally emanates from sources in one's own household" (i.e. fellow-tribesmen, neighbors, clients, freedmen, and slaves).[96]

Although a politician's personal patronage consisted largely of his municipal ties to his hometown and tribe, this was not the extent of his clientelistic relationships. Indeed, distinguished Romans also possessed a retinue of clients within the perimeter of Rome itself. Like their municipal counterparts, urban clients served a dual function in the canvass: they both provided votes for their patron and they also influenced the popular vote through their constant attendance. Were the votes of these urban clients a valuable voting commodity for a candidate? Cicero implies in his speech in behalf of Murena that the votes of the lower orders were meaningless: "If the poor men have nothing but their vote, then, even if they vote, their support is valueless."[97] It has already been noted that the votes of the lower orders could be very important if there existed a serious fracture within the first and second classes, which was usually the case. Moreover, Cicero's statement should not be taken at face value. In this particular instance it served Cicero's purpose to portray the votes of the lower order as useless and their constant attendance as being the only valuable function they could serve for their patron, because his client, Murena, was charged with illegally hiring attendants to follow him around and thus presumably also to vote for him. Cicero needed to diminish the importance of the votes of the lower order, while making it appear that Murena's attendants were trying to repay their obligations to him by performing the only valuable service they could provide: to constantly follow him around the forum and give his candidacy *pompa* and show.

Moreover, Cicero also should not be taken too literally in this passage from his defense of Murena when he states that the votes of the clients were worthless, because in many other instances he says that the votes of the lower classes, which were the classes from which many of a patron's personal clients came from, were the decisive factor in deciding elections.

> For it is the privilege of free peoples, and above all of this people, whose conquests have given it paramount sway over the whole world, that by its votes it can bestow of take away its offices as it likes. We too have our part to play; tossed as we are upon the stormy billows of popular favor (*popularis voluntas*), we must bear contentedly with the people's will, win it to ourselves when it is estranged, grapple it to us when we have won it, and pacify it when it is in turmoil. If we set no great store by its awards, we are not called upon to do it homage; but if we set our hearts upon them, we must not grow weary in courting its favor.[98]

In this passage Cicero argues that it was the votes of the masses that decided the elections; and not only the elections of the lower magistracies in the *comitia tributa* but also the higher elections. For example, Cicero attributes the defeat of the noble-born Lucius Philippus in the consular election of 93 B.C. by Marcus Herennius, a man of much lesser birth, to the inconsistencies in the voting behavior of the masses: "Nothing is more fickle than the people in the crowd, nothing harder to discover than how men intend to vote, nothing trickier than the whole way in which elections work."[99] What is inferred in all this is that the votes of the lower orders did matter in elections, which means that both forming patronage ties with these men of lower social standing, and ingratiating oneself with them through popular appeals represented a necessary imperative in order to remove at least some of the fickleness and unreliability inherent in Roman elections. Candidates did, in fact, form patronage ties with the men in the lower orders, which according to Cicero exercised a significant influence on the outcomes of elections: "The elections, and above all those of the aediles, are the expression of the party feeling of the populace, not of their maturer judgment; their votes are wheedled out of them rather than honestly won; the voters too often consider what they themselves owe to a particular candidate rather than what is due to him by the state."[100] Regardless of the moral wrong men like Cicero might have seen in this process, it was the right of the people to fulfill their personal obligations to their patrons even if that meant putting their own interests and those of their patron(s) before those of the *Res Publica.*

Constant attendance, which gave a canvass *pompa* (show) and a candidate's reputation *dignitas* (dignity or prestige), served as the second function a candidate's

personal clients provided for their patron's canvass. Although attendance was a way in which clients could fulfill their obligations to their patron, patronage in this case was in reality not used in the traditional sense of mobilizing the specific votes of clients, but rather it was being used to gain the *popularis voluntas* or the people's favor. The *Commentariolum Petitionis* divides attendance into three groups: "the first callers at your house (*salutatio*); the second, escorts from your house (*deductores*); the third attendants in general."[101] The first group consisted of a politician's clients and friends; the second group was made up of friends of equal or even superior social standing; and the third group consisted completely of a candidate's personal *clientelae*. The clients within the first group performed the clientelistic ritual of paying respects at a candidate's house every morning; however, often these clients were men "who visit several of the candidates," either because their clientelistic ties to one particular candidate were not strong enough to warrant all of their devotion or they had more than one patron.[102]

This evidence, needless to say, introduces an element of fluidity within the whole patronage system, which brings us to a delicate and difficult point in our argument. Although the pluralism and fluidity within the Republican patronage system have been discussed before, P.A. Brunt argues that its significance on the importance of patronage has not been sufficiently stressed in the secondary literature. One can infer from his argument that partly because of the fluidity within the patronage system "there is indeed no sign that in this period the mobilization of clients had anything more than a marginal effect on elections."[103] If the fluidity of patronage determines that it will have only a marginal impact, then it logically follows that all forms of patronage throughout history have been equally marginal in elections, because every type of patronage system--whether modern or historical--has been characterized by a certain amount of fluidity among both patrons and clients. In fact, Johnson and Dandeker argue that all forms of patronage "are characterized by an essential fluidity, ambiguity and flexibility," and it is essential in a patronage system to have "rivalry between patrons for clients and the ability to change

patrons or to have multiple allegiances to them."[104] Brunt's argument that fluidity makes patronage a negligible factor in elections simply does not bear any credibility given that fluidity is a fundamental aspect of patronage. Simply because clients are not exclusively bound to one particular patron does not mean that an industrious candidate could not eventually make them his exclusive clients through attention and industry. A candidate must illustrate to his clients that their morning attendance is pleasing to him, and that he is gratified by even this small service they pay to him. In this way clients who visit several candidates, "seeing that one of them takes special notice of this service, often devote themselves to him, desert the rest, and gradually emerge as his own men instead of everybody's."[105] Still the strong aspect of fluidity does present a weaker system of patronage than had previously been envisioned.

The third group of attendants the *Commentariolum* speaks of were the attendants in general, who were the clients bound to support their patron/candidate during his canvass and at his election. The *Commentariolum* stresses that a client's full-time attendance was also an obligatory aspect of patronage: "To those who owe you this service, insist absolutely that any who are not too old or too busy should regularly attend on you themselves, and that those who cannot themselves do so should appoint their relatives this duty."[106] The most revealing passage on the popular function these clients served comes from Cicero's speech in behalf of Murena:

> Men of small means are only able to earn favors from our order or pay us back in one way and that is by helping us and following us about when we are candidates for office. . . It is the poorer men with the time available who provide the constant attention that is habitually given to men of standing and to those who confer benefits.[107]

We may infer from this that through the attendance of personal clients a candidate hoped to win the favor of the larger populace. According to Q. Cicero, the *popularis voluntas* could be won over through attendance because "a large company of daily escorts makes a great impression and adds great prestige."[108] Moreover, Q. Cicero stresses to his brother

that daily attendance instills in the general voter a candidate's positive qualities and deserving of having them bestow office on him.[109] The net result of client attendance was that it gave the citizenry the impression a candidate was a winner; and in ancient Rome if a candidate looked like a winner and acted like a winner then floating voters would often have been inclined to lend him their support.

Roman historians frequently apply the modern concept of the 'bandwagon effect' to explain this voting phenomenon, which in ancient Rome "was achieved by advertising the nature and magnitude of one's support, by the number of *salutatores*, by the size of the escort to the forum and on the canvass, and by the splendor and the optimistic enthusiasm of the campaign."[110] Conversely, if a candidate appeared "sad or "dejected" the rumor would spread and not only decrease the support of the masses, but also diminish the electoral effectiveness of his friends.[111] The positive public image of patronage ties and the rumor or talk spread by clients were thus a significant aspect of late Republican patronage, and one of the reasons why it was so important for electoral success. Although this evidence illustrates the influential impact patron-client relationships exerted on voting behavior, it is important, of course, to recognize that patronage was used for an entirely different purpose here: a purpose which actually leads to conclusions that weaken instead of strengthen the role of patronage in influencing the outcome of elections, because in this instance patron-client ties were used to win the votes of the uncommitted voter who could be swayed by rumor and public reputation.

Nevertheless, the preceding pages should have convinced the reader that **personal** patronage ties represented an essential factor for electoral success not only for their own votes but also for the influence they had on the masses. In between the two systems designed to mobilize votes, the evidence indicates there often existed a common ground in which patronage ties and popular support intertwined. This evidence, however, also suggests that the popular function of a candidate's personal *clientelae* was more important than their specific votes. More marginal because of their limited number, yet still

fundamental for electoral success were the votes of a candidate's personal clients. Nonetheless, the significance of these personal clients is greatly diminished in comparison to the traditional interpretation. The Gelzerian conception of patronage, which propounded the view that a candidate depended on mobilizing vast armies of *personal* clients for their specific votes at the polls, greatly overestimates both the number and the electoral significance of a politician's own personal retinue of adherents. The evidence clearly shows how truly finite were the number of a candidate's personal *clientelae*, which were limited to a very large extent to his own town or tribe. Thus, although a candidate's own personal clientelistic network were of consequence, they were only a small part of a much larger political canvass, which also required a candidate both to cultivate lateral friendships with *amici* for their patronage networks and to cultivate the general populace in other ways besides through the reputation provided by personal *clientelae*.

