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THE ALBANIAN CRISIS IN YUGOSLAVIA:
AN IGNITED FUSE


A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
FOR A BACHELOR OF ARTS DEGREE IN
HISTORY OF PUBLIC POLICY

BY

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SANTA BARBARA, CALIFORNIA

JUNE 1987



SOURCE: Prepared for Problems of Communism by the
Cartographic Services Laboratory, Department of Geography,
University of Maryland College Park, MD, from US Central
Intelligence Agency base map 504463, Yugoslavia, January 1981.

The Balkans, the supposed "powder keg" of Europe, possess a nationalistic fuse which if not carefully controlled could be ignited. This fuse is the current Albanian crisis. The problem of nationalism in the Balkans has been around for centuries. From the time of Ottoman occupation various nationalities, Serbs, Croats, Albanians, Hungarians, and Bulgars, have been struggling for their own national dominance and liberation. The relationship between the Yugoslavs and the Albanians has been an especially trying one, which is being challenged still to the present day. The issue of Yugoslav-Albanian nationalism is a very emotion laden issue. Kosovo, the area of Yugoslavia within the Republic of Serbia inhabited predominantly by Albanians, was not only the birthplace of Albanian nationalism, but also the center of the Serbian heritage. These two nationalities are vying for the preservation of their heritages as well as the strengthening of their national rights. The social, economic, and political implications of various policies make solutions to this joint struggle practically impossible. It could be described as a sort of "Catch 22". If the government supports a policy giving more rights to the Albanians, then the Serbs feel forced to emigrate from the area. If a policy is enacted to benefit the Serbs, then the Albanians feel that their national rights have been violated. One can wonder if a just solution is possible.

The outbreak of the riots and demonstrations in Kosovo in 1981 were an example of the seriousness of the Albanian crisis. For many years the

problems and concerns of the Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo have not been top priority on the government's agenda. Even after the outbreak of riots in 1981, the government overreacted and failed to discover the true causes of those demonstrations. In the past several years the Kosovo and Yugoslav governments have begun to realize the serious implications of the Albanians upon Serbia, Yugoslavia, and the Balkans, due to the increased number of Serbs emigrating from their homeland and the greater majority of Albanians occupying the area. The Balkan Peninsula is important to the two world powers, the U.S. and the Soviet USSR, politically, strategically and militarily, and instability in any part of this area could cause instability in Europe as a whole. The issue of the Albanian majority in Kosovo can no longer be avoided. The whole country must work together to find a solution. According to one Yugoslav author, Dimitrije Bogdanovic, "It must be understood that the problem of Kosovo and Yugoslavia is not a problem of one nationality against another, but of one nation versus another nation."¹ By analyzing the general historical development of Kosovo, the relations between Yugoslavia and Albania, the demonstrations of 1981 and the current emigration of the Serbs, as well as the social, economic, and political implications of each, one can more fully understand the complexity of the crisis as well as discover the inherent failure of the government to realize the importance of the Albanian problem sooner.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

To better understand the depth of the differences between Yugoslavia and Albania which resulted in the Albanian crisis, one must consider the general historical development and events that shaped Serbian and Albanian nationalism and the relations between the two. This history can be divided

into several periods: pre 1914, the interwar period, and finally WWII thru the 1950's. Kosovo- Albanian relations during the 60's and 70's will be discussed later and in more detail.

Historians differ in opinion as to the whether or not the first settlers of the Kosovo Region were the Slavs or the Illyrians. The general consensus seems to be that the Albanians were descendants of the Illyrians and that in approximately 600 B.C the Slavs settled the Peninsula. Several archaeological finds have given evidence to the Illyrian occupation of the area that the Albanians now occupy. Also, the Albanian language comes from the Indo-European group.

Yugoslavia's affiliation to two worlds, Western Europe and Byzantium, influenced various regions of Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia. The divisions, completed at the end of the medieval period, can account for the cultural differences that exist today not only between Albanians and Yugoslavs, but also between Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

The Nemanja dynasty ruled the Serbian Kingdom from 1168-1371. From 1331-1355, Stefan Dusan of the Nemanjic dynasty proclaimed himself ruler over parts of Greece and Albania, but not everyone recognized him as such. He had plans to form a coalition against the Turks, but his death halted all such plans. As a result of his reign the Serbian State expanded greatly. His weakness, however, was the fact that his power depended on the cooperation of landlords. Unfortunately antagonisms among them were rooted in different ethnical origins. The lands also lacked inner cohesion. The boundaries and frameworks that followed this period influenced the development of Yugoslav divisions under the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman states in later centuries.

One of the major events that resulted in the emotional buildup of the Kosovo problem and was the focal point of Serbian nationalism was the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. The battle of Kosovo was a battle between the Turks and the Slavs. The Serbian Prince Lazar was defeated by the Turks. The glorification of the war heroes in oral epic poetry provided incentive for future battles against the Turks, fighting in hope of "avenging Kosovo." "The battle of Kosovo, like the Alamo, was a battle of courage and heroism which determined the fate of the land for the next five centuries."² Some people describe Kosovo as "transcendental."³ This is derived from the fact that "many people died on the land in Kosovo (making it a grave) but allowing for re-births and a new life. Many cultures as well as religions have crossed paths there, Christians, Moslems, Albanians, Austrians, Magarys, Bysantines, Serbs, Bulgars and many more."⁴ This author's view is a little melodramatic but it exemplifies the lasting impact that this battle had upon the Serbs. Because this battle was a major part of Serbian folklore and heritage might be one of the reasons that the Serbs in Kosovo today feel threatened by the Albanians who are forcing them to leave their "holy land."

The five century Ottoman occupation of the Balkan peninsula was probably the single event which had the most influence upon Kosovo-Albanian relations and the economic, and political conditions of Kosovo today. During the 15th to the beginning of the 16th century the Turks took over most of Yugoslavia, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Serbia. The Turkish occupation resulted in conflicts among Christian and Islamic religions. The political and social order of Yugoslav lands was destroyed, and major demographic changes took place. The Turkish influence changed the historical course of the Yugoslav people and introduced them to a new culture

and spiritual elements. The current underdevelopment of the Kosovo region could be attributed to the Turkish conquests, which halted the economic integration of Balkan countries into Europe causing the system to permanently lag behind other European countries. Under Turkish rule the Serbs and Albanians had to decide upon the Islam or Christian religion. Moslem converts received more prestige and material wealth. The Albanian region was easier to convert, because they had no unifying religion and were not tied too closely to Christianity. The Serbs, on the other hand, adhered to Christianity as their only bond and unifying thread. The Albanians claimed "Ku este shpata este feja."⁵ (your faith is where the sword is). The Albanians were better warriors than the Serbs and therefore more pleasing to the Turks. During this period conflicts among the Moslems and Christians and more specifically between the Albanians and the Serbs erupted. People who converted to the Moslem religion were allowed to carry guns, which caused much resentment among other South Slavs. The Albanians saw the Turks as valuable assets and took advantage of them relating to the Ottoman government, rather than dreaming of their own Albanian state. The Serbs, on the other hand, had a heritage to uphold (the Battle of Kosovo). They dreamed of a true Balkan State and would rather have died than convert. After the 1683-1690 Austro-Turkish Wars, the mass of Serbs, under their patriarch, left Kosovo and moved to Southern Hungary, fearing reprisals from the Turks. The Albanians moved into Kosovo, filling the created vacuum. During the late 17th to early 18th centuries, the Turks were trying to convince the Albanians to settle in Kosovo and the lower regions of Yugoslavia, while the Austrians accepted the Christian Serbs, and organized them into their hereditary frontier.

Another reason that the Serbs were so attached to the Kosovo region was because of the return of their patriarch to Pec in 1557. The patriarch (the head of the Serbian religion) helped to promote the unity of the Serbian people. Austria used the patriarch of Pec to gain assistance against the Turks. The Turks tried to gain Serbian support through the patriarch but when he was removed in 1766 the Turks had to look to the Greeks for support. The abolishment of the Serbian patriarch meant that there was no center for the Serbian national movement. Luckily the second center of Serbianism (Montenegro) was able to pick up the pieces and consider themselves the heirs to Serbian statehood. The many monuments and monestaries in Kosovo are examples of the Serbian heritage in the area. The monestaries also provide evidence of the Serbian dominance of Kosovo during the Middle Ages. Not a single Albanian historical monument exists in Kosovo. By the end of the 18th century the idea of developing Yugoslav nation states was underway. Religious differences made universal integration more difficult. Up until the 19th century religion was the framework of communities.

In the Treaty of Karlowitz 1699 the Turks gave up huge areas of land without compensation. The Danube became the frontier line between the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires. The Serbian Revolutions (1804-1815) were a result of the struggle for independance and a Serbian national society was created, peasants were emancipated, and the Serbian State initiated. This state proved threatening to the Albanians because they did not have a nationalist organization or party strong enough to combat the Serbs. Austria attempted to build an Albanian border between Serbia and Montenegro in order to keep the Serbs from gaining a coastal port, which would lessen their dependence on Austria. The Albanians saw Constantiople as a protector and

the Montenegrins saw it as a symbol of Serbian oppression. The Albanians, instead of rising up and fighting, found protection in the Ottoman Empire. Maybe this could account for the tendency of the Albanians to isolate themselves in Kosovo today.

The Eastern crisis of the 1875-1878 period was important not only for the entire Balkan peninsula, but also for Albania. This period was the first time that the Albanian problem was seen as such to the great powers. No one participating in the Berlin Congress of 1878 had expected that their decisions concerning the Albanian territory would arouse such opposition. The treaty became one of the most significant documents for the national liberation movements, establishing Romania, Serbia and Montenegro as independent nations. At the Berlin Conference, the great powers kept considering Albania to be Turkish territory. The powers failed to recognize the national interests of the Albanians. The Albanians in March 1878 felt threatened when they learned that the Treaty of Saint Stephan between Russia and Turkey gave Albanian territories to the Balkan states. On June 10, 1878 three days after the opening of the Berlin Congress 80 delegates gathered from various areas of Albanian territory. Their goal was to invite the delegates "to unite in a single front against the danger of the partitioning of the country and to form a national league according to the old Albanian tradition."⁶ This league was called the League of Prizren. The league fought for "the realization of the fundamental goals of the national movement: for the recognition of the Albanian nation as an indivisible whole, and respect for its rights as a nation in all directions, for the defense of the inviolability and integrity of the Albanian national territories, and for the uniting of the Albanian lands into a single unit under Albanian administration."⁷ The League of Prizren created a

solid base for later struggles for freedom, independence and social progress. The League also forced the Great Powers at the Congress of Berlin to acknowledge the importance of the Albanian factor in the solution of the Balkan crisis. This was the first time that the Albanians formed a group to unite themselves nationally. During most of the 19th century the Albanians were faced with a situation unlike the Greeks and Serbs. The Albanians had no national identity, no common written language upon which to unite and no national culture. By 1881 the League was unable to resist the Ottoman invasion and the movement collapsed. The League, despite its failure, did accomplish a lot. Greece and Montenegro received less Albanian land than they would have otherwise. In between, at the turn of the century and under the Ottoman-Albanian pressure, a good number of Serbs left Kosovo and moved to Serbia.

The 1912-1913 Balkan Wars and London Conference continued the debate over what to do with the Albanian territories. During the London Conference December, 1912, it was decided that the great powers would insist on the formation of an Albanian state. Most of the powers felt that Serbia should withdraw from Albania. Also the Serbs wanted the Serbian Albanian border to be as far West as possible. This would allow Serbia a safe and neutral zone to the sea. Meanwhile the Austrians were upset because they did not want Serbia to have an outlet to the sea, for they feared that Serbia would not depend on them anymore. They led to the creation of an independent Albania, but left one-third of the Albanians outside its borders, in Serbia and Montenegro. The Balkan Wars of 1912, 1913 brought an end to Ottoman rule in the Balkan Peninsula. The pre 1914 period of historical development of the Balkan Peninsula can best be characterized by the struggle among powers for

the territory of the Ottoman heritage in the Balkans and the gradual affirmation of independent national states.

From the Balkan point of view, WWI was a continuation of the Balkan Wars. WWI was a war sparked by nationalist ambitions. It resulted in the dissolution of two multinational empires: Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian. The peace treaties that followed, such as the Versaille Treaty of 1918, confirmed the shape of the Balkan states. Yugoslavia and Albania were both recognized as their own entities. During the interwar period Yugoslavia became a royal dictatorship. This dictatorship adhered to harsh policies against the national minorities causing national conflicts to put an end to the constitutional government. After the war, the government tried to re-Serbianize Kosovo by abolishing the semi-feudal economic conditions that were present in the area. They also had to bring the Albanians into the political process. The Albanian struggle on the Ottoman side during the 1912 war and the reprisals of the Serbian army after WWI gave rise to the irredentist movement of Albanians in Yugoslavia. Irredentists are people who are natives of a specified country, in this case Albania, but who are living under foreign rule, Yugoslavia, yet wish to be reunited with their native country.

The status of the Albanians in Yugoslavia between the wars was repressed by difficult living and working conditions, and a lack of national, cultural, economic, and social rights. The government policy of denationalization failed to suppress the Albanian national consciousness. Albanian and Serbian nationalism has clashed since mid 19th century and during the Balkan Wars. The Albanians tended to become dependant on whomever controlled the Adriatic. In 1918 the formation of Yugoslavia united the South Slavs, but

also included the Albanians, Hungarians and other non Slavs. From 1919-28 the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) felt that the national problem could be solved by the local decentralization of government. Between 1918 and 1941 11,000 Serbian settlers were given land in Kosovo, and that land amounted to three times as much land as the local Albanian families received. The Albanians greatly resented this colonization. Kosovo was the only region that "could boast more prisons and police stations than schools."⁸ In between the wars the Communist Party opposed the denationalization policy.

More important to future relations between Yugoslavia and Albania and to the development of Albanian nationalism was the Post WWII resolutions and attempts made by Tito to reconcile government policy with Albanian nationalist desires. "The relations between Yugoslavia and Albania are scared by history, and the conditions following WWII has kept those scars afresh."⁹

During the 1930's the revolutionary movement in Kosovo grew. Tito, once promoted to General Secretaryship, stressed Yugoslav unity. But at the same time he also created separate Communist Parties for separate party organizations. At this time it was debatable whether or not the idea of separate parties was more unifying or whether it only increased already built up hostilities among the nationalities. In some ways this division could not be helped. The Croats rejected the unitarian set up of Yugoslavia. In 1937 they set up their own party as a reaction against the dominance of the Serbian establishment. In 1945 the Serbs set up their own party. The heritage of the old Austro-Hungarian social democracy, which had split the various nationalities into different socialist parties increased divisions among nationalities during this period.

In 1939 the Italian conquest of Albania took place. The Italians tried to portray themselves as the "liberators of the Albanians," claiming that they had returned them to their homeland. During the 1930's and 40's Enver Hoxha, the head of the Albanian labor party who ended up ruling until 1985, campaigned for the emancipation of Albania and the consolidation of the Albanian people as well as independence. From 1943-1945 several conferences and resolutions emerged which discussed the future status of the Albanian region in Yugoslavia. In September of 1943, Enver Hoxha described the National Liberation Struggle in Albania as a common struggle with the allies against the Axis Powers. He claimed that Albania's aim was to continue the resistance movements in Albania, Yugoslavia, and Greece and to forget the past. He felt that the Albanian people had suffered too long. The National Liberation Movement would attempt to show the Albanians in Kosovo that they could be liberated by fighting against the fascist invaders. Finally he claimed that the Albanian people in Kosovo would themselves eventually have to choose which side they wanted to join, Yugoslavia or Albania.

The Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party replied with this letter to the Albanian committee November of 1943:

To raise today the question of unification would mean giving a helping hand to various reactionaries, including the enemy himself... and it is hardly necessary to emphasize that between us and a democratic and anti-imperialist Albania this cannot possibly be an issue...The new Yugoslavia which is in the making will be a land of free nations, and consequently there shall be no room for national oppression.¹⁰

The Albanians at this time were upset because the Yugoslav communists had gone back on their promises of an independent Kosovo. This was the first conflict between the Kosovo and Albanian Communist Party. December of 1943-January 1944, as the war was coming to an end, the first Conference of

the People's Liberation for Kosovo and Metohija was held in Bujan, Albania. The resolution of the conference called for all Albanians in the region to unite in the common struggle with the other peoples of Yugoslavia against the occupiers and once liberty was gained, then the Albanians would be in a position to give themselves the right to self-determination, including the right to succession. The promise would come back to haunt the Communist Party later on.

Kosovo and Metohija form a region in which Albanian inhabitants preponderate; they, as always, still wish to be united with Albania. Consequently, our duty is to point to the true way which the Albanian people should take in order to achieve their aspirations. The only way for the Albanians of Kosovo and Metohija to unite with Albania is through a common struggle with the other nations of Yugoslavia against the invaders and their forces, because it is the only way to win freedom, when all the nations, including the Albanians will be able to choose their own destiny, with the right to self-determination- including secession. The guarantee is the National Liberation Army of Albania, with which it is closely linked. A further guarantee is our great allies, the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and the United States (The Atlantic Charter and the Moscow and Tehran Conferences).¹¹

Regarding the question of the future borders between Yugoslavia and Albania, it will be resolved by brotherly agreement and co-operation between the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia and the Council of National Liberation of Albania on the basis of the right of self-determination of nations. How the borders will be drawn will depend on the evolution of the political situation in Yugoslavia and Albania. At present we must not make any definite statements on this issue.¹²

After WWII, Tito met with Hoxha and when Hoxha asked Tito why the Albanian occupied areas of Yugoslavia were not given to Albania, when one of the reasons they had fought on the Yugoslav side during WWII was to gain those territories, Tito replied that the "Serbs would not understand."¹³ One might wonder if Kosovo had been given over to the Albanians if the current problems would have lessened. At this point it seems that the Serbian heritage

is too strong in that area and the predominant number of Serbian monestaries is too great.

After WWII two alternatives existed as to what to do with Kosovo. One was to partition Kosovo between Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia. The second was to give Kosovo autonomy within Serbia. In 1945 the government hoped that the solution would be only temporary because, until 1948, the Yugoslav Communist Party was still hoping for the creation of a Balkan Federation, which would have solved the Albanian problem by incorporating Kosovo into Albania. The Partisans in 1944-45 held a military campaign in Kosovo to deal with those suspected of collaborating with the enemy, and to establish Communist rule in that area. After 1945 the Albanians were recognized as a distinct national group. The military government was replaced with a civilian one.

Yugoslavia's break with the Comintern in 1948 ended the idea of a Balkan Federation as well as decreased relations with Albania. The break had nothing to do with ideology, but only with a struggle for power between Stalin and Tito. Tito was too independent a leader to be able to work with Stalin. Tirana, since Yugoslavia's break with the Cominform in 1948, has presented itself as "the defender of the Albanian brethren against discrimination by the Serbs."¹⁴ After the break, the Belgrade government felt that anti-Yugoslav propaganda in Tirana (Albania's capital) might reach the Albanians in Kosovo. Hoxha described this interference by the Yugoslavs as "the blackest page in the history of the party."¹⁵ Hoxha also felt that he had benefited from the break, because he did not want to be swallowed up by Yugoslavia. He was once quoted as saying "the enemy of my enemy is my

ally." meaning that the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia's enemy was now Albania's ally.

After de-Stalinization in Russia (1956), which resulted in the temporary relaxation between Yugoslavia and USSR in the 50's; and the Sino-Soviet split in the 60's, Albania moved toward China, got economic support and went through the Albanian version of the cultural revolution. Although Stalin stayed as the idol of the Albanian leaders, and still is today. After Mao's death in 1976, Albania moved away from China into international isolation.

Albanian-Yugoslav relations can best be characterized by oscillations between hostility, territorial problems, nationalism and differing economic and political outlooks of the elite. During the 1960's Albanian nationalism rose. The 1970's were characterized by a more lax cultural exchange between the two nations. During the 1980's, relations were disrupted by the riots of 1981, which exemplified the idea that the nationalist problem had not yet been worked out.