Needless to say, a candidate could not secure election to one of the lower magistracies merely on the basis of the votes provided by his **personal** patronage ties; he also had to develop friendships, either based on genuine goodwill or political expediency, among those men who could greatly influence voting behavior by means of their downwardly vertical patronage networks. This second, and in my estimation significantly more dynamic and powerful aspect of Republican clientelism, is concerned exclusively with the bonds of patronage gained through *amici*. The picture of this second type of patronage that emerges throughout this section is one in which a candidate was able to vastly increase his vertical clientelistic network without actually increasing the number of clients he possessed through **lateral** relationships to *amici*, who were not in and of themselves clients. Unlike the Gelzerian interpretation where a few notables controlled vast multitudes of personal clients, the conception of clientelism the evidence supports presents a completely different picture: a picture in which the organizational structure of patronage was not grouped in huge blocks of clients but rather it was fragmented among many middlemen (i.e. municipal aristocrats, patrons of *collegia*, powerful freedmen, and

other types of *amici*), who each controlled a finite amount of patronage within their sphere of influence.

Without doubt, not all *amicitia* relationships in Roman society were based on the mutual exchange of political services: that is the mobilization of clients in a friend's behalf. Some were based upon purely political foundations, while others involved both politics and genuine friendship. Still others might not involve politics at all. This section, however, focuses on friendships that had at least some underlying political motivations. In order to lucidly explain the importance of *amici* and their patronage networks in influencing the outcome of Roman elections, I will analyze the two assemblies and the impact *amici* had on the voting behavior in each assembly separately.

The cultivation of *amici* for their ties of patronage was particularly acute for candidates canvassing for one of the lower magistracies in the tribal assembly, because these men were just starting out in their political careers and thus would not have had much of an opportunity to develop a strong public reputation through a career in the law courts or in the military. By the same token, however, young politicians also had not had sufficient opportunity to cultivate a wide array of *amici* through one of these careers, as men vying for the upper magistracies most certainly would have. So younger politicians had to depend to a much larger extent on *amicitia* relationships previously cemented through family and tribal connections. Nevertheless, *amici* gained through these family ties and tribal bonds gave a candidate for one of the lower magistracies powerful electoral support at the polls. Above all a candidate had to secure as many friends as possible who were of exceptional influence and could control the vote of a tribe. A candidate had to utilize numerous methods to win the support of many influential *amici*: he had to use promises and assurances along with kindness and charm; he had to weigh each man's capacity for vote-getting in order to determine the extent to which he should value and cultivate each and every friend's support.[112]

Such was the case with Plancius, a relative newcomer to the Roman political scene

when he canvassed for the curile aedileship in 55 B.C. Previously existing family bonds coupled with business friendships formed the bases of Plancius' electoral support at his election. He benefitted from the fact that his father was a *princeps publicanorum* or director of a tax-farming company, which was an important political group to have friends and business connections in because they voted as part of the eighteen centuries of the equites. "The backbone of our political life," Cicero stresses, "is to be found among the body of the tax-farmers."[113] Plancius' father, Cicero states, tirelessly canvassed and courted his order in behalf of his son.[114] Plancius himself also formed ties with the order of the knights as a promoter and director of many equestrian companies.[115] By providing many *beneficia* to the tax-farmers during his terms as quaestor and tribune, Plancius further cemented already existing bonds. Thus Cicero asks if there is anybody "so bold as to deny that its influence in forwarding Plancius' candidature was most marked?"[116] So Plancius, through ties of friendship with influential tax-farmers who were able to mobilize the votes of their order in his behalf, secured for his candidacy much of the eighteen centuries of equites. Conversely, Cicero states that the equites in return ensured a "means of securing advancement for their children."[117] In other words, Plancius was henceforth *gratia obligatus* (i.e. he owed them) to his *amici* among the tax-farmers for the electoral support they mobilized for him.

"Name any tribe," Cicero boasts in his defense of Plancius, "and I will tell you through whom he carried it."[118] Meaning that Plancius won the necessary eighteen tribes needed for election in the tribal assembly by means of *amici* and their vertical patronage networks, such as Plancius' *amicitia* relationships with the prominent tax-farmers discussed above. Regardless of the moral wrong men like Cicero might have seen in this process, it was the right of the people to fulfill their personal obligations to their patrons even if that meant putting their own interests before those of the *Res Publica*. Again, however, one should view Cicero's claim above with a certain amount of skepticism, because after all he was trying to present an argument showing his client won these tribes

through connections with *amici* not bribery. Yet his boastful claim also should not be dismissed out of hand either. The multitude of zealous supporters which swarmed the courtroom at his trial gives an indication of the tremendous support Plancius' friends generated on his behalf at the polls. Cicero describes the courtroom scene, employing this tactic to illustrate the immense support Plancius must have derived from his *amici*:

> You see them thronging this court to-day, gentlemen of the jury; they have come in the garb and guise of mourners to appeal for your mercy. Must not so many Roman knights, so many tribunes of the treasury,---not to mention the Proletariat (*Plebs)*, who were present to a man at the election, and who have been dismissed from this court,---must not all these have lent vast material and moral support to my client's candidature?[119]

Cicero then proceeds to list many influential men by name who gave their assistance to Plancius' candidacy.[120] "Can you wonder, then," Cicero rhetorically asks the prosecutor, Laterensis, "at the election to the office of aedile of one who, though in some respects he may be inferior to yourself, in respect, I mean of name and fame, is nevertheless your superior in the support given to him by his townsfolk, his neighbors, and his business partners."[121] Laterensis, on the other hand, failed to win election partly owing to his refusal to cultivate friendships with popular and influential men.[122]

Even if Cicero exaggerated his client's support achieved by means of *amici* to improve the effect of his defense argument, it still must have been the case that Plancius did receive prodigious support from his friends. Cicero certainly would not have argued that a young politician like Plancius could win election through the support of friends, if that argument did not at least seem plausible and in keeping with traditional Roman electioneering practices. The mobilization of patronage networks outside of his own personal patronage ties, as described above, required candidates like Plancius to employ a hierarchical approach to canvassing: first a candidate had to secure friendships with men of influence within his own social class, who would then use their patronage ties to secure their respective tribes for him. According to Cicero, such a canvass was common and accepted: it was a traditional feature of Roman canvassing for politicians "to secure for

their friends the votes of their tribe, or to look for a like service from their friends in their own elections."[123] Many prominent politicians mobilized patronage networks through this hierarchical method in their canvasses for public office: a method which was, according to Cicero, "instinct with the spirit of courtesy, kindliness, and chivalry."[124] In fact, Cicero himself effectively utilized these very same methods in his own election to the consulship, heeding the advice given to him by his brother to "take special pains to recruit and retain those who have from you, or hope to have, control of a tribe or a century, or some other advantage."[125] As the evidence suggests, providing electoral support for an *amici* was often based to a very large extent on self-interest, for the reason that such backing required the recipient to return the favor with equal support to the benefactor in his election.

The introduction of these *amici* or lateral middlemen-patrons as a significant component in Republican patronage brings to light an aspect that fundamentally weakens the importance of electoral patronage when compared to the traditional Gelzerian interpretation: that of conflicting obligations. It must have often been the case that a man of influence in his tribe was friendly with many of the candidates vying for the same office, and thus he might have been obligated to mobilize support for more than one of the candidates. Although men of influence in their tribe could support more than one of the candidates because there were a plurality of offices open at each level of the *cursus honorum*, it certainly must have been the case that they had to deny support to some of their friends because of obligations to other candidates. The trial of Plancius again serves to illustrate this point. Cicero owed a deep obligation to his client and friend, Plancius, for the support received from him during his exile from Rome in 58 B.C.[126] Yet the prosecutor of the case and one of Plancius' rivals in his aedilician election, Laterensis, also had been very concerned over Cicero's dignity and safety during his banishment, because he was also an *amicus* of Cicero's. Cicero clearly states the dismay he felt over his conflicting obligations when he was forced to make a comparison between the prosecutor,

who was a "dear friend," and his client, to whom Cicero was under the deepest obligation [127]

Although the example cited above concentrates explicitly on the conflicting obligations within the courtroom and not the canvass, it must have also been the case that Cicero was torn in opposing directions during his friends' respective aedilician candidacies as well. Cicero chose to canvass in behalf of Plancius, taking into account that he owed him a much greater *officia* than he did Laterensis. "And indeed my own method of solicitation," Cicero pleads, "was such as to suggest that I was canvassing for him, not because he was my friend or my neighbor, nor because I had been on very intimate terms with his father, but rather because he was in a sense, the only begetter and saviour of my life."[128] Cicero chose to support the friend with whom he believed he owed the greater debt. Just as in Cicero's predicament, *amici* or middlemen patrons must have frequently had conflicting obligations between opposing candidates. They would be forced to fulfil their obligation to one of the candidates while leaving their obligation to one or more of the other candidates unfulfilled.

In the Gelzerian view, a noble could rest assured that his personal *clientelae* would vote for him. This new conceptualization of patronage, however, presenting the historian with many new complexities, results in a reevaluation of the relative importance of patron-client ties for electoral success. In the first place, middlemen-patrons were not bound by the same ties of loyalty as *clientelae*, and thus the mere fact that the mobilization of a large segment of a candidate's ties of patronage first moved through these lateral relationships before they proceeded vertically to the client's themselves, severely weakens the strength of a candidate's broader clientelistic network. Secondly, these electoral power-brokers would hardly have mobilized their clients with the same vigor and enthusiasm as a candidate would his own personal adherents. Finally, because these *amici* often had conflicting obligations at any given election, a certain amount of unreliability and uncertainty is interjected into the electoral patronage system when compared to the much

more static orthodox interpretation. Although the evidence attests to the essential role *amici* and their patronage ties played in elections to the lower magistracies, it also suggests a system characterized by intrinsic fluidity and uncertainty. In short, the evidence portrays a weaker patronage system than the one put forth by the Gelzerians.