Albanian- Yugoslav relations before 1960 remained relatively tranquil due to the educational and economic backwardness of Kosovo, and because Kosovo was not integrated very well into mainstream Yugoslavia. Before 1966 Kosovo, "served as a colonial dependency, ruled, neglected, and exploited by Serbia and local Serbs."¹⁶ But in 1966 the Party was shaken by a disturbance from within, when Aleksander Rankovic, head of the Yugoslav Secret Police and Yugoslavian Interior Minister from 1945-1966, confessed to forcing the Albanians in Kosovo to leave. He was also held responsible for atrocities made against the Albanian population and minorities between 1952-1966. He became a symbol of the Serbian dominance in the postwar period. Sources in Tirana claimed that Belgrade had a policy of "barbaric crimes, odious

assassination, violations, and fascist torture of ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia."¹⁷ Tito's dismissal of Rankovic was the first sign that Tito was willing to reconcile some of Yugoslavia's differences with Tirana. At this time Tito realized that the rights and interests of the Kosovars had been neglected. With the fall of Rankovic, the Kosovar Albanians' demand for reform became irresistible. They soon began to feel that they should be granted the right to be separate from Serbia.

In 1967 and 1968, some of the Albanian intelligentsia demanded that Kosovo become a republic, but this idea was rejected by the Albanian nationals as unrealistic for two reasons: first, the other nationalities in Kosovo would not agree and secondly, the other republics would not endorse the idea without the o.k. of the Serbs, Macedonians and Montenegrins. This idea was forgotten for a while, but the feelings and ideas still lingered on. Then, on November 27, 1968, rioters demanded 1) a Kosovo republic, 2) the dropping of the word Metohija (a Serbian word) from the name Kosovo-Metohija, 3) the extension of the right of self determination, which was promised to them before WWII and never granted, and finally 4) they demanded the establishment of an independent University at Pristina. The riots resulted in the dropping of the name Metohija, granting of permission to the Kosovars to fly their Albanian flag, and the establishment in 1970 of a University at Pristina. Slogans such as "Long Live Enver Hoxha," and "Kosovo-Republic" were predominate amongst the rioters.¹⁸ The demonstrators, mostly students, threatened public order with speeches, slogans and Albanian flags. The provincial leadership in Kosovo denounced the demonstrators as "nationalistic, reactionary, and anticonstitutinal, designed to disorient the Albanian population."¹⁹ The idea of a republic was denounced

by the Central Committee of the League of Communists on Feb. 1969 because the demand was seen as "a demand for changing the state frontiers; which would not only threaten security of Yugoslavia and its territorial integrity, but would also imply danger of international complications in the Balkans."²⁰

After the 1968 riots, the Yugoslavs developed a more liberal policy towards the Albanians. The Albanians in Kosovo were allowed to use the Albanian literary language. Their self esteem and national consciousness were increased when they were granted permission to learn about their history and national heritage through Albanian history books. The Constitution was revised, granting greater autonomy to Kosovo and more direct links with the Federal authorities. Kosovo went from an "oblast" to "pokrajina." (From a region to a province.) Professors were brought over from Albania and Albanian literature was readily available. Enver Hoxha, in regards to the development of cultural relations with Yugoslavia, stated, "Our University and other Institutes of higher learning are prepared to help our Kosovar brothers with texts and grant scholarships to Kosovar youths to complete their studies. Kosovar teachers, and others, can be admitted for practice and specialization, or to exchange experience. We have the conviction that in this direction too, the fraternal peoples of Yugoslavia will understand and support us, for we are following the path of internationalism."²¹ One of the problems with the continued cultural as well as nationalistic exchange, especially with books, was that Albanian books portrayed Yugoslavian history and the national liberation struggle "insufficiently."²² This continued cultural and nationalistic exchange might have been one of the reasons for the outbreak of the riots in '81, because it nourished Albanian irredenta.

Increased cooperation between Belgrade and Tirana took place in the 1970's, especially after the Soviet Union's intervention in Czechoslovakia.

Not unlike their Yugoslav neighbors, the Albanians were worried about the mounting Soviet pressure in the Balkans; hence, the two Balkan states resolved, somewhat reluctantly at first, to revive the memory of their armies' joint struggles during the second World War, and undertook to coordinate their foreign policy in an effort to strengthen their internal security. In this joint effort, the predominantly Albanian-populated Province of Kosovo was raised to the status of international mediator: the dynamic leadership of the League of Communists of Kosovo was assigned the all-important role of bridging the gap that so often in the past had led to conflict.²³

In the mid 1970's the Yugoslav government, more specifically Edvard Kardelj, Yugoslavia's chief ideologue of the LCY, felt that the problem of the national question was basically solved. "In Yugoslavia we have in a large part resolved the national question in the classical sense of that concept."²⁴ Even a Kosovan Serb felt that "interethnic relations are stable as never before."²⁵ On the surface this might have seemed true, but the continued poor economic and social conditions in Kosovo did not satisfy the Albanians' needs. This was exemplified in the riots of 1981.

THE KOSOVO RIOTS 1981

The previous part of this paper has traced the historical development of Kosovo, as well as Yugoslav-Albanian relations up until 1980, in order to place the inherent conflicts among the Serbs and the Albanians, which is the main issue concerning the 1981 riots, in the proper context. On the surface it seemed as if conditions were improving for the Albanians, but it wasn't until riots broke out in Pristina in the Spring of 1981, that it was proved otherwise. These uprisings exemplified the dangers of closing ones eyes to a political situation. In 1979 a Kosovan leader Musa Limani warned, "the new generations in the underdeveloped regions, equipped now with a higher

education and greater sensitivity to social relation, will not accept to remain all their life in an inferior economic and social position."²⁶ Unfortunately the government did not take this warning seriously, a decision they would regret later.

"Troubles in Kosovo erupted not from the degree of autonomy, but from the failure (mistaken) policies pursued by the government in the past."²⁷ By analyzing the suggested causes of the riots, the slogans used, the political, social, and economic problems in Kosovo, one can see that the government's naivete and lack of interest in this area allowed a problem to evolve that probably could have been contained sooner.

As I have shown, one of the main problems in Kosovo is the fact that it is the center of national heritage for both the Albanians and the Serbs. For the Albanians, Kosovo is the "cradle of the Albanian national renaissance." Kosovo played the central role in the Albanian national struggle when the League of Prizren (1878) signaled the arrival of the Albanian nation to a level of political maturity, because before this time that had been practically unnoticed. For the Serbs, the epicenter of their medieval history, the Serbian patriarch, was located in Pec. The Battle of Kosovo (1389), is a major part of Serbian folklore. The issue of Kosovo itself is a very emotion laden issue. Reactions on both sides are emotional. The demonstrations occurred at a time of confusion, due to the weakening of the national leadership following Tito's death. The central authorities in part overreacted due to pressure by the Serbs.

The demonstrations, which began as students voiced some of their differences concerning conditions at the University, soon erupted into a political protest for a Kosovo-Republic. The students were upset due to too

many students and too little space, bad food, small allowances, undernourishment, bed sharing by shifts and more. The students felt that a refusal to meet their demands would be discrimination against the Albanians by the South Slavs. All of these frustrations were pent up as well as resentments concerning the economic backwardness of Kosovo. The students' demands gave the Albanian people in other parts of Kosovo the necessary excuse to voice their opinions. Students boycotted classes, trains were derailed, factory equipment and shop windows were destroyed, acts of arson and sabotage were present and in open street battles some rioters even used kindergartners as shields from the police. The demonstrators demanded improvement of economic conditions, release of political prisoners, freedom of press, and equal rights with other ethnic groups. The authorities were surprised by the extent of the violence the demonstrators used. The exact number of people who died is unknown. Some sources say only 11, when in reality more people believe the number is closer to 100.

One of the main questions concerning the riots was why the Yugoslav government overreacted, using tear gas and tanks to restore order as well as declaring a state of emergency and imposing a curfew. Was all of this really necessary? How could an innocent demonstration turn into a "bloody armed confrontation."²⁸ Did the government really understand the importance and the seriousness of the Kosovar demands? A Committee of the Federal Presidency and the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists in April 1981, asserted, "that Albanian nationalism has nothing in common with the demand of most in Kosovo. The problems are not linked to ethnic inequality, but to the laxness of the local government."²⁹ If this is how the government really viewed the problem then it is no wonder that they

reacted in the way they did. The local government it is true did not implement all the policies correctly, but it is unfair to say that nationalistic motives were not present at all. The Tirana press summed up the riots in the following way: "Belgrade's misinformation about Kosovo, the poverty, misery, and political repression of the Albanian people in Yugoslavia and the Serbian Tutelage of Kosovo equals the causes of the conflicts."³⁰ This was closer to reality than any of the previous statements made by the Yugoslav government. Yet at this point the Albanians in Albania were more impoverished and repressed than those in Kosovo. A fear developed, with the outburst of the riots, that the nationalist fever might spread to other parts of Yugoslavia, thus undermining the stability of the country as a whole. Some of the top party bodies in Kosovo described the event as counter-revolutionary and stated that

nothing need changing in the system, and the cause lay not in the socio-economic development of Kosovo, but in Nationalism, which had not yet been overcome, and which had been exploited from abroad. The situation had been allowed to deteriorate because of lack of vigilance, because of opportunism, and because of liberalism at home.

Yugoslavia was a factor of peace, stability and security in Europe, so that any attempt at destabilizing her had an international as well as domestic dimension and both Yugoslavia and Albania would suffer as a result.³¹

This quote is interesting, because the local government sees the problem as being one of nationalism, whereas the national government did not. In reality, I feel that in part nationalism stemmed from the economic and social problems in Kosovo. The demonstrations, were a reminder that a solution to the Albanian problem was urgent.

By analyzing some of the demonstrators' slogans one can see what some of their motives were. Most of the slogans were nationalistic in nature. Several such as "We are Albanians, not Yugoslavs" and "We are the children of

Skenderberg, the army of Enver Hoxha," are irredentist in nature.³² Others such as "Union with Albania," "Trepca does the work, Serbs profit," expressed the concerns of the Albanians.³³ The most controversial demand was the one for "Kosovo republic."³⁴ The Yugoslav government was most concerned with this demand, because they feared that if Kosovo was granted the status of a republic then it might secede from Yugoslavia. If it were to secede then this might create a domino effect upon the other minorities in Yugoslavia who would then want to secede to their prospective countries, for example, the Hungarians in Vojvodina. From the Albanian point of view, if the citizens of Kosovo were granted the status of a republic, then they would be able to realize their own decision-making potential and authority, which they presently didn't possess due to their attachment to Serbia.