The role of *amici* and the means by which a candidate cultivated their support was exceedingly more complex for the higher elections decided in the centuriate assembly. Regardless of whether one calls them *amici*, friends, men of influence, or lateral middlemen-patrons, these powerful men played an equally decisive role in mobilizing voters for candidates canvassing for one of the higher magistracies (i.e. the consulship or the praetorship) in the *comitia centuriata*. In fact, Q. Cicero advised his brother to " take care to secure all the centuries through many friends (*variis amicitiis)* of different sorts."[129] Q. Cicero explains in the following passage from the *Commentariolum Petitionis* which segments of the citizen body a diligent and industrious candidate vying for one of the higher magistracies could secure through bonds of *amicitia*:

> First---and this is obvious---draw to yourself senators, Roman knights, active and influential men of all other ranks. Many energetic city folk, many influential and active freedmen are about the forum; as many as possible should be most diligently brought by yourself or by mutual friends to desire your success; pursue them, send agents to them, show them how you esteem the benefaction. Then, reckon up the whole city---all the Colleges, the suburbs, the environs; if you strike a friendship (*amicitia*) with the leading men from among their number, you will easily, through them, secure the masses that remain. After that, comprehend in your mind and memory the whole of Italy divided into its tribal divisions, and let there be no town, colony, rural district, or indeed any place in Italy where you have not a sufficiency of support; inquire and seek out men everywhere, get to know them, pursue them, secure them, see that they canvass their localities for you and act like candidates on your behalf.[130]

One might at first ask whether in fact this is patronage? The answer is a resounding "Yes." Of course, *amici* were not in and of themselves clients; however, two segments of this passage reveal a fact that scholars have not sufficiently stressed: namely, that patron-client relationships form the foundation which underlies these friendships. For instance, when Q. Cicero tells his brother to form friendships with the leading men from among

these groups and through them he will secure the rest, he is making a reference to how these leading men or lateral middlemen-patrons will mobilize their personal patronage ties in behalf of Cicero's candidacy. The second reference to the dynamics of patronage comes at the end of the passage when Q. Cicero advises his brother to see that his municipal friends mobilize their municipalities in his behalf. In short, candidates formed friendships with many of these municipal leaders or men of influence for the express intent of having these men mobilize their personal patronage ties at his election. Securing the tribes and centuries through friends represented the essence and real import of Republican patronage resided. A man's own personal patronage ties were important no doubt, but hardly could they compare to the immense and varied support a wide array of *amici* could provide.

Needless to say, it follows from this that a candidate for one of the higher magistracies began to cultivate bonds of *amicitia* years in advance of his actual bid for the consulship. It took many years and a lot of hard work for a rising politician to form enough political friendships. Leaders of the equestrian order and wealthy men in the Italian municipalities were of particular import for a candidate to form close ties with. As proconsul of Transalpine Gaul in 66 and 67, years before his candidacy for the consulship, Murena's generosity to men of influence in this region won him the electoral support of many tribes in Umbria. While in Gaul Murena looked after the equestrian interests in that province, enabling them to recover difficult debts. Such activities were the ways in which a rising politician secured to himself *amici*.[131] Work in the law courts as a defense advocate was one of the most effective methods a candidate could use to form ties of *amicitia* with influential men in Rome and in the municipalities. Cicero, for example, based his earlier elections and his consular campaign for the most part on the bonds of obligation or friendships he had acquired defending eminent men in the law courts. Cicero gained many *officia* as a defense advocate; and thus by the time of his consular election he had acquired tremendous electoral support from those influential men he had defended.

Cicero worked especially hard during his public career, both as an official Roman magistrate and as an advocate in the courts, on behalf of the equestrian class in order to obtain their support and backing for his elections. As mentioned already the knights or *equites* consisted of both the businessmen known as *publicani* and the aristocracy in the Italian municipalities. Cicero states: "I have been concerned for perhaps the greater part of my life in cases connected with revenue-contractors (i.e. the *publicani*) and . . . I believe I may say that practical experience has given me a fairly intimate acquaintance with them."[132] Cicero's defense of Sextus Roscius in 80 B.C. presumably laid under obligation a leading man of the Amerians, who then was obligated to return Cicero's great *beneficia* by mobilizing the Amerians at Cicero's elections. The people of Ameria, although not personally obligated to Cicero as Sextus Roscius was, were upset at the charges against their leading townsman, and thus would have been quite responsive to any request by their patron asking them to lend their support at Cicero's future canvasses. In another case, leading members of the Aletrians asked Cicero to defend one of their own, Scamander. Because Aletrium was situated near Cicero's hometown of Arpinum, Cicero was already tied to them through *vicinitas* (neighborly bonds). So he was more than willing to use his forensic skills on behalf of people who were tied to him as clients. Asking Cicero to defend one of their own shows the Aletrians already had close bonds with Cicero and perceived him to be their protector or patron in Rome. Those men of influence or *amici* whom Cicero had defended were obligated to return the service at his election, or else they would be looked down upon by their peers as an *ingratus homo*. Q. Cicero notes the electoral support Cicero derived from his clients in the law courts and the obligations these men owed:

> Since your campaign is amply supported by the kind of friendship which you have acquired by defending cases, make quite sure that a particular duty is apportioned and assigned to each of all whom you have laid under obligation; and since you have never before troubled any of them for anything, make it clear that you have kept in reserve for this occasion all your claims to what in your opinion they owe you.[133]

Thus, in the years leading up to the canvass for higher election a brilliant orator such as Cicero could gain many influential friends in the law courts, who were then obligated to mobilize their patronage in his behalf.

By defending the leading members of various communities, a senator had access to ties of patronage outside of his own limited personal clients. Many of the communities with which Cicero formed ties of obligation remained tied to him throughout his life.[134] For instance, Cicero's defense of Caecina of Volaterrae and a woman from Arretium created long-term relationships based on the mutual exchange of services. Again Cicero's bonds of mutual obligation with persons of influence like Caecina and the woman from Arretium are not in and of themselves examples of patronage ties, because these relationships between persons of roughly equal social standing were lateral not vertical in nature. However, Caecina and the woman from Arretium used their patronal power within their particular spheres of influence for Cicero's elections, and this is an example of the mobilization of patronage. So a candidate like Cicero first cultivated lateral relationships of obligation with *amici*, and then and only then do we see the mobilization of clients between these *amici* and their adherents. In return for their political support, Cicero constantly watched over and protected his friends' interests, both through his official magisterial positions in Rome and also through his connections with other *amici*. For example, Cicero proposed in a letter to his friend Atticus in 60 B.C. a protective measure in behalf of Volaterrae and Arretium, which would allow them to retain property that had been made public land, but had not yet been distributed.[135] Similarly, a letter addressed to Q. Valerius Orca in 45 B.C. again illustrates Cicero's efforts on behalf of these two communities. Cicero strenuously beseeched his friend Orca to look out for the best interests of these two communities. In return for this service, Cicero promised Orca he would receive the support "for all time a municipality so respectful, so staunch, and so honorable."[136] Cicero stated that he used his position and influence in behalf of these communities because "they have proved their gratitude to me in overflowing

measure; for never once have they failed me either in my triumphs or in my troubles."[137]

There were other groups with powerful electoral influence which a Roman politician could bring under obligation through his efforts in the law courts sometimes months or even years before his actual canvass for one of the higher magistracies. The *Commentariolum* specifically states that Cicero, as a defense advocate, laid under obligation "four Sodalities run by men of great influence in electioneering, C. Fundanius, Q. Gallius, C. Cornelius, and C. Orchivius."[138] *Sodalitates* were important electoral supporters for a candidate because they were religious or social organizations of the upper class, which served as pressure groups at elections and trials involving their members or friends.[139] In essence, this is merely a purely political friendship whereby Cicero promised to defend these men in exchange for their promising to mobilize their adherent or clients in his impending consular election. The four men were patrons of their respective groups and thus were obligated to Cicero to mobilize their clients in his behalf.

It should of course be recognized that most of the leading members of these Italian communities and groups had a plurality of obligations to many people. In fact, by conferring a *beneficium* for Volaterrae and Arretium, Orca, just like Cicero, formed a relationship of mutual obligation with the leading members of these communities. Cicero thought it a rare honor when the people of Capua chose to have him as their only patron.[140] The plurality of obligations were the reason why a candidate constantly needed to remind his *amici* of their obligation to him. In fact, the need for a candidate during his canvass to remind his friends of their debt to him is a pervasive theme throughout the *Commentariolum*. In one example, Quintus advised his brother on how to mobilize his friends for active support: "What you have to do is exact from them on this occasion what they owe you by frequent admonitions, requests, assurances, making it clear that they will never have another chance to thank you."[141] In another instance, Cicero is advised to explicitly demand those under a personal obligation to him to repay their personal debt at his upcoming consular election. Constant demanding put a strain on

the idealized moral qualities of *amicitia*, because as Cicero himself wrote, "a man of any modesty finds it repugnant to address such a petition to one whom he thinks he has put under obligation to himself, lest he should appear to exact rather than request what he wants, and to reckon the granting of it rather as payment for value received than as an act of kindness."[142] It is plausible to assume that during a canvass it was not as improper as it was in the rest of life for a candidate to exact services from *amici*.

Despite the unreliability and strenuous demands often placed on *amici*, the hard work candidates like Cicero put in years before their election in the law courts or in other arenas returned dividends at the polls. By the time of his consular election, Cicero had acquired many influential friends among the public revenue contractors, Order of the Knights, many city boroughs, many men of varying rank whom he had defended in the law courts, and several Colleges.[143] Through these *amici* Cicero could expect to mobilize many blocks of clients. How much stock could a candidate put into his friends mobilizing their patronage ties in his behalf? The fact that the leading members of the Italian communities and other men of influence had a plurality of obligations, often conflicting, seriously undermines the reliability of these ties of patronage. A candidate simply could not be sure which of his friends would support his candidacy. According to Q. Cicero, in the election "all things are full of deceit, snares, and treachery."[144] Friends one expected to give unconditional support might turn out instead to offer their support for the opposition. Thus, not only did a candidate have to remind *amici* of their previously existing obligations, but he also had to spur them to active interest by promising them future benefits (*beneficiis*) once he was elected.[145] If patronage through friends could not be wholly relied upon, then a candidate would not rely completely on these ties for votes at his election. Consequently, he would need to turn to other methods of support such as games or bribery, which would complement his patronage support: his friends and his own. In the overall perspective, then, the Republican patronage system, with its intrinsic fluidity and plurality of obligations, emerging in this study is significantly weaker

than the highly structured and organized system put forth by the orthodox camp

During the actual canvass itself friends of every sort needed to be established We now turn to the nuances of the canvass for one of the higher offices itself and the methods in which a candidate mobilized varied patronage networks through *amici*. A candidate needed both to spur his already existing friends to mobilize their patronage ties for him, while continuing to cultivate new bonds of mutual obligation with men of influence in all sectors of society. A candidate's *amici* included men with whom he shared genuine goodwill as well as men whose friendship was based on purely political foundations, and whatever variations of friendship lay in between these two poles. In order to spur friends during his canvass to mobilize their clients on his behalf, a candidate needed to know his *amici* personally, which was critical in retaining already existing *amicitia* relationships as well as in forming new ones, "without which there can be no friendship."[146] According to the *Commentariolum*, "nothing is so silly as to think that a man whom you do not know is your eager supporter."[147] A candidate had to know what they expected of him and he had to tell them plainly what he expected of them. He had to know "how genuine goodwill can be distinguished from counterfeit."[148] Only by knowing his *amici* personally could a candidate properly judge the extent of his friends' electoral support in his behalf. What voters could a candidate realistically mobilize through relationships with friends?

"For getting the votes of the centuries," Q. Cicero states that one needed to form friendships with "persons of exceptional influence. . . . For in these days, electioneering experts have worked out, with all their eager will and resources, how to get what they want from their fellow-tribesmen."[149] Q. Cicero statement is a general remark on how a candidate secured support in the *comitia centuriata*. But the 193 centuries were made up of various smaller voting groups and organizations which a candidate specifically tried to mobilize through *amici*. Individual friendships needed to be used to secure the Order of the Knights, the municipalities, the colleges, the guilds, and the suburbs of Rome.

Especially important from among the men of influence were those who hoped for a return service in their own future elections, because their own personal ambition would have made them a more reliable source of patronage votes.[150] In order to ensure that men who were attached purely by future expectations fulfilled their services, a candidate had to "make them perceive that your help is ready at hand for them, also let them see that you are watching their services carefully, that you look and notice exactly how much comes of each of them."[151] By constantly watching over the services of *amici*, a candidate could take out some of the unreliability inherent in such relationships.

Candidates formally announced their candidacy twenty-four days before the scheduled election, and then the actual canvass began. The candidate would remain continually in the public eye from this date until the election, walking about the forum with his retinue of friends, adherents, and clients in a toga artificially whitened with chalk.[152] During the 24 days of the canvass a candidate formed many new friendships for the express purpose of mobilizing new patronal networks. "For there are men of influence in their own neighborhoods and towns," Q. Cicero writes, "persistent and prosperous persons who, even if they have not felt inclined to exercise their influence before, still can easily make efforts at a moments notice for someone to whom they are indebted or well disposed."[153] Normally this type of "wheeling and dealing" was not appropriate. But "a canvass, for all it nuisances, has the convenience that you can make friends of any people you wish without disgrace, which you cannot do in the rest of your life."[154]

Brief political friendships formed during the canvass, although essential for securing enough electoral support, were looked down on by contemporary Romans because they often didn't have the moral qualities of *fides* that was in accordance with the Roman ideology of friendship. However brief political friendships did not have to remain temporary and without *fides*, rather the *Commentariolum* advised Cicero to show his new friends he valued their services highly, stressing to them that their friendship would remain a good investment even after the election. "The result will not be a brief vote-catching

friendship but a solid and permanent one."[155] A candidate with enough diligence could cultivate the support of anybody during his canvass: friends or enemies. According to the *Commentariolum*, "there is nobody (unless closely connected with one of your competitors in some way) whom you cannot easily induce, if you try, to earn affection and obligation to him by doing you a good turn."[156] By cultivating new friends to complement previously existing ones, a candidate let no town, colony, college, guild, or municipality escape his influence. "Inquire and seek out men everywhere, get to know them, pursue them, secure them, see that they canvass their localities for you and act like candidates in your behalf. They will want you as a friend if they see that you are anxious for friendship."[157] When a candidate had secured friendships with the men of influence from among the varied voting, political, social, and geographic groups in Italy, then and only then did his prospects for election to the consulship appear bright.

Let us examine the example of Lucius Licinius Murena's candidacy for the consulship of 63, which visibly shows the value of *amici* in a canvass; however, it also illustrates the problem of ambiguity when trying to differentiate between *ambitus* and the legitimate exchange of resources in a patron-client relationship in the evidence. Murena, a *novus homo*, was successful in his bid for the consulship, defeating among others the noble Servius Sulpicius Rufus. Sulpicius, sensing he was going to be defeated in his attempt at the consulship, prepared a prosecution against Murena for *ambitus* even before the actual election had been decided.[158] Although Cicero had aided his friend Sulpicius during his canvass, he served as defense advocate for his other friend Murena during his *ambitus* trial. Sulpicius was hurt that Cicero violated the bonds of friendship between them and defended his opponent, Murena.[159] "When you were a consular candidate," Cicero retorts, "I failed you in nothing that could have been asked of a friend, or a man of influence, or of a consul." However, a greater obligation to another friend in peril now demanded Cicero's services. "I am under no obligation," Cicero proceeds, "to you not to defend him. . . . I have for a long time, gentlemen, had close ties of friendship with

Murena, but they will not be overridden by Servius Sulpicius in a case involving his civil rights because they took second place in an electoral campaign." To abandon a friend during his hour of peril would have been a violation of amicitia, and would have branded Cicero with the stigma of arrogance and cruelty.[160] Interestingly, one may infer from this a hierarchy in the Roman concept of mutual obligations: regardless of the relative strength of the friendship, an obligation to a friend in peril appears to take a preeminent position to all other obligations. The above example is again illustrative of the conflicting obligations distinguished and influential Romans like Cicero had to deal with on a regular basis, both in the courtroom and at the polls. Were it not for Sulpicius' candidacy for the consulship of 63, Murena very well might have received the support of his friend Cicero in his own canvass. However, since Cicero decided his friendship to Sulpicius deserved preeminence, Murena's friendship to Cicero proved fruitless during his canvass. Of course, since there were two consular positions open, Cicero could have possibly overcome some of the conflicting obligations by supporting both men at the polls, but the evidence notes only his exclusive support for Sulpicius. It must have been the case that many such friendships proved equally unreliable at the time of elections, either because of conflicting obligations or simple apathy.

Moreover, Murena's trial also shows that a friend's support during a canvass once given was not permanent and unconditional. Sulpicius' contemplation of a prosecution during his canvass markedly diminished the vigor of his friends' backing. Cicero notes that "close friends of candidates are unnerved by this sort of rumor and their enthusiasm cools. They either abandon the campaign as already decided or they keep their services and support for the prosecution and trial."[161] As seen above Roman elections had a powerful "bandwagon effect," influencing the support of even the strongest friends. "In a consular election a sudden movement of opinion is important," Cicero emphasizes, "particularly when it has swung to a good man whose candidature has many other sources of support."[162] If it appeared that a friend would lose, there was no sense in continuing to

support him. It was better to jump over to the stronger campaign and hope that by giving it your support you could ensure services for the coming year. Of course not all ties of friendship were so weak that at the first sign of trouble they broke. However, when examining the importance of patronage one certainly has to take into account how truly fragile, unreliable, and self-interested some of these bonds really were.

Let us now return specifically to the example of Murena's election. Because he was of patrician heritage and noble birth while Murena was a man of much inferior social background, Sulpicius argues that Murena could only have won the election by means of *ambitus*. Cicero used many arguments to refute this claim, most of them dealing with the allegation only indirectly. The argument that directly addressed the actual charge of *ambitus* is the only one relevant for now, however. In the first place, Sulpicius charged Murena with paying men to follow him around Rome, which was illegal according to a decree proposed by Cicero himself and ratified by the senate.[163] Cicero argues that Murena's retinue consisted of personal clients, not salaried followers. "It is the poorer men with the time available who provide the constant attention that is habitually given to men of standing and to those who confer benefits."[164] Cicero implies the "poorer men" were Murena's clients who were merely performing a traditional favor to their patron in return for the benefits he has given and will continue to give to them; and that "there is no penalty that can prevent men of lower class from showing their gratitude in this old-established way of fulfilling their obligations."[165]

The prosecution further charged Murena with breaking the *ambitus* law by indiscriminately providing seats at games and banquets. A candidate could provide seats at games, provide banquets out of his own purse, and perform other services for his own tribe. The preceding *beneficia* were, in fact, required duties of a candidate. Cicero rhetorically asks the people in the courtroom if they could

> ever remember a time when there has not been this wish---whether self-interested or out of a disinterested generosity---to provide a seat in the circus and the Forum for our friends and fellow-tribesmen? Those are the rewards and bounties that

poorer men receive from their fellow-tribesmen by ancient custom [166]