Another slogan, one which called for an "ethnically pure Kosovo," can be termed a fascist theory based on the idea of an aryan race. According to Sinan Hasani, the Vice President of the Assembly of the Socialist Federativ Republic (SFR) of Yugoslavia, the demonstrators "wanted to turn the wheel of history a century back, that is to realize the dreams of the bourgeois and pro-fascist forces which cherished the dream of an ethnically pure Albania."³⁵ In order to be granted this wish, Kosovars would have to be granted the right of sovereignty, and no one would be able to stop them. Then the whole Constitution would have to be changed, but the process is long and difficult and Serbia would have to consent, which it probably never would. Also Macedonia and Montenegro might not agree either, because the Albanians in those areas would want to join the republic, resulting in a shifting of the borders. Slogans also depicted the animosity of the Albanians towards the Serbs. "The weaker Serbia-stronger Kosovo." Foreign reports even told of

intrusions by the Albanians into Serbs' homes, desecration of Serbian cemeteries, and the growing fear that the riots inflicted upon the Serbian population. This fear is still present today, and is one of the reasons for the Serbs' current emigration from Kosovo.

"The People today, and history in the future, will not forgive us our mistakes."³⁶ Another interesting aspect to analyze is the perspective of the Yugoslav government's view towards past and future policies concerning Kosovo. Sinan Hasani seems to feel that information should have been provided for the Albanian people concerning the true form of the Stalinist regime in Albania. He claims that if the people knew the truth about Albania then maybe they would not have wanted to join that side. "This great failure of ours to provide information about Albania has been dearly paid for."³⁷ National feelings probably would have been different if the people had known the nature of the Albanian regime, often described as totalitarian, with the basic rights of men threatened, and families even spying on each other. The government should have taken into consideration some of the present misunderstandings, and some of the mistakes could have been prevented. Today, they are beginning to see the flaws in past policies. The Yugoslav government claims that the demonstrators' measures were counter-revolutionary due to the nature of the slogans, and were aimed at disrupting the constitutional order and integrity of a country of "brotherhood and unity."³⁸ I do not think that the Albanians had this intentionally in mind when they began. When frustrations were pent up for so long all one needed was the smallest reason to let the fuse start burning. The government, by believing that these were the Albanians' only motives, was trying to cover up for their mistake of not realizing the extent of the problem sooner.

One of the dilemma's concerning the riots and the current situation in Kosovo is the government's role and reactions. They were put in a tough position to make on-the-spot decisions about something of which they had not realized the true significance. The government was faced with the problem of Yugoslavia's being made up of 8 separate republics and 8 separate economic entities. Tito once claimed that "one of the most complex areas in this country, where our policy and its principled nature in regard to the national question is put to test and proves itself is precisely in the Province of Kosovo. For, here for centuries all social contradiction,- social, economic, political, national and others, have been manifested in sharp form. Above all, the national composition of the population in this area is one of the most complex in this part of Europe."³⁹ It is no wonder that the government had a hard time with decision making in that area. "History explains the present and orients towards the future."⁴⁰ The government is now beginning to see the mistakes that they made concerning policy during the time of the riots. By analyzing the government's reaction to the events in Kosovo and the policies that followed, one can discover the weaknesses and the mistakes made.

The reaction of Yugoslav authorities trying to stop the demonstrations exemplifies the government's "weak link." They declared a state of emergency, closed the Kosovo borders, imposed a curfew, and banned gatherings in several communities, of more than 5 people. The Yugoslav regime attempted to downplay the riots, which led to a criticism of the entire LCY policy towards Kosovo up to that time. It was discovered that the Local Kosovar Party had not issued directives which it had been sent. There was a big problem of mismanagement and power in the hands of the few. In Kosovo 40% of the people employed are involved in bureaucracy. This is too

much for a region with such poor economic development. Within the government itself people are torn as to which solution to follow. "Yugoslavia is torn in a fierce tug of war between political leaders convinced of the necessity for market oriented reform, and political economic resisters unwilling to make the needed sacrifices in power, privilege and money."⁴¹ Belgrade began to put the blame on the local leadership for not implementing the policies that they were supposed to. The local party enacted a news blackout, which only made matters worse. People began to fear a return to the Rankovic era. On April 3rd martial law was declared. After introducing the martial law, Stane Dolanc (a Slovene member of the Yugoslav Party, and Federal Secretary for internal Affairs) commented, "that the Yugoslav state had no intention of giving republican status to Kosovo and thereby creating a second Albanian state. Citing the two Koreas and two Germanies as unhappy examples, he suggested that two Albanias would be a danger to the future stability of the Balkans."⁴² The crisis in Kosovo also strengthened the political positions of those who felt that the policy of liberalization had gone too far. Others felt that a move toward democratic centralism would be highly destabilizing. The authorities also tended to underestimate the movement for a republic, in some instances I think they failed to take the Albanians seriously. With no solution in sight the Albanians might push for secession. In May of 1981 the LCY Central Committee decided to no longer allow professors and textbooks to be brought over from Albania. This was a smart decision because it would therefore keep out any unwanted irredentist propaganda. The riots destroyed the idea of Kosovo as a bridge between Yugoslavia and Albania. Authorities were also surprised at the scale of the

riots. The government responded with stiff sentences on militants, and the purging of the local apparatus.

Since 1982 the Yugoslav regime has supported a policy of political differentiation in Kosovo in order to root out Albanian nationalism and purge and put under stricter control the local League of Communists. Unfortunately the students involved in the riots paid a higher price for their mistakes than their leaders. Party officials were only put in retirement, whereas many students were sent to jail. Sources differ as to the effect of the purges. One suggests that the purges did not effect more than the top leadership of the Kosovo party organization. By September of 1981, 365 of 4,000 members were purged in Pristina, and by June 1982, 1,200-1,500 of 92,000 members were purged in the province.⁴³ Whereas another source suggests that during 1981-1982 the purges affected all aspects of life, party and government officials, TV and radio journalists and professors. The purges also created a fall in industrial production due to the lessened number of people.

Another aspect of government policy that can be analyzed is whether or not their policy of repression was a better path than one of compromise would have been. The policy of repression (in terms of military security) was an acceptable solution for the short-run, but not for the long run. It tended to increase separatist tendencies among Albanians. When the government denies the Albanians certain rights equivalent to other ethnic groups then they are being alienated further. (But was the government denying them equal rights, I do not think so.) A policy of compromise might at this time seem to have been better, but one must also keep in mind the timing of the events. The riots occurred almost exactly one year after the death of Tito. "Tito was increasingly seen as an essential linchpin, holding back a tidal wave of

historic South slav nationalism that threatened to pull the country apart."⁴⁴ Maybe this could account for one of the reasons that riots of that intensity did not erupt sooner in Yugoslavia. The government was still getting used to a collective leadership. It is hard after someone had been ruling for 40 years, for a government to be able to jump right in and pick up where he left off. The Yugoslav authorities, at the time of the riots, probably wanted to contain the demonstrators as fast as possible and with any means possible in order not to affect the stability of the country. Unfortunately when decisions are made quickly it is not always easy to thoroughly think through all the long term effects. Maybe if the government hadn't overreacted as it did, and they had taken a moment to think things out more thoroughly, lives would not have been lost, and relations hindered.

According to one author the task facing the Yugoslav leadership in the Albanian areas is difficult. He feels that their policy on economic development will probably create more discontent and the policy on the rapid development of education will raise the people's expectations for job availability, but the Kosovo region is so underdeveloped that there are not many positions of employment available. And most Albanians in Kosovo are not fluent in Serbo-Croatian, the language of the majority in Yugoslavia, so they are unable to get jobs outside of Kosovo. After the 1981 riots, antagonisms increased between the Serbs and the Albanians. In a later section the result of these increased antagonisms, the emigration of Serbs from Kosovo, will be discussed.

By analyzing the Planned Platform for Action by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in developing socialist self-management, brotherhood, unity and fellowship in Kosovo, one can gain a much better idea

as to how the Yugoslav authorities perceived the problems caused by the riots, and the mistaken policies followed in the past. The platform was discussed at a session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, held on Nov. 17, 1981 in Belgrade, eight months after the outbreak of the riots in Kosovo. The platform discussed the mistakes made by the League of Communist in Kosovo, the weaknesses in the development of self management in Kosovo, the problem of nationalism, and the underdevelopment and poor economic situation in Kosovo. It also posed some solutions and called upon each individual in Kosovo to help suppress the continued rise in nationalistic and irredentist movements. The platform stated that the causes for the outbreaks are manyfold. First, the timing was important, for the riots occurred at a time of political instability as well as one of economic difficulty. Secondly, the nature of the Kosovo leadership was such that it provided a leeway for nationalism to develop. They did not realize the true nature of the Albanians' demands and slogans. Much disparity also existed between the Provincial Central committee, Serbian Central Committee and the Yugoslav Central Committee. The local government, frustrated by this, voiced their concerns to the people creating greater dissatisfaction amongst them. And finally the development of "bureaucratic-statist" relations rather than self-management. The platform also claimed that part of the responsibility should be put on the Central Committees of Serbia and Kosovo for not having seen what was going on in Kosovo and applying stronger policies in that area. The leaders in Kosovo during the riots could not hold up under the pressure and were unable to undertake political action when it was needed most. The platform claimed that measures were being taken following the riots to expose the goals of the

enemy to the public, and to train and activate self-management organs in Kosovo. Self-management was said to be the best way to increase communications between workers and the government, and with the slow development of this system in Kosovo, relations were not met. The leaders were not always aware of their responsibilities to their individual self-managing communities. The platform also expressed the need for implementation of a policy of economic stabilization which will be discussed in another section later.