Murena, Cicero argued, merely followed ancient and hallowed patronage customs, and thus was not guilty of committing *ambitus*. To do this indiscriminately to all the tribes, however, was *ambitus*. Although a candidate could not win tribes other than his own through *beneficia*, his friends could secure their own tribes in his behalf by means of *beneficia* in a legitimate patron-client relationship. The prosecution argued Murena won these tribes through indiscriminate public displays. However, Cicero provides an alternative explanation: "But shows were given to the tribes and invitations to dinner were given. . . . Even though Murena took no part in this gentlemen (i.e. the men in the courtroom), and his friends followed traditional practices with moderation."[167] What the prosecutors argued was *ambitus*, Cicero reasoned was merely a permissible *beneficium* from Murena's friends to their clients and fellow-tribesmen. Cicero maintains that "all these acts are the obligation of friends and relatives, the services of poorer men and the duties of candidates . . . displaying an open-handedness which is the token of liberality rather than of bribery."[168]

Are the preceding examples of illegal electioneering, or are they in fact examples of the genuine exchange of services between patrons and clients for electoral purposes? Unfortunately there is no way of completely knowing. All we have is Cicero's highly biased account to go on. Whether Murena was guilty of these allegation is not important, however. What is important is how these examples illustrate the dynamics of Roman patronage, both between patron and client and among *amici*; but their import also rests on their illustration of the inherent ambiguity between patronage and *ambitus*, and how illegal electioneering methods could be hidden within the parameters of patronage and passed off even to the most discerning Romans as a traditional and legal electoral practice.

As we come to the end of this analysis of the dynamics of Republican patronage, one needs to ask whether the nobles emerge as the central patrons, as the Gelzerians argue. Even P.A. Brunt, who has argued so forcefully against placing too much emphasis

on patronage relations in Roman society, states that "the great noble dynasts presumably had the largest number of clients."[169] It is important, of course, to recognize that Brunt proceeds to argue clients were not a sufficient reason for the noble's success at the consular elections. The traditionalists have argued in favor of the masses of clients among the noble houses to explain how the nobility maintained a virtual stranglehold on the consulship during the late Republic. Only masses of clients could possibly explain this domination, they argued. The evidence suggests, however, it was not the nobles who were the great patrons of huge armies of clients. The *Commentariolum* suggests the influence of the nobles in elections, their own and their friends, derived not necessarily from mass *clientelae*, but rather from their *dignitas* and prestige they had with the masses. It has already been shown that a candidate had to set up a variety of friends to win election. To win the centuries and tribes through ties of patronage he needed to make friends with "men of influence." In another passage from a letter to Curio, Cicero states that Milo had the support of "men of influence in securing votes."[170] What is remarkable about these two passages is that the nobles and men of exceptional influence appear to be two distinct groups of people. "Men of illustrious career and name (i.e. the nobles)," Q. Cicero argues served only the purpose of providing a candidate's canvass with show and prestige.[171] The real power patrons were the influential men in the order of the knight, colleges, sodalities, tribal organizations, and Italian municipalities. These patrons served as lateral not vertical middlemen between candidates and the fragmented *clientelae* of Italy, of which each middleman controlled only a finite amount of clients.

If the nobles were not powerful patrons, then one must ask how they were able to maintain such a dominant hold on the higher magistracies, excluding from office many new men like Cicero. The answer lies with the nobles' *dignitas*. Precedence played an important role in Roman society. Nobles were born into families with illustrious histories. Their ancestors were the distinguished consuls and generals of antiquity who had given Rome its greatness. The Roman people obsessed over the qualities of the noble houses.

Very few new men, Cicero among them, were able through their work in the courts or military to match the nobles in this respect, which is why the voters not put under obligation tended to vote for the nobles instead of the new men. Of course, this is not to say the nobles did not use the same methods of mobilizing patronage through friends and clients as new men like Cicero did.

Unlike the traditional Gelzerian model of Republican patronage, with its highly systematized and organized structure of patron-client relationships, the picture which emerges from this study presents a significantly more unstable system of clientelism. The introduction of **lateral** middlemen-patrons or *amici* as the prevalent source of a candidate's patronage votes offers the historian a weaker form of patronage. Middlemen were not bound to candidates by the same interpersonal ties of obligation as clients, and would hardly have mobilized their *clientelae* with the same vigor as the candidate himself. Moreover, middlemen-patrons often were confronted with conflicting obligations to more than one of the candidacies, creating a great deal of uncertainty and unreliability within the whole patronage structure. Thus, the introduction of these middlemen-patrons into our model of Republican patronage results in a much more fluid and unstable system, which, when compared to the Gelzerian conception, is weaker and a much less reliable, though still important, source for gaining and mobilizing votes.

Cultivating the People's Favor By Popular Methods

Patronage was only one of two systems a candidate could utilize in order to secure electoral support. Even in a paper on patronage it is necessary, in order to maintain perspective, to emphasize what is unquestionably true: namely, that cultivating the favor of the general populace was just as indispensable for electoral success as the cultivation of patronage ties. Each of the two systems coexisted within Roman society and even intertwined at times. According to Q. Cicero, "a memory for names, an ingratiating manner, constant attendance, generosity, publicity, [and] a fine public image" were all

popular mechanisms candidates used to appeal to the undifferentiated voter in order to win their favor.[172] In trying to win the favor of the masses through legal activities, a candidate had to have above all else a political persona that would appeal to the people and present them with desirable qualities. These requirements are certainly not foreign to our way of thinking about politics; in fact, many of these are familiar to us today because they are the mechanisms politicians in modern democracies use in order to reach public office. Another way to win the favor of the people was through illegal electioneering techniques such as mass or limited bribery, paying men to follow a candidate around during his canvass, or giving games illegally. Often, however, there existed a great deal of ambiguity between benefits exchanged in a patron-client relationship and the indiscriminate purchase of votes (e.g. Murena). Many laws were passed to clarify this distinction. In 81 B.C. the Romans passed a bribery law which introduced a maximum penalty of ten years exclusion from public office for committing *ambitus*. Again in 67, 63, 55, and 52 stricter and more encompassing *ambitus* laws were passed to try and curb the increasing instances of electoral bribery.[173] These laws, however, failed to curb the pervasiveness of electoral bribery, because the dividends were too great and candidates could for the most part conceal their illegal electioneering activities in the guise of resources flowing between patrons and clients, as Murena might have done.

It may not always be possible to say exactly what aspect of electioneering was the most important, exactly how many votes a man could secure by means of the differing mechanisms; but without doubt the development of a strong public reputation was crucial for electoral success. Fame as an orator or military man, support from the distinguished *publicani* and equestrians, friendly regard of the nobles, enthusiastic aid of young men, and constant attendance were all ways in which a politician could achieve widespread publicity about his reputation.[174] According to Q. Cicero, "there are two professions which can raise men to the highest level of distinction: that of a successful general and that of a good orator."[175] Cicero himself gained this level of distinction through his

success as an orator in the law courts, where he gained wide recognition among the Roman citizenry who often attended the trials. In a letter to Atticus in 59 B.C., Cicero admitted that he was not engaged in politics at all, and yet through his work in the law courts found that he won "extraordinary favor not only with those who enjoy my services, but with the people in general too."[176] Cicero notes that both his defense of Bestia and Archia took place before large crowds of spectators.[177] Because the public courts were held outside in the forum where large crowds of spectators could watch the proceedings, a talented orator like Cicero could become widely known and respected among the crowds, who might then praise Cicero's reputation to the larger Roman populace. Cicero, although a new man, was said to have overcome the stigmatization that comes along with this moniker solely because of the great prestige he acquired in the law courts.[178] An orator could also bring great prestige to his reputation if those he had defended in the law courts were in constant attendance throughout his canvass. "Demand of them plainly," Quintus advises his brother, "that since it is due to your unpaid efforts that they have retained their property, or their reputation, or their life and all their fortunes, and since there will never be another chance for them to thank you, they should repay you by this service."[179]

The alternative method for attaining a renowned public reputation was through a career in the military. In fact, Cicero argues that a candidate gained a superior public reputation in the military than in the law courts: "Let the Forum give way to the camp, peace to war, the pen to the sword, shade to the heat of the sun; in short, concede first place in the State to that profession which has given the State dominion over the world."[180] Again one should take Cicero's defense rhetoric *cum grano salis*. He is after all attempting to prove that his client, Murena, won the consular election in part because of the tremendous reputation and fame his military career gave him with the Roman populace, which, according to Cicero, was a traditional method of securing the favor of the people. At the same time, Cicero was trying to reduce the prestige Servius Sulpicius

Without a doubt, though, a military career benefitted a candidate during his canvass, and especially helped him to win the people's favor. Let us examine Murena's military career and how it helped him to win the consulship. Cicero attributes Murena's success at the consular election to two things: the first was his magnificent games, which are examined later in this section; the second his military career.[181] In 73 B.C. Murena served as subordinate commander under Lucius Licinius Lucullus in Asia, Bythinia, and Pontus. In 65 he was elected praetor and spent the next two years as proconsul in Transalpine Gaul. Murena did not run for the consulship until 63, yet the soldiers in Lucullus' army gave him overwhelming support during his canvass and at the polls. They were able to do this because they were assembled in Rome for a triumph. According to Cicero their voting power and prestige is undeniable, "deriving its strength from their very number, from their influence with their friends and, most important of all, from the great weight that they carry with the whole people of Rome in electing a consul."[182] Thus, not only were the votes of the soldiers a significant asset at the election, but their influence with the general populace was also pivotal in ensuring Murena's success at the polls. The talk of Lucullus' soldiers was especially influential in helping increase Murena's reputation with the people. According to Cicero,

> talk like this is important: "He saved my life when I was wounded; he gave me a share of the booty; he was our leader when we took the camp and engaged the enemy; he never asked a soldier to endure more hardship than himself; he was lucky as well as brave.[183]

Through talk like this the people of Rome learned about Murena's bravery, generosity, leadership skills, and his reputation for luck. Moreover, Lucullus' commendation also impressed upon the people Murena's qualifications for the consulship. All of the above had an influential impact on the general populace, which helped sway their vote in favor of Murena's candidacy.