Many lessons can be learned from the riots. The events showed the lack of communication between the Communists, the working people and the Youths. They also exemplified problems in the League of Communists, being in an unstable position which left the door wide open and susceptible to enemy infiltration. The platform suggested, "for everyone in Kosovo, for the Albanians, the Serbs, the Montenegrins, the Moslems, and the Turks, and primarily from the young people, it is a noble goal and permanent task to safeguard and develop the brotherhood and unity and equality that were made a reality by the national revolution and socialist development."⁴⁵ The policy of the leadership was also at fault for not coming completely to grips with nationalism. Finally the platform proposed that:

In a word, we have in common the manifold, striferidden and courageous life of our nations and nationalities. We especially share the past and present revolutionary struggle. Socialist self-management development and its gains belong to us all. This is the basis on which the consciousness and conscience of the young generations of all peoples, of all nationalities in Kosovo, must grow.⁴⁶

This is so true, both sides must begin to look at where they have come from, what they have endured and look towards long run policies that will allow a peaceful future.

To complete the analysis of the causes and effects of the Kosovo riots upon Kosovo, the Albanians, the Serbs and Yugoslavia as a whole, the discussion that will follow will cover the Albanian's reaction to Yugoslav authorities' policies, the problem of nationalism between the Serbs and Albanians, some of the social problems affected by the riots, economic problems, constitutional problems, and finally conclude with some proposed solutions.

The Albanians, especially Enver Hoxha, are caught between the desire to maintain or attempt to maintain good relations with Belgrade and their sympathy and allegiance to the ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia. In the end the Albanian government in Tirana had little choice but to publicly support the Kosovars or risk being accused of "betraying its brothers."⁴⁷ In November of 1981 Hoxha warned that if Belgrade continued its present policy, the opposition of the Albanians would continue to grow and become even more acute. Belgrade protested this, claiming that Tirana had interfered in Yugoslavia's internal affairs. The claims made by Hoxha were expressed in articles in the "Zeri i popullit." By international law, Albania has no right to interfere in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia has the "full legal right to defend its constitutional system using appropriate measures, this being guaranteed to Yugoslavia by international law as the inalienable right of every state."⁴⁸ Future relations between Albania and Belgrade will be determined by Belgrade's policy towards ethnic Albania, and the unraveling of ethnic conflict in Kosovo and Tirana's foreign policy in the post Hoxha era.

The Albanians in Kosovo have themselves reacted to the government's policies in several ways. Some citizens in Pristina refuse to pay taxes and

bills, which upsets the other Yugoslavs in the other republics because they have to make up the differences. The policies, which were set up to take measures against those who do not pay the bills, were not properly implemented. Thousands of Albanian families were not paying rent to the government housing authorities, and in the past four or five years, 9,000 cars never got registered.⁴⁹ Currently many Albanians are beginning to have their children in Belgrade hospitals so they can say that their children are Serbs, and that they have a right to be in Kosovo, and therefore should not be treated differently.⁵⁰

Roots of the national conflict in Yugoslavia lie largely in historical experience which have created bitterness and suspicion among closely related nationalities. Yet universal and basic issues form a thread throughout the complex problem of national relations.

The structural elements of Yugoslavia's national question can be defined as such: 1) Yugoslavia is a multinational state made up of 6 nationalities, most of the South Slavs, except the Albanians, and several other national minorities in Yugoslavia which are not of that same background. The country possesses no national language, but approximately 70% of the people speak Serbo-Croatian. 2) Most nationalities are not located in geographic areas. Each federal unit, with the exception of Slovenia, is multi-national in character. 3) Nationalities are internally separated by history, the ethnic map being overlaid with historic frontiers. 4) The late formation of the Yugoslav state after the development of national consciousness has caused the existence of conflicts between the Yugoslav state and loyalty to each individual nationality. "No political movement has been able to elaborate its program or count on any kind of popular support without taking the national question as its basis, i.e., the resolution of problems concerning the position of each nation in this area,

inter-national relations, and the character and destiny of the community to which they aspire."⁵¹

Two nationalistic interpretations of the Kosovo riots exist. The first interpretation views the riots as an omen to the beginning of the disintegration of the multinational federation, especially due to the Albanians' cry for a republic resulting in possible secession. Another interpretation says that Yugoslavia is another Northern Ireland. Irredentism would continue, but be containable. The latter seems probably closest to the truth. A potential "double irredentism" exists in Kosovo. On the one hand, the Albanians are longing for a union with Albania; on the other hand, the Serbs and the Montenegrins campaign for restoration of their dominance or they will emigrate en mass to respective republics. This is currently taking place and has been gradually for the past decade. Petar Stambolic, a member of the SFRY Presidency, said in 1981 that "an attempt has been made to break up brotherhood and unity, to create mistrust and provoke conflicts among nationalities in the Province."⁵² I do not think that the demonstrators purposely attempted to break up Yugoslavia's idea of brotherhood and unity, or to provoke conflicts among nationalities. In part those conflicts had begun years ago. He also claimed that the slogan of brotherhood and unity is one that Yugoslavia is using to form the foundation upon which Yugoslavia is building all social and other relations among the nations and nationalities of socialist Yugoslavia. In reality, the events in Kosovo proved this statement otherwise. Tito, during a speech in Pristina in 1974, stated "that in their entire further development, the efforts of the working people of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, the Socialist Republic of Serbia and our community as a whole have been directed toward removing the hard legacy of

the past and transcending deep contradictions. Thanks to this, many difficulties have been overcome and results have been attained in all spheres of social development in Kosovo."⁵³ It is rather ironic that Communists in Yugoslavia have been claiming for years in their propaganda that the nationality problem had been solved thanks to socialism and socialist self-management, when today they are faced with nationality problems more severe than ever before. Unfortunately not all of the differences were overcome, and the result was the riots. "The current insistence on dealing with the national question does not come only from an issue of the past, but rather it is part of the development linked to the overall development of the socialist revolution and socialism."⁵⁴ One of the crossroads in policy concerning the national questions evolved when the Communist party, at the 4th Congress(1934), decided to set up separate Communist parties for the Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, etc. At first one might think that this policy would only enhance divisions among nationalities, but in reality experience has proven that it has actually tied them together rather than separating them in their inseparable class and national struggle. Finally not only did the riots stimulate Albanian nationalism, but also Serbian nationalism. The Serbs began to rally together to combat the hostilities forced upon them by the Albanians. With the increasing population of the Albanians in Kosovo, the insecurity of the Serbs in that area also increased. Since 1968 the Serbs have been slowly emigrating out of the area. This poses problems because they have no where to go. A later section will discuss further the cries of these Serbs in Kosovo, as well as the treatment of the Albanians towards them and the effects that this emigration is having upon the country.

Kosovo, being the most underdeveloped area in Yugoslavia, contains many social problems, which may, in part have contributed to the spread of discontent among the Albanians, as well as the Serbs. Part of the Albanians problem is their isolation from the rest of Yugoslavia. Sometimes it has been said that the Albanians are a nationality that lives in Yugoslavia, but whose country of origin is Albania. Therefore they are raised to understand that their present community is not a permanent one, in other words not their real mother country. Maybe the Yugoslavs orient them in this way. In reality the Yugoslavs and the Albanians have historically lived together for long periods of time and together they fought against foreign invaders. They tend to feel and think of themselves as a separate nation with its own history and cultural heritage. By insisting on keeping the Albanian language and an ethnically pure cultural orientation, they have isolated themselves from jobs in other Serbo-Croatian speaking areas of Yugoslavia. Albanians are not required to learn Serbo-Croatian, therefore keeping them from leaving Kosovo and seeking jobs elsewhere where more prevalent.

Other factors that have limited Kosovo's progress are the high birth rate and the patriarchal family structure. In 1971 the Albanian birthrate was 29.3 per 1000. Between the period of 1961-1971 the number of Albanians in Yugoslavia increased by 43%.⁵⁵ The Albanians by number also rank third in the nation behind the Serbs and the Croats. In Kosovo Albanians make up 80% of the population. The concentration of Albanians in this area makes it harder for them to be treated like a minority, when in reality in Kosovo they are the majority. Almost as many Albanians live in Kosovo as in Albania. Of all the Albanians in the Balkans approximately 42% are in Yugoslavia. The population structure by nationality in Kosovo is as follows:

	1961	1971	1981
TOTAL	963,988	1,243,683	1,584,558
ALBANIANS	646,631	916,168	1,227,424
SERBS	227,016	228,264	209,792
MONTENEG.	37,558	31,555	26,875
TURKS	25,764	12,244	12,578
MOSLEMS	8,026	26,357	58,948
OTHER	18,963	29,105	48,945 ⁵⁶

One should note the great increase in the number of Albanians in Kosovo by 1981 as well as the decrease in the number of Serbs, due to emigration. The poverty and backwardness also accounts for much dissatisfaction. In 1939 90% of the population was illiterate, but by 1981 96% of the children in Kosovo were being educated.⁵⁷ Unemployment is 3x that of the Yugoslav average. Most Albanians lack good managerial skills, which might account for the adherent mismanagement present in many of the factories. The average family is also much larger, 6.9 members, amongst Albanians than Yugoslavs, 3.5 members. The young population, more than 1/2 are under 20 yrs old, puts a strain of the social services.

Problems also existed in the structure of the University. Seventy percent of the students were in the social sciences, unfortunately Kosovo was in need of more engineers. People who were out of high school and unable to get jobs were given credits, or scholarships and sent to the university, which led to a loss of criteria in the schools. It might have been these types of students, who were not as motivated as the others to study, who were to be taken over by organizers who tried to bring up students with the ideology of separatism and nationalism. "This type of student loitering about the facilities with various problems on their hands and not studying regularly became prominent in those organizations which pushed them to do the dirty work."⁵⁸ It is hard to know whether this statement is valid, but in part it might be. Hasani also felt that

some of the professors from Albania were "a trained team of people whose aim was to indoctrinate the students with nationalism and irredentism, being more agitators than teachers."⁵⁹ Hasani also felt that the Yugoslavs and the Albanians had struggled together in the people's liberation struggle, and if they had not fought together between the wars who knows what the fate of the Yugoslav land and the Yugoslav nation might have been. Some of his thoughts might seem a little melodramatic but I think that both nationalities should keep in mind the times that they fought together, rather than concentrating solely on the conflicts or differences between the nationalities.