Constant attendance from a variety of men gave a man's campaign much pomp and

prestige, which in turn garnered much electoral support for a candidate. The *Commentariolum* advised Cicero "to take great pains, besides, to acquire young nobles, or rather to keep the enthusiasm of those whom you have acquired: they will bring you great prestige."[184] Especially important was attendance by distinguished friends, which the *Commentariolum* refers to in this capacity as *deductores*, from among the order of the knights, the nobles, the senators, and those men a candidate had defended in the law courts. According to Cicero, "if they come in large numbers to our houses and on occasion accompany us down to the Forum, if they condescend to walk with us the length of a public hall, we think that we are receiving great attention and respect."[185] By providing this service, *amici* helped a candidate win the favor of the people, mainly because a "large company of escorts makes a great impression and adds great prestige."[186]

A man running for office also had to present to the people the personal qualities they wanted in a candidate, impressing upon them his worthiness for public office. First, a candidate had to show off his ability to remember people and their names. "Nothing to my mind," Q. Cicero comments, "is so popular and gratifying."[187] At first this might appear trivial, but in Roman society it was seen as an agreeable trait for a man canvassing for office. When a candidate visited the forum in order to cultivate the populace he had to know and recognize the people previously canvassed, by name if possible, and treat them as if they were intimates even if they were not, because "people are charmed more by looks and words than by the substantial benefits received."[188]

If a candidate wished to win the favor of the masses, then ingratiation was another necessary skill. Although contemporary Romans viewed ingratiation as crude and base most of the time, but in the canvass it was "indispensable for a candidate, whose facial expression and conversation must be modified and adapted to the humor and the inclination of all whom he meets."[189] One's public persona needed to adapt equally to rich as well as poor men, urban and rural, young and old. Obviously the favor of some

men were more important than others during the canvass, but no man could be ignored. Cicero is advised to let no man be in a position of saying that he has not been canvassed with diligence and vigor (N. 59). The candidate had to stay in Rome at all times and continuously attend the forum, shaking men's hands and kissing babies (or the Roman equivalent). He had to flatter men with praise and charm them with his oratorical skills in order to win their hearts and minds; when this was achieved their votes would follow.

A wide display of generosity also established a strong public reputation: such repute positively influenced the voting behavior of the Roman populace. Generosity often took the form of public games and or banquets, which were supposed to be provided for out of the rising politician's own private means. Election to the aedileship was especially important for the rising politician because one of its primary functions was to give feasts and games for the public benefit. When Julius Caesar was aedile in 63, he staged games including 320 pairs of gladiators fighting in combat, also sparing no expense on theatrical performances, processions, and munificent public banquets. Plutarch states the result of this magnificent display "was to make the people so favorably disposed towards him that every man among them was trying to find new offices and new honors to bestow upon him in return for what he had done."[190] Nor was Caesar's extravagance during his aedileship by any means unusual. In fact, Cicero's testimony in *De Officiis* unrolls name after name of prominent men who staged magnificent games and banquets during their aedileships.[191]

Cicero lamented candidates having to "squander their money on public banquets, doles of meat among the people, gladiatorial shows, magnificent games, and wild-beast fights."[192] Cicero, however, was above all a realist when it came to politics, which made him accept as fact that sometimes extravagant expenditures on the part of rising politicians were unavoidable: "And yet I realize that in our country, even in the good old times, it had become a settled custom to expect magnificent entertainments from the very best men in their year of aedileship."[193] Cicero himself was rare in that his aedileship was not

marked by magnificent public displays designed to win the favor of the people. During his aedileship, however, Cicero did use his own private resources to lower the price of grain in Rome, which in actuality was merely another way besides games and feasts to secure general popularity among the masses. Moreover, a candidate's *amici* often gave banquets in his behalf, assembling the people either at large or tribe by tribe. Although games and banquets could not reach all the citizenry, a candidate should have his friends and adherents praise the munificence of these displays to the larger Roman populace, implying that positive rumors such as these will favorably dispose the people towards his candidacy.[194]

Failure to give magnificent banquets and or games could hinder a man's advancement up the *cursus honorum* to the consulship. Such was the case of Aemilius Lepidus Mamercus Livinianus, a very wealthy man who failed in his bid for the consulship precisely because he refused early in his political career to accept the aedileship and the responsibility of having to pay for public displays.[195] Quintus Tubero, who despite his noble lineage, failed in his bid for the praetorship not because he failed to give the people a game or a feast, but rather because the feast he did give was cheaply arranged, including earthenware crocks and goatskins instead of the more expensive coverings and silver cups.[196] Cicero is advised to avoid any suspicion of cheapness: "the Roman people loathe private luxury, but they love public splendor."[197] On the other hand, Cicero attributes Murena's election to the consulship in large part to the splendor of the public games he presented to the people as praetor. In the following passage Cicero explains to the prosecutor in Murena's *ambitus* trial, Servius Sulpicius, the electoral significance his client's games had on winning the favor of the general populace:

> Do not treat with such complete contempt the fine arrangements for his games and the splendor of his shows which helped him so much. Need I mention that games have great attraction for the people and the ignorant herd? There is nothing less surprising. Yet that is enough for my case; elections are decided by the people and the masses. If, then, the splendor of games has such an attraction for the people, it is not surprising that it won their support for Lucius Murena. If we, who are able

> to derive many pleasures of a different kind from our work which keeps us from the entertainments enjoyed by the people, are delighted and attracted by games, why be surprised at the attraction they hold for the ignorant masses (*multitudo indocta*).

Cicero's main thrust in this passage is that Murena's games helped him to win the favor of the floating voter. Moreover, Murena's popularity with the masses was reportedly an entirely sufficient explanation for why he won the consular election. It is, of course, important to recognize Cicero was trying to maximize the electoral benefit Murena received from his games in order to show that he didn't need to resort to bribery to win the election. Whether or not Murena needed to resort to bribery, and whether or not Murena's games sufficiently explained his success at the polls is irrelevant. Cicero's argument that games in and of themselves carried enough weight with the people to decide a consular election must have rung of the truth to the jurors, or else such an argument certainly would have rung hollow in the courtroom and Murena would not have been found not guilty. Moreover, the importance of splendid shows and games in influencing voting behavior is not presented in the evidence as an aberration peculiar to Murena's canvass; rather Cicero emphasizes they were a well known and accepted part of Republican politics.[198]

Unquestionably, too, illegal electioneering methods served as a powerful mechanism for securing the favor of the uncommitted voter. The distribution of money by candidates was the most blatant form of electoral corruption. Bribe money was distributed in both assemblies through *divisores*, who were agents and officials of the tribes. *Divisores* often did the legitimate job of distributing money from leading tribesmen to their *tribules* (i.e. the flow of resources from tribal patron to his clients), but they also served as intermediaries for bribes given to the tribes by candidates. Cicero charged that Verres bribed *divisores* to defeat him for the aedileship. "I found out" Cicero maintains, "that baskets full of Sicilian money were handed over by a certain senator to a roman knight . . . and that the *divisores* of all the tribes were called to him by night."[199] It is

often difficult to tell who exactly received the money, or how much was in the bribe. It seems plausible to assume that if large amounts of people were bribed the amounts would be quite small, and thus the rich would be less likely to be influenced by such bribes. Conversely, a candidate could also bribe a select few individuals with large bribes. Murena was charged with trying to bribe the equestrian centuries, which were small enough for their voting behavior to be sufficiently swayed by large bribes to a select group of individuals.[200] Similarly, in 53 two candidates vying for the consulship were willing to pay as much as ten million sesterces for the vote of only a single century, *centuria praerogativa*.[201] In short, bribery was rampant in the late Republic. Q. Cicero ineffectively attempts to diminish the fear he has that bribery might ruin his brother's bid for the consulship when he states "that no election is so polluted with bribery that some centuries do not return, without bribes, the candidates with whom they have a very special bond."[202] One can certainly infer from this statement the obvious prevalence bribery must have played in Republican elections. In order to curb the affects of bribery, Cicero is advised to strike fear into the other candidates and *divisores* with threats of prosecution.[203] Moreover, the case of Murena showed that bribery could easily be concealed within the legitimate exchange of resources between patrons and clients. Because bribery was so easily passed off as legitimate *beneficia*, it seems plausible to assume that this made it even more appealing to ambitious candidates hoping to gain an advantage.

Conclusion

Out of this evidence a new conception concerning the importance of patronage in Republican elections emerges. Let us examine, for the sake of cogency, the main points which support this new conception. In light of the interpretation of patronage put forth in this second chapter, one is able to view retrospectively how crucial the theoretical, methodological, and comparative examinations were in the first chapter for establishing

the parameters upon which patronage would be examined in the primary evidence. The interpretation in the second chapter simply would have had no foundation without these elucidations.