During times of poor economic conditions and underdevelopment, it only takes a small spark to exhaust years of pent up frustrations. The Kosovo riots provided this spark for the Albanians. The economic backwardness, economic policy for Kosovo, mismanagement by leaders and managers, and the mismanagement of funds from the Development Fund provided the atmosphere for the demonstrations.

The conflicts are taking place in an area that is the least developed in Yugoslavia, a region where road traffic might be held up by a horse drawn cart and where men of Albanian ethnic descent proclaim their Moslem faith by wearing a white skullcap.⁶⁰

One thing must be taken into consideration when analyzing the economic situation in Kosovo. If one looks at the economic growth of Kosovo in terms of its own historical context, then Kosovo has done well, but if compared to the rest of the republics and provinces, Kosovo lags far behind. The main reasons for Kosovo's economic problems, lie in her past backwardness, neglect and misrule by the authorities, and inadequate investments.

Kosovo's economic development ran into problems from the beginning. Five centuries of Ottoman dominance in Kosovo could account for one of the

reasons for her underdevelopment. Two decades of rule by a royal Government cut off Southern Yugoslavia from economic technological progress. The region was not yet ready for the quick transformation from an agrarian society to an urban one. The growing disparity in wage differentials between the urban and rural sectors caused increasing conflicts among individuals. Post WWII development was difficult because the Cominform blockade reduced the amount of available resources, not allowing a sufficient amount for the development of Kosovo. Over 80% of the people at this time, lived from subsistence farming. Kosovo also had an unsuitable economic structure. Kosovo at one time adhered to a policy of the production of raw materials. Unfortunately this led to a dependence of the rest of the republics for finished goods. The result was a neglect of agriculture, a switch to capital intensive policy. This switch to the processing industry caused more problems than solutions. The industry could not keep up with the rapid population growth. Then, on top of that, fewer young people are staying on the farms. Approximately 10% of those between the ages of 15-34 are leaving agriculture for the cities for recreation, schooling, industry, higher wages, and a higher standard of living. Unfortunately the cities cannot hold all of these people either. Diversities in living standards that exist between Kosovo and other areas in Yugoslavia could turn any economic issue into a political one. Twenty five percent of the people age 50 and above are still in agriculture. The problem here lies in productivity. The older a person gets the less productive he may become. Ninety percent of the land in private property has a ceiling acreage of 10 hectares or 20 acres meaning that the farms can not be expanded or enlarged. Also the small size of the farms makes it harder for mechanization to be utilized for faster and more productive farming.

Shortages in food items were a result of low grain yields. Unfortunately this was during a time when the demand for such items was increased due to increased population growth. As a result, food had to be imported, but in order to do that foreign currency was needed which meant the use of valuable capital. The peasant has begun to mistrust the government. Some farmers are beginning to rent their land to the younger people. The workers that go abroad to work, Garstarbeiters, were returning home rather than going abroad. This has been an added source of income for Yugoslavs. Now that some of them are being forced to come home, more economic cooperation with Western Europe, especially in lowering the tariff barriers to Yugoslav goods, could help eliminate some economic problems.

Another problem exists with economic policy. The policies made by the Yugoslav government, which are technically based on benefiting the nation as whole, have in reality added to the problem. The responsibility for the lack of development in Kosovo is due to the Federal government policy. They failed to give Kosovo money from the investment fund until 1957 and then when they did, it was in credits that had to be paid back. This gave Kosovo a bigger economic burden and made it harder for accumulation of capital. After WWII a central investment fund was set up to aid the underdeveloped regions of Yugoslavia. Each republic contributed. This caused some resentments and still does to this day, among the more developed areas, because their profits are going to aid the underdeveloped regions, who tend not to allocate the funds wisely. The reform of 1965 abolished the central investment fund and replaced it with a Federal Fund for the Accelerated Development of Underdeveloped Regions. A portion (1.85%) of each republic's gross social product was used for redistribution to the less

developed regions. Forty Percent of the fund went to Kosovo, which accounted for 70% of the province's investment capital. The problem with Kosovo is that the money from the fund is their basic source of capital whereas in other republics it is used as supplementary credits. The allocation of dollars in the federal fund were as follows:

	1966-1970	1971-75	1976-80
TOTAL(dinars)	8.9 million	24.5 million	76.9 million
KOSOVO	30.0 %	33.0 %	37.0 %
BOS. HERCEGOVINA		30.7 %	32.4 % 30.6 %
MONTENEGRO	13.1 %	11.4 %	10.8 %
MACEDONIA	26.2 %	22.9 %	21.6 ⁶¹

In 1981 The LCY Leadership reaffirmed the government policy of putting dollars into Kosovo, hoping that this would help turn the corner in development. This is what had been done in the past, and thus far it has not really helped. The money gets put in the wrong hands, resulting in mismanagement. The policies were also poorly implemented. Just last fall (1986) Kosovo declared bankruptcy as well as Montenegro. Evidently more money did not help the existing problems. The principle of distributing the funds has not brought very good results. Each republic tends to build to its own capacity and resists inter-republic projects.

Several other problems make the economic situation in Kosovo worse. A drop in the exchange rate of the dinar lessens the amount of foreign currency that the area is able to get. The equipment that was borrowed from the West with western credit is outdated and depreciating quickly. The per capita income of the Albanians is below 1/3 of the average for the country. Inflation in Yugoslavia is currently around 100% and rising. Unemployment rate in Kosovo is huge. Too many students graduate with liberal arts degrees and not engineering or science degrees. The federal government has made

attempts to instigate projects for work, but they have failed. Approximately 32 applicants applied per job in 1982 in Kosovo.⁶² Another major economic, as well as social problem is the great increase in the population. Usually population growth can be an asset to a country, but in Kosovo that is not the case, due to the disproportion between economic and population growth. When one increases the population, problems increase as well in terms of housing availability, food, etc.

Kosovo possesses abundant energy resources, an abundant supply of organic and inorganic raw materials, fertile land, and great potential in human resources, but they are not used properly.

One policy that the government has been trying to enforce, is that of economic stabilization. After Tito's death, the collective leadership felt that the best way to combat national heterogeneity and differences in economic interest was to follow a policy of economic stabilization. In September 1981 an article in *Kommunist* suggests that the struggle for economic stabilization is as significant as the struggle against political enemies. The problem lies in the fact that the non developed regions must depend on the richer more developed areas, who have their own problems, priorities, and prejudices. If the leadership does not take this into consideration then these problems could lead to more destabilization rather than stabilization.

In the five year period between 1976 and 1981 part of Kosovo's investments were allocated to large facilities for power and metals despite an insufficient number of personnel and projects, which resulted in the inefficiency of the factories as well as an overall fall in the performance of investments in Kosovo. The self management system of linking organizations of associated labor in Kosovo and throughout all of Yugoslavia, is a major

factor in integrating the economy of Kosovo with the economy of Serbia and Yugoslavia, unfortunately this was developing slowly in Kosovo. This also proved to be another weakness in the government system because economic integration is so dependant upon this.

"If the other regions in Yugoslavia walk, the Kosovo must run."⁶³ This quote best describes the economic lag in development that Kosovo has over the other regions of Yugoslavia. Unfortunately the problem lies in the fact that Kosovo is neither walking nor running, causing the gap to widen rather than become more narrow.

Several solutions are available that might help dig Kosovo out of its grave. According to the Yugoslav League of Communists "the only remedy lies in enormous efforts on the part of all the working people and improved work habits, discipline and responsibility. It must be clear to every working person and citizen that their personal incomes, the growth of their standard of living, and progress in the environments in which they live all result from their own efforts."⁶⁴ They also suggested that another solution would be to make investments in industry, but this has not proven to be successful, due to the mismanagement of personnel and funds. The Albanians have also begun to set up factories in predominantly Serbian areas in order to increase the number of Albanians in that area, due to the requirement of knowledge of Albanian language for employees. One solution, possibly the best of all, would be to have other republics sponsor projects in Kosovo. Again the problem lies in the fact that the richer republics resent supporting Kosovo and its "special status." The poorer republics resent the fact that Kosovo is given "special status." Another solution might be to let the Kosovars manage their own economy rather than being under the vestiges of Serbia. Then they could

make their own mistakes and find their own solutions. Another solution poses the expansion of the university. Students could be taught about self management, norms, values, management skills. The problem with this solution is the low standard of living, and the low quality of instruction. Another solution would be to increase the number of administrators to better manage the workers, but this would probably only aggravate the problem further. Also increasing the number of elites and bureaucracy is not wise, because then the self-managing idea of the workers governing the workplace is invalid. The other problem in Yugoslavia is the fact that each republic has its own economic system. One train, for example, has to change locomotives eight times, because each railroad in each republic is run by a different organization. To date, the best solution seems to be to put all nationalistic differences aside and set up a general Yugoslav market following the laws of economy. This would eliminate some of the local and domestic bureaucracies.

The socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, created through the common struggle of the nations and nationalities in the People's Liberation War and Socialist Revolution of Yugoslavia and on the basis of free will of the population-the nations and nationalities of Kosovo-and free will of the people of Serbia, has joined the Socialist Republic of Serbia within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia...In realization of common interests, the working people, the nations and nationalities of Kosovo, make decisions in the federation on the principles of mutual agreements between the republics and autonomous provinces in the organs of the Federation, in conformity with the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Constitution of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, and on the principle of the responsibility of the republics and provinces for their own development and that of the Yugoslav socialist community as a whole.⁶⁵

This quote, from the introduction of the Constitution of SAP Kosovo, describes the supposed relationship between the province and her republic, unfortunately as exemplified in the slogans of the demonstrators, the

Albanians in Kosovo are not satisfied with this relationship. The constitutionality problem is a source of friction and an explosive issue for Yugoslavia. Yugoslavian government lacks the willingness, energy and enthusiasm to attempt a new approach. Soon the insistence and demand for a "Kosovo republic" might force the Yugoslav rulers to make a choice. Two tendencies exist to help solve this problem. First, one could increase the rights of the provinces in order to bring them as close as possible to the status of a republic, without actually being one. Second, one could maintain the principle of state and territory within the Socialist Republic of Serbia. This would probably satisfy Serbia's need for sovereignty, but the Albanians would still be in a constitutionally inferior position. The relationship between the nation and each nationality, or national minority, and between the republic and the autonomous provinces are important to the Yugoslav constitutional system.

In 1946 a Yugoslav constitution set up Yugoslavia as a multi-ethnic federation of 6 republics and 2 regions. Then after the riots of 1968, in 1969 the Constitution granted Kosovo a supreme court and the right of displaying the flag, recognizing the position of a province. . In 1971 the power of veto was granted to Kosovo. This was a major step, because it meant that they could control the outcome of certain laws. This also greatly increased the hostilities among the Kosovar Albanians and the Serbs, because now the Albanians had the power to veto the Serbs' laws. Finally in the 1974, most recent Constitution, the provincial rights, duties etc, were determined. The government hoped that self management would play a role in integrating the nations and nationalities. Unfortunately, as previously discussed, the development of self-management in Kosovo was slow. With the constitutional

reforms of 1971 and 1974, Kosovo began losing its Serbian character. The Albanian minority was no longer a Serbian problem, but also a Macedonian and Montenegrin one. During the economic crisis policies which attempted to aid and fund industries made matters worse. Kosovo has a problem of double dependency, to the Federation, and to the Serbian Republic. The same is true in regards to the Republic of Serbia which must look toward the federation and the provinces. The reform of 1974 recognized the right of Kosovo to exist as an original political entity. The changes that took place in the Constitution of 1974, drew lines of distinction between Albanian and the other national minorities. The political emancipation from 1968-1981 created new strategies for the party officials and professors, but they failed to satisfy the desires for the Albanian republic. "The Yugoslav constitutions (1968-71-74) giving the provinces the same rights as republics have failed to meet the demand for greater autonomy as expressed by the Kosovar Albanian population."⁶⁶ The demand for an Albanian republic in Kosovo has acquired symbolic power. "What is at stake is not only a completion of a process started by the defeat of unitarianism in 1966, but also the whole image of the Yugoslav state, and the revolution that brought it into being."⁶⁷ There are many problems with the Albanians' demand to amend the Constitution and become a republic. First of all the Serbs fear that the Albanians would succeed from the Yugoslav Federation. Whether in reality, they would or not is debatable. To amend the constitution is an elaborate process. A certain number of delegates in the Federal chamber must agree just to get it on the agenda. Then all republics must unanimously vote. If it is not put on the agenda within a year, then the proposed amendment is postponed for a year. If the second time it is again not unanimously approved, then it is rejected

forever. Serbia would never agree. Could anything have been done to integrate Kosovo into Yugoslavia while protecting the Albanian rights? Why didn't the government create a republic in 1946 when they wrote the first Constitution. Maybe then the Albanians might have felt more a part of Yugoslavia from the beginning. On the other hand the risk of their seceding was still present, but that is a risk that might have paid off later.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

One can look back over the social political and economic problems in Kosovo brought forth during the riots of 1981 and ponder various solutions. In the section to follow some of those solutions will be discussed. Some are valid and worth thinking about and others, due to the current conditions, just not feasible. At this point in time the government has placed itself between a rock and a hard spot. The problem must be looked at thoroughly from both sides. A solution is going to take discussion, consultation, compromise and conciliation. As discussed at the beginning, the Serbian Albanian problem must be viewed from an historical perspective. Keeping in mind that two truths cannot exist. One must look at the situation from both sides and figure that each side has some truth to it. A happy median must somehow exist. Unfortunately, each side is "quick to take offensive and slow to forget grievances, while sympathy they expect to arouse in others over their problem is not always reciprocated by a willingness to understand the point of view different from their own."⁶⁸ After the 1968 riots, more discussion should have taken place. A more careful analysis should have been undertaken to discover the roots of the problem. Today one of the only solutions seems to be peaceful dialogue. The public must be informed of the origins of the riots, as well as the needs of the Kosovar Albanian people and the feelings of the

Serbs. As an editorial in the *Economist* (Oct. 3 1981) suggested, "a concession to Kosovo now could save Yugoslavia a bigger explosion later." Unfortunately a great concession has not been made and the current problem has switched from being a demand for national rights by Kosovar Albanians, to a demand by the Serbs for better representation and treatment. This mistreatment is causing them to migrate from Kosovo en masse. The solution needs to be international not just bilateral. The other republics should also voice a greater concern over the Kosovo problem because now it is not only a Serbian problem but a problem that affects all of Yugoslavia and her stability as nation. Both sides must step back and look how far they have come together. If both sides, during WWII were able to fight together to combat a common enemy, why don't they do the same now? Maybe the current youth in Kosovo will begin to realize that there are more opportunities available beyond the borders of Kosovo. They should begin to demand a larger Yugoslav education. More emphasis needs to be put on the education of engineers and technicians. Kosovo is the bridge between Yugoslavia and Albania. This region should be used as a means to bring together both countries.

SERBIAN EMIGRATION FROM KOSOVO

Now that the causes and effects of the demands by the Albanians in Kosovo have been analyzed, it is necessary to analyze the situation that has been taking place with the Serbs these past few years, especially in 1986.

"The emigration from Kosovo is a tragic problem of this country."⁶⁹ Ever since the riots of 1981, the Serbs have felt increasingly uneasy in their homeland as the Albanians dominate the Kosovo region. For years the Serbs have been slowly emigrating from Kosovo, but these past two years the numbers have increased greatly. For example, from 1968-71 15,000 Serbs and

Montenegrins left, then within the next 10 years (1971-1981) 30,000 are said to have left.⁷⁰ After the 1966-68 events in Kosovo, the self confidence of the Kosovar Albanians increased, making the Serbs even more unsure of their own situation. As the Serbs move out, the Albanian nationalists are beginning to realize their goal of an "ethnically pure Kosovo." Then in 1983 the Serbs in Belgrade, who had at one time lived in Kosovo, called for more rigorous measures against the Kosovar Albanians. "These Serbs struggled under terribly difficult circumstances for the autonomy and the equality of the Albanian people."⁷¹ Now these Serbs are beginning to feel rejected from those that they had ultimately helped. By analyzing the cries of the Serbs, the en masse migrations of Serbs to Belgrade to voice their wishes, and the government reactions, one can see the urgency and importance of the issue.

The best way to give an accurate account of the events of the past year, is to chronologically discuss them. One can then gain a better view as to how a problem can escalate if covert actions are not taken, causing people to lose patience and faith in their country's government.

On February 26, 1986, 167 people from 42 villages in Kosovo went to Belgrade to discuss their concerns about the situation in Kosovo with the Federal Government. The reason the Serb and Montenegrins went to Belgrade in the first place was because their pleas were not effective in Kosovo. At this meeting various representatives from Kosovo voiced their concerns and reasons for coming. The people were getting restless in Kosovo. They claimed that it had been five years and the problems of emigration still had not been solved. They came to find their rights as citizens of Kosovo. They did not come to argue against the Albanians, but to argue against their own inequality. The government keeps offering promises, but takes no action. The

villagers claimed that they are living under depression and fear, and are looking for help and hope. They spoke of the violence that they are subjected to by the Albanians, the burning down of houses, raping of children, and the taking of jobs. The local government does not offer any help. They also claimed that this is not only a problem of the Serbians, or a Kosovan problem, but a Yugoslavian problem. "We came with the basic wish that you will allow us to live, work and to be able to stay and live normally in Kosovo."⁷² "I am not against the Kosovar Albanians or anyone. But I just want to say that it cannot be equality, when he has 10-15 children, and I have only two. He found jobs for 10 of them, I cannot even find one."⁷³ They are not against the Albanians, but against the irredentists who are making the Serbs lives miserable, at work, on the roads and in trains. The governments felt that a bridge of faith should be built, between the government and Serbia, because if that bridge is knocked down then no solutions are possible. According to Zdravko Čirić, Vice President of the Skupština (Assembly), "Every citizen in Yugoslavia, who is a decent man, must understand the depth of the idea of Joseph Broz Tito, that brotherhood and unity does not have any substitute, not for any of us."⁷⁴ Ilijaz Kurtesi, President of the Skupstina, claims that it will not be easy but that everyone must fight against the irredentists and against nationalism. Unfortunately all the government did at this time was offer hope that the problems would be effectively solved or worked out.

One of the problems that the emigration of the Serbs and the Kosovo riots seem to have in common is the government's lack of constructive action. They keep making promises, and cries that the brotherhood and unity of Yugoslavia must be upheld, but how? They do not seem to be providing valuable assistance. One of the problems seems to lie in the jurisdiction of

the Constitution. The Federal government will only go as far as their Constitutional responsibilities will allow them to. Unfortunately each organ of the government, be it local or federal, can only go so far, and none of them far enough. After each trip by the Serbs to Belgrade, more discussions took place, each organ of the government had their private meetings, but no solutions were found. Veljko Markovic, a member of the leadership of Serbia, claims that conditions have improved since the Spring 1981, but according to the Serbs that is not true. He does admit that concrete solutions to the problem have not been found. He realizes that the people have lost faith in their local and national government and to gain that faith back decisive measures will have to be taken. All the politicians seem to stress the importance of the issue and the concept that it is a Yugoslavian problem, but each organ will only go so far. Everyone needs to gather together and jointly find some solutions. Ivan Stambolic, President CK SK Srbija, in an interview with a journalist from Politika, claims that the problem lies in the leader of the Kosovo party. "Life together is the only possibility. The Serbs and Montenegrins must stay in Kosovo and fight together for the progressive and honorable communists and from them it will depend on whether the irredents will make their aims possible. Our fight and slogan will answer the best by extending a hand even further to Kosovo and Yugoslavia because it is ours and we must defend her at any price. Everything that happens in Kosovo is in the hands of Albanian and Serbian nationalists. Because of that, the assignment of all Communists is to strengthen the fight against all nationalists. In the last five years the Communist Party has been in its hardest fight, that of liquidating the irredents. The main assignment now is

to get rid of the remainder of the Albanian irredents, whom are not easy to recognize. We must be consistent, and determined."75

In March of 1986 some Serbs and Montenegrins began to become desperate with their situation. They began signing a petition, voicing their concerns and stressing their willingness to leave Kosovo. Approximately 60,000 people signed the petition. Serbs, especially in the village of Batuse were upset that a number of Albanians had settled in their predominantly Serbian village. They built houses next to the road, therefore blocking the safe passage of Serbs. Sometimes the villagers are afraid to leave their houses for the Albanians might be waiting like hunters. In that small town there have been 6 attempted rapes and one rape of an eight year old girl. Boza Markovic, one of the people who represented his village in Belgrade in February, said that he went to Belgrade to find the rights that they were not getting from the Provincial government in Kosovo. One of the Albanians who came to the village erected an Albanian flag outside his house, meaning that he had come and won against the Serbs. The Albanians bought the land from the Serbs who were pressured to sell. There is much controversy over where the Kosovar Albanians get the money to buy the houses. One Serbian villager who had 8 children had his house torn down so a factory could be built. He was given new housing, except it had only two bedrooms and a leaky roof, and no floor. He claimed that all the irredentists Albanian and Serbian have two or three houses and he cannot even get one. The Serbs in March were trying to stick together, to create a "global serbian village" from all the Serbian and Montenegrin villages in Kosovo. "If we are already going to go onto a reservation, then we will live like Indians and not let the cowboys in."76 This analogy describes the situation fairly well, if the Serbs and

Montenegrins unite, then the Albanians cannot affect them. A similar pressure is applied against the Turks in Kosovo.