In the purely theoretical realm, the examination of what exactly constituted a patron-client bond provided a valuable working definition, allowing us to differentiate between relationships within the rubric of clientelism with those that were not. Yet dependence upon a purely ideal theory of patron-client relationships would be seriously damaging, if not fatal, to this analysis: it would simplify the multiplicity and disregard too many facets of an actual moving situation. Seeing patron-client relationships in the evidence only where the words *patrocinium*, *patronus*, and *cliens* appear is inadequate because it is superficial: it takes into account too few aspects of patronage, it explains things too ideally, it overemphasizes only the explicit references to patronage and ignores the social conditions these relationships existed in, and it ignores patron-client relationships contained in Republican society which are not readily apparent or easily discernible. Therefore, the methodology for this thesis required an examination of patronage in the primary evidence not only where it exists explicitly but also where it exists implicitly. Thus, words such as *amicus*, *beneficium*, *officium*, and *gratia* also served as examples of patronage relationships in the evidence when their context supported such an interpretation. Without doubt, the interpretation in the second chapter could never have developed and come to fruition without an examination of these words that implicitly referred to patronage relationships. Furthermore, the comparative analysis with the parallel system of patronage in Catania, Italy provided a valuable model upon which to compare and illustrate the main dynamics and principles acting within the Republican patronage structure.

The significance of the interpretation set forth in the second chapter, when cast against the backdrop of the ongoing debate between the traditionalists and the revisionists, arises from its integration of both arguments into a balanced interpretation. Between

them, this synthesis has rendered the two diametrically opposed schools out-of-date, or (properly speaking) not so plainly wrong as merely inadequate. Limited in its concerns, too superficial and structured in its perspective of clientelism, the orthodox school presents an interpretation inadequate for explaining both the organization and importance of patronage in the elections of the late Republic. The view put forth in the preceding pages diminishes the orthodox hypothesis to a very large extent, and supports the revisionists' contention that patronage was not the dominant force in Republican politics. It has been shown that a few nobles in fact did not control large blocks of patronage, but rather these ties were dispersed among many *amici* or middlemen-patrons. This fragmented organization obviously brings with it more fluidity and unreliability into the patronage system, which results in a much weaker system of clientelism than what Gelzer and his later proponents had envisioned.

Moreover, in order to understand Republican politics one cannot focus simply on ties of patronage, as has been the case with many of those in the orthodox camp, but rather one must also take into account the votes of the general populace and how candidates went about securing those votes. The votes of the undifferentiated masses were won through games, banquets, illegal methods, and above all a strong public reputation. Thus, it is also true that popular methods of canvassing were also indispensable for electoral success. Yet the evidence does not suggest that patron-client ties were of negligible importance, as some of the revisionists like Yakobson and Millar have argued. The preceding pages should have convinced the reader, if nothing else, that although patronage was not the key to deciding elections, it was nevertheless an indispensable aspect of late Republican politics. It is in a sense inevitable that out of two opposing camps a moderate synthesis of both arguments will emerge, and this thesis is a representation of that moderate view: a view which states that the revisionists were correct in that the orthodox view clearly overestimated the significance of patronage ties in Republican politics, and envisioned a much more stable structure of patron-client

relations than actually existed; but that the revisionists went too far in claiming that patronage was of negligible influence on the outcome of elections.

Endnotes

1 See Alexander Callow, The Tweed Ring (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1966), Theodore J. Lowi, At the Pleasure of the Mayor: Patronage and Power in New York City. 1898-1958 (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).

2 See for general information on patronage and its development Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies eds. E. Gellner and J. Waterbury (London: Duckworth, 1977); Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development eds. S.N. Eisenstadt and Rene Lemarchand (London: Sage Publications, 1981). See for general information on patronage in ancient societies Patronage in Ancient Society ed. Andrew Wallice-Hadrill (New York: Routledge, 1989).

3 Mathias Gelzer, The Roman Nobility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969) 139.

4 This has been a prevalent opinion among Roman historians. T.P. Wiseman, New Men in the Roman Senate (London: Oxford University Press, 1971) 125: "In these elections (elections in the *comitia tributa*), therefore, the urban *plebs*, and those in the rural tribes but with little property, had far more to say than in the centuriate assembly, where they were practically disenfranchised." P.A. Brunt, The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988) 429: "The votes of the poor . . . counted for almost nothing in the centuriate assembly." P.A. Brunt, Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic (London: Chatto and Windus, 1971) 9: "the real power always belonged to the aristocratic Senate, which could normally manipulate and check the assemblies." J. Suolahti, Junior Officers of the Roman Army in the Republican Period 15: "For in the elections no real freedom of choice existed among the electorate, since their decisions were guided by numerous bondages and ties, from family relations and frienships to factors such as *clientela* and bribery."

5 Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, "Patronage in Roman Society: From Republic to Empire," Patronage in Ancient Society Ed. Andrew Wallace-Hadrill (New York: Routledge, 1989) 71.

6 Fergus Millar, "The Political Character of the Classical Roman Republic," Journal of Roman Studies 74 (1984) 2.

7 Alexander Yakobson, "*Petitio et Largitio:* Popular Participation in the Centuriate Assembly of the Late Republic," Journal of Roman Studies 82 (1992) 34. See also for the importance of *ambitus:* Andrew Lintott, "Electoral Bribery in the Roman Republic," Journal of Roman Studies 80 (1990) 1-16.

8 There has been some controversy concerning the authenticity of the *Commentariolum Petitionis* because it does not appear in the *Codex Mediceus* of Cicero's letters with his brother Quintus, however, it does appear at the end of Marcus' letters with his brother in other sources. For a discussion regarding its authenticity see R.G.M. Nisbet, "The *Commentariolum Petitionis*: Some Arguments Against Authenticity," Journal of Roman Studies: 84-7.

9 Terry Johnson and Christopher Dandeker. "Patronage: Relation and System," Patronage in Ancient Society ed. Andrew Wallice-Hadrill (New York: Routledge, 1989) 231.

10 S.N. Eisenstadt and Luis Roniger, "The Study of Patron-Client Relations and Recent Developments in Sociological Theory, Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development, eds. S.N. Eisenstadt and Rene Lemarchand (London: Sage Publications, 1981) 276-77. Luis Roniger "Modern Patron-Client Relations and Historical Clientelism," Archives Europeenes De Sociologio 24 (1983/4) 69-73.

11 S. N. Eisenstadt and Luis Roniger 276-7.

12 Andrew Wallice-Hadrill 78.

13 Millar 17.

14 Richard P. Saller, Personal Patronage Under the Early Empire (Cambridge: Cambrdge University Press, 1982) 9.

15 ibid. 7.

16 ibid. 10-11.

17 Marcus Tullius Cicero, " *Epistulae Ad Quintum Fratrem*," Cicero in Twenty-Eight Volumes vol.10, trans. W. Glynn Williams (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972) 16, p.457: *omnes et se et suos amicos, clientis, libertos, servos, pecunias denique suas pollicentur.*

18 See Lily Ross Taylor, Party Politics in the Age of Caesar (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961) 54: Taylor implies many freedemen in Rome were important clients of the great noble houses when she argues that "from the late fourth to the second century there seems to have been a persistent effort on the part of the nobles to increase their own prestige by having their property-owning freedmen registered in the rural tribes." Erik Wistrand, Caesar and Contemporary Roman Society (Goteborg: Kungl. Vetenskaps- och Vitterhets-Samhallet, 1978) 8.

19 Erik Wistrand, Caesar and Contemporary Roman Society (Goteborg: Kungl. Vetenskaps- och Vitterhets-Samhallet, 1978) 20.

20 Saller 15.

21 Brunt, The Fall 355.

22 Marcus Tullius Cicero, "*De Officiis*," Cicero in Twenty-Eight Volumes vol. 21, trans. Walter Miller (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972) I. 47, p.51

23 *De Officiis* II. 30, p. 199.

24 Saller 14.

25 Marcus Tullius Cicero, "*De Amicitia*", Cicero in Twenty-Eight Volumes vol. 20, trans. William Armistead Falconer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press) 27, p. 139

26 *De Amicitia* 46, p. 157.

27 *De Amicitia* 27, p. 139.

28 Quintus Cicero, *Commentariolum Petitionis*, Cicero in Twenty-Eight Volumes vol. 28, trans. W. Glynn Williams (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972) 23, p.763.

29 Brunt, The Fall 381.

30 Gelzer 66

31 Marcus Tullius Cicero, "*Pro Murena*," Cicero in Twenty-Eight Volumes vol 10, trans C Macdonald (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1972) 7, p 195

32 *De Officiis* II. 63, p. 235.

33 Saller 17.

34 Rene Lemarchand, "Comparative Political Clientelism: Structure, Process and Optic," Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development (London: Sage Publications, 1981) 20.

35 Mario Caciagli and Frank P. Belloni, "The 'New' Clientelism in Southern Italy: The Christian Democratic Party in Catania," Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development (London: Sage Publications, 1981) 36.

36 Caciagli and Belloni 37.

37 James Scott, "Patronage or Exploitation," Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Society (London: Duckworth, 1977) 23-24.

38 Robert K. Merton, "Latent functions of the Machine," American Urban History: An Interpretive Reader with Commentaries (London: Oxford University Press, 1969) 293. See also Alexander Callow, The Tweed Ring (London: Oxford University Press, 1966) 117.

39 ibid 38.

40 ibid 39.

41 ibid 40.

42 Yakobson 34.

43 Keith Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) 22.

44 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Antiquitates Romanae* vol. 1, trans. Earnest Cary (Cambridge Harvard University Press) II 2.9, p. 33.

45 Hopkins 4.

46 ibid 3, 7.

47 Lemarchand 20.

48 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 18, p. 765.

49 T.P. Wiseman, "Competition and Co-operation," Roman Political Life 90B.C - A.D. 69 Ed. T.P. Wiseman (Exeter: University of Exeter, 1985) 7.

50 *Epistulae Ad Quintum Fratrem* 6, p.605.

51 *Epistulae Ad Quintum Fratrem* 4, p.539.

52 *Pro Murena* 86, p. 295.

53 *Pro Murena* 88, p. 297.

54 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 55, p. 761.