As with the riots of 1981, once people are already frustrated it only takes a small spark to ignite a massive response. This is exactly what happened when Kosta Bulatovic, a Serbian agronomic engineer from Kosovo Polje, was arrested because of a general suspicion of enemy activities and passing out of nationalistic propaganda. People felt that the arrest of Bulatovic was the arrest of all of them. Approximately 7,000 people immediately gathered in front of the cultural center and demanded the release of Bulatovic. The people began to use his arrest as an excuse for expressing their dissatisfaction with the whole situation in the province. The people demanded to talk with officials from Belgrade, but they were not granted this privilege until the next day. The government at this point made the mistake of not talking with the people right away. They held meetings in private and did not let them know what was happening. The government was not ready for a gathering that large. When the crowds got restless, the government felt more pressure and did not react in an effective manner. All the Serbs wanted was to live peacefully in Kosovo. The Serbs began to cry out for a massive trip to Belgrade, and they began to sing the song "Hey Sloveni," the national song of Yugoslavia. This was rather ironic because the Albanians have protested this song due to its referral to the South Slavs, and they do not consider themselves to be of that origin. Finally Bulatovic was released and begged the people not to go to Belgrade, but it was already too late, and the next day 20,000 Serbs and Montenegrins gathered in the Sava Center in Belgrade. They discussed for 6 hours their grievances with the government. The government relayed the same message, that the people had heard for the last five years:

they must believe in each other, and work together to solve the problems, for the brotherhood and unity of Yugoslavia!

The Serbs were leaving for many reasons. They were leaving due to their economic conditions in Kosovo, as well as the problem of employment. It is much harder for the Serbs to get jobs in Kosovo, because they do not know Albanian. As Serbs, they no longer felt at home or safe in Kosovo, an area dominated by a people of a different religion and heritage. Some of their children had been beaten up. There were problems in school, concerning division and separation of school benches.

The following are quotes from the Serbs and Montenegrins who went to Belgrade, expressing the personal hardships and reasons for their trip:

Our general problem lies in the fact that as Communists we remove ourselves from each other, and we tend to recognize each other by national belonging.

Albanians won't ever be under larger pressure from irredentists as now, those who are against them, should fight.

The problem lies in the nature of politics. I beg to secure a normal life for all in Kosovo Polje and Kosovo.⁷⁸

Our aims are not to upset or disturb the state, but we only want our complaints heard and to secure for us a quiet and free life. We know that nothing can be changed over night and we are not waiting for everything to be solved at once, that is impossible, but we certainly hope that things will positively change and improve. We especially hope that now the provincial leadership can take charge and clearly say to the irredentists- if you touch anyone whomever it may be one more time, then this or that will happen to you.⁷⁹

The government has returned to us our hope. If everyone does what they are supposed to, things will not stay that are not liked. And surely everyone in Yugoslavia is for that.⁸⁰

Two and one half years ago my daughter was raped. Two years later, there is still no answer from the judge. My daughter because of the incident was left blind and had to leave school. I have already been to Belgrade four times. I

feel that if things do not get better this time, I do not know what I will do.⁸¹

In all of the talks the people felt that the Communist Party, Socialist Savez and all other social powers should take the problem into their own hands and not pass it on to others.

The more Serbs who leave, the more the Albanians begin to realize their goals of an ethnically pure Kosovo. To give one an idea of the numbers at issue:

Year	#families which left	#members
1982	817	2,360
1983	451	1,444
1984	267	854
1985	312	992 ⁸²

These statistics are according to the Skupstina of Kosovo. But according to the evidence of the general commission, in 1982 6,746 people left, 1983:4,341; 1984: 5583; 1985: 3,480; for the four years a total of 18,150 Serbs and Montenegrins left Kosovo. The numbers get smaller at times, because the more people that leave, then the less there are left to leave the next year. The number of Serbs and Montenegrins living in Pristina alone, has dropped 14% since 1981. The situation is crucial to the stability of Kosovo as well as all of Yugoslavia.⁸³

An editorial in June, 1986 said that the big migration of the Serbs to Belgrade in a specific way actualized the problems in Kosovo. The whole town of Batuse threatened to leave, except for the four houses of Albanians. The Serbs and Montenegrins are only looking for peace, a safe life, equality with others in Yugoslavia, but no special privileges. The politicians must give up their careers and ambitions and solve the problems of the people. One of the solutions to the problem could be to have factories in other republics use a

certain percentage of workers from Kosovo. One Serb from Kosovo claims that petitions, verbal appeals, and "open letters," will not solve the problems in Kosovo. People should just live together under the same roof. Another suggestion would be to have the Albanians learn Serbo-Croatian and the Serbs to begin to learn Albanian so that communication would be easier between them.

"The aim is to coordinate the action of the state and social political organs and organizations in republics and autonomous provinces and Federation."⁸⁴ The government is trying for quicker and more effective implementation of laws in all areas of society, and political and economic stability which will allow for more security of all the townspeople in Kosovo. "A pressure is being attempted on the organs, which five years ago and which now are concerned in the fight against counter-revolutionary elements of the Albanian nationalists and irredents," says Daut Jusrica President OKSSRN.⁸⁵ Veljko Odalovic, Sekretar of general organization CK Kosovo Polje, claimed, "We were short sighted when we thought we could sit in an office and solve problems."⁸⁶ He felt that if someone had just talked to the people gathered in front of the cultural center the first morning the Serbs might not have gone to Belgrade and the problem would not have escalated so quickly.

The Kosovar Serbs and Montenegrins were still not satisfied and Kosovar Albanian-Serb relations continued to decline. Over the three months in the summer of 1986, various events were reported: 21 felonies, (6 of those being rapes, Kosovar Albanians raping Serbian women and children), 137 postings of enemy slogans, 15 fires and explosions, 12 sabotages, 10 stonings, 5 desecrations of tombstones and graves, and 19 attacks in opposition to the government organs.⁸⁷ This list could continue, but this gives one an idea as

to the continued frustration the Serbs and Montenegrins are facing. One owner of a private shop, Kasum Rahmani, sums up the situation well, claiming that his business is not booming because Serbs are his friends and his native language is Serbo-Croatian. It is clear to him now that the Albanians are the only ones who have any chance of being able to stay in Kosovo. In July in the village of Bresje, near Kosovo Polja, a protest was started after a 20 year old Serbian nurse was raped. Upon hearing of this attack the villagers gathered in the center of town hoping to talk with the local leaders. The leaders felt that they had several options, 1) to hold a meeting in private 2) to talk with the people outside, or 3) to delay a meeting. Finally they decided to tell the villagers that a meeting would not be held because the conditions just were not present for one. The only thing the leaders did do was to talk with the girl's family.

Thus far, the Serbian and Montenegrin villagers in Kosovo had traveled to Belgrade two times to voice their concerns about the situation in Kosovo. In February of 1986 they claimed that either they would live together in Kosovo or move from Kosovo all at once. In April they claimed that freedom and equality did not exist in Kosovo and that they must all emigrate together. They tried to make this mass emigration a reality in June, but they were stopped in Kosovo Polje. Finally in November the Serbs again travelled to Belgrade, still voicing their continued concerns and hoping to be able to live peacefully in Kosovo.

Why did the Serbs go to Belgrade for the third time? This time their motives were inspired by two attempted rapes, one of a 20-year-old girl and one of an eleven-year-old, and the fact that over the summer 6 rapes were attempted. "The rapes are not due to sexual motives, but from nationalistic

hatred."⁸⁸ They claimed that if Yugoslavia was not going to protect them, then they would protect themselves. "If you cannot help us, then you are carrying the guilt for our actions, and don't be surprised when you hear that we are killing ourselves."⁸⁹ They demanded an immediate change in the 1974 Constitution. They emphasized the failure of the local leaders to deal with the problem under pressure. People must be brave at this time because if they are not, then the price they pay will be high.

For the first time the villagers stressed that it was to be their last time in Belgrade. Let's hope so. One can only hope that the local and national government will analyze the situation carefully and will evaluate past policies critically to help come up with some effective action. This issue can no longer stand dormant. The citizens of Kosovo have just about run out of patience, and as one can see by the past events, the results could be tragic.

CONCLUSION

By reviewing the historical development of Kosovo, the relations between the Albanians and the Serbs, and the results that massive dissatisfaction with relations and conditions can have upon people, one can get a feel for how complex the whole Albanian Crisis really is. I do not, in the least bit, empathize with the Yugoslav government. They are facing a hard task, but they must take action. Human nature might make some people react in a non productive manner during times of crisis, but one must learn from past mistakes. All the various nationalities and national minorities struggled for many years, side by side to make Yugoslavia a place of "brotherhood and unity." Why can't they remember that? Everyone should work together in order to extinguish the fuse which has already been lit, before the situation in Yugoslavia, the Balkans and even Eastern Europe, is destabilized any further.

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