55 *Pro Murena* 55, p. 257.

56 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 53, p.787.

57 Paterson, 34-38.

58 Marcus Tullius Cicero, "*Pro Plancio*," Cicero in Twenty-Eight Volumes vol 11, trans. N.H. Watts (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972) 66, p. 493.

59 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 43, p. 781.

60 A person was considerd part of the nobility if a previous member of their family had reached the consulship. For example, when Cicero reached the consulship in 63 he brought nobility to his family. New men were candidates whose families had not previously reached the consulship.

61 See Mathias Gelzer, The Roman Nobility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), chapter 2; Lily Ross Taylor, Party Politics in the Age of Caesar (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1961), chapters 1-3.

62 Gelzer The Roman Nobility 101: "Thus it calls for no further explanation that in the genberal consciousness nobility was synonymous with the possession of many *clientelae*."

63 Taylor, Party Politics 2.

64 P.A. Brunt, The Fall 431: "Patronage was one of many factors that affected voting behavior, and the evidence does not warrant the conclusion that it counted more than any other; rather it suggests that it was of subordinate importance;" Fergus Millar 2: "But the existence of these structures [patronage] is itself a modern hypothesis, which has very little support in our evidence;" Alexander Yakobson 34: "It is by no means certain that Roman elections were dominated by the patronage system to such an extent; indeed, the very fact that electoral corruption was so rampant in the late Republic can be seen as proving that the traditional patronage system was in crisis and did not control large sections of the electorate."

65 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 16, p. 761.

66 *Pro Plancio* 12, p. 419.

67 *Pro Plancio* 46-7, p. 467.

68 *Pro Plancio* 12 and 51-2, pgs. 421, 473, 475.

69 Millar 13.

70 H.F. Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972) 47.

71 Jolowicz 23.

72 Lily Ross Taylor, Roman Voting Assemblies: From the Hannibalic War to the Dictatorship of Caesar (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966) chptr. 4.

73 ibid., Roman Voting Assemblies 67.

74 H.F Jolowicz 81: 'it was, of course, impossible for the great majority of voters to attend the assembly except very occasionally.'

75 *Pro Plancio* 15, p. 425.

76 *Pro Plancio* 9, p. 417.

77 Lily Ross Taylor, The Voting Districts of the Roman Republic (Rome: American Academy in Rome, 1960) 13.

78 Thomas Mitchell, Cicero: The Ascending Years (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979) 100.

79 Wolfgang Kunkel, An Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitutional History (London: Clarendon Press, 1966) 11.

80 Yakobson, 45.

81 ibid. 46. Yakobson notes for evidence the election of 64, where the split in the voting was deep and Antonius received only a few more centuries than his rival Catiline. A similar voting split was also said to have happened in the previous year or a few years before, when L. Turius lost the election by only a few centuries.

82 Asconius, Commentaries on the Five Speeches of Cicero trans. Simon Squires (Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1990) 94, p.145.

83 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 51, p. 787.

84 Asconius, 145.

85 Yakobson, 47.

86 Mary Beard and Michael Crawford, Rome in the Late Republic: Problems and Interpretations (London: Duckworth, 1986) 50-51.

87 Taylor Roman Voting Assemblies 97. See alsoWiseman New Men 125.

88 *Pro Plancio* 49, p. 471.

89 *Epistulae Ad Quintum Fratrem* 4, p. 539.

90 *Pro Murena* 73, p.277; *Pro Plancio* 47, p. 467.

91 *Pro Murena* 72, p. 277.

92 *Pro Plancio* 21-22, p. 433.

93 Mitchell 101.

94 *Pro Plancio* 20, p. 431.

95 *Pro Plancio* 19-20, p. 431.

96 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 17, p. 763.

97 *Pro Murena* 71, p. 275.

98 *Pro Plancio* 11, p. 419.

99 *Pro Murena* 36, p. 233.

100 *Pro Plancio* 10, p. 419.

101 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 34-5, p. 775.

102 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 35, p. 775.

103 Brunt, The Fall 300

104 Johnson-Dandekar 240.

105 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 35, p. 775.

106 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 37, p. 777.

107 *Pro Murena* 70, p. 275.

108 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 36-7, p. 777.

109 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 34, p. 775.

110 Mitchell 95.

111 *Pro Murena* 45, p. 245.

112 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 21-24, p. 767.

113 *Pro Plancio* 23-4, p. 435.

114 *Pro Plancio* 24, p. 435.

115 *Pro Plancio* 32, p. 449.

116 *Pro Plancio* 24, p. 435.

117 *Pro Plancio* 24, p. 437.

118 *Pro Plancio* 48, p. 469.

119 *Pro Plancio* 21, p. 433.

120 *Pro Plancio* 27-29, p 439-443.

121 *Pro Plancio* 30, p. 445.

122 *Pro Plancio* 46, p. 467.

123 *Pro Plancio* 45, p. 463.

124 *Pro Plancio* 45, p. 463.

125 *Pro Plancio* 45, p. 465. *Commentariolum Petitionis* 18, p. 763.

126 *Pro Plancio* 1, p. 407.

127 *Pro Plancio* 6, p. 413.

128 *Pro Plancio* 25, p. 439.

129 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 29, p. 771.

130 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 29-30, p. 771.

131 *Pro Murena* 42, p. 241.

132 Marcus Tullius Cicero, "*The Verrine Orations I*," Cicero in Twenty-Eight Volumes vol. 7, trans. L.H.G. Greenwood (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972) 181, p. 487.

133 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 20, p. 765.

134 See also T.P. Wiseman New Men in the Roman Senate 35. Thomas Mitchell Cicero: The Ascending Years 98-106.

135 Marcus Tullius Cicero, "*Epistulae Ad Atticum*," Cicero in Twenty Eight Volumes vol 22, trans E O Winstedt (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1972) 19, p 85

136 Marcus Tullius Cicero, "*Epistulae Ad Familiares* I," vol 27, trans W Glynn Williams (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972) 2, p 19

137 idem

138 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 19, p. 765.

139 Taylor, Party Politics 36 and 64.

140 Marcus Tullius Cicero, "*Pro Sestio*," Cicero in Twenty-Eight Volumes vol 12, trans. R. Gardner (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972) 9, p. 47. "*In L. Calpurnium Pisonem Oratio*," Cicero in Twenty-Eight Volumes vol.14, trans. N H Watts (Cambridge: Harvard University Press) 25, p. 171.

141 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 19, p. 765.

142 *Epistulae Ad Familiares* II 1, p. 107.

143 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 3, p. 753.

144 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 39, p. 777.

145 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 19-20, p. 765.

146 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 31, p. 773.

147 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 28, p. 771.

148 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 39, p. 777.

149 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 18, p. 763-5.

150 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 18, p. 763-5.

151 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 22-3, p. 767.

152 Taylor, Party Politics 67.

153 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 24, p. 767.

154 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 25, p. 769.

155 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 26-7, p. 769.

156 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 26, p. 769.

157 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 31, p. 771.

158 *Pro Murena* 43-4, p. 243.

159 *Pro Murena* 7, p. 193.

160 *Pro Murena* 7-8, p. 195.

161 *Pro Murena* 45, p. 245.

162 *Pro Murena* 53, p. 255.

163 *Pro Murena* 67, p. 271.

164 *Pro Murena* 70, p. 275.

165 *Pro Murena* 71-2, p. 277

166 *Pro Murena* 72, p. 277

167 *Pro Murena* 72, p. 277.

168 *Pro Murena* 73, p. 279.

169 Brunt, The Fall 395

170 *Epistulae Ad Familiares* II 3, p. 109.

171 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 18, p. 763.

172 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 41-2, p. 779.

173 Lintott, 8.

174 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 50, p. 785-7.

175 *Pro Murena* 30, p. 223.

176 *Epistulae Ad Atticus* II 22.3, p. 183.

177 *Epistulae Ad Quintum Fratrem* p. 493.

178 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 2, p. 751.

179 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 38, p. 777.

180 *Pro Murena* 30, p. 225.

181 *Pro Murena* 37, p. 235.

182 *Pro Murena* 38, p. 235.

183 *Pro Murena* 38, p. 235.

184 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 6, p. 753.

185 *Pro Murena* 70, p. 275.

186 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 36-7, p. 777.

187 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 42, p. 779.

188 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 46, p. 783.

189 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 42, p. 781.

190 Plutarch, Fall of the Roman Republic trans. Rex Warner (New York: Penguin Books, 1972) 248.

191 *De Officiis* 57, p. 229: 'So both Publius Crassus . . . gave splendid games in his aedileship; and a little later Lucius Crassus (with Quintus Mucius, the most unpretentious man in the world, as his colleague) gave most magnificent entertainments in his aedileship. Then came Gaius Claudius, the son of Appius, and after him, many others---the Luculli, Hortensius, and Silanus. Publius Lentulus, however, in the year of my consulship, eclipsed all that had gone before him, and Scaurus emulated him.'

192 *De Officiis* 56, p. 227.

193 *De Officiis* 57, p. 229.

194 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 44, p. 781.

195 *De Officiis* 58, p. 229.

196 *Pro Murena* 75-6, p. 283.

197 *De Officiis* 58, p. 231. *Pro Murena* 76, p. 283.

198 *Pro Murena* 40 p. 239.

199 Marcus Tullius Cicero, "*In C. Verrem Actio* I," Cicero in Twenty-Eight Volumes vol. 7, trans. L.H.G. Greenwood (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972) 22,p. 89.

200 *Pro Murena* 54, p. 255.

201 *Epistulae Ad Quintum Fratrem* II 14.4.

202 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 56-7, p. 791.

203 *Commentariolum Petitionis* 57, p. 791.

